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Abstract  
This thesis analyses the idea of central bank independence, how it shaped the creation 
of the European Central Bank (ECB) and its management of the Euro Crisis. Based on 
a genealogical analysis, the thesis identifies the central normative commitments 
undergirding the insulation of monetary policy from ordinary democratic politics. It 
argues that central bank independence is an institutional response to the ‘problem of 
politics’ in relation to money: the problem that money is simultaneously founded on 
political authority and fundamentally threatened by the ordinary exercise of this 
authority. Central bank independence, then, constitutes a way of grounding the value 
of money politically while at the same time depoliticising its government. The form 
that central bank independence takes in practice, however, differs substantially, 
reflecting different ways of wedding the idea to broader constitutional imaginaries. 
Drawing comparisons to other major central banks, the thesis details the ECB’s form 
of independence and argues that the creation of the ECB not as a government agency 
(as the Fed) or a societal power on a par with the government (as the Bundesbank), but 
as a sovereign representative on a par with the Member States altered the 
constitutional make-up of the Eurozone. As the existential crisis of the euro shows, 
general tensions within central bank independence become irresolvable contradictions 
in this constitutional construct. Without institutional mechanisms for resolving them 
through ordinary politics, the emergency politics of the Euro Crisis placed the ECB 
centre-stage, engaged in the ‘higher lawmaking’ of changing the Eurozone’s 
constitution in order to save it. In doing so, however, the ECB redefined the meaning 
of its independence and reignited ‘the problem of politics’ by undermining its 
underlying social contract. 
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Introduction 
 
 
What justifies the central bank’s ability to say ‘no’ to a democratically elected 
government? What gives it the authority to do so?  
These are questions that go to the heart of the contemporary notion of central 
bank independence, a political idea that has been extraordinarily influential since the 
so-called ‘neoliberal revolution’ of the late 1970s. In the European Union, the idea was 
taken to its extreme, but in many ways logical, conclusion by constituting an 
independent central bank, the European Central Bank (ECB), outside the framework 
of a state. This thesis presents an analysis of the problem that this idea responded to; 
how it emerged in practice and theory; what its conceptual underpinnings and 
normative justifications are; how it was institutionalised in the Eurozone; and, finally, 
what problems its institutionalisation in the Eurozone have given rise to. Above all, 
however, this thesis is about the foundations of the independent central bank’s 
authority: what gives it the right and the power to act against democratic governments? 
The thesis approaches central bank independence as a political idea, a way of 
thinking about politics (Freeden 2013), that is realised through the institutional form of 
the central bank and its governmental practices. It expresses a set of normative 
commitments and conceptions about the relationship between politics and the activity 
of governing, on the one hand, and the economy and the monetary order, on the other. 
As a particular strand of political thinking, it has distinct ideological overtones, but it 
is neither a full-blown ideology in its own right nor reducible to a component part of 
any one ideology. It is as such that I approach and analyse it. The thesis does not 
develop ‘a theory of central bank independence,’ but analyses the discursive and 
institutional practices that have, over time, established central bank independence as a 
theory of politics and political economy. 
 Independent central banks are public institutions and are inscribed within a 
general framework for the exercise of public powers. Within this framework, however, 
they occupy a peculiar position. Detached from ordinary politics, their governmental 
practices are not directly controlled by elected representatives in governments or 
parliaments. The nature of their distance from the ordinary political process, however, 
differs from central bank to central bank depending on the (constitutional) form and 
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political culture of their respective political communities. This means that even though 
the idea of central bank independence takes on a relatively uniform expression, its 
manifestation in institutional form differs markedly. This difference, I argue, concerns 
the source of their power and authority. 
The question of the central bank’s foundation of authority demands not only 
an analysis of the idea, but also an analysis how central bank independence is created 
through law and political practice. The thesis thereby combines a genealogical analysis 
of public and theoretical discourses on central bank independence with a 
reconstructive analysis of its legal forms. In both respects, the thesis works through 
deconstructing and reconstructing ‘texts’ relating to the normative as well as 
institutional foundations of central bank independence.  
The idea of central bank independence is not based on a single ‘great work.’ It 
emerges from a variety of practices and ‘texts’ (speeches, legal documents, press 
releases, theoretical and empirical academic literature, etc.). No one ‘text’ can be 
considered the authoritative statement of the idea. The central concepts and logics are 
developed over time in dispersed works and are never comprehensively combined in a 
coherent theoretical framework. The notion of central bank independence nevertheless 
expresses a relatively coherent way of thinking about politics and political economy. 
This relative coherence, however, can only be established through moving between 
close textual analyses of individual texts that express the idea in some form and the 
broader societal context in which they are situated. In reconstructing the idea on the 
basis of dispersed claims and justifications relating to central bank independence, the 
thesis moves from the descriptive level of observed (discursive) practices to the 
exposition of the normative-theoretical underpinnings that make them meaningful 
from the perspective of the actors themselves in a particular context. That is, the 
analysis presented seeks not only to give an account of what actors say and do but also 
of the broader ideas, concepts and presuppositions that the saying and doing express 
and are based on.  
The analysis of the idea of central bank independence is not concerned with 
evaluating its normative defensibility. Rather, it approaches the idea as a system of 
knowledge that ‘thinks’ in particular ways about societal problems and how to address 
them. It analyses both the idea and its different institutional expressions as responses 
to ‘urgent demands’ arising out of particular historical conjunctures (Foucault 1980). 
The analysis does thus not address whether or how the ideals embodied in the idea of 
Introduction 
12 
 
central bank independence can be realised, but what kinds of problems the idea 
responds to and how. It asks, furthermore, what kinds of problems such responses give 
rise to themselves. The analysis presented, then, is not a critique of the idea of central 
bank independence in the sense of establishing whether it is ‘right’ or ‘wrong,’ ‘just or 
‘unjust.’ It is a critique in the sense of expounding the logic informing this particular 
way of thinking as well as the contradictions it gives rise to. 
The first stage of the genealogical analysis consists in identifying the basic 
problem that the idea of central bank independence responds to. This, I argue, is the 
problem of politics in relation to money. Chapter 1 discusses how the collapse of the 
gold standard in the interwar period undermined the intellectual foundations of 
economic thinking at the time and sparked new currents of economic and monetary 
thinking. With the collapse of the gold standard, the idea that monetary value and the 
basic principles of the monetary order were based on something outside the realm of 
politics lost credibility. In a concrete sense, the value of money and its government 
came to be founded on politics and political authority in the wake of the collapse of the 
gold standard.1 
The political rather than ‘natural’ foundations of the value of money 
introduced the problem of politics with regard to money in two distinct senses.2 On the 
one hand, the foundations of the monetary order had to be explicitly based on political 
decisions. The question, then, became what kind of monetary order to constitute 
through political action. On the other hand, monetary policy became subject to 
competing political convictions as to its objectives and how it ought to be conducted in 
response to concrete developments. The question in this regard was what principles 
and ends monetary policy ought to be conducted on the basis of.  
These problems can be addressed in a variety of ways. In chapter 1, I present 
three main approaches to doing so: the Keynesian, the German ordoliberal, and the 
 
 
1 As noted in chapter 1, this is not to say that the gold standard was not ‘political.’ But it was so in a 
different sense from the fiat currency regime that followed it. The ideology of the gold standard 
‘naturalised’ the value of money, whereby the foundations of the monetary order as well as the 
orientation of monetary policy were seen as being external to the political process. With the collapse 
of the gold standard, this fiction could no longer be sustained. The foundation of monetary value 
became explicitly tied to political decisions on the monetary order and its government. 
2 My use of the term ‘problem’ is not intended to convey a situation that is necessarily unwelcome or 
harmful. I use the term in the more technical sense (‘problematique’) of marking out a basic condition 
from which something follows. As I discuss in detail throughout this thesis, however, from some 
perspectives the problem was indeed something unwelcome that needed to be overcome.  
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American neoliberal. To Keynes (and others whose ideas resembled his), the problem 
of politics was welcome. It allowed for the political control of monetary policy in 
accordance with general economic objectives. Such thinkers stressed the ‘primacy of 
politics’ with regard to monetary policy. To thinkers associated with ordo- and 
neoliberalism, however, the introduction of the problem of politics meant that the 
stability of monetary value was threatened by politics. They therefore sought to 
overcome the political control of monetary policy though establishing automatic 
mechanisms or rules governing its exercise.  
Despite their differences, the three ‘ways of thinking’ discussed in chapter 1 all 
shared the notion that the question of the monetary order is inseparable from the wider 
question of the economic order. Particular monetary regimes make certain economic 
practices possible and others impossible. Any particular position on the monetary 
problem of politics entailed also a position on the role of politics and government in 
the economy. Another notable similarity between the three is that none promoted a 
vision of central bank independence as a response to the problem of politics in relation 
to money in the absence of a gold standard. Such a vision only emerged in the post-
World War II period, most notably in West Germany. Chapter 2, then, analyses the 
emergence of central bank independence in Germany.  
The emergence of central bank independence in post-WWII West Germany 
was highly contingent. It was not obvious that the German central bank would become 
independent. That it did owed much to a narrative about Germany’s monetary past – 
the hyperinflation of the 1920s in particular but also the repressed inflation of the war 
and immediate post-war period. This narrative postulated a causal link between a 
politically controlled central bank and hyperinflation, on the one hand, and 
hyperinflation and societal collapse, on the other. Through this ‘political myth,’ the 
meaning and importance of central bank independence was grounded in something 
beyond its economic expediency. ‘The myth of the hyperinflations,’ in turn, came to 
inform the German public imaginary on the central bank and its relationship to the 
government. 
 The broad public acceptance of the myth of the hyperinflations provided the 
German central bank with a source of authority to act against the government of the 
day in conflicts over monetary policy. This was based on the notion that electoral 
representation was an incomplete way of representing the will of the people. It could 
only express a partial will. The central bank, on the other hand, represented the 
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people’s foundational will for price stability. As such, it was a representative of the 
people on a par with the government. This structure of ‘dual representation’ is crucial 
both in terms of the normative justification for the central bank’s ability to say ‘no’ to 
government as well as its authority to do so. It was in this direct and ‘organic’ (i.e., not 
formalised) representational relationship between the central bank and the stability-
conscious people that the solution to the problem of politics in relation to money was 
found in the German context. 
As highlighted in chapter 4, the dual representation of popular will was 
reproduced, but in a different form, in the Eurozone context. The notion will therefore 
be unpacked throughout the thesis. A few remarks on it from the outset are nevertheless 
in order. 
At a basic level, political representation refers to the exercise of public power 
on behalf of others. The people as the foundational subject of public authority in 
political modernity (Canovan 2005) is made present in the activity of governing 
through representation (see Pitkin 1967). Representatives, in turn, must exercise public 
power not for themselves but “in the interest of the represented” (Manin et al 1999: 2). 
This minimal conception of representation, however, can give rise to many different 
conceptions of what representation entails (see Pitkin 1967; see also Urbinati and 
Warren 2008). In this thesis, I focus on a conception of representation derived from 
Hobbes’ theory of sovereignty (see also chapter 4). By positing the sovereign, whether 
King or assembly, as a representative of the people, Hobbes “used the idea [of 
representation] to ground a secular conception of political authority” (Runciman 2010: 
15; see also Pitkin 1967; Loughlin 2003). From Hobbes we thus get the notion that 
government is legitimate because it acts on behalf of the people. It may not be 
democratic, but the activity of governing is always performed based on the relationship 
of political representation between the people and its governmental apparatus. What 
is represented, in turn, is the will of the people, whether expressed in elections, 
constitutions or in the basic will for survival.  
The notion of dual representation, then, refers to a structure of making the 
people present in the activity of governing not through one highest governmental 
authority but two equally empowered such authorities. The dualisation of 
representation, in turn, is accomplished through a conception of the representational 
relationship being differentiated according to different orders of popular will. While 
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representing the same political subject, the people, the representatives do not represent 
the same kind of will.  
On the one hand, elected representatives (governments and parliaments) 
represent the periodic and changing expressions of popular will through the ballot box. 
From the perspective of dual representation this is a perfectly legitimate form of 
representation, but it is only partial. It is, for one, the will of the majority that is 
represented, leaving the will of the minority unrepresented in the activity of governing. 
More importantly, however, it expresses political will on the subjects of the day and 
governs according to short-term considerations. The expression of political will 
through electoral representation may, furthermore, be corrupted by incentives arising 
from the electoral process itself (see chapter 3). If electoral representation monopolises 
the representation of popular will, in short, it will be fleeting and ever-changing.  
The idea of central bank independence is based on a conception of the stability 
of the monetary order being a precondition for a viable democratic, political life (see 
chapter 2). Securing monetary stability, in turn, demands far-sightedness and expert 
management. Subjecting monetary policy to electoral representation risks not only 
undermining the foundational will of the people for price stability but also the very 
structure of electoral representation as such. Popular will must, therefore, also be 
represented through (‘impartial,’ non-partisan) governmental institutions that govern 
according to long-term considerations (see chapters 2 and 3). These institutions must, 
in turn, be able to say ‘no’ to elected representatives. While there may be other such 
representative institutions, this thesis focusses only on the central bank as a ‘monetary 
representative’ of the people. In this conception, the central bank exercises not an 
authority delegated to it by elected representatives, but one derived directly from the 
people. 
Within a state, dual representation refers to the same underlying political 
subject: the people. Dual representation is thereby institutionalised within the 
framework of the state as the general sovereign representative of the people. In conflicts 
between the central bank and government, the people must, somehow, decide. Dual 
representation beyond the state, however, takes on a different form and creates 
different kinds of problems. As I highlight in chapter 4, the ECB was constituted as a 
direct representative of the peoples of Europe, who transferred the right to exercise 
sovereign powers with regard to monetary affairs to the ECB through the constitutional 
contract of the Maastricht Treaty. By constituting it outside the framework of an 
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existing state and vesting it with sovereign powers within its sphere of policymaking, 
the ECB was constructed as a sovereign representative on a par with the Member 
States of the euro. This is highlighted by the fact the ECB’s monetary policy decisions 
become directly effective throughout the Eurozone’s territory without the involvement 
of Member State representatives or the possibility of Member State veto. Instead of the 
dual representation of a people’s will within the structure of unified sovereign 
representation, sovereign representation itself is thereby dualised. Every people of the 
Eurozone is made present in the activity of governing through two governmental 
institutions exercising sovereign powers: the ECB within the sphere of monetary policy 
and its Member State in other spheres of policymaking. Both kinds of sovereign 
representation are thereby limited – the ECB’s more limited than the Member State’s. 
This constitutes the Eurozone’s peculiar response to the monetary problem of politics: 
the central bank’s authority is founded on the constitutional separation of the sovereign 
powers to conduct monetary policy, on the one hand, and general economic policy, on 
the other. This separation is justified by the theory of central bank independence that 
emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, as discussed in chapter 3.  
The separation of the sovereign power to conduct monetary policy from the 
realm of the state creates a peculiar order of exercising governmental powers within 
the Eurozone (discussed in chapter 5). While sovereign representation may be divided 
and limited, the fundamental political right of the individual peoples to authorise 
governmental activity is not. The fundamental condition of the constitutional 
construction of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is based on the continued 
sovereignty of the peoples as separate foundational subjects. This, according to its 
founding constitutional imaginary, creates limits on the exercise of sovereign powers 
by both the ECB and the Member States. In short, the exercise of governmental 
powers is constrained by law, which concretises the founding will of the peoples. The 
ECB, however, exercises technocratic discretion to fulfil its mandate; its telos of price 
stability. Technocratic discretion is envisioned as a rules-based approach to governing 
that, in the spirit of the law, fills the inevitable gaps of the legal order. The democratic 
expression of political will through electoral representation at the Member State level, 
finally, is constrained by both the rule of law and the technocratic authority. According 
to the imaginary, however, this constraint is not to be understood as an external 
limitation on democracy but one arising from the peoples themselves. The three 
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governmental logics – the rule of law, technocracy and democracy – are thereby 
supposed to be mutually reinforcing.  
As highlighted in chapter 5 and spelled out in more detail in chapter 6, there 
are important tensions between the three governmental logics. In the Eurozone Crisis, 
these tensions manifested themselves as contradictions. On the one hand, the Crisis 
revealed the inherent ambiguity of the ECB’s legal mandate: fidelity to the law might 
compromise fidelity to the telos. There was, in other words, a tension between the 
formal expression of political will in the past and the governmental necessities of the 
present. This was highlighted by the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) 
programme. On the other hand, the Crisis revealed the difficult relationship between 
the representation of political will at the Member State level and the general 
governmental order of the Eurozone. In the Greek crisis of 2015, this came to a head 
and the ECB played a crucial role in this regard.  
More than anything, the Eurozone Crisis revealed that the constitutionalisation 
of price stability and the structure of dual sovereign representation had not eliminated 
the problem it was created to overcome, namely, the problem of politics with regard 
to the monetary order. Ordinary politics at the Member State level continued to 
constitute a threat to the monetary order (and its embodied ideology). Moreover, the 
need for governmental flexibility in the face of an unprecedented crisis raised the 
problem of the fundamental political authorisation of the governmental order. As I 
highlight in chapter 7, then, the contradictions inherent in the EMU’s governmental 
order introduced the ‘necessity’ of realigning sovereign representation. The problem 
of politics thereby became not one of limiting the exercise of political authority but of 
generating it in order to secure the requisite governmental capacity to protect and 
enforce the stability of the monetary and economic order.  
 
This thesis approaches central bank independence as a political, rather than economic, 
project. The analysis, however, is not only about central bank independence as such. 
It is about a particular way of thinking about political and governmental issues. The 
constellations of practices, theories and normative premises that go into the doctrine 
of central bank independence as a conceptual apparatus address the basic question: 
how ought we to govern? The idea of central bank independence responds to this question, 
but its answer expresses an approach to the organisation of governmental powers and 
the limits of politics that is more general. It expresses the notion that there are some 
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spheres of societal life that ought not to be subject to politics, but which need 
nevertheless to be governed by public authority. It gives expression to the distinct 
strand of political theory and political philosophy that promotes the ideal of 
government without politics.  
Few of the ‘texts’ analysed and discussed in this thesis are political theoretical 
in any sense of the term. Their underlying political theoretical assumptions and 
commitments are nevertheless often clear. While the central sources remain those 
produced by ‘second-hand dealers in ideas,’ the thesis seeks to underline the theoretical 
aspect of the texts discussed by relating them to established works of political theory 
and philosophy. This is not to say that the texts so analysed derive or develop their 
crucial ideas from or against such works. Rather, situating such texts in relation to 
‘great’ works can bring out certain aspects of these ways of thinking through 
resemblance and difference in terms of posing and answering key questions. Central 
bank independence is thus employed as a lens for approaching a particular way of 
thinking about politics.  
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Chapter 1 
The Monetary Order and the Problem of Politics 
 
 
Introduction 
One of the most significant events in the history of Western economic thought was the 
Great Depression. It challenged the very foundational assumptions undergirding 
established ways of thinking about economic and monetary matters and sparked new 
economic ideas as well as radical revisions of the ideas of old. In the course of this crisis, 
it became clear that the principles on which the pre-World War I political and 
economic order was founded could not be recreated. Something new had to take its 
place. The monetary order in particular had to find a new foundation.  
In this chapter I focus on three theoretical approaches to the question of the 
foundations of the monetary order that emerged in the inter-war period: 
Keynesianism, the German ordoliberalism of the Freiburg School and the American 
neoliberalism of the Chicago School.1 While commonly understood as contributions 
to economic theory, (the quality of) their economics is not my concern here. What is 
relevant for the present purposes is the political thinking informing or derived from the 
economic theories. Or rather, I approach the theories as political theories that address 
the relationship between politics, the government of money, and the wider economic 
order.  
Despite their differences, the three approaches share the view that the question 
of the government of the economy is key to establishing and maintaining a good 
society. The stakes involved in ‘getting the economics right’ are not limited to 
increasing economic prosperity or securing monetary stability. These are but the 
 
 
1 The three schools should be considered along the lines of ‘thought collectives’ rather than as fully 
coherent and uniform theoretical apparatuses and within each school of thought there are important 
differences between thinkers. Thinkers within each thought collective nevertheless share a certain 
general outlook on the role of politics in relation to economic and monetary policy and it is this 
outlook that I focus on in this chapter. The three approaches are thus presented not through 
comprehensive or exhaustive reviews but through exemplary works and thinkers within each tradition; 
works and thinkers that “can ‘stand in’ for a general logic, because [they illustrate] it in a 
paradigmatic fashion” (Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti 2017: 189; see also Ferrara 2008). The 
objective, in other words, is not to provide full account of the three traditions but to highlight certain 
ways of thinking about and approaching a set of common problems. 
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means for constructing a more just society. As Adam Przeworski and Emmanuel 
Wallerstein (Przeworski 1985: 206) note: “Behind economic alternatives lurk visions of 
society, models of culture, and thrusts for power. Economic projects entail political and 
social ones.” 
The three approaches have, with varying intensity across time and space, been 
highly influential in post-war economic thinking and practice (see, e.g., Kaldor 2015 
[1983], Hein and Joerges 2017; Van Horn and Mirowski 2009). This is no less true 
when it comes to central banking in the post-WWII period. Their influence on the idea 
of central bank independence, however, is not straightforward. As I highlight below, 
none espoused central bank independence from politics in the form it was later to take. 
And yet, as I discuss in chapters 2 and 3 in particular, central bank independence in 
theory, practice and public law has, more or less consciously, incorporated central 
elements from each of the schools while leaving others out.  
The three theoretical approaches discussed in this chapter were to a large 
extent developed in response to the experiences of the interwar period, most 
importantly the Great Depression and its social and political consequences. One 
crucial consequence of the Depression was the conclusive collapse of the gold standard 
and the firm belief that the value of money rested on being convertible into gold at a 
fixed rate. For the thinkers discussed here, this introduced a crucial challenge: from 
that point on, the foundations of the monetary order were openly and inescapably 
political. The problem of politics with regard to the monetary order, which to a large 
extent could be ignored during the heyday of the gold standard, had to be tackled head 
on. As I come back to throughout this thesis, the challenges associated with an explicitly 
politically founded monetary order that the three approaches identified in this context 
are still some of the central concerns in terms of the relationship between the 
government of money and the wider question of politics and societal organisation. As 
highlighted in chapters 2 and 3, furthermore, central bank independence emerged in 
important part as an institutional response to such challenges. Before turning to the 
discussion of the idea of central bank independence as a response to the problem of 
politics in the next two chapters, this chapter seeks to identify what that problem 
consists in and how different theoretical approaches have sought to respond to it.  
The first section of the chapter presents a brief discussion of the collapse of the 
gold standard and the emergence of the problem of politics in relation to the monetary 
order. I then turn to how the Keynesian approach addressed this. While I focus mainly 
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on Keynes, the ‘Keynesian approach’ was not limited to Keynes himself but was shared 
by other political actors and movements such as the New Dealers in the US and the 
social democrats in Scandinavia. This approach stressed the importance of steering the 
economy towards ends decided upon politically and it can be summarised under the 
heading of ‘the primacy of politics’ (Berman 2006).  
In explicit opposition to Keynes, different strands of new economic liberalism, 
neoliberalism, sought to overcome both the shortcomings of laissez-faire liberalism and 
present alternatives to economic planning (Keynesianism as well as Communism). 
While Keynes may not have been necessary for this tradition to emerge, his ideas 
represent the radical, even ‘catastrophic’, alternative to their own. After a brief aside 
on Hayek’s notion of ‘denationalising’ money and its irrelevance to the discussion of 
central bank independence, the chapter proceeds to present the ordoliberal approach 
to ‘curing the Keynesian illness’ before turning to the approach of the American 
neoliberals. While both these approaches seek to stifle the influence of politics on 
monetary policy, they do so in different ways. Rules rather than political or 
technocratic discretion are important to both approaches, but the nature of the rules 
differs. While the ordoliberals developed the concept of an ‘economic constitution’ – 
thereby stressing the political origins of the rules and principles guiding economic and 
monetary policy – the neoliberals developed a method for guiding all forms of decision-
making on the basis of the supposedly immanent rules and regularities of ‘the 
economy.’ The three approaches discussed can be summarised as follows: 
Keynesianism emphasises political rule and focusses on influencing the content of 
policy-making; ordoliberalism focusses on polity-making and emphasises the rule of 
positive law; and neoliberalism emphasises the natural laws of the economy and 
focusses on shaping the way people think about both policy- and polity-making.  
 
Money and Politics in the Interwar Period 
One of the notable intellectual victims of the Great Depression was the ideology of the 
international gold standard, the “gold-standard mentality” (Eichengreen and Temin 
2000: 183). While the gold standard may not have been the cause of the Great 
Depression, it was only overcome after the gold standard was finally abandoned in the 
1930s (Eichengreen 1996). Its abandonment, in turn, meant that the monetary order 
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had to be confronted nihilistically, without an absolute.2 The value of money was no 
longer grounded in something that represented the ultimate symbol of stability and 
value. Fiat currency was no longer among “the lesser types of money” (Schwartz 1987: 
364), but the defining form. In contrast to money based on a commodity standard, fiat 
currency’s only claim to value is found in a political authority making such a claim. 
The value of money is essentially grounded in a political promise and the general belief 
that this promise will not be broken.  
In response to this sea-change in the Western monetary imaginary, new forms 
of economic thinking emerged which sought not only to make sense of the collapse but 
also to construct theories of a capitalist economic and monetary order which did not 
rely on gold as an absolute standard outside the realm of politics. This, in turn, meant 
that politics became the defining problem of the monetary order.  
 
The Death of Gold and the ‘Old’ Central Bank Independence 
The gold standard was a product of the 19th century and it “prevailed in its most 
pristine form between 1880 and 1914” (Bordo 1981: 2) but the interwar period saw 
repeated attempts to reintroduce it (see Eichengreen 1996). Under the gold standard, 
central banks played a crucial role in managing (the effects of) gold and capital flows 
and were allowed considerable independence in doing so. Their decisions, however, 
were largely “regarded as obscure” and uncontroversial (Eichengreen 1996: 9). This 
relative political unimportance of independent central banks under the gold standard 
owed much to the widespread perception that “[u]nder a strict gold standard, there is 
no need for a central bank” (Bordo 1981: 5). As a former Bundesbank president, Karl 
Blessing (1966: 89, my translation), put it: under the gold standard “nobody demanded 
of the central bank that it should stabilise the price level.” Thus, while “[a] central 
bank, independent of the government, became the ideal of all who held respectable 
views [during the era of the gold standard]” (Bopp 1946: 309), the meaning of central 
bank independence under a functioning gold standard is very different from its 
 
 
2 It ought to be noted that even before the interwar collapse of the gold standard, a number of thinkers 
had challenged the theoretical and historical accuracy and coherence of the metallic theory of 
money. Before World War I, Georg Friedrich Knapp, for instance, had presented his State Theory of 
Money in 1905 and Alfred Mitchell-Innes his credit theory of money in 1914. The gold standard 
mentality, however, continued to dominate economic thinking, the international monetary order 
and governmental practice well into the interwar period.  
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meaning under a fiat monetary regime. Theoretically at least, it is simply considered 
the agent of automatic mechanisms associated with international trade and self-
regulating markets (Polanyi 2001: 31). As such, the central bank is simply “supposed 
to follow the rules of the game” (Bordo 1981: 5), whereby the creation of money is 
regulated by ‘natural’ forces outside its control (Polanyi 2001: 141). The central bank 
can mediate the domestic effects of sudden monetary changes, but it is essentially the 
dedicated ‘servant’ of a system that would exist and function even without it. In that 
sense, the central bank is indeed independent of politics but only because the system 
as a whole is.  
This independence of money from politics was of course a myth (Polanyi 2001; 
Eichengreen 1996). As a monetary order, it was no less ‘political’ than fiat currency. 
Without the commitment of major political and economic powers to “take whatever 
steps were required to defend the central bank’s gold reserves and maintain the 
convertibility of the currency into gold” (Eichengreen 1996: 5), the gold standard 
would have been meaningless.3 The gold standard rested no less than fiat money on 
political authority. This observation, however, is akin to observing that the divine right 
of kings, no less than the sovereignty of the people, is founded on a combination of 
beliefs, conventions and interests. For the purposes of understanding contemporaneous 
thinking, such an approach would obscure that these ideas were largely taken for 
granted and considered inherent in the order of things at the time. In a society 
governed by an absolute monarch on the basis of anointment like in a society whose 
currency rests on gold, there is ordinarily no questioning of the underlying truth of the 
arrangement. “Belief in the gold standard was the faith of the age … Where Ricardo 
and Marx were at one, the nineteenth century knew not doubt” (Polanyi 2001: 26).4 
Regardless of the partisan constellation of government, the commitment to the policies 
demanded by the gold standard was unquestioned. 
 
 
3 Scholars disagree on the relative importance of the different forces working to maintain the gold 
standard at the time. Whereas Kindleberger (1973) stresses the role of the UK as the hegemonic 
power, Polanyi (2001) stresses the importance of the transnational network of haute finance and its 
influence on national governments, and Eichengreen (1996) highlights the importance of great 
power cooperation in the realm of monetary affairs. Whatever the forces working for the 
maintenance of the gold standard were, however, they were largely undermined with the outbreak 
of WWI. 
4 Marx accepted Ricardo’s commodity theory of money almost to the letter, replacing only Ricardo’s 
conception of the value of gold being based on scarcity and usefulness with his labour theory of value, 
which attributed value to gold on the basis that it embodied a certain quantity of labour.  
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Only once the order of meaning within which this made sense entered a crisis, 
as it did with the outbreak of World War I, was the gold standard fundamentally 
questioned. In a sense, the collapse of the gold standard did for money what ‘the death 
of God’ (or natural law) did for politics: it forced confrontation of the question of its 
ultimate foundations in the absence of an external absolute. This analogy is reflected 
in Blessing’s (1966: 88, my translation) notion that “in the good old time of the gold 
standard there was no problem of the stability of monetary value in today’s sense.” 
While changes in the general price level could occur, these changes were “more or less 
accepted, like the weather, as something God-given.” What is at stake with the collapse 
of the gold standard, as with the secularisation of the foundation of political authority, 
is a turn to a system of monetary-political thinking and acting that must replace a 
transcendent absolute with a self-consciously social and political construction. In the 
final instance, the value of money, like the legitimacy of political authority, now rested 
on nothing but mutual promises, agreements and social imaginaries. This, of course, 
did not mean that the search for a grounding of value was abandoned but rather, as 
Hannah Arendt (2006; see also Moyn 2008) emphasised in relation to the modern 
revolutions, that value had to find its grounding in the realm of human action. “[The 
currency problem of our time consists in … replacing by acts of will and cooperation 
what the gold standard accomplished more or less automatically” (Blessing 1966: 91, 
my translation). 
The collapse of the gold standard was radical in itself as well as symptomatic of 
a wider revolutionary change. As Polanyi (2001: 21) put it,  
The breakdown of the international gold standard was the invisible link between the 
disintegration of world economy which started at the turn of the century and the 
transformation of a whole civilization in the thirties. 
The 1920s, in Polanyi’s reading, had sought in vain to recreate the 19th century 
international economic system through a reconstruction of some of its crucial elements, 
including the gold standard. As such, it was tied to the 19th century in intellectual terms. 
The truly revolutionary decade was the 1930s, which along with the Great Depression 
saw the final abandonment of gold and “entirely new elements entered the pattern of 
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Western history” (ibid: 24).5 Included in these was the simultaneous recognition of the 
political foundations of the value of money and the elevation of the currency question 
to one of the fundamental problems of politics. 
 
The Problem of Politics in Relation to the Monetary Order 
A comprehensive account of the factors supporting the 19th century gold standard 
mentality is beyond the scope of this thesis. It is, nevertheless, worth stressing one 
important factor that has a direct bearing on the emergence of the problem of politics 
in relation to the monetary order. In the 19th century, as Eichengreen (1996: 6) notes, 
the problem of unemployment had yet to emerge as a systemic problem. Or rather, 
political elites conceptualised unemployment not as a political problem but as a 
problem of individual failings (see also Polanyi 2001). In so far as there were social 
movements that demanded a break with this conception,6 the ‘age of liberalism’ 
criminalised, jailed and denied them political representation (Polanyi 2001: 234; 
Hobhouse 1944 [1911]: 214; Berman 2006: 12). The gold standard in the age of 
economic liberalism rested in large part on the political illiberalism of the ruling class. 
Significant interests and classes of the population were excluded from political 
representation. Only this could make it possible to consider the often recessionary 
policies demanded by the gold standard as being consistent with “domestic prosperity” 
(Eichengreen 1996: 6; see also Keynes 1920: 18-22).7  
Among the crucial differences between the 19th century and the interwar period 
are the extension of the franchise, the recognition of trade unions and the emergence 
 
 
5 Polanyi (2001: 24) lists “the abandonment of the gold standard by Great Britain; the Five-Year Plans 
in Russia; the launching of the New Deal; the National Socialist Revolution in Germany; [and] the 
collapse of the League [of Nations] in favor of autarchist empires” as “the landmarks” of this change. 
6 Marx famously conceptualised the unemployed as the ‘reserve army of labour’ and presented an 
analysis of the capitalist system of production and extraction of profit as being premised on the 
presence of a ‘surplus population’ alongside an ideological individualisation of the responsibility for 
unemployment (Capital vol. 1, chapter 25 in particular).  
7 In Keynes’ (1920: 18) post-WWI analysis, the Europe of the gold standard was “so organized socially 
and economically as to secure the maximum accumulation of capital. While there was some 
continuous improvement in the daily conditions of life of the mass of the population, Society was so 
framed as to throw a great part of the increased income into the control of the class least likely to 
consume it”. This age of growing inequality, more recently documented by Piketty (2014), was, 
according to Keynes, the essential driver of capitalism at the time and it rested on “a double bluff or 
deception.” “[T]he labouring classes accepted from ignorance or powerlessness, or were compelled, 
persuaded, or cajoled by custom convention, authority, and the well-established order of Society into 
accepting, a situation in which they could call their own very little of the cake that they and nature 
and the capitalists were co-operating to produce” (Keynes 1920: 19-20).  
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of the labour movement as a potent, albeit often reluctant (Przeworski 1985), electoral 
political force. These factors altered the political dynamics considerably. 
Unemployment and the general question of economic adjustment became a politically 
salient issue. The automatic adjustments demanded by the gold standard were no 
longer tolerated by an important proportion of the electorate, which could now find 
political representation in the form of mass parties – Social Democratic as well as 
Fascist and National Socialist – that promised ‘work and bread.’ Governments that 
allowed economic forces to run their course, producing mass unemployment and 
hunger in the process, could no longer count on the population to accept this fate as 
the inevitable outcome of natural processes or just punishment for prior excesses. They 
faced the very real threat of being ousted by political movements promising a radical 
reorganisation of the economy (see Berman 2006).  
Reflecting on this condition in the immediate post-WWII period, the 
ordoliberal Walter Eucken captured the problem succinctly: “Governments of 
countries where mass unemployment occurs and persists are unlikely to be re-elected. 
The Economist expressed the general feeling when it said in 1942: ‘If liberal democracy 
is incompatible with full employment, then it has to go’” (Eucken 1989 [1948]: 43). 
Under modern conditions, losing the battle for the economy spelled, like losing a war, 
the certain end for a particular government and potentially even for a certain 
governmental form. The ‘double movement’ (Polanyi 2001) had set in and the ‘masses’ 
had become an important political force. In the process, economic and monetary 
policy became politicised (Eichengreen 1996: 10). In relation to the monetary order, 
the partisan composition of government was no longer irrelevant.  
This change did not come about overnight. During the 1920s, leftist 
governments would often flounder – when they were not ousted by conservative forces 
invoking a state of exception – on the contradiction between their social policies and 
electoral base, on the one hand, and their adherence to the gold standard, on the other 
(Polanyi 2001: 236-237). In the 1930s, however, this changed, not least due to 
Roosevelt’s New Deal, which sacrificed the international gold standard for domestic 
employment policies. From then on, the monetary order in a very concrete sense rested 
on partisan politics and the government of the day. The standard of value had been 
displaced from the unchanging naturalness of gold to the ever-fluctuating artificiality 
of political life. The fundamentals of the monetary order were explicitly linked to the 
vagaries of (partisan) politics.  
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In addition to the politicisation of the monetary order at a foundational level, 
the purposes for which monetary policy was to be conducted were no longer the subject 
of general agreement. Currency stability was no longer the only overriding objective 
of monetary policy but became relativised in relation to unemployment in particular. 
Since a government committed to full employment could not tolerate a central bank 
conducting a policy with recessionary effects in the name of monetary stability, the 
very foundation on which the pre-WWI notion of central bank independence rested 
had disappeared. 
While there were clearly legitimate reasons for governments to take control of 
monetary policy, the collapse of a fixed standard of monetary value also introduced 
greater scope for governments to manipulate the currency for incendiary purposes 
(Keynes 1920: 236). While the governments performing such manipulations were 
rarely socialist, the threat that they posed to capitalism and private property was linked 
to the communist threat. As Keynes (ibid: 235) famously attributed to Lenin, “the best 
way to destroy the Capitalist System was to debauch its currency” (ibid: 235).8 Through 
a “continuing process of inflation” induced by governments seeking to “confiscate, 
secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their citizens,” the very 
spirit of capitalism was in danger of being undermined. This problem, however, was 
not necessarily linked to the economic ideology of a particular government. It was a 
general problem of government under a fiat or managed currency regime (ibid: 237). 
Government as such, in other words, constituted a perennial threat to the monetary 
order and, thus, to the liberal capitalist political-economic order. 
* 
The collapse of the gold standard introduced the problem of politics in relation to 
money. Monetary thought had to confront the question of politics and government. 
The general problem manifests itself in two distinct but interrelated ways: in relation 
to the foundations of the monetary order and in relation to the ordinary government 
of money or monetary policy. The general problem and its two manifestations will be 
 
 
8 The evidence for Lenin ever having expressed this view is not conclusive (see Fetter 1977; White and 
Schuler 2009). The notion is reproduced in both Eucken’s (2004 [1952]: 255) and Friedman’s 
(Friedman and Friedman (1990 [1980]: 268) work. Interestingly, the former attributes the statement 
to Lenin, while the latter attributes it to Keynes. 
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discussed throughout the thesis but on the basis of the discussion so far, its elements 
can be summarised as follows.  
When the value of money is politically determined and controlled, the 
monetary order can no longer be understood as being natural and beyond the control 
of the political authorities of the state. The monetary order is artificial and has to be 
instituted and maintained through the exercise of political authority. Political authority 
defines monetary value and constitutes the monetary order. The question, then, is how 
foundational political authority is exercised and what kind of monetary order is 
established. Because the monetary order is explicitly founded on political authority, 
the possibility of political change can never be ruled out. In a foundational sense, then, 
the stability of the monetary order is subject to political authority. 
Because the monetary order is political, not natural, it is manipulable. It is not 
only subject to changes of fundamental political will but remains also inescapably 
subject to the expression of political will through the ordinary political process. Thus, 
the monetary order is at the mercy of the expression of political will through 
government policy. This can manifest itself directly through the political control of 
monetary policy or indirectly through conflicts between monetary objectives and other 
economic objectives of the government. In the absence of ‘absolutes’ grounding the 
meaning of any given policy objective, those objectives can be redefined at the whim 
of governments and electorates. Monetary policy is thereby subject to, and ‘threatened’ 
by, ordinary (democratic) politics.  
The thinkers discussed below all start from this condition. The question is what 
follows from it: should politics and political authority be embraced or ought it, 
somehow, to be overcome anew? 
 
The Primacy of Politics in Keynesianism (and Beyond) 
Keynes’ approach to economic problems, including the problem of politics in relation 
to money, was not entirely unique at the time. Aggregate demand management, for 
instance, was a crucial aspect of Swedish social democratic policy already before The 
General Theory was published. Interwar social democrats, furthermore, often adopted a 
perspective that positioned them, like Keynes, in opposition to the economic 
determinism of both orthodox Marxism and laissez-faire liberalism (Berman 2006: 6, 
169; 2009: 562). There is in particular a close affinity between Keynes and the 
Stockholm School economists whose work inspired Swedish Social Democracy (Blyth 
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2002: 96). Before turning to the discussion of Keynes’ ideas, I will therefore briefly 
discuss the approach of the Stockholm School, exemplified by the economist and 
Social Democrat Gunnar Myrdal.9  
 
Social Democracy 
In a series of lectures given in 1928,10 Myrdal (1953: x) developed an immanent critique 
of (neo)classical economics, which sought to uncover its foundations in an ideological 
commitment often “only present as tacit assumptions, implicit in the conclusions.” This 
ideological commitment amounted to a corruption of the “economic science” whose 
task, he claimed, “is to observe and describe empirical social reality and to analyse and 
explain causal relations between economic facts.” “To determine what our fears and 
wishes ought to be,” he argued, is “outside the realm of science” and “the proposition 
that one state of society, actual or imagined, is politically preferable to another can 
never be inferred from the results of scientific work” (ibid: 1).  
Myrdal’s (ibid: 13) critique was directed specifically at the tendency to present 
“specific political recommendations … as results of scientific analysis.” The 
consequence of the critique is clear: the values according to which society is governed 
ought to be determined politically, not by a ‘science’ founded on the principles of 
natural law and utilitarianism. This, in turn, had important consequences for monetary 
policy: it had to “be set within the framework of economic policy which in turn must 
be set within an overall political frame of reference” (Dostaler 1990: 208). By advancing 
visions of an normatively superior economic order, the (neo)classical economists were 
leaving economic science behind and entering the realm of politics.  
The economic and monetary order, then, is inescapably a political order and 
the policies that shape its concrete form should depend on the values that the political 
community wants realised. Government cannot achieve whatever it wants in terms of 
 
 
9 Myrdal’s work not only inspired the policies of the Swedish Social Democrats, he was also active in 
developing and implementing them as an MP (elected in 1934) and later as Trade Minister (1945-
7). In his ‘intellectual biography’ of Myrdal, William Barber (2008: xi) notes that: “If his contribution 
had been available to readers of English before 1936, it is interesting to speculate whether the 
‘revolution’ in macroeconomic theory of the depression decade would be referred to as ‘Myrdalian’ 
as much as ‘Keynesian.’” 
10 Under the title Vetenskap och politik i nationalekonomien [‘Science and politics in (macro)economics’], 
published in Swedish in 1930 and in English, with the title The Political Element in the Development of 
Economic Theory, in 1953. 
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economic outcomes because policies have unintended consequences. But it is the role 
of economists to help politicians understand these, not to prescribe the values 
according to which the community governs itself. The economy is not a fixed order 
operating according certain universal and unalterable principles, whereby government 
intervention becomes distortive by definition. The economy is inescapably politically 
constituted and governed according to political choices.  
What characterises this perspective is that it locates the driving force of history 
in political action rather than economic processes. It asserts “the ability of collective 
action to shape history” (Berman 2009: 562). This means that the question of the ‘best’ 
economic order can only be answered with another question: best in terms of what? 
And this, in turn, can only be answered through the formation of political will. While 
this point may seem obvious, even banal, Myrdal highlighted that even though most 
economists claimed to adhere to it, their theories and policymaking did not. The 
economic ‘experts’ were not neutral arbiters of technical knowledge but active 
promoters of particular political-economic ideologies.  
 
Keynes and the Capitalist Economy 
Keynes (1978a [1936]: 383-4) to a large extent shared this view and The General Theory 
provides a comprehensive re-examination of the fundamental tenets of modern 
economics in this light. The classical doctrine of economics held that macroeconomics 
was merely the aggregation of processes and mechanisms at the level of individuals. 
Adam Smith’s (Wealth of Nations, bk. 1, ch. 2) famous notion that “It is not from the 
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but 
from their regard to their own interest” was elevated to the general principle guiding 
all economic activity. Any distortion of the principle of the general interest emerging 
from the pursuit of private interests was consequently viewed with suspicion.  
Keynes rejected this. By considering the economy as a whole as the starting 
point, Keynes arrived at the notion that what is rational for the individual may be 
irrational for the community. Furthermore, in failing to take a comprehensive view of 
the economy, classical economics failed to acknowledge its political foundations and 
preconditions. For instance, in relation to the question of international peace, Keynes 
(1978a: 382, emphasis added) noted that  
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under the system of domestic laissez-faire and an international gold standard … there 
was no means open to a government whereby to mitigate economic distress at home 
except through competitive struggle for markets.  
To Keynes, then, like to some of his socialist contemporaries – Lenin (2010 [1917]) 
and Luxemburg (2003 [1913]) in particular (see also Arendt 2017 [1951]) – the classical 
theory neglected the question of the relationship between the capitalist economy’s 
inside and its outside; the question of imperialism, in other words. In its focus on 
equilibria, it failed to acknowledge capitalism’s inherent need for ever expanding 
markets for products and factors of production to overcome its internal tensions.11 
While Lenin and Luxemburg saw this as an inherent and inescapable feature of 
capitalism, Keynes perceived the problem as one of ideas about state policy. The 
problem was that the 19th century capitalist state did not, for ideological reasons, 
address the problems associated with the domestic class conflict and power-imbalances 
between capital and labour but operated on the tacit premise that such problems could 
be overcome through the external expansion of markets. WWI and the Great 
Depression dispelled this illusion (Keynes 1978a: 383) and the crisis opened the door 
for a paradigm shift that would redefine the ideational and ideological outlook of the 
state (Polanyi 2001; P. Hall 1993; Blyth 2002).   
The comprehensive view of the economy has a direct bearing on the question 
of monetary order and monetary policy. Keynes’ theory takes its point of departure in 
a critique of the Quantity Theory of Money and its failure account for crises. A laissez-
faire theory, the Quantity Theory, which Friedman would later revisit and reformulate 
(see below), conceives of money as essentially neutral. Changes in money supply will 
only affect the price level, leaving ‘real’ economic variables unchanged. The conclusion 
is therefore that government should refrain from conducting an active monetary 
policy; it would, at best, be ineffective. As such, public authority should not react to 
monetary developments but simply laisse-le passer. Keynes’ (1978b [1923]: 65, emphasis 
in original) critique of this is summarized in a famous passage from A Tract on Monetary 
Reform:  
Now ‘in the long run’ the Quantity Theory is probably true … But this long run is a 
misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead. Economists set 
 
 
11 As Arendt (2017) draws attention to, political elites at the time also failed to acknowledge the political 
tensions that imperial expansion outside Europe entailed within Europe. 
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themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us 
that when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again. 
The long run assumption does not hold because the damage caused in the short run 
may destabilise the economy to such an extent as to completely alter its shape. History, 
as Keynes saw it, is made up of short runs and politics can change its course. Economic 
theory, then, must develop an understanding of crises that can serve as a guide to 
government action.  
The crisis, according to Keynes (1978a: 315), is in large part caused by “the 
sudden collapse in the marginal efficiency of capital.” This, in turn, is accompanied by 
a “dismay and uncertainty as to the future” which then again leads to a “sharp increase 
in liquidity-preference” (ibid: 316). That is, economic actors tend to hoard money 
rather than engage in the consumption or investment necessary to counter crisis 
tendencies. “In conditions of laissez-faire the avoidance of wide fluctuations in 
employment may, therefore, prove impossible” (ibid: 320). On this basis, Keynes (ibid.) 
concludes “that the duty of ordering the current volume of investment cannot safely 
be left in private hands.” “[T]he common will, embodied in the policy of the State” 
(ibid: 377) must intervene “to expand output” (ibid: 325) and exercise “a guiding 
influence on the propensity to consume.” Furthermore, “a somewhat comprehensive 
socialisation of investment will prove the only means of securing an approximation to 
full employment” (ibid: 378).  
Keynes’ response to the Depression entails an agenda for transforming the 
relations of power in capitalist society. This is particularly clear with regard to the 
state’s role in increasing investment, which is associated with “the great social 
advantages of increasing the stock of capital until it ceases to be scarce” (ibid: 325). The 
power of the capitalists to dictate the terms of production would thereby be limited and 
it would, in the final instance, “mean the euthanasia of the rentier, and, consequently, 
the euthanasia of the cumulative oppressive power of the capitalist to exploit the 
scarcity-value of capital” (ibid: 376). What The General Theory provides is thus a 
justification for using state power to transform the antagonistic relationship between 
capital and labour, whereby the inherent tendency of capitalism to address its domestic 
problems through external expansion would be stifled. Keynes’ theory, in other words, 
allows for detaching the domestic from the international, whereby also the 
internationality of the monetary order cedes importance and monetary policy becomes 
a domestic political concern. 
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Keynes (ibid: 372) explicitly situates his theory as a response to the problems 
emerging in the twilight years of the ‘gilded age’: “[t]he outstanding faults of the 
economic society in which we live are its failures to provide for full employment and 
its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes.” Monetary policy 
plays a crucial role correcting these. Inequality in wealth and income, Keynes (ibid.) 
claims, is mainly justified by the “belief that the growth of capital depends upon the 
strength of the motive towards individual saving and that for a large proportion of this 
growth we are dependent on the savings of the rich out of their superfluity.” Keynes 
(ibid: 372-3), however, shows that “the growth of capital depends not at all on a low 
propensity to consume but is, on the contrary, held back by it.” “The justification for 
a moderately high rate of interest” (ibid: 375) thereby collapses along with the 
argument for a monetary policy pursuing price stability above all else. Instead, he 
claims to demonstrate that “the extent of effective saving is necessarily determined by 
the scale of investment and the scale of investment is promoted by a low rate of interest” 
(ibid: 375, emphasis in original). In terms of monetary policy, then, “it is to our best 
advantage to reduce the rate of interest to that point relatively to the schedule of the 
marginal efficiency of capital at which there is full employment” (ibid.). Private saving, 
in turn, ought to be replaced in the main by “communal saving through the agency of 
the State,” which would allow for “the growth of capital up to the point where it ceases 
to be scarce” (ibid: 376).   
Transferring the task of capital accumulation from the private to the public 
entails the separation of capital from capitalists. Capital, in this perspective, should not 
be considered the sacred private property of the capitalist but as something inherently 
social. To the extent that capital is privately held, it ought to be disposed of in a manner 
beneficial to the community as a whole. In Scandinavian social democratic legal 
theory, this was known as ‘functional socialism’ (see Adler-Karlsson 1967). Capital 
ownership, according to this approach, should be considered an absolute right neither 
of the individual (as in capitalism) nor the state (as in communism) but should be 
disaggregated into its component parts and functions in society. Embodying the 
common will, the state then determines the scope of private ownership and initiative 
as well as the distributions of its rewards. The task of state policy, then, is not to stifle 
individual initiative but to correct it of its excesses and ensure the “conditions of [its] 
successful functioning” (Keynes 1978a: 380, emphasis added).  As such, it is not  
Money and the Problem of Politics 
34 
 
the ownership of the instruments of production which it is important for the State to 
assume. If the State is able to determine the aggregate amount of resources devoted 
to augmenting the instruments and the basic rate of reward to those who own them, 
it will have accomplished all that is necessary (ibid: 378). 
In this conception, the state does not take full control of the means of production but 
determines the broad outlines of their use. As such, this approach constitutes, as Adler-
Karlsson (1967) noted, an ‘alternative between capitalism and communism,’ and both 
Keynesians and social democrats “held out the prospect that the state could reconcile 
the private ownership of the means of production with democratic management of the 
economy” (Przeworski 1985: 207; see also Berman 2006: 180). Politics, in other words, 
would allow for and should seek a compromise between capitalism and democracy. 
 
The Dependent Independence of the Central Bank 
Keynes’ (1978a: 379) theory, which involved “a large extension of the traditional 
functions of government,” informed his attempts to educate political leaders across the 
political spectrum in the UK and beyond, including on questions of currency reform, 
monetary policy and central banking (see, e.g., Keynes 1978c: 1-203). A notable 
example of the latter is Keynes’ (1978d [1932]12) sympathetic critique of the Labour 
Party’s 1932 proposal for monetary reform.  
Labour’s proposal had asserted the primacy of domestic considerations in 
monetary policy. In doing so, it had pitted itself against the policy priority of the 
Treasury and the Bank of England, who remained committed to “an ultimate return 
to gold” because “they conscientiously disbelieve in the whole order of ideas for which 
the alternative policy stands for” (Keynes 1978d: 129). Keynes supports this aspect of 
Labour’s proposal because it would reverse the hierarchy of norms and allow monetary 
policy “to be rid of the tie with gold” (ibid.), particularly in the crisis situation. 
The choice of monetary order has important implications for the institutional 
relationship between the central bank and the government. Should the monetary order 
be reformed, Keynes (ibid., emphasis added) claims, “it will, in fact, be the doubting 
[Governor of the Bank of England] Mr Norman … who will have the first shot at trying 
to carry out the policy which is not his own choice.” The central bank is thus subjected to 
political authority and would not be in a position to say ‘no.’ The “successful 
 
 
12 The article was published in two parts in The New Statesman and Nation on 17 and 24 September 1932. 
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management” of the currency, however, is “not so easy” (ibid: 129-30). The new 
monetary regime will “require the exercise of a new technique, including, especially, a 
large measure of control over the volume of new investment” (ibid: 130). In line with 
the argument of The General Theory, monetary policy needs to be considered in 
conjunction with the role of the state in controlling investment, a coordination without 
which “the business of controlling the value of sterling … is likely to prove beyond our 
powers” (ibid: 136).  
Labour’s proposal entails that the Bank be put completely under the auspices 
of the political representatives, with only “the day-to-day business of the Bank being 
carried on by the Governor and his subordinates” (ibid: 130). Keynes, however, sets 
out an alternative vision of the central bank’s position: “The management of the 
Bank,” Keynes (ibid: 131) agrees with Labour, “should be ultimately subject to the 
Government of the day” and the “principles of the currency system … should be 
determined by Parliament.” Keynes thus places the political authority to determine the 
monetary order with the legislative power and the power to determine the objectives 
of monetary policy with the executive. However, “[t]he less direct the democratic 
control and the more remote the opportunities for parliamentary interference with 
banking policy the better it will be” (ibid.).  
Keynes thereby presents a particular notion of central bank independence. The 
objectives of monetary policy are to be determined politically, but its execution should 
be left in the hands of the experts at the Bank. Keynes (ibid.) justifies this on the grounds 
that “If the Bank of England is to carry out the monetary policy which is proposed, it 
will be engaged in the practice of a very difficult technique, of which the Parliament 
will understand less than nothing.” “[D]emocratic interference” in the day-to-day 
practices of the Bank should be avoided because “[a] planned economy will be 
impracticable unless there is the utmost decentralisation in the handling of expert 
controls” (ibid.). For a comprehensive economic policy to work, in other words, 
deference to technocratic expertise is necessary. The central bank is dependent on the 
democratic process and the government of the day for its objectives but requires 
independence for achieving them. As such, the Bank’s “independence and its prestige 
are assets [worth preserving]” (ibid: 132).  
In Keynes’ (ibid.) analysis, the “demand for [the Bank’s] subjection to the 
democracy largely arises … out of the peculiarities of recent years” in which “the 
country has possessed no defined standard and not even a defined monetary policy laid 
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down by Parliament.” The consequence of this is that “the Bank of England has been 
left free to exercise … a wider discretion than it ought to have … on matters which go 
far beyond the practice of a technique for the attainment of a purpose, the general 
character of which has been laid down by a higher authority” (ibid.). The problem is 
not the independence of the Bank but that the political authorities have shirked their 
responsibility for economic and monetary policy. If the Bank is acting otherwise than 
the government desires, it is not the Bank that is at fault but the government. “The 
widespread feeling that the Bank of England is an irresponsible body exercising 
arbitrary power without marked success” (ibid.) is therefore misdirected. The problem 
is not the Bank’s independence, but that the government has allowed the Bank to 
decide autonomously on the objectives of monetary policy. Keynes’ response to the 
problem of politics in relation to the monetary order and monetary policy is thus to 
embrace it. At the same time, however, he called on political authorities to recognise 
their own (cognitive) limits. To Keynes then, central bank independence was not a 
response to the problem of politics but a means of enhancing the technical execution 
of political objectives.  
 
Intermezzo: The Irrelevance of Hayek 
Friedrich von Hayek is perhaps the most famous critic of Keynes and the notion of 
political control of money. In Choice in Currency (1976a) for instance, Hayek explicitly 
blames the Stagflation Crisis of the 1970s on Keynes, whose theory, according to 
Hayek (1976a: 14), justified the practice of “government control of the quantity of 
money.” As Hayek (ibid.) saw it, there was “not the slightest hope that any government, 
or any institution subject to political pressure, will ever be able to [secure monetary 
stability].” In democracies governed by the majority of the day, governments would 
“have no choice but to use their powers for the benefit of particular groups” and those 
groups invariably demand more money (ibid.). The problem of monetary instability 
and inflation is inherent to (democratic) politics and the only viable solution is “to find 
a way to protect money from politics” (ibid: 16, emphasis added). While Hayek revered the 
gold standard for its automaticity and ability to provide monetary stability, he did not 
believe it could be reintroduced politically. Instead he advocated a system of free 
currency competition, whereby no state would be able to monopolise the issuance of 
legal tender within its territory. In this system, there would be no need for a central 
bank.  
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The ‘denationalisation of money’ (1976b), however, encounters the problem 
that it requires conscious political action to introduce it. Hayek (1976a: 22) envisions 
that this could be done through an international treaty. Hayek’s currency regime is 
thereby as dependent on political will as the Keynesian currency system that he is 
criticising, only not at the domestic but at the international level.13 The main difference 
is that the daily control of monetary matters is removed from the political process of 
individual states and subjected, through international law, to the disciplining force of 
competition. Hayek does not escape the problem of politics, but simply relocates it to 
a different level.14 A political decision on the currency regime must still be made. The 
question for Hayek is how the ‘right’ decision will be made. In this regard Hayek, like 
Keynes (and Simons and Friedman, see below), seeks to change people’s way of 
thinking about the role of politics in society and in relation to money. In the final 
instance, then, Hayek places his trust in the “great struggle of ideas” (Hayek 2011 
[1960]: 48). 
Like Hayek, German ordoliberalism and American neoliberalism sought to 
overcome the problem of politics in relation to money and positioned themselves 
against the Keynesian embrace of politics in the government of money. In contrast to 
Hayek’s ambiguity on the question, however, these approaches explicitly recognised 
the necessity of public authority as the foundation of the monetary order. They thus 
rejected the possibility that a stability-oriented monetary order might emerge 
spontaneously from the workings of market forces. The problem of politics was there 
to stay. The question was only how to address it. In this regard, the two approaches 
developed theories and frameworks that explicitly sought to establish principles and 
rules governing the exercise of public authority with regard to monetary affairs. As 
such, they are of greater relevance to the question of monetary order and monetary 
 
 
13 Both Choice of Currency and Denationalisation of Money are at least partly written as interventions in the 
debate on European monetary union and specifically on the question of whether to introduce a single 
currency (1976a: 17; 1976b: 17-18). The notion of an international treaty governing monetary 
relations was thus presumably inspired by the European Economic Community and its ability to 
introduce a rules-based order enforced by “international bodies” rather than “international 
authorities possessing powers of direction” (1976a: 22), that is, without a sovereign power.  
14 Somewhat paradoxically, Hayek subjects the monetary order to executive discretion by trusting states 
to enshrine the monetary order in international law. Perhaps more than anything, this reveals that 
it is not political authority as such that Hayek is afraid of but the democratic process and its potential 
for empowering anti-capitalist governments.  
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policy than Hayek. Their respective approaches to the nature of the principles and 
rules governing monetary affairs, however, differed.  
 
The Primacy of the Constitution in Ordoliberalism  
Ordoliberal thinking did not abandon the gold standard and the principles informing 
it easily. In the inter- and post-war periods, however, the historical situation could not 
be ignored and the question of the general economic and political conditions of the 
monetary order had to be confronted (Lutz 1989 [1935]: 21915). In response to this, 
ordoliberals developed an approach which sought to reintroduce the principles of the 
gold standard through an authoritative political decision.  
For ordoliberals, the structural connection between the monetary order and 
“the overall economic system” (ibid.) is decisive. The question of monetary order must 
be addressed in relation to the wider socio-economic order. The principles governing 
each aspect of the general order must not conflict. In this regard, the primary principle 
of the gold standard is its automaticity, it “is a mechanism,” a “machine” (ibid: 220). 
Properly conceived and supported, the gold standard eliminates political discretion in 
relation to monetary policy. “[T]he essence of the gold standard” (ibid: 225-6, 
emphasis added) is an impersonal and apolitical mechanism. It is a “strict order of 
international finance” in which political discretion is constrained by a mechanism that 
ensures that the money supply is always “‘appropriate’” to the needs of the economy 
and “almost nothing at all is left to the planning initiative of [central] bank managers.” 
In contrast to Keynesian monetary policy, the gold standard “makes few rather than 
many demands on the human intellect” (ibid: 226). 
The automatic monetary system, however, can only emit signals to guide 
government action. The implementation of those signals rests on public authority. But 
the freedom of public authorities to interpret those signals is constrained and 
government cannot, “with impunity” (ibid: 236, emphasis added), affect core variables 
of economic policy in a manner contrary to those signals. Keynesian economic 
 
 
15 Published originally under the title “Goldwährung und Wirtschaftsordnung.” Friedrich A. Lutz was 
a student of Eucken, who develops a similar approach in Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik, albeit based 
an international commodity basket of consumer and industrial goods. The principles and effects of 
such a system would be similar to the gold standard except that “the value of money would not 
depend on one commodity – that is, gold – but would be linked to the value of several commodities” 
(Eucken 2004 [1952]: 262, emphasis in original, my translation).  
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planning, therefore, presents “an irreconcilable antithesis” to the automatic monetary 
order because it is 
based on the idea of conscious organization by a central authority. Its aims and 
methods originate … in a totally different world based on a fundamentally different 
view of the structural principles of the economy (ibid., emphasis added).  
For a general economic order to function, then, there must be a coherence between 
the principles governing all aspects of policymaking. The question of monetary order 
must therefore be answered in the context of the broader question of the political-
economic order a society wants for itself (ibid: 226-7).  
The choice between different monetary orders – a managed and an automatic 
– is a general choice between different approaches to governing the economy. This, in 
turn, is a choice that involves sacrifices. Whereas the managed monetary order involves 
the sacrifice of monetary stability, the automatic entails the sacrifice of the government 
prerogative to respond discretionarily to domestic political concerns: “If the rules are 
not observed” the automatic monetary system “ceases to be a system and chaotic 
conditions result” (ibid: 229). Governments must therefore not succumb to popular 
pressures for stimulus during a trough. The government ought, rather, to support the 
market in correcting the structural problems of the economy that led to the crisis in the 
first place. Only this will be an authentic and sustainable response to any given crisis. 
The international and automatic monetary system thereby promises to introduce a 
mechanism to enforce market discipline on government policy.  
 
The Economic Constitution 
The necessity of aligning the principles governing monetary and economic policy, 
demands a political commitment to allow “the price mechanism to take effect” (ibid: 
231), as only the price mechanism can translate ‘real’ economic developments into 
intelligible signals for economic actors. This is one of the central tenets in ordoliberal 
economic theory: the price mechanism constitutes the central allocative device that 
allows the large industrialised economy to function smoothly and with a minimum of 
distortions (Eucken 1951 [1939], 1989 [1948], 2004 [1952]). As Franz Böhm (1989 
[1966]: 53) put it, “the controlling force of the signals [of the market price system] 
consists in the fact that they co-ordinate the partial plans of all participants on the basis 
of decisions which are made by these participants.” It is a system of economic decision-
making which requires no governing central authority. The price mechanism operates 
Money and the Problem of Politics 
40 
 
as a “scarcity gauge” or a “calculating machine” and aides otherwise disassociated 
economic actors in the determination of “how to combine factors of production to 
produce what is required” (Eucken 1989: 27-8).  
To perform its role the price mechanism must not be disturbed. It therefore 
demands general price stability, since price developments that reflect conditions other 
than the relative scarcity of different goods and factors of production in the free market 
distort its functioning. In order protect the price mechanism, the ordoliberal order 
requires a strong state both to establish the necessary framework conditions and protect 
them from corruptive forces arising from the market or society (see Foucault 2008; 
Bonefeld 2015; Streeck 2015; Wilkinson 2015a). It is a strong state, however, in a 
particular sense. As the bearer of “volonté générale,” the state’s tasks must “include 
anything connected with the realisation of free market conditions” (Böhm 1989: 55). It 
must be endowed with a wide degree of discretion for evaluating and acting on what it 
perceives as the conditions necessary for realising the free market economy (see White 
2017a). However, the “task of government consists merely in creating the conditions 
enabling this control mechanism [of the market] to operate in accordance with the 
constitution” (Böhm 1989: 64, emphasis added). The state must refrain from going 
beyond its role as an enabler and protector of the economic constitution. It is strong in 
the sense that it must be afforded broad powers to ensure the workings of an automatic 
mechanism that disciplines not only others but also itself. The strong state thus subjects 
itself to qualitative limits but at the same time the automaticity of the monetary system 
reinforces such constraints by ensuring that breaches of the economic constitution are 
‘punished’ automatically. The internationality of the monetary system reinforces this 
punishment mechanism and thereby becomes a core feature of the domestic 
constitutional order of constrained government.  
The price mechanism of the market is, like the deist God, a weak ‘sovereign.’ 
It works through the natural laws of the economy, but these are corruptible and the 
market needs state power to enable and enforce its ‘will.’ In this political theology (see 
Manow 2001), the immanent order of nature does not emerge spontaneously in its 
perfect form, as “the classical economists” thought (Eucken 1989: 38). It is, rather, the 
task of “economic policy … to bring about the free, natural order that God intended” 
(ibid: 34; see also Eucken et al 1937). In this order, economic policy must be considered 
in its entirety to prevent incongruities between different parts of it. As such, 
“[m]onetary policy, policy on cartels, trade policy, policy towards small businesses et 
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cetera” should not be “seen as separate specialised areas to be dealt with discretely” 
(Eucken 1989: 39) but constituent parts of a general whole. The problem of politics is 
thus pivotal to ordoliberal thinking in that political authority presents a perennial 
threat to the ‘natural’ order – through its potentially corrupting influence on the 
workings of the market – while at the same time being inescapably necessary for 
bringing it about and protecting it. This inherent paradox between the artificiality and 
naturalness of the market economy means that political authority is always both 
necessary and unwanted. The question, then, is how the paradox is to be addressed. 
The ordoliberal paradox of political authority is a variant of Rousseau’s 
‘paradox of politics’ (Honig 2009), i.e. the problem that good laws come from good 
politics but good laws being a precondition for good politics. The problem is that social 
life does not emerge ex nihilo but is always situated historically and in concrete 
constellations of power. Any limited reform within the specific historical situation is 
inescapably insufficient or even counter-productive because it cannot adequately take 
the whole range of its consequences into account. Introducing the gold standard alone 
in the historical situation of Weimar Germany, for instance, would be bound to fail 
unless the comprehensive economic and political order were to be reconfigured along 
with it. Conversely, as Eucken (1989: 32) notes, “[t]here is little point in devising 
national constitutions in the modern world without regard for the economic system.” 
And in the face of structural economic changes, “[t]he constitution of the country [may 
remain] unchanged, but because of the shift in economic power the governmental 
decision-making process undergoes a change” (ibid.). The monetary system or the 
economic constitution must not, in other words, be addressed in isolation but in 
conjunction with the wider consideration of the constitutional relation between state 
and society (see Böhm 1989). 
In order to address this problem and overcome the problem of unintended 
consequences of partial and discretionary political initiatives, a ‘naturally’ occurring or 
artificially induced break with the past must be sought. In 1922, Carl Schmitt (2006) 
introduced his concept of the decision in and on the state of exception as the political 
equivalent of the miracle in Christian theology to address this problem and the 
ordoliberals in large part adopted this notion in their political theory (see, e.g., Böhm 
1989: 63). In Constitutional Theory, Schmitt refined the concept of the political decision 
and, by fusing it with the concept of the constituent power, arrived at a conception of 
the constitution as being derived from “the political will, whose power or authority is 
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capable of making the concrete, comprehensive decision [Gesamtentscheidung] over the 
type and form of its own political existence” (Schmitt 2008 [1928]: 125). This 
constituent decision, in turn, defines the constitution in its entirety and “[t]he validity 
of  any additional constitutional rule is derived from the decision of  this will” (ibid.). 
In their so-called ‘Ordoliberal manifesto,’ the ‘founding fathers of 
ordoliberalism’ – Eucken, Böhm and Hans Großmann-Doerth (1937: xix/1989: 24) – 
adapted the language of the ‘comprehensive decision’ to their own intellectual 
programme. In this, ‘the economic constitution’ (Wirtschaftsverfassung) is described as “a 
general political decision [Gesamtentscheidung] as to how the economic life of the nation 
is to be structured.”16 The manifesto calls for energetic legal-political action, but it 
rejects the Schmittian nihilism of the constituent moment. The economic constitution-
making process should instead “bring scientific reasoning, as displayed in 
jurisprudence and political economy, into effect for the purpose of constructing and 
reorganising the economic system” (Eucken et al 1989: 23; see also Eucken 2004: 250-
253; Müller-Armack 1978). The economic constitution should therefore be constituted 
by “men of science” who “by virtue of their profession and position” are “independent 
of economic interests” and, therefore, “the only objective, independent advisers 
capable of providing true insight into the intricate interrelationships of economic 
activity and therefore also of providing the basis upon which economic judgements can 
be made” (Eucken et al 1989: 15; see also Biebricher 2014: 97). The realisation of 
‘God’s intended order’ needs legal-political action as its midwife and the 
“comprehensive decision on the political order [Die ordnungspolitische Gesamtentscheidung] 
has to stand before individual economic policymaking acts” (Eucken 2004: 250, my 
translation). The latter, in turn, must conform to ‘the principle’ [Prinzip] enshrined in 
the economic constitution. 
The question of the monetary system is thereby inscribed within the wider 
question of the principles informing the basic economic and political constitution of 
the state. The monetary problem thereby becomes “merely one part of the 
fundamental matter of the principles by which economic life should be governed” (Lutz 
 
 
16 See also Müller-Armack (1978: 328), who saw the job of “shaping an economic order” as requiring 
“its incorporation into a total life style.”  
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1989: 235).  The problem of monetary order is thus an integral part of the general 
problem of how a political community governs itself.  
The internationality of currency systems such as the gold standard (and later 
the euro), however, introduces an additional difficulty. Precisely because they are 
international, their functioning and maintenance requires “confidence in political 
stability at home and abroad and, barely distinguishable from this, confidence in the 
maintenance of the currency” (ibid: 233, emphasis added). If there are concerns about 
the stability of the political system at home or abroad, economic activity ceases to be 
governed by ‘pure’ economic motives such as profit and productivity and becomes 
determined by political considerations concerning “the real or supposed general 
security or financial security of the countries concerned” (ibid.). The question of a 
particular government’s willingness to make the necessary sacrifices to maintain the 
currency system thereby becomes a concern for every other member of the system 
(ibid: 234). The internationality of the currency system thereby transforms the internal 
affairs of any member into a domestic political concern for every other member. As 
such, an international monetary system requires embedding not only in a national 
economic constitutional order but in a transnational one based on a comprehensive 
political decision in a constituent moment.  
 
The Role of the Central Bank 
Although underdeveloped in ordoliberal thought, the transnational dimension of the 
ordoliberal economic constitution has a direct bearing on the question of the euro and 
the ECB. I will return to this in chapters 4 and 6. For now, it is worth considering in 
more detail what the role of the central bank is within the ordoliberal economic 
constitution.  
As discussed above, ordoliberals hold that the monetary system cannot “be 
considered in isolation” or “from the perspective of monetary technique only” (Lutz 
(1989: 236-7; see also Lutz 1962 [1936]: 94-95). It must be considered from the 
perspective of the basic principle of “the whole economic system.” Like all other 
governmental institutions, then, the central bank must follow ‘the rules of the game’ 
and, in line with the general view of the role of the central bank under the gold 
standard, “not much is expected of a central bank” because its operations are “simply 
derived from the application of general economic principles to the monetary system” 
(Lutz 1989: 236). This does not render central banks superfluous, but it means that 
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they must not exert a conscious, independent influence on monetary policy. “[T]hey 
must,” rather, “work in the same direction” as the monetary system (ibid: 229). The 
automaticity of the system thereby provides the central bank with “an indicator of the 
need for action and of the end to be achieved” (Macmillan report as cited in Lutz 1989: 
229). Any intervention by the central bank must, in other words, follow Alexander 
Rüstow’s principle of ‘liberal interventionism’: it must “work in the same direction as 
the rules of the market, not against them” (Lutz 1989: 241, n. 7).  
The principle of liberal interventionism has a direct bearing on the question of 
central bank independence: 
there can be no question of any ‘independence of the human intellect’ … it is not for 
the [central bank manager] to command but to obey even if this means obeying in 
the manner of a highly intelligent servant who deduces only from certain indications 
what his master wishes and then does the right thing without any express command 
(ibid: 230).  
The market is the ‘master’ whose signals the central bank must head faithfully and the 
‘monetary constitution’ (Lutz 1962) must ensure the “automatic functioning” of 
monetary policy so that it does not depend on the “day-to-day decisions of political 
bodies” (Eucken 2004: 262, my translation). Monetary policy thereby becomes an 
exercise in applying the rules and principles of the economic constitution without 
independent agency. Monetary policy is rendered outside ordinary politics through the 
initial comprehensive political decision on the economic constitution, but its conduct 
is not left to an independent central bank. In fact, “an all too independent and weakly 
controlled central bank is difficult to fit into the structure of  the state. It will be tempted 
to position itself  in opposition to the general economic policy of  the state” (Eucken 
1946 as cited in Bibow 2009: 170). The ordoliberal economic constitution does thus 
not provide a justification for central bank independence, quite the contrary (see also 
Bibow 2009).  
While the ‘primacy of monetary policy’ [Primat der Währungspolitik] (Eucken 
2004: 255) is a core aspect of ordoliberal thought, it is so in the limited but important 
sense of monetary stability being the essential precondition for a functioning price 
mechanism, without which the competitive market economy is unthinkable (ibid: 256). 
Because the gold standard had been the historically most successful means of securing 
monetary stability, the ordoliberals sought the reintroduction of its principles by other 
means. They did so, however, by providing a political theory of its foundations in a 
comprehensive political decision on an economic constitution. When adherence to the 
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gold standard was no longer a political necessity, it had to be made part of the 
constitutional choice between a “Free economy” and a “planned economy” (Lutz 
1989: 241). The government of money, then, would take place on the basis of the 
primacy of the constitution. Within the constitutional order, politics ought to play as 
minor a role as possible and public authority should be employed mainly for protecting 
and sustaining the constituted system. The constituent political decision, in other 
words, ought to eliminate the role of politics in governing money and economic life in 
general. 
 
The Primacy of Rules in American Neoliberalism 
The ordoliberals conceived of the economic constitutional choice as one between 
competing comprehensive orders of potentially equal economic merit. That is, the 
Keynesian planned economy could be as efficient as the market economy, but it 
operated according to different principles. The choice between them was a moral one: 
should society be free or unfree? To American neoliberals such as Milton Friedman, 
this choice was false. The planned economy was indeed morally inferior to the free 
market economy because it rested on coercion (Friedman 2002 [1962]: 13). More 
importantly, however the notion that a planned and a free market economy operated 
according to different organising principles was rejected. Regardless of the system of 
governing, the ‘economy’ adhered to immutable laws and the problem with the 
planned economy was that even a fully rational, ‘well-meaning’ planner would never 
be able to know the full consequences of its policies. The planned economy would 
inescapably produce unintended and unwanted outcomes and was therefore quite 
simply a clumsy and sub-optimal way of organising economic activity. 
This rejection of competing principles governing economic life had an 
important bearing on the question of money. Inflation, according to Friedman and co-
authors such as Rose Friedman and Anna Schwartz, is neither a capitalist nor a 
socialist phenomenon but finds its cause in the use of the printing press by government 
(Friedman and Friedman 1990 [1980]: 254; Friedman and Schwartz 1963). It is a 
monetary phenomenon and is derived from the way in which money is governed. As 
such, the question of the monetary order becomes not so much a constitutional 
question as a question of policymaking and of establishing a methodology for 
governing money in a manner that does not distort the functioning of the economy. 
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Rules vs Authorities in the Absence of the Gold Standard 
While monetarism, the neoliberal theory of monetary policy, is primarily associated 
with the work of Friedman after WWII, some of its core conceptual underpinnings 
were developed by Henry Simons in the inter-war period. Simons (1936: 11), in turn, 
developed them on the basis of an “amazement that so many people of insight should 
hold unwaveringly to the gold standard as the best foundation of national policies.” 
This attachment to gold indicated, according to Simons (ibid: 12), “how little progress 
liberals have made in showing, by way of answer to revolutionists, what kind of money-
rules might be adopted to make capitalism a more workable system.” Liberalism, in 
other words, had failed to develop a credible response to the collapse of gold as the 
foundation of monetary value and as such, “[t]he monetary problem stands out today 
as the great intellectual challenge to the liberal faith” (ibid: 1).  
A liberal response to the problem of money had to abandon the gold standard 
but without turning to a “reliance on discretionary (dictatorial, arbitrary) action by an 
independent monetary authority” (ibid: 5, emphasis added). A liberal response had, in other 
words, to reject central bank independence. Instead efforts ought to be directed to 
designing and establishing “a monetary system good enough so that, hereafter, we may 
hold to it unrationally—on faith—as a religion, if you please” (ibid: 14). The task, in 
other words, was to politically establish a system of governing money that would then 
become depoliticised and taken for granted. The answer, Simons suggested, could be 
found in the “establishment of a simple, mechanical rule of monetary policy” (ibid: 16). 
While such a rule could not “wisely be written into our fundamental law, it must 
provide the same sort of limitation and mandate as would a constitutional provision” 
(ibid: 24-25). It should be able to constrain the freedom of “a dominant party” (ibid: 
25) and thereby remove the conduct of monetary policy from the realm of partisan 
politics. In order to perform this function, its significance would have to be grounded 
in public opinion: the rule “must be accepted by the community, and obeyed by the 
legislature, as the guiding principle of government finance” (ibid: 24).  
In this regard, Simons (ibid: 25) argued, “there is probably nothing more 
promising than the idea of a stable price-level as a symbol articulating deep-rooted 
sentiments and as a source of discipline in fiscal practice” This grounding in the 
community’s monetary imaginary would then “assure adequate moral pressure of 
public opinion against legislative (and administrative) tinkering” (ibid: 29). The 
meaning of price stability and the rule governing monetary and, by extension, fiscal 
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policy should, in other words, be grounded in a popular imaginary defying rational 
explanation. It should be grounded in the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people. 
When picking up on Simons’ argument in “A Monetary and Fiscal Framework 
for Economic Stability,” Friedman (1948: 247) equally presented his framework as 
being aimed at eliminating “the discretionary control of the quantity of money by 
central bank authority.” His framework thus presents a vision for reducing “the 
uncertainty and undesirable political implications of discretionary action by 
governmental authorities” in response to economic developments as they arise (ibid: 
263). Friedman (ibid: 246), furthermore, seeks to “specify the general institutional 
arrangements” conducive to securing “political freedom, economic efficiency, and 
substantial equality of economic power”; ends that are best achieved by relying “on a 
market mechanism within a ‘competitive order’ to organize the utilization of economic 
resources” (ibid.). Friedman’s focus is not on individual policies but on the general 
structure within which policymaking takes place. In this regard, Friedman’s makes two 
specific propositions regarding the monetary order and the conduct of monetary 
policy:  
(1) Government must provide a monetary framework for a competitive order since 
the competitive order cannot provide one for itself. (2) This monetary framework 
should operate under the ‘rule of law’ rather than the discretionary authority of 
administrators (ibid.).  
So far, so ordoliberal: political authority must constitute the monetary system, but it 
must play no conscious part in managing it. In contrast to the ordoliberals, however, 
Friedman’s (ibid: 252) programme is, like Simons’, explicitly presented as privileging 
domestic over international concerns.  
The focus on domestic concerns reflects Keynes’. Keynes, however, reserved a 
prominent and continuous role for politics in monetary policy combined with a degree 
of central bank independence in the technical pursuit of the government’s desired 
policy. Friedman’s framework allows for neither. This dual rejection is informed by 
Friedman’s fundamental scepticism regarding the capacity of human beings to 
successfully control economic forces. To Friedman, the natural forces of the economy 
do not, in principle, need politics as their midwife. However, while these forces can 
never be suspended entirely, they can be distorted and perverted by government 
intervention, whereby a “moderate contraction” can be turned “into a major 
catastrophe” (Friedman 2002: 38; see also Friedman and Schwartz 1963). This leads 
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Friedman to conclude that “The Great Depression … is a testament to how much 
harm can be done by mistakes on the part of a few men when they wield vast power 
over the monetary system of a country” (Friedman 2002: 50). The question, then, is 
how to design a system for governing money that leaves as little scope for human error 
as possible.  
Friedman’s response is that the conduct of monetary policy ought to be 
subjected to the “government of law instead of men by legislating rules for the conduct 
of monetary policy” (ibid: 51). According to Friedman (ibid.), this “will have the effect 
of enabling the public to exercise control over monetary policy through its political 
authorities, while at the same time it will prevent monetary policy from being subject 
to the day-to-day whim of political authorities.” Friedman, unlike Keynes, thereby 
introduces a schism between the legislative power of the people (through elected 
representatives) and government. The monetary order is explicitly subject to political 
control, but the conduct of monetary policy is not. The political control of monetary 
policy, then, is limited to updating the monetary policy rule “as we [learn] more about 
monetary matters” (ibid: 55).  
The notion of a rule governing monetary policy reflects a dedication to doing 
“less harm” (Friedman 1948: 254). The question for Friedman is not that of creating 
the perfect system of monetary policymaking, but of creating one that is as little 
distortive as possible. In this regard, it of little importance whether the particular rule 
chosen is the best possible rule. What matters is that one is chosen. The logic informing 
this is derived from Friedman’s conception of the economy. The economy adheres to 
immanent, immutable forces, but it is not humanly possible to gain a perfect 
understanding of those forces. The perfect monetary policymaker is not so much a 
political impossibility as an epistemological one: the policymaker may be perfectly 
benevolent, but because she cannot gain full knowledge of the workings of the 
economy, she cannot know the full consequences of her actions. Conscious 
policymaking is bound to produce unintended, distortive effects. As such, any rule, 
however imperfect, is preferable to discretionary policymaking because the rule at least 
is predictable and any distortion it may cause is one-off rather than continuous 
(Friedman 2002: 50-51). “The precise definition of money adopted, or the precise rate 
of growth chosen, makes far less difference than the definite choice of a particular 
definition and a particular rate of growth” (ibid: 54). 
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The Economic Approach to Central Banking 
The problem of politics, however, remains unresolved, as there can be no certainty 
that the public and its political representatives will choose to introduce a rule via 
legislation. As such, the public and its representatives must be educated in how to think 
about policymaking. This is a central theme of neoliberal ‘governmentality’ (Foucault 
2008): what is important is not to promote concrete policies but to shape how people 
think about and evaluate choices between different options (see also Becker 1964). 
According to this approach – which seeks to shape the way people think rather than 
what they think – political decisions ought, like economic ones, to be guided not by 
unchanging convictions but by weighing the costs and benefits of particular actions. A 
principled opposition to any given institution or social phenomenon thereby becomes 
less important than the weighing of the relative costs and benefits of competing 
alternatives. Thus, even though Friedman was, in principle, opposed to the very 
institution of a central bank (see Friedman 1976), his primary contribution to economic 
theory focussed on how a central bank ought to conduct monetary policy (see Doherty 
1995). 
Friedman’s critique of central bank independence was specifically aimed at its 
institutionalisation in the absence of “a thoroughly automatic gold standard” 
(Friedman 2002: 51). In a post-gold standard condition, where the value of money has 
“no relation to any commodity,” there is no anchor to guide monetary policy. As such, 
“the quantity of money is determined … by government. Government and the 
government alone is responsible for any rapid increase in the quantity of money” 
(Friedman and Friedman 1990: 253). The problem of money is, in other words, a 
problem of government. The question, then, is how the power of government can be 
rendered ‘harmless’ to the monetary order.  
While the ordoliberals sought the solution to this problem in a comprehensive 
constitutional decision, Friedman seeks it in a reorientation of governmental thinking 
about monetary policy. While Freidman presented the monetary rule (or the computer) 
as the ideal, it should be understood as a methodological device rather than an actual 
programme. Like the abstract notion of the perfectly competitive free market economy, 
it constitutes the horizon against which alternative ways of governing monetary matters 
are measured. Its practical unreality or infeasibility is, in this context, irrelevant as long 
as it inscribes any given policy decision in a calculus of costs and benefits that takes a 
hypothetical market outcome as the benchmark: given a hypothetical base scenario of 
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inaction or non-intervention, what are the costs and benefits of a particular course of 
action? Public interventions may be perfectly legitimate, from this perspective, but they 
need to demonstrate their superiority.  
The basic problem for American neoliberals is not to specify the content of 
policy- or polity-making decision, but rather to shape the methodology of decision-
making as such. It is, in the first instance, not important what is decided but how. This 
does not mean that concrete values and policies are not promoted – as for instance 
Friedman’s k-percent rule for monetary growth (Friedman 1960) – but they are so on 
the basis of their ability to minimise distortions to the economy. For the American 
neoliberals, the problem of politics is thus not so much one of overcoming political 
influence on economic life but of establishing a particular syntax and grammar for how 
it is conducted. The problem of politics becomes one of educating governments and 
people in how to think about competing policymaking options in a manner that renders 
the activity of governing as unobtrusive as possible. In terms of monetary policy, then, 
“[t]he first and most important lesson that history teaches about what monetary policy 
can do … is that monetary policy can prevent money itself from being a major source 
of economic disturbance” (Friedman 1968: 12). In other words, the most important 
function of monetary policy is to neutralise the potentially destructive economic effects 
of monetary policy. What matters is that Ulysses ties his hands.  
 
Conclusion 
Following the collapse of the gold standard in the interwar period, the political 
foundations of the value of money and the monetary order became a pressing 
intellectual concern. Because both the value of money, the monetary order and the 
conduct of monetary policy were no longer determined outside the political process, 
economic thinking had to confront the problem of politics. In this chapter I have 
discussed three approaches to the problem, which responded to the challenge in 
different ways.  
What the three approaches discussed have in common is that none considers 
central bank independence as being linked to the achievement of price stability. In 
none, central bank independence figures as a way of addressing the problem of politics 
in relation to money; except perhaps in Keynes, but then only in a highly limited and 
specific manner. However, as I will highlight in the next two chapters, the doctrine of 
central bank independence in the absence of a gold standard incorporated central elements 
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from each of the approaches. To anticipate points developed over the next chapters, 
central bank independence shares a technocratic and discretionary approach to 
monetary policy with Keynes; it shares an emphasis on the legal, even constitutional, 
separation of monetary policy from the control of political authorities with 
ordoliberalism; and it shares a conception of governing in accordance with the 
immutable natural laws of the economy with neoliberalism. With both ordoliberalism 
and neoliberalism, furthermore, it shares the fundamental concern with the primacy 
of price stability and, thus, monetary policy. What it leaves out (or is situated 
problematically in relation to) is the Keynesian notion of the final subjection of 
monetary policy to the government of the day, on the one hand, and the ordo- and 
neoliberal notions of instituting a system for eliminating central bank discretion, on the 
other.  
According to all three approaches, the central bank is not supposed to be in a 
position to say ‘no’ to government. For Keynes, this would be in violation of the 
primacy of the government’s economic policy; for ordoliberals this would indicate the 
failure of the economic constitution; and for the neoliberals, the central bank ought 
not to be in a position to say anything because the government ought not to be in a 
position to ask anything of it. This reflects, perhaps, that the three approaches are 
concerned with developing a general framework for how economic and monetary 
policy ought to be conducted. Central bank independence, on the other hand, emerged 
within and in response to the existing ‘imperfections’ of political and economic 
practices. It was never constructed systematically as a ‘pure’ theory, but emerged from 
practices, narratives and justifications that were situated in specific conflicts and 
historical contexts. It emerged, nevertheless, as a general way of thinking about how to 
address the problem of politics in relation to money, which has had an extraordinary 
influence on the institutional position of central banks around the world, including the 
ECB’s. It is its emergence in practice and theory that I discuss in the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 2 
The Myth of the Hyperinflations and the Emergence of 
Central Bank Independence in Germany 
 
 
Introduction 
“Nothing, as we have to keep reminding ourselves, made the German people so bitter, 
so mad with hatred, so ripe for Hitler as the inflation.” So wrote Stefan Zweig (2011: 
340) in his 1942 memoir, The World of Yesterday. The German hyperinflation of 1923, 
according to Zweig, destroyed not only economic values but the moral compass of the 
German people:  
Even the Rome of Suetonius never knew such orgies as those at the transvestites’ 
balls in Berlin, where hundreds of men in women’s clothing and women dressed like 
men danced under the benevolent gaze of the police. Amidst the headlong fall of all 
values, a kind of madness took hold of the bourgeois circles that had so far resisted 
any change to the well-ordered society (ibid: 338).  
With the annihilation of the value of money, Zweig suggests, all other values evaporate 
with it. Inflation is not only an economic event, much less simply a monetary 
phenomenon. The trauma was not inflation as such, but that it was accompanied by a 
societal lapse into a state of nature without any form of guideline for appropriate 
economic, political or moral behaviour, not to speak of sanctions for transgressing 
them. With an almost Hobbesian devotion to constrained freedom, Zweig (ibid: 338-
339) claims that the German people secretly “hated the new German Republic, not 
because the government might suppress some of this wild freedom but, on the contrary, 
because it held the reins too loosely.” In the shadows lurked a new Leviathan promising 
to reinstate “law and order” (ibid: 339).  
The narrative linking the German hyperinflation to the rise of Hitler is well-
known. What is perhaps less well-known is that the contemporary notion of central 
bank independence is to a large extent founded on it; at least in so far as the German 
Bundesbank inspired the notion of central bank independence. As Hans Tietmeyer 
(1998: ix-x, emphasis added), then president of the German Bundesbank, put in on the 
threshold of transferring monetary sovereignty to the ECB: 
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The internal and external stability of the value of the Deutsche Mark is ultimately a 
reflection and result of a stability culture in Germany which has grown over a period 
of decades and which has its origins in the painful historical experience of two hyperinflations 
with their disastrous social and political consequences … [Monetary stability] needs to be 
based on a social consensus which assumes concrete shape in terms of adequate legal 
and institutional regulations … without the protective shield of independence, 
central banks are exposed to a latent danger of being called upon to perform tasks 
which they cannot fulfil with the instruments they have.  
Shifting the emphasis from the German context to central banks in general, Tietmeyer 
generalises the German experience. Central bank independence, he suggests, is not a 
peculiarity of the German ‘economic constitution’ but an institutional solution to a 
universal problem. Central bank independence, in this narrative, is the institutional 
form corresponding to a social consensus on the need for price stability, just like the 
state is, in Hobbes, for the social consensus on the need for political stability. Both 
demand a certain sacrifice of political freedoms but in their absence, life will be 
‘solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short,’ as the hyperinflation and WWII attest to. 
Central bank independence is thereby grounded in something beyond its economic 
rationality. It is not only with reference to better economic outcomes that an 
independent central bank pursuing price stability is justified. It is justified against the 
background and fear of societal collapse and the possibility of the worst.  
When the Bundesbank was created after WWII, most central banks were 
‘Keynesian’: they were politically controlled and made to serve the broader economic 
agenda of the government of the day. The newly established independent German 
central bank was an anomaly. Its independence, furthermore, different from central 
bank independence under the gold standard as it was not only independent of 
government but also of the tie to gold. From the perspective of the theories discussed 
in chapter 1 as well contemporaneous practice this form of independence was 
unprecedented: “among all the important central banks in the world, the German 
Bundesbank is endowed with the greatest independence. Even compared to the 
American Federal Reserve Bank” (Emminger 1986: 27, my translation). Half a century 
later, its independence inspired emulation across the world and provided the blueprint 
for the ECB. Understanding the nature of the Bundesbank’s independence and the 
foundations of its power to act against the democratically elected government is 
therefore not only of relevance to an understanding of the Bundesbank itself. It is of 
central importance to understanding the societal role of independent central banks in 
general and the specific conception of politics that this institutional form responds to. 
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This chapter analyses how the German central bank, first Bank deutscher 
Länder (BdL) and later the Bundesbank, was constituted and the justifications offered 
for its independence from government. Unsupported by the dominant economic 
theories of the day (discussed in chapter 1), the central bank’s independence was 
justified against the backdrop of constituting price stability as a Grundnorm of economic 
and political life. This link between central bank independence and price stability was 
an innovation in terms of monetary-political thinking that became extraordinarily 
influential, particularly following the Stagflation Crisis of the 1970s (discussed in 
chapter 3). What I highlight particularly in this regard is the role played by the political 
myth of the hyperinflations. Consciously promoted by German central bankers in the 
debates leading up to the adoptions of the Bundesbank Act in 1957, this mythical 
narrative sought to ground the meaning of central bank independence in something 
more fundamental than positive law or economic expediency. The myth posited an 
order of meaning within which price stability was something akin to an ‘absolute’ and 
central bank independence was the only way of realising it. It sought to ground the 
meaning of central bank independence in public opinion – the ‘hearts and minds’ of 
the people – and the central bank presented itself as a representative of the people on 
a par with the elected government. ‘The people’ was thus represented with equal right 
by two potentially competing governmental institutions in a structure of ‘dual 
representation.’ The people, existing as public opinion, thereby became the source of 
the central bank’s power to act against the government in concrete conflicts. 
 
Central Banking in the Post-War Period 
German central bank independence after WWII was, as noted, an anomaly at the time. 
Until the early 1970s, the post-war monetary order was in principle based on the 1944 
Bretton Woods agreement. In reality, however, the situation was not as clear. 
European currencies including the D-mark only became fully convertible constituents 
of the system in 1958. Beginning its collapse in the late 1960s, it only survived as a fully 
functional international monetary system for about a decade (Bordo 1993). Bretton 
Woods was not exactly a beacon of stability, in other words. There are nevertheless 
some crucial characteristics of the system that informed the way central banking was 
conducted at the time.  
At the time of the Bretton Woods conference, the prevalent view was that “If 
there is anything that inter-war experience has clearly demonstrated, it is that paper 
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currency exchanges cannot be left free to fluctuate from day to day under the influence 
of market supply and demand” (Nurkse 1944 as cited in Bordo 1993: 29). While the 
gold standard was perceived to have failed, owing, inter alia, to rigidities in terms of 
the demands placed on domestic adjustments, a floating currency regime was 
perceived to have led to the prevalence of beggar-thy-neighbour devaluations, with 
highly destabilising effects. The gold standard was too strict, but the anarchy of floating 
currencies was too chaotic. This analysis can be challenged (see, e.g., Eichengreen and 
Sachs 1985), but it “was crucial in the design of the Bretton Woods system” (Bordo 
1993: 31). As such, the agreement was essentially an attempt to “combine the 
advantage of the classical gold standard (i.e., exchange rate stability) with the 
advantage of floating rates (i.e., independence to pursue national full employment 
policies)” (Bordo 1993: 5). Gold was not abandoned as the ultimate anchor of monetary 
value, but the tie to gold was rendered more flexible. The idea was that adjustments 
would no longer have to take place abruptly but could be handled in an orderly fashion. 
According to Walter Eucken (2004: 168, my translation), this meant that “the 
Bretton Woods agreement was basically nothing but a compromise between all the 
‘monetary orders’ that had developed since the collapse of the gold standard.” Instead 
of being based on “one principle,” it combined, to the horror of Eucken (2004: 168, 
emphasis in original, my translation), principles from “economic systems of completely 
different character” and was thus not an order in the sense discussed in chapter 1. 
Whether or not Eucken’s pessimism was justified, his analysis captures a crucial point: 
the specifics of the domestic monetary orders were not fully determined by the 
international system. Although not Keynesian in a comprehensive sense, the system 
reflected the Keynesian notion of allowing states to conduct autonomous monetary 
policies in accordance with domestic agendas rather than subordinating these “to the 
dictates of external balance and … the international transmission of the business cycle” 
(Bordo 1993: 5). States, furthermore, could maintain capital controls in order to 
safeguard domestic monetary autonomy and fixed exchange rates at the expense of 
international financial integration (Rodrik 2011).  
Following the Keynesian (and social democratic) primacy of politics, Bretton 
Woods allowed domestic political authorities to determine the objectives of monetary 
policy relatively freely. In the age of ‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie 1982) and social 
democracy (Berman 2006: 179), this entailed also a Keynesian approach to expanding 
the role of government in economic activity in many countries. This was reflected in 
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(changes to) the institutional position of central banks. At the time, many central banks 
were still privately owned. While this private ownership was largely irrelevant for the 
purposes of conducting monetary policy, the nationalisations of central banks after the 
Great Depression and WWII were important symbolically. Analysing the 
nationalisations of the Bank of England and Banque de France, one observer 
concluded that the acts  
can be analyzed most fruitfully not as isolated fragments of history nor even 
harbingers of immediate changes in monetary policy but as reflections of changes in 
the basic attitudes of the British and French people toward the role that government 
should play in economic affairs (Bopp 1946: 308).  
Central banks were to be subordinated to government and to the post-war project of 
economic reconstruction and reorganisation (see also Elgie and Thompson 1998).  
The primacy of politics with regard to monetary policy was legally enshrined 
in a number of countries. The Bank of England was subordinated the Treasury’s quest 
to make monetary policy favour “the borrowers of money as against the money 
lenders.” Monetary policy was, in the (Keynesian) words of the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer at the time, to be “on the side of the active producer as against the passive 
rentier” (Dalton 1947 as cited in Wood 2005: 298). The situation was not much different 
on the continent. The Belgian National Bank was subordinated to the Minister of 
Finance, who had “the right to control all the Bank’s operations” (Art. 29, Organic 
Law of the National Bank, 1939 as cited in Bade and Parkin 1988: 5) and the Dutch 
Bank Act of 1948 “made clear that monetary policy was not just the business of [the 
central bank] but was part of general economic policy and as such lay most definitely 
within the competence of the government” (DNB n.d.: 6). The governor of the Banque 
de France at the time, Jacques Brunet, insisted in the context of European monetary 
integration that “the role of governments in monetary policy be emphasized” (Brunet 
1962 as cited in James 2012: 49). In Italy, the post-fascist leadership of the Banca 
d’Italia, with Luigi Einaudi at the helm, could only wrest a modicum of independence 
from the government. In their study of central bank laws, Bade and Parkin (1988: 4) 
thus concluded that even in the late 1980s these central banks were “subservient to the 
central governments … in the formulation and conduct of monetary policy.” 
Most central banks at the time were, in other words, “politically controlled and 
there existed no well-developed conceptual framework as to why or how central banks 
should be independent” (James 2012: 43). As discussed in chapter 1, “economic theory 
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was deeply unsympathetic to any idea of independent central banks” (James 2012: 47). 
The “old form of central bank independence,” as Lutz (1949: 209, my translation) 
described it, had disappeared with the collapse of the gold standard and there was no 
appetite among economists or policymakers for re-establishing it in its old form or 
anew. In a hearing in the US House Banking Committee in 1964 on the independence 
of the Fed, similarly, the economics professors called to testify all discouraged central 
bank independence:  
Four, including Milton Friedman, favoured money rules, and the rest joined [Paul] 
Samuelson and [John] Gurley in recommending the subordination of monetary 
policy to the president. It was unthinkable, even “ludicrous,” that monetary policy 
did not conform to the program of elected officials (Wood 2005: 346).1 
 
Central Bank Independence in European Monetary Integration 
Given the general international consensus, it is not surprising that the notion of central 
bank independence was absent from the 1970 Werner Report on European Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU). This report constituted the starting point for the Delors 
Committee’s work that led to the creation of the euro and the ECB (Baer and Padoa-
Schioppa 1989) and it provided a blueprint for monetary union that was remarkably 
similar to that outlined in 1989 (Verdun 2001). One crucial difference, however, 
concerned the EMU’s governmental structure. The Werner Report (1970: 26) 
considered the transfer of decision-making power to two European institutions 
indispensable: “a centre of decision for economic policy, and a Community system for 
the central banks.” The former of these – a gouvernement economique (Verdun 2003) – 
would, according to the Report, “exercise independently, in accordance with the 
Community interest, a decisive influence over the general economic policy of the 
Community” (Werner Report 1970: 12, emphasis added). 
The centralisation of economic government at the European level was 
envisioned to be accompanied by a transfer of powers to the European Parliament, to 
which the economic government would be “politically responsible” (ibid: 13). On the 
 
 
1 In addition to the Bundesbank, there were two other exceptions to the general pattern: the Fed and 
the Swiss National Bank (SNB). The SNB is a special case for a variety of reasons, not least due to 
its maintenance of a domestic gold standard until 2000, and I will not discuss it further in this thesis. 
The Fed’s independence, on the other hand, will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4. The 
hearing in question concerned a proposal to reduce the independence of the Fed, which was, by 
some, considered excessive. 
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question of the independence of the central bank, however, the Werner Report was all 
but silent. While noting that it would resemble the Fed in its autonomy (ibid.), the 
Report stressed that the two organs “work together for the realization of the same 
objectives” (ibid: 26). Given the primacy of the economic government and its political 
responsibility to a strengthened parliament, this vision of EMU reflected the belief that 
“central banks required political supervision” (James 2012: 79). Indeed, the German 
contributor tried unsuccessfully to push forward he German notion of central bank 
independence and the Bundesbank remained fundamentally sceptical about the 
Report (ibid: 76-82).  
In the Delors Report, in contrast, the notion of an economic government was 
abandoned. The formulation, coordination and implementation of Community 
policies “would not necessarily require a new institution.” Realising EMU would 
require only “the creation of a new monetary institution” (Delors Report 1989: 21). 
This institution, in turn, “should be independent of instructions from national 
governments and Community authorities” (ibid: 22). Furthermore, in place of the 
political responsibility to parliament that the Werner Report envisioned, the Delors 
Report only suggested modest central bank accountability in the form of written and 
oral reporting to the other Community institutions (ibid: 22-23).  
What the Fed was for Werner, the Bundesbank was for Delors. And the 
absolute independence of the future ECB reflected the German central bankers’ 
concern that even though the Fed was “independent of the government” it was still too 
subject to “political pressures,” particularly through “its accountability [Rechenschaft] to 
Congress” (Emminger 1986: 27, my translation). In contrast, the Bundesbank was both 
“independent from government and parliament” (ibid., emphasis in original, my 
translation).2 The prevalent ‘European’ perspective on the status of the central bank 
had shifted markedly. The intellectual consequences of the Stagflation Crisis played a 
key role in this shift (see chapter 3). In the specific European context, however, the 
importance of the D-mark for European monetary relations – and with it the German 
 
 
2 Emminger’s claim that the Bundesbank was independent of parliament is not entirely true. Its 
independence was only enshrined in ordinary legislation, not, as the notion of independence from 
parliament would suggest, by the constitution (Emminger 1986: 27). However, over the years, 
Emminger (ibid., my translation) claimed, the Bundesbank’s independence had “gained a de facto 
quasi-constitutional character,” whereby the Bundesbank had become independent also of the 
Bundestag.  
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notion of central bank independence – was decisive (see Dyson and Featherstone 
1999). 
 
The Constitution of Independence 
The independence of the German central bank is often viewed as an inevitable 
consequence of the inter-war period. When it emerged, however, it was highly 
contingent and fraught with conflict (Hentschel 1988; Mee 2016). In the years leading 
up to the adoption of the Bundesbank Law in 1957, there was, like elsewhere, no 
generally accepted theoretical or political justification for central bank independence 
in Germany and the main political parties of the Federal Republic did not consider it 
viable. Eventually this would change to the point where Jacques Delors’ quip that “Not 
all Germans believe in God, but all believe in the Bundesbank” was considered to sum 
up “the near-divine standing of the German central bank with the German public” 
(Handelsblatt 2017, 28 July). 
Understanding how central bank independence emerged in the context of a 
near-universal consensus against it requires an appreciation of the specific historical 
situation in which it was created. In the three years between the end of the war and 
the currency reform that introduced the D-mark, the monetary situation in what would 
become West Germany was highly unstable and “barter became the means of 
exchange in daily life” (Kennedy 1998: 2). This period of ‘repressed inflation’3 became 
linked to the experiences with the hyperinflation in the 1920s and constituted the 
second prolonged experience of fundamental uncertainty regarding the monetary 
situation within a generation. In this light, it is perhaps not surprising that the second 
inflation “created a powerful political culture in favor of monetary stability” (ibid.). 
What is surprising is that this Stabilitätskultur took the institutional form of central bank 
independence.  
It is a peculiar historical irony that the modern form of central bank 
independence emerged in and became so closely associated with Germany. Prior to its 
establishment after WWII, no country in the world had perhaps had worse experiences 
 
 
3 Repressed inflation refers to a situation when goods are unavailable at nominal prices, which are fixed 
through price controls. In such a situation, goods are obtained through barter, rations and the black 
market using foreign currency. Wages fixed in accordance with the official rate are more or less 
worthless and while there is nominally no inflation, the currency is in reality worthless. 
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with it. As Giersch and Lehment (1981; see also Leaman 2001; Schieritz 2013; Mee 
2016) note, two of the most traumatic episodes in German economic history – the 
hyperinflation of 1923 and the Great Depression, which combined sky-rocketing 
unemployment with deflation – both took place under the guardianship of a legally 
independent Reichsbank. Furthermore, the reform that ended the hyperinflation and 
brought about a period of price stability and growth was “not supported by the 
Reichsbank; it was even a reform against the Reichsbank” (Giersch and Lehment 
1981: 10). The Reichsbank’s independence was, of course, gradually curtailed after 
Hitler’s rise to power. But even so, the Reichsbank’s independence was effective neither 
in ensuring price stability nor in preventing the government from using the printing 
press for incendiary purposes. As such, it is not surprising that post-war German 
politicians and economic thinkers were sceptical of central bank independence, 
including the ordoliberals (see chapter 1; see also Bibow 2009; Feld et al 2015; Young 
2017). 
So how did the Stabilitätskultur come to be expressed in the institutional form of 
central bank independence? Initially, the practice of central bank independence was 
forced on West Germany by the occupation authorities. As Emminger (1986: 20, my 
translation) later remarked, the Bundesbank was a “child of the occupation.” Subject 
to the Allied Banking Commission’s (ABC) supervision and veto the Bundesbank’s 
predecessor, the BdL established in 1948, was not, in fact, legally independent. But on 
the explicit demand of the Americans, and despite German opposition, it was 
independent from the control of German political authorities (Buchheim 2001: 8; 
Bibow 2010). Even Ludwig Erhard, who later became a champion of the Bundesbank’s 
independence, opposed this complete independence at the time, arguing, not unlike 
Keynes, that while the central bank should be given independence in the conduct of 
monetary policy, the government was the final decision-making authority (Buchheim 
2001: 12).  
During its first years, the BdL was a controversial institution in Germany and 
it was subject to political attacks from all sides (Hentschel 1988). It is highly doubtful 
whether it would have survived the first few years in a (fully) sovereign German state 
and without the occupation authorities’ support (Buchheim 2001: 16-17). “[L]ike a 
benevolent dictator” the ABC shielded the BdL from both the German political 
authorities and democratic pressures (Berger 1997: 435; see also Mee 2016: 233; 
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Dickhaus 1998). Without the military occupation, the German form of central bank 
independence would have been unlikely to even get off to a start.  
When the German Basic Law (GG) was adopted 1949, it conferred on the 
federal government the task of creating a federal central bank (Art. 88 GG). On this 
basis, the military authorities asked the newly created federal government to come up 
with a “substitute arrangement” before monetary sovereignty was transferred to the 
new West German state (Bibow 2009: 160). However, neither the Basic Law nor the 
military authorities specified its institutional form. Before the West German state could 
take “full sovereignty over central banking,” the government had to come up with a 
new central banking law or introduce a transitional arrangement “to determine who 
would take over the function of the ABC in the future.”4 At the beginning of the 
process, Cabinet decided that a “draft of a transition law be presented soon and that it 
should basically stipulate that the federal government take the place of the ABC.”5 This 
reflected the general (Keynesian) outlook on central banking at the time: independence 
was a mistake in need of correcting (Hentschel 1988). Invoking not the inflations but 
the Great Depression, Die Welt wrote in 1949 (cited in Mee 2016: 141): “In all countries 
the non-political central bank belongs to the past ... It came to awful experiences in 
1931 with the Reichsbank independent from the state.” The general consensus against 
central bank independence was thus based in large part on a narrative of the interwar 
period that stressed the complicity of the independent central bank in the Great 
Depression.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Das Bundesarchiv, Kabinettsprotokolle, 137. Kabinettssitzung am 20. März 1951, D. 
Notenbankgesetz (my translation). 
5 Ibid. 
6 While it is not the intention of this chapter to evaluate why the efforts to create a politically supervised 
central bank failed, it is worth noting that this failure was due in significant part to conflicts between 
the Länder and federal levels over the central bank’s degree of centralisation. In opposition to the 
federal government, the Länder favoured a decentralised arrangement (Berger and de Haan 1999: 
24). The final institutional outcome, a politically independent but centralised central bank, can be 
seen as a compromise between the two positions. What was a compromise to the Länder and federal 
governments, however, was a perfect victory for the central bankers, who wanted precisely that: a 
centralised and independent central bank (Mee 2016). 
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The Inflations in Central Bank Discourse 
The general scepticism about central bank independence, however, was not shared by 
the central bankers themselves. They valued their independence and engaged actively 
in debates with politicians and the public to bring them around to their point of view.  
In an early intervention in favour central bank independence, for instance, 
Otto Veit7 (1950: 141, my translation) argued for the need to “limit state sovereignty 
[staatliche Oberhoheit] over money creation to legally constituting [gesetzliche Konstituierung] 
the central bank and appointing the leading personalities. Apart from this, the central 
bank shall fulfil its task independently of state instructions.” To Veit (ibid: 141-142), 
furthermore, the “independence of monetary policy from political influence is as 
important as the independence of the judiciary … Neither more nor less.” Presented 
at a meeting of the famous Board of Academic Advisors to the Economics Ministry 
(ibid: 9-10), Veit’s justification is noteworthy: “The monetary catastrophes that the 
German people has lived through, always began with using the central bank to finance 
the state [benutzung der Zentralbank für den Staatskredit]” (ibid: 142). The independence of 
the central bank is thereby presented and justified as a bulwark against the catastrophes 
suffered by the German people in the recent past.  
The narrative linking the experience of the catastrophic consequences of the 
inflations to the necessity for central bank independence became a consistent trope in 
central bank interventions in the debate on the future status of the central bank. 
Initially, the narrative was mainly employed ‘behind the scenes’ in fora such as the 
Board of Academic Advisors, in private correspondence and in closed meetings. An 
example of this relates to one of Finance Minister Fritz Schäffer’s early drafts for a 
central bank law. Sponsored by Adenauer, it “foresaw the final submission of the BdL 
to the government’s decisions” (Dickhaus 1998: 176). As noted above, central bank 
independence was more closely associated with the Great Depression than with the 
inflations at the time and the government’s “sphere of influence over the central bank” 
was justified with reference to the independent Reichsbank leading Germany “into a 
difficult economic crisis, not least because of the lack of agreement between central 
bank and state policy” (‘Begründung,’ draft Bundesbankgesetz, September 1950 as 
 
 
7 Veit was president of Hessen’s Landeszentralbank and member of the BdL’s highest decision-making 
body, the Central Bank Council. 
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cited in Mee 2016: 165). Schäffer, furthermore, worried that a too independent central 
bank would be able to bring down an elected government, since the public would, 
regardless of the central bank’s institutional status, tend to attribute responsibility for 
unpopular monetary policies to the government rather than the central bank. Thus, 
he argued, “a central bank that operated in full independence of the economic policy 
of the government could not exist anywhere in the world. If so, this government could 
not conduct any economic policy.”8  
BdL president Wilhelm Vocke,9 however, sought to counter and alter this 
narrative of the interwar period. In a letter to Schäffer, he argued that “After two 
inflations the people is [das Volk ist] distrustful when it comes to money … the mere 
possibility that [government control of the central bank] could happen can damage 
confidence” (as cited in Mee 2016: 149).10 The BdL, furthermore, “advanced the idea 
that [Scäffer’s] draft was a result of Adenauer’s imposition” (Dickhaus 1998: 176). In 
a public address, Vocke suggested that this imposition was motivated by a sinister 
agenda: “An independent central bank, one free from politics, is the best guarantee of 
the currency … The time when you have to destroy the independence of the central 
bank is when you wish, as Hitler did, to start an inflation” (Vocke 12 May 1950 as cited 
in Mee 2016: 161, emphasis added).  
Like Zweig, the central bankers thereby invoked a link between the inflations, 
Hitler, and the societal catastrophes of the preceding decades. In doing so, they added 
a further element: government control of the central bank was the cause of the 
inflations. As such, government control of the central bank was a ‘Hitlerian’ agenda 
and a prelude to the worst. The relevant catastrophe was not the Great Depression, 
but the inflations and the people had to be protected from its government by its central 
bank. The mythical narrative of the inflations in central bank discourse thereby 
presents, still in embryonic form, a dimension that would become crucial to the 
 
 
8 Das Bundesarchiv, Kabinettsprotokolle, 139. Kabinettssitzung am 3. April 1951 (my translation). 
9 Vocke was president of the Direktorium, the executive body of the BdL. Karl Bernhard was chairman 
of the Zentralbankrat or central bank council, the highest decision-making body. Vocke, however, 
quickly became the public face of the BdL and was interim president of the Bundesbank when 
established in 1957. The centrality of Vocke was reflected in media discourse. Der Spiegel (1956b, 6 
June), for instance, referred to the BdL as “Vockes bank” and noted that “if one considers the Central 
Bank Council as the currency-parliament, Vocke’s BdL is the government” (my translation). 
10 I have modified Mee’s translation slightly based on his rendering of the original. Mee translates ’Das 
Volk ist’ as ‘the people are.’ 
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German and, later, European (see chapter 4) notion of central bank independence: the 
dual representation of the people.  
 
Myth and the Dual Representation of the People   
The German central bank’s response to the problem of politics in relation to money 
rested on two elements: the myth of the inflations and the dual representation of the 
people. A politically controlled central bank leads to inflation and inflation leads to 
societal catastrophe. As such, the central bank must become an independent societal 
force on a par with the government. In order to become so, it must, like the 
government, be a representative of the people. The myth of inflations and the central 
bank’s representative claim are inherently linked: the myth constitutes the narrative 
grounding the significance of a particular value (price stability) and links it to a 
particular institutional form (central bank independence). The dual representation of 
the people, then, gives force to this institutional form. Only by grounding the authority 
of the central bank in the same source as that of the government can the central bank 
legitimately say ‘no’ to the government.  
 
Myth as a pouvoir moteur 
In the context of the debate on European Monetary Union, Richard Lambert and 
Peter Norman (1989) speculated that “Perhaps the Bundesbank’s real power lies in 
strong public support. It is, opinion polls testify, perhaps the most respected institution 
in West Germany. The folk memory of hyper-inflation in this century have left their 
mark.” Emminger (1986: 26, my translation) similarly noted that the foundation of the 
Bundesbank’s independence was to be found in the fact that, “regarding inflation, the 
Germans are burnt children.” As such, the extraordinary independence of the 
Bundesbank was explained by the fact that “the stability-consciousness 
[Stabilitätsbewußtsein] of the Federal German population is more developed than in most 
other countries.” The experience of the inflations is thus seen as something that 
motivates public opinion in favour of central bank independence. It is, furthermore, a 
living power of opinion that cannot be fixed once and for all in law. It needs constant 
reiteration lest “the memory of the terrible [böse] past, particularly the inflation after 
World War I” should fade (ibid.). To secure a “solid foundation [feste Gundlage] for the 
independence of the central bank,” the German central bank therefore undertook 
Myth and Central Bank Independence 
65 
 
“great and active efforts to promote the population’s understanding of and support for 
the stabilitätspolitik” (ibid: 26-27).  
The narrative of the inflations played a key role this “cultivation of public 
opinion” (Muthesius 1950 as cited in Mee 2016: 154). One of the most important 
implications and clear manifestations of the success of this “publicity work 
[Öffentlichketisarbeit],” according to Emminger, was found in a study conducted by 
Helmut Schmidt in the beginning of his Chancellorship in 1974. In this study, Schmidt 
famously concluded that “we cannot use a public conflict with the Bundesbank; public 
opinion would not stand on our side” (as cited in Emminger 1986: 27, my translation).  
That public opinion came to attribute such importance to the battle against 
inflation and to associate it so strongly with central bank independence is not self-
evident. Several countries have experienced hyperinflation, some even worse than 
Germany’s, without either paving the way for fascist dictatorship or developing a 
Stabilitätskultur manifested in central bank independence. This does not mean that the 
preoccupation with the horrifying experiences of the inflations should be disregarded 
as mere hysteria. It is not. The question is how the experiences of the past speak to the 
present. What message do they convey?  
While the hyperinflation of 1920s was unquestionably a traumatising event, a 
sober account of the interwar causes of the rise of Hitler would have to include 
considerations about the war debt, reparations payments, the political system of the 
Weimar Republic, the Great Depression, including the deflation and dramatic 
unemployment that it entailed, the capitalist elite’s preference for the Nazis over the 
Social Democrats, etc. Similarly, accounting for the post-WWII Wirtschaftswunder of 
high growth, low unemployment and stable prices would have to include 
considerations of the effects of the Marshall Plan, post-war reconstruction, 
reinvigorated corporatism, the German economic model of export-driven growth, etc. 
To give an accurate account would, in other words, sacrifice the elegant simplicity of 
the narratives linking the hyperinflation to the horrors of Nazism, on the one hand, 
and the economic and monetary reforms of 1948, including the establishment of the 
independent BdL, to the Wirtschaftswunder, on the other. It would, presumably, have no 
unified plot. Furthermore, that the lesson of the two inflations should be central bank 
independence is the product of a very selective, even distorted, reading of history, as 
noted above. The narrative linking a politically controlled central bank to societal 
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collapse rests, in other words, on a simplification and distortion of historical facts. It is, 
in its details, untrue. This does not, however, make it a lie. It is, rather, a myth. 
‘Myth’11 is often placed within the dichotomy of ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood,’ a 
“belief that has no foundation in fact” (Tudor 1972: 13). In more nuanced terms, it is 
often conceived as “an ideologically marked narrative which purports to give a true 
account of a set of past, present, or predicted political events, and which is accepted as 
valid in its essentials by a social group” (Flood 1996: 44 as cited in Bottici 2007: 8-9). 
The underlying claim in such definitions is that the myth ‘purports’ to truth when it is 
in fact false and, one might add, problematic in its seductive simplification of complex 
social processes. The myth thereby appears as a suspicious political tool associated 
above all with totalitarianism, dictatorship and authoritarianism (Friedrich and 
Brzezinski 1966: 90-92; see also Cassirer 1946). Critics of any given myth thus often 
seek to expose its shaky factual basis and establish a more correct account of the events 
or phenomena in question. Critics of the ‘German’ approach to central banking, who 
see it as being too preoccupied with the spectre of inflation (or the ‘inflation monster’ 
as in the ECB’s imagery and vocabulary; see picture 2.1.), similarly often seek to attack 
its foundation in the myth of the German hyperinflation by exposing the myth as an 
untruth (see, e.g., Leaman 2001; Economist 2013, 15 November; Schieritz 2013; Mee 
2013, 2017).  
While ‘speaking truth to myth’ is, of course, a perfectly valid political strategy, 
the attempt to inscribe myth within the dichotomy of truth and falsehood may miss the 
point (Bottici 2007: 9). Instead of focusing on its truth value, myth may, instead, be 
approached from the perspective of what it does. One may approach myth in a manner 
that brackets the problem of reality (ibid: 12). Mythical narratives are stories, yes, but 
they are stories told not “for the sake of amusement, but in order to promote some 
practical purpose” (Tudor 1972: 16). There is a deep seriousness about political myth, 
a seriousness that has less to do with past or present reality as with attempting to shape 
or preserve a certain understanding of the world, which then feeds into the institutional 
structures of society. This understanding, in turn, is not an attempt ‘to understand the 
real causes of things’ but an expression of aspirations and desires to shape ourselves 
 
 
11 Myths can take a wide variety of forms. In this thesis, I focus only on the historical myth that relates 
to social phenomena and non-fictional historical events. 
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and the world on the basis of values and opinions, hopes and fears. Myth relates to the 
question of who we are and want to become.  
 
 
Picture 2.1. The Inflation Monster. Screenshot from the ECB’s 
educational video “Price stability: why is it important for you?” Reprinted 
with permission from the ECB. The video is available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F6PvX625JCs [accessed 16 
December 2019]. Behind the two youths stands the ‘inflation monster’ and 
the setting is a marketplace in an unspecified but what appears to be a 
German inflationary past.  
 
Georges Sorel emphasized this aspect of myth when highlighting the 
motivating force of the mythical narrative, “the pouvoir moteur of a great myth” (ibid: 
14). In many ways an ‘un-Marxist’ move, Sorel framed socialism, the class struggle and 
the proletarian revolution not in terms of its scientific basis in the objective conditions 
of workers but in the heroism of participating in a battle of historic proportions and 
significance. Sorel (1999: 27) stressed that what motivates the partisan is not the 
expectation of material gains following victory, but the conviction and belief that one 
is part of something ‘great.’ Referring to Bergson, Sorel (ibid: 26) suggests that the 
struggle in the name of myth is not (only) aimed at altering the outer, ‘objective 
conditions’ of life, but at the experience of the life-affirming liberty that we enjoy “most 
of all when we are making an effort to create a new individuality within ourselves, thus 
endeavouring to break the bonds of habit which enclose us.”  
While the motive force of myth works on the individual, Sorel (ibid: 27-28) 
stresses that this individual dimension is inextricably linked to its social dimension. 
“The belief in glory” can only be sustained by “myths accepted by the masses.” Myths 
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are not “descriptions of things but expressions of a will to act” (ibid: 28) and they “must 
be judged as a means of acting on the present” (ibid: 116). In this, the myth differs from 
the utopian or reformist programme, which, according to Sorel, can be refuted on the 
basis of their potential for realisation. In contrast, a myth does not lend itself to such 
refutations “since it is, at bottom, identical to the convictions of a group, being the 
expression of these convictions in the language of movement; and it is, in consequence, 
unanalysable into parts which could be placed on the plane of historical description” 
(ibid: 29). It is perhaps not surprising, then, that attempts at doing precisely this in the 
German context, providing a historical critique of the factual basis of the myth of the 
inflations, have done little to alter the general narrative.12 
Sorel’s conception of the myth allows for an understanding of the practical 
force of myths in public contests over the meaning of events past or present. They are 
not lies, distortions or illusions but convictions and aspirations that can express a 
deeper, existential truth and act as a pouvoir moteur for political action. In this sense, 
political myths are closely related to political ideologies, which to some extent at least 
always contain some element of myth. As Christopher Flood (1996: 11-12) put it, 
political mythmaking “is linked to the existence of competing ideological beliefs about 
what society is and how it ought to be.” The myth of the inflations is no different in 
this respect. Its elevation of price stability above all other potentially competing 
economic objectives reflects a particular ideological position; it reflects the ordo- and 
neoliberal primacy of price stability but presents an alternative avenue for realising it. 
However, the mythical narrative itself does not present itself as advancing a particular 
ideological perspective but puts forward a conception of society that seeks either to 
overcome a status quo, or to reject attempts at altering it, on a foundational level. The 
myth thereby acts on the self-institution of society through the creation or reproduction 
of a “symbolic network” of meaning (Castoriadis 1987: 117) that naturalises the 
 
 
12 For instance, in 1973, the Social Democrat Herbert Ehrenberg published a book devoted to refuting 
the myth of the inflations and desacralising the independence of the Bundesbank. In it he argued 
that “The belief in the wisdom and independence of senior officials seems to be far greater in 
Germany than belief in the parliamentary system. The bad experiences with two … inflations 
apparently speak for this vote of confidence for an independent central bank. But the person who 
makes this argument knows regrettably little of German monetary history: both the inflation in 1923 
and the Great Depression in 1929 took place with the powerful help of a Reichsbank whose 
autonomy was nothing less than that currently granted to the Bundesbank” (Ehrenberg 1973 as cited 
in Mee 2016: 375). 
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ideological message it conveys. In this sense, myth may be considered an instrument of 
ideological hegemony in the Gramscian sense. It is a means of constituting a public 
monetary imaginary that can be held ‘unrationally, as a matter of faith,’ as Simons 
suggested (see chapter 1).  
Mythical narratives often refer, implicitly or explicitly, to several temporalities 
at once:  
A myth is typically a tale concerned with past events, giving them a specific meaning 
and significance for the present and thereby reinforcing the authority of those 
wielding power in a particular community. They may carry a lesson, explicit or 
implied, for the future course of events (Friedrich and Brzezinski 1966: 91). 
The myth thereby serves to provide a (more or less fictional) story about actual 
historical events from which certain principles of contemporary social relevance can 
be abstracted. At the same time, it gives a certain telos (whether positive or negative) to 
history that (heroic and/or self-sacrificial) political action in the present partakes in 
bringing about or preventing.  
The German inflations were actual historical events. They did take place. The 
question is how to interpret them, how they speak and give meaning to the present. 
The central bankers’ narrative about the inflations situates the events within a broader 
narrative of causes and consequences. It explains the past and gives an indication of 
what to do in order to remain true to the meaning of the event, or in this case, how to 
avoid its repetition in the future. At the same time, it works to constitute a new societal 
being that reinforces or breaks with the tradition inherited from the past. The narrative 
is thereby an aestheticisation of the event. It recreates the event as an artifice that 
symbolises a broader system of meaning and the event is given a significance beyond 
what a ‘disinterested’ factual account can offer. It is in this sense that the myth 
transcends the dichotomy of true and false. The myth offers not a transcendental, 
scientific or historical Truth, but it captures something essential about the event for 
someone and something. It rationalizes it within a framework of understanding and 
meaning-making that provides it with a significance that the facts themselves do not 
necessarily support. 
This points to myth’s selectiveness; it works on social memory as a method for 
remembering and forgetting certain things in certain ways (Blumenberg 1985: 9). The 
historical myth performs the function of highlighting particular aspects of events – 
“Why should we forget the lessons which a terrible record of inflations has taught us?” 
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Vocke (1955: 5) asked. At the same time, the myth ‘forgets’ things that do not accord 
with the desired (ideological) system of meaning. The historical material on which the 
myth builds is selected, sequenced and ordered within “a more or less coherent plot” 
(Bottici 2007: 115). The myth thereby reduces complexity, postulates a certain order 
and causality of things, and promises ways of improving the human condition. Its 
criterion of validity, in turn, is not empirical or logical falsifiability but only its public 
reception. As Sorel (1999: 117) argued, “Everything which its opponents endeavour to 
establish may be conceded to them without reducing in any way the value of the thesis 
which they think they have refuted; it matters little whether [the myth] is a partial 
reality or simply a product of the popular imagination.” What matters, in other words, 
is that people (act as if they) believe in it. “Publicity,” then, is “‘one of the sharpest 
weapons in the arsenal of a central bank,’” as Vocke put it upon retiring from the 
Bundesbank in 1958 (Vocke 1958 as cited in Mee 2016: 235) because it contributes to 
shaping what people believe. 
Because of its ability to simplify complex social processes and condense them 
into powerful mental or actual images (see pictures 2.1. and 2.2.), myth lends itself 
eminently to political and ideological struggles involving the shaping of collective 
narratives that give meaning to societal arrangements. The political myth is situated 
not in the abstract but in concrete conflicts over social being and the institutional 
structures that preserve and recreate society. The work on and of myth is therefore not 
exhausted in the process of founding and ‘giving grounds for’ or ‘grounding’ [begründen] 
the significance (Blumenberg 1985) of certain (institutionalised) ways of being in 
something beyond themselves. It remains continuously invokable in the process of 
becoming that political society is (Bottici 2007). 
 
The Central Bank as an Organic Representative of the People 
If the myth of the inflations served to motivate public opinion in favour of central bank 
independence, how did this inform the institutional relationship between the central 
bank, the government and the people? What kind of institutional structure was 
envisioned to give force to the meaning conveyed by the myth? Indications of this were 
found in Veit’s and Vocke’s notion of the central bank having to become an 
independent power within the state in order to be able to protect the people’s will for 
price stability from government. This implies a conception of government having an 
agenda different from that of the people despite being democratically elected. The 
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government, in other words, is an imperfect representative of the will people. This means that 
the will of the people has to be represented in the activity of governing in more ways 
than one; it has to be represented also by other governmental institutions with equal 
right and authority.13 
 
Picture 2.2. Inflation imagery. Illustration from Der Spiegel (1956, 6 June: 20). 
  
This does not mean that the political system – government and parliament (for 
simplicity’s sake: government) – does not represent the people but its form of 
representation is limited to representing prevailing political opinions at any given time. 
The government is the electoral representative of the people. Its legitimacy rests on 
governing according to the opinions of the people expressed in elections. It derives 
authority from the power of the people to elevate certain individuals to a position of 
political command through the ballot box, which at the same time forms the basis of 
holding the rulers to account. It is thus a specific form of representation (see also 
Urbinati and Warren 2008) – albeit the form most commonly associated with the term 
representation – based on the institutionalised, periodic expression of the changing 
 
 
13 While the central bankers’ discourse refers mainly to the central bank, the conception implies that the 
people is represented with equal right also by other institutions (see also Rosanvallon 2011).  
This photo, Lohngeld-Transport im Waschkorb (1922): Durch zwei 
deutsche Inflationen … , has been removed as the copyright is owned by 
another organisation. The photo shows a group of men pushing a cart holding 
laundry baskets supposedly full of worthless money.  
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political opinions of the people. As such, its legitimacy is based on the electoral majority 
of the day. 
Inherently partisan, this form of legitimacy could only be partial, according to 
the central bankers. The government could only legitimately claim to represent those 
who voted for it and it would always be subject to short-term temptations and 
pressures. Providing the public good of stable money, on the other hand, the central 
bank claimed that it represented the long-term interest of “the whole people” [ganzen 
Volk] (Vocke 1973: 176). The central bank thereby saw itself as always in potential 
antagonism not only with government but also with bodies representing the interests 
of a subset of the population: trade unions, industry and agriculture in particular. While 
these might be legitimate representatives of their respective members, they could never 
express anything other than “group” or “sectional interests” and their perspective was 
limited to the present. The pursuit of such interests was “endangering what we have 
achieved” (Vocke 1955: 2). Neither individually nor together could they be considered 
representatives of the people as a whole and balancing their interest would lead not to 
the general interest but only to the partial realisation of any number of particular 
interests.  
Because the value of money is in the general and existential interest of the 
people, it must be governed with “impartiality and independence” (Vocke 1955: 3; see 
also Rosanvallon 201114). The central bank is thus presented as a “fully objective and 
neutral institution” (Vocke 1955: 2) serving neither special interests nor the electoral 
majority of the day: “Even the largest groups are minorities as compared with the 
grand total of our nation, whom we serve undividedly” (ibid: 3) against “all those who 
in some particular field … are determined to place their own interests before those of 
the community” (ibid: 5). The central bank acts for “the whole nation, which for its life 
relies upon a sound and stable currency and which includes the housewives, the man 
 
 
14 Rosanvallon (2011: 6) defines impartiality as the “[a]chievement of generality by way of detachment 
from particularity” and it is “characterized by a structural variable (the fact of independence) and a 
behavioral variable (the maintenance of distance or equilibrium [in relation to partisan and/or 
special interests]).” The establishment of independent, technocratic authorities such as central banks 
thus reflects, according to Rosanvallon (2011: 80), “the idea that a suspicion of partiality amounted 
to a denial of legitimacy.” 
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in the street, the pensioners and the savers: Be without fear, we are on guard” (ibid., 
emphases added).15  
This particular intervention, which invokes a stable currency as an existential 
precondition for societal life without fear, was made in the context of discussions on 
the Bundesbank Law and specifically on the question of independence. The target of 
Vocke’s critique was the idea of limiting the central bank independence in any way. 
Shortly before the address was delivered, Adenauer had asked the BdL to refrain from 
introducing further credit restrictions without first consulting the government (Mee 
2016: 205). To Vocke (1955: 3), such demands were outrageous:  
If the management of the Central Bank were to be subordinated to politics … then 
it would have to be expected that the Government office in charge possess a greater 
measure of technical expert knowledge and practical experience … than the Central 
Bank management, the Government then clearly being the actual authority directing 
the bank. Nobody desires such an arrangement and the Government itself is 
interested in seeing that an institution which occasionally must not shrink from 
unpopular measures is not directed according to political conceptions or according 
to considerations based on elections or changes in party tendencies, but is genuinely 
objective with the sole aim of maintaining a stable currency. 
It is the central bank’s distance from partisan electoral politics and particular interests 
that allows it to act with objectivity and impartiality. What is at stake in attempts to 
limit the central bank’s independence, according to Vocke (ibid., emphasis added), is 
not that the government considers itself better at conducting a monetary policy aimed 
at price stability. Rather, what is at stake is “a case of imposing or forcing other points 
of view on the Central Bank, such as obliging it to act in a way which it considers 
dangerous for the currency. Only if this effect is desired should its independence be discontinued 
or restricted.”  
The independence of the central bank, then, is justified as a safeguard against 
partial, partisan interests taking over the conduct of monetary policy. In order to serve 
the general interest of the people and its ‘desire’ for price stability, the central bank 
must be independent. Its insulation from the electoral process, however, does not 
 
 
15 This conception rests on the myth of the hyperinflations in the sense that it is only through the 
understanding of even moderate levels of inflations as preludes to catastrophe that it can make sense. 
A ‘sound and stable currency’ is posited not against the alternative of a moderately more fluctuating 
or inflating currency, but the catastrophic scenario. There is no middle ground.  
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disqualify its claim to democratic legitimacy, according to Vocke (ibid: 5, emphasis 
added). Quite the contrary:  
In the last analysis it is not only the economic values that will be at stake, but also 
political freedom and democracy itself. Everything we have gained: employment, a 
prosperous economy, social life and, last but not least, our political life are founded 
on a stable currency and are seriously threatened by its depreciation.16 
Echoing Zweig’s notion that inflation is not merely an economic phenomenon, the 
independence of the central bank is justified as being the precondition for social and 
political life, for ‘democracy itself.’ This argument found favour with pundits at the 
time. In a piece devoted “Geheimrat Vocke”17 and the speech cited above, Die Zeit 
(1956, 9 February, emphasis added, my translation) agreed: “The guardian of the 
currency [Hüter der Währung] is as important as the guardian of the constitution [Hüter 
der Verfassung]. Because the currency is also a piece of the wall that protects [umfriedet] 
our democratic way of life.”18  
This conception of legitimacy inscribes itself within the broader notion of 
‘constrained democracy’ (Müller 2011) and the German post-war tradition of anti-
majoritarian guardians of democracy (Möllers 2007). Democratic government, 
according to this perspective, cannot be given free (economic) reign, but must take 
place within a space regulated by non-majoritarian and non-partisan institutions such 
as the Constitutional Court and the central bank. Some aspects of societal life, in other 
words, must be taken out of the ordinary democratic process in order for that 
democratic process to function properly. Such guardian institutions, in turn, govern 
not according to the will of the majority but on the basis of the impartial pursuit of the 
general interest, whether expressed in foundational law (Grundgesetz) or foundational 
values (Stabilitätskultur).  
A crucial function of independent guardian institutions is that they enforce 
constraints on majoritarianism. In this regard and with reference to the question of 
German rearmament, Vocke (1955: 5) invokes a telling analogy: 
Imagine a tremendously heavy truck preparing to cross a bridge, whereupon the 
engineers warn the driver that the bridge will not take the weight of the vehicle. The 
driver argues that orders are orders and that it is a military or political necessity that 
 
 
16 Translation modified on the basis of Vocke 1973: 189. 
17 The English equivalent of ‘Geheimrat’ is Privy Councellor. Denoting someone’s status as ‘loyal 
advisor’ to the sovereign, this formal title had long been abandoned in Germany at the time.  
18 For further examples of the positive reception of the speech, see Mee 2016: 208-209.  
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the vehicle should cross the bridge. What happens? It will have to be made clear to 
the occupants of the vehicle that the bridge, should they venture upon it, will collapse 
and that the vehicle with the driver and the load of armaments will crash to the 
bottom. 
Allowing majoritarian politics unconstrained reign, in other words, threatens to lead 
to policies that if implemented will lead to their own undoing, resulting, potentially, in 
complete societal collapse. Ignoring the ‘engineer’s’ warnings can be “life threatening,” 
Vocke (1973: 176, my translation) noted in a 1950 speech that also invoked the bridge-
currency analogy (“Die Währung ist eine Brükkenkonstruktion”). The sustainability and 
prosperity of a democratic state therefore depends on technocratic institutions 
enforcing the ‘laws of nature’ pre-emptively in order to prevent the destructive 
consequences that would in any case manifest themselves down the road. Vocke thus 
invokes an image of the central bank as an apolitical institution ‘engineering’ the 
societal conditions in which political freedom and democracy can be realised.  
Despite imposing constraints on government and partisan politics, the central 
bank should not, according to this perspective, be considered detached from the 
people. It reflects, on the contrary, the notion that “there is more than one way to act 
or speak ‘on behalf of society’ and to be representative” (Rosanvallon 2011: 8). It is the 
representative relationship between the people and the central bank that elevates the 
central bank to a position of authority. The fundamental, government-establishing 
power of the people is thereby not exhausted through its representation in the political 
system. The people can and does authorise other institutions to act as its representative, 
whereby the sovereignty of the state is expressed through multiple public offices. The 
power to command, in other words, is pluralised, allowing for legally irresoluble 
conflicts between rival expressions and representations of the sovereign will of the 
people. As the Minister of Justice, Fritz Neumayer, argued in the Cabinet debate on 
the Bundesbank Law in 1956: “the Bundesbank must be entitled to take measures 
against the intentions of the Federal Government [even] in an emergency situation.”19 
The democratic legitimacy of the central bank is thus conceptualised as resting 
on the central bank’s ability to embody the will of the people, potentially against the 
expression of the will of the people through electoral representatives. This conception 
of democracy sees the expression of the ‘will of the people’ through periodic elections 
 
 
19 Das Bundesarchiv, Kabinettsprotokolle, 143. Kabinettsitzung am 11. Juli 1956, my translation.  
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as being inadequate and incomplete (Rosanvallon 2011). At the same time, however, 
it introduces the possibility of the people being pitted against itself through the forms 
in which it makes itself present in the activity of governing. The question, then, is how 
such conflicts can be resolved.  
The central bankers had, as indicated by the bridge-currency analogy, a clear 
answer to this: on questions relating to money, the central bank should prevail. 
However, the answer was more sophisticated than this. As Vocke (1973: 176, my 
translation) noted in a 1950 speech, any suspicion that the central bank was not 
governing in accordance with the general interest would undermine its authority and 
legitimacy. As such, independence should not be considered a carte blanche to do 
whatever the central bank saw fit: “A central bank that is oppositionist [oppositionslustig] 
or wants to conduct an obstructive policy would immediately lose its independence.” 
The central bank’s independence, in other words, comes with certain implicit duties 
and obligations. Failure to fulfil these would lead to the immediate forfeiture of its claim 
to impartiality and right to independence because it would lose its character as a 
representative of the people. Its ability to resist government and parliament, in other 
words, rests on its ability to demonstrate its impartial pursuit of the common interest, 
not on its legal mandate, which was, after all, only based on ordinary legislation subject 
to the Bundestag. In case of misconduct on the part of the central bank, the elected 
representatives of the people would have the right to suspend the central bank’s 
independence.  
Such a scenario, however, is of limited relevance for the purposes of 
determining whether the central bank or the government should carry the day in 
situations of conflict. The relevant scenario is one where both central bank and 
government make legitimate but conflicting claims in the name of the people. It 
underlines, however, that while potentially very powerful, the central bank’s claim to 
legitimate representation is quite elusive: because “the legitimacy of independent 
authorities depends on their ability to demonstrate their impartiality, that legitimacy is 
inherently unstable” (Rosanvallon 2011: 96). Whereas the government derives 
legitimacy from the electoral process, the independent central bank’s legitimacy is not 
as formalised. Achieving the mandated objective is of course one source but this cannot 
inform situations of conflict concerning, for instance, the relevant interpretation of a 
particular economic situation. According to Rosanvallon, this is one of the crucial 
problems for the independent authority. Since it cannot rely on formal input, it must 
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rely on the continuous display of fidelity to the spirit of its mandate. As such, “[e]ach 
intervention, each decision is tantamount to a refoundation of the institution” 
(Rosanvallon 2011: 96). The fact that an institution’s actions were impartial yesterday 
does not mean that they are so also today or tomorrow. As such, it must continuously 
engage in efforts to win the people’s trust.  
The “bond of trust between the public and its central bank” is, according to 
the ECB’s first chief economist, Otmar Issing (2002: 19), “something like a credit 
relationship.” And like creditworthiness, “a reputation for impartiality can be 
established” (Rosanvallon 2011: 97). Trust is “a form of capital” (Rosanvallon 2011: 
97); “Vertrauen ist Kapital” (Vocke 1973: 175). And like capital, it has a “cumulative 
dimension: the greater an institution’s reputation for impartiality, the easier it is to 
establish the impartiality of any particular decision” (Rosanvallon 2011: 97). The 
“effective social power of an institution” (ibid.) thereby depends on its ability to 
accumulate trust through its continuous demonstration of its impartiality in the pursuit 
of the general interest of the people. In a conflict between the government and the 
central bank, the central bank’s source of authority is thus the people’s trust that the 
central bank is, in fact, acting not for itself or for some special interests but for the 
people as a whole.  
Rosanvallon argues that this form of representation should be considered along 
the lines of what the French public law theorist Carré de Malberg called “organic 
representation” (Rosanvallon 2011: 88). While Carré de Malberg’s notion of organic 
representation referred to the state as such, Rosanvallon (ibid: 90) claims that today it 
is the independent authorities “that most clearly play the role of organic 
representatives.” This is because they are based on a conception of the people not as 
asserting its right to govern or to exercise control over how its representative governs, 
but on the people relinquishing control over the activity of governing to the 
representative, trusting the representative “to act and will for” the people (ibid., 
emphasis in original). While this leaves the people with no institutionalised ways of 
influencing its organic representative, the fragility of its claim to authority acts as 
guideline for its actions: it must govern according to an underlying societal value, “ein 
sozialer Grundkonsens” (Emminger 1986: 29, emphasis in original) and show itself to be 
pursuing this value. In order to prevail in conflicts with government, the central bank 
must govern on the basis of a principle that resonates with the people and whose 
realisation is more foundational than the realisation of values expressed in elections.  
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The notion of grounding the independence of the central bank in something 
more foundational than ordinary legislation is reflected in the discourse of German 
central bankers. As Emminger (1986: 27, my translation) noted “the Bundesbank’s 
independence is formally only secured through the Bundesbank Law, that is, an 
ordinary law, not through the constitution.” In law, its authority rested on the 
legislative power of the Bundestag. This, however, was considered an insufficient 
foundation of independence. The central bankers of the BdL thus  
agreed that the independence of the Bundesbank would only be secure when it could 
rely on the overwhelming support of the population; only then would it be immune from 
political interference. Moreover, we said: when the Bundesbank is not responsible to 
the government or parliament then it must in a democracy be accountable to the 
people [dem Volk gegenüber Rechenschaft ablegen] (ibid., emphasis added, my translation). 
The problem of politics in relation to monetary policy was, in other words, to be 
overcome through establishing a direct relationship of trust between the central bank 
and the people; a relationship built on winning over the ‘hearts and minds’ of the 
people through the myth of the inflations.20  
 
Conclusion 
The German notion of central bank independence conceptualises the central bank as 
a representative of the people’s foundational will. The ordinary legislation of the 
Bundesbank Law thereby becomes imbued with a “quasi-constitutional character” 
(Emminger 1986: 27) because of the sozialer Grundkonsens in favour of price stability. In 
that sense, the German notion of central bank independence reflects the same 
approach as that of the neoliberals. Central bank independence was not a product of 
comprehensive political decision on the economic constitution, but it was still to be 
based directly on the foundational power of the people and not the constituted powers 
of government and parliament. The central bank became one dimension of the 
institutional expression of popular sovereignty but in an organic rather than formalised 
 
 
20 In discussing the relationship between the independent institution and the people, Rosanvallon uses 
precisely the Bundesbank as an example. Reproducing the mythical narrative, Rosanvallon (2011: 
116) argues that the German people concluded that price stability was “an essential prerequisite of 
democracy.” Rosanvallon (2011: 117-8, emphasis in original) concludes that the independence of 
the Bundesbank was established as a means of constituting a “direct relation” between the people and 
“the institution in control of the nation’s currency.” This, in turn, “meant that the central bank 
intended to base its actions on fundamental political principles, the very same principles that defined 
the meaning and form of the social contract.” 
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sense. On this basis it considered itself the equal of the government. To Adenauer’s 
question on whether he considered the central bank “the rightful equal of the Federal 
government?” BdL President Karl Bernhard simple response was: “yes.”21 The central 
bank was the equal of the government because it was a representative of the people on 
a par with it. 
The claim to equal representation was based on the portrayal of inflation being 
“a betrayal of the people [Betrug am Volk]” caused by government control of the central 
bank (Vocke 1973:181). Erhard (1956 as cited in Mee 2016: 229) even put it into a 
formula: “The formula ‘dependent central bank = inflation’ is valid at all times and 
everywhere. Historical experience proves that to us with crystal clarity.” In Cabinet, 
Erhard countered Adenauer and argued that the Bundesbank “should not be obliged 
to support an inflationary government policy … The central bank must be able to say no. 
Public opinion demands it” [Das verlange die öffentliche Meinung].”22 To Erhard, there was 
nothing anti-democratic about the central bank’s independence. On the contrary, it is 
a product of the people’s will, whose continuous support for the central bank on the 
question of monetary policy trumps the intermittent bestowal of electoral legitimacy 
on the government. The mythical narrative of the inflations and its public reception 
constituted the ultimate grounding of the central bank’s independence and authority 
vis-à-vis government. It provided a grounding of the meaning of this particular 
institutional configuration in a violent past.  
The mythical narrative gave central bank independence a meaning and 
significance beyond what could be established reasonably on the basis of statistical, 
logical or historical analysis. It did so, furthermore, in a manner that was easily 
comprehendible to a broad audience. It grounded it in the societal fear of a return to 
a catastrophic past. As such, it was only right that the central bank should prevail over 
government in cases of conflict (see Mee 2016 for a good historical account of such 
conflicts). Even if this would sometimes ‘hurt’ in the short run, “one must in certain 
 
 
21 The exchange between Adenauer and Bernhard took place in a Cabinet meeting on the future 
Bundesbank law (Das Bundesarchiv, Kabinettsprotokolle, 126. Kabinettsitzung am 14. März 1956). 
In the meeting minutes the exchange is rendered as:  
Bundeskanzler: … Sind Sie denn der Auffassung, daß Sie gleichberechtigt neben der Bundesregierung stehen?  
Bernhard: Ja. 
The term ‘gleichberechtigt’ is not easy to translate, but it may be rendered as ‘equal standing’ or 
‘rightfully equal.’ 
22 From Das Bundesarchiv, Kabinettsprotokolle, 143. Kabinettssitzung am 11. Juli 1956, emphasis 
added, my translation. 
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circumstances be able to say no, also in cases when the heart, the emotions, would 
rather say yes” (Vocke 1973: 181, my translation). The central bank’s foundation of 
authority in the public acceptance of the myth of the inflations at the same time meant 
that the myth had constantly to be reiterated in order to keep the folk memory alive:   
As the horrors of the National Socialist ‘welfare state,’ the war and the inflation 
recede into the past, we begin somewhat to forget that a free economy, liberalised 
trade and a stable currency are not a matter of course … but that they have been 
obtained through great sacrifices and toils. So too must they be defended and it is 
worthwhile procuring them with sacrifices [mit Opfern zu erkaufen]. Because on these 
rests not only the economic and social but also the political balance and the freedom 
of the democratic human being (ibid: 187, my translation).  
When the so-called Transition Law of 1951 transposed the BdL into German 
law, it was never, from Adenauer’s and Schäffer’s perspectives, supposed to become 
the blueprint for central banking in Germany. It was supposed to be a temporary 
solution and the central bank’s independence was still up for debate. As Adenauer 
(1956, my translation) saw it, “[t]he central bank council is completely sovereign with 
respect to [vollkommen souverän gegenüber] the Federal Government. It is, of course, 
accountable to itself. But we have here an organ, that is responsible to no-one, neither 
parliament nor government.” This arrangement was unacceptable. Should the central 
bank be given full autonomy, Adenauer argued, “This would give [it] the position of a 
power within the state [Stellung einer Gewalt im Staate eingeräumt] which could act against 
the political powers.”23 This ‘democratic exception’ could not last and was in direct 
contradiction to Adenauer’s notion of Kanzlerdemokratie; a unitary form of political 
representation if ever there was one.24  
As it were, the Transition Law established the German tradition of central bank 
independence and allowed the BdL to nourish its prestige and public standing (Bibow 
2009: 167; see also Dickhaus 1998). Over the next 5 years, the BdL asserted its 
independence on a number of occasions and managed to keep the currency relatively 
stable while the German economy experienced the first years of the Wirtschaftswunder. 
 
 
23 From Das Bundesarchiv, Kabinettsprotokolle, 143. Kabinettssitzung am 11. Juli 1956, my translation. 
24 The central bank’s ability to act against an elected government appeared unconstitutional to 
Adenauer. As he put it in a Cabinet meeting, should the law merely instruct the Bank “to support 
the general economic policy of the Federal Government within the framework of safeguarding the 
stability of the currency, then the stability of the currency would be given primacy over general 
economic policy, and the Bundesbank would be granted an autonomous decision in situations of 
conflict. Such a regulation is unconstitutional” (from Das Bundesarchiv, Kabinettsprotokolle, 143. 
Kabinettssitzung am 11. Juli 1956, my translation).  
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As observers from different fields have remarked, from the ashes of the war and the 
repressed inflation, the D-mark and the German economy, against all predictions at 
the time, rose to international renown and the currency became a source of pride in a 
country where political nationalism was still unacceptable (see, e.g., Tognato 2012; 
Marsh 1992; Habermas 1991). The D-mark and its guardian became symbols of the 
societal break with the past. As one newspaper put it in the context of the debate over 
the Bundesbank Law in 1956:  
One can only hope that no formulation will be found that in any way cancels the 
independence of the central bank. This would be dangerous, not only for the 
currency but also for politics. In the public, there exists a conviction that the central 
bank council must be shielded from political influences in all its forms, as otherwise 
a clear and expert central bank policy is not possible. After all, everyone in Germany 
knows that in the two currency catastrophes we have behind us, the floodgates of 
inflation were opened at a time when the government still possessed the trust of the 
population (Die Zeit 1956, 22 March, my translation, emphasis in original).25 
Crucially, when the Bundesbank Law was adopted in 1957 it reproduced the 
existing absence of an institutional mechanism for resolving conflicts between the 
central bank and the government. Government and central bank were equals and 
could have recourse to no external or superior institutional authority for the resolution 
of conflicts. This was not a mistake or compromise. It was Erhard’s model and it was 
intended to ensure close, often informal coordination and cooperation between the 
central bank and the government. However, in situations of insurmountable 
disagreements, the debate would have to be resolved in the public sphere (see, e.g., 
Bundesbank 1972; see also Mee 2016; Berger and de Haan 1999; Bibow 2009; 
 
 
25 At this point, domestic and international media had come out in full force in favour of the BdL and 
central Bank independence. In Der Spiegel (1956a, 6 June), Vocke was described as “Kanzler der 
Deutschen Mark” and the Financial Times (1956, 19 June: 7) named him “the guardian of the D-
Mark.” In the latter article, the correspondent noted that “Recently, when the Chancellor, Dr. 
Adenauer, himself rebuked the [BdL] in public … it became clear within 24 hours that the bank and 
not the Government would be upheld by the public.” This was unsurprising “[i]n a country where 
inflation has wiped out savings twice within 25 years.” Similarly, with reference to a bellwether 
incident in 1950, Der Spiegel (1956b, 6 June: 17) noted that “on that day the sovereign of Palais 
Schaumburg [seat of the Chancellery] realised for the first time that he possessed no means of 
pressuring [Druckmittel] the monetary sovereign in Frankfurt [den Frankfurter Souverän der Währung].” 
The article, furthermore, portrayed the central bank’s independence as a product of the painful 
experiences of the two German inflations – “Durch zwei deutsche Inflationen … … schmertzliche erfarungen 
gesammelt” (Der Spiegel 1956b, 6 June: 20). Vocke equally figured in the tabloid press, with Bild Zeitung 
(1956, 4 June as cited in Mee 2016: 222) declaring: “An autograph from Greta Garbo – exciting. An 
autograph from Vocke – reassuring.” 
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Tognato 2012). The Bundesbank Law cemented the practice of turning to the public 
in cases of conflict and created a dynamic in “which West Germans felt it only natural 
to embrace lessons from the inter-war past to make their points” (Mee 2016: 400). In 
these disputes, only the (mediated) public could act as judge. In accordance with the 
notion of dual representation, this was only logical. In cases of insurmountable conflict 
between, in principle, equally valid positions and claims to representation, the people 
had to manifest itself as the ‘actually existing popular sovereign’ to decide the matter 
(Glossner 2010; Orléan 2008). 
The German notion of central bank independence emerged in the post-war 
period as an intellectual approach to economic and monetary government in its own 
right. By emphasising independence as an institutional solution to the problem of 
politics in relation to money, it departed from the approaches discussed in chapter 1. 
It nevertheless reflected and incorporated, whether consciously or not, ideas and 
principles from each of the three approaches to construct a novel approach to central 
banking. At a basic level, it reflected the neoliberal notion of grounding the meaning 
of price stability in a popular imaginary. As the bridge-currency metaphor highlights, 
it also adopted a conception of the economy that was similar to that of the neoliberals: 
it operated according to certain inherent, immutable laws that government ignored at 
its peril. As such, monetary policy ought, in contrast to Keynes, to be depoliticised and 
its objective should be price stability and price stability alone. The ordoliberal notion 
of grounding the monetary order in something more foundational than ordinary law, 
similarly, informed the central bankers. But without the possibility of the ordoliberal 
comprehensive constitutional decision, the central bankers sought a more organic 
foundation of authority. This, in turn, emphasised the agency of the central bank in 
conducting monetary policy under a fiat currency regime. On this, then, central bank 
independence adopted or reflected the Keynesian idea of applying technocratic 
expertise to the government of money rather than subjecting it to automatic 
mechanisms or legislated monetary rules.  
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Chapter 3 
The Economic Science of Central Bank Independence  
 
 
Introduction  
By presenting central bank independence and the pursuit of price stability as two sides 
of the same coin, the German notion of central bank independence offered an 
institutional alternative to the discretionary political control of monetary policy that 
was otherwise dominant in the post-war period. In so far as the conduct of monetary 
policy remained discretionary, it was constrained by the ‘absolute’ of price stability, 
whose meaning was grounded in its existential significance. Central bank 
independence under a fiat currency regime was thereby no longer a threat to price 
stability, as the ordoliberals and neoliberals had seen it. By separating the conduct of 
monetary policy from the government’s economic policymaking, it allowed for the 
possibility of pursuing price stability even against the wishes of the government of the 
day. As such, it constituted a protection against the potential capacity of government 
for doing harm. Taking money out of the political equation was, in other words, a way 
of making politics more ‘economic’ by enforcing frugality on the government.  
This particular meaning of central bank independence allowed for the 
ordoliberal embrace of central bank independence (see Bernholz 1989). It was now not 
so much a name for an institutional form as for a particular ideology of economic 
government. The ordoliberal Wilhelm Röpke (1998 [1957]: 215) could thus argue that 
the central bank “certainly has the ultimate responsibility” for protecting against 
inflationary pressures. But circumstances may “threaten to require more from the 
exercise of this responsibility than public opinion, government and the full-
employment dogma are prepared to accept. In these circumstances the independence 
of the central bank is invaluable.” This statement contrasts markedly with Röpke’s 
earlier writings on monetary policy, which emphasised the importance of the state’s 
control of monetary policy and made no mention of the central bank or its 
independence (see Röpke 1937). Presumably on experiencing Bank deutscher Länder’s 
successful pursuit of price stability in the immediate post-war period, Röpke (1998: 
216-217) had changed his view and elevated the monetary authority to the central 
institutional guardian of the free market economy: “the heavy artillery of the bank of 
Science and Central Bank Independence 
84 
 
issue must occupy the center” in the battle against the “moral and social problem [of 
inflation].” In democracies, furthermore, “[i]t is not enough that [limits] should be laid 
down in constitutions; they must be so firmly lodged in the hearts and minds of men 
that they can withstand all onslaughts. One of the most important of these norms is the 
inviolability of money” (ibid: 220).  
 While ordoliberals such as Röpke embraced the idea relatively early on, the 
German notion of central bank independence remained the exception for another two 
or three decades both in economic theory and institutional practice. The norm 
remained the politically controlled central bank. Only in the 1980s did the economic 
theory of central bank independence emerge. When it did, it appears to have started a 
‘wave of independence’ in the late 1980s. It is the development and the central tenets 
of this theory that is the subject of this chapter.  
What distinguishes the theory of central bank independence from the German 
notion of independence is that it grounds the meaning of central bank independence 
in a scientific discourse rather than in a mythical narrative. As such, it appeals less to 
the ‘hearts’ of the people than to the ‘minds’ of policymakers. The justificatory 
discourse is thereby transformed from one that employs historical narratives to one 
that employs statistics and mathematical formulae and its imagery takes the form of 
equations, tables and graphs (picture 3.1). By separating central bank independence 
from particular historical and cultural contexts, this allows for generalisations. Central 
bank independence can thereby be presented as a general solution to a universal 
problem of politics rather than something intimately linked to specific historical 
circumstances and experiences.  
Picture 3.1. Scientific imagery. A function from Kydland and Prescott (1977: 484). 
 
That being said, the theory reproduces, whether consciously or not, some of 
the central elements of the German notion. Most importantly, it presents central bank 
independence as a “guardian against any misuse of power by the political authorities” 
(Allen 1989 as cited in Blyth 2013: 140). The central bank thereby remains a means of 
constraining the passions and irrationalities of politics. It is, according to a former 
member of the ECB’s Executive Board,  
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a way to protect policy makers against the temptation of using monetary policy in a 
distortionary way [because in] a paper-money regime, where government liabilities 
represent means of payment and have purchasing power, there is always the 
temptation for any government to use such money in an opportunistic manner (Bini 
Smaghi 2007).  
Central bank independence, in other words, is presented as a means of conquering 
short-term temptations in the name of long-term benefits. 
 
Stagflation and the Science of Central Bank Independence 
Over the decades following the end of WWII, the Bundesbank oversaw a period of 
rapid economic growth and low unemployment combined with low inflation. This, 
however, was not particularly unique as many other countries experienced something 
similar at the time without an independent central bank. It was, rather, the German 
record of inflation and unemployment during the Stagflation Crisis that impressed 
observers and made the Bundesbank the “Weltstar” (Emminger 1986: 20) of central 
banking as well as the lodestar of the scientific discourse. The myth of the inflations 
may never have disappeared entirely from the imaginary of central banking, but it took 
a backseat to the question of grounding the German experience of central bank 
independence in scientific language. 
The Stagflation Crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s saw a “secular upward drift 
in both the inflation and unemployment rates” and was understood at the time to be 
different from but as severe as the Great Depression (Peterson 1980: 277). The severity 
of the crisis was emphasised by its global dimension; no major developed economy was 
left unscathed. And like the Great Depression it had a profound, albeit less radical, 
intellectual impact:  
What is clear from the experience of the last decade is that the conventional 
Keynesian approach is not working, that we are confronted with a condition which 
does not respond to the standard techniques which use fiscal and monetary policies 
for demand management (Peterson 1980: 277).  
If the Great Depression marked the death of the gold standard and the ideology of 
laissez-faire liberalism, the Stagflation Crisis ended the Bretton Woods system and the 
dominance of the ideology of Keynesianism.1 Policymakers looked for alternatives.  
 
 
1 Alexandre Lamfalussy (1997), president of the ECB’s precursor, the European Monetary Institute, 
explicitly invokes the lessons of the Stagflation Crisis and the failure of Keynesianism as the 
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The most widely adopted alternative was found in neoliberal thought. In 
particular, the neoliberalisms of Hayek and Friedman were claimed to inform the 
political philosophies of politicians such as Thatcher and Reagan. But while some 
turned to grand theory for inspiration in the quest for alternatives, others turned to the 
more mundane task of studying the causes of why some countries had fared better than 
others through the Stagflation Crisis. In this respect, the record of the Bundesbank 
grabbed attention.  
 
Figure 3.1. Consumer Price Inflation in selected countries 1968 - 1987 
 
Source: World Bank. 
 
While West Germany did not escape the Stagflation Crisis unscathed, the crisis 
was less severe here than in most other countries. In fact, both the inflation rate and 
the level of unemployment were markedly lower and more stable than in most other 
OECD countries during the period (see figures 3.1. and 3.2.). For instance, whereas 
 
 
background against which the notion of central bank independence was enshrined in the Maastricht 
Treaty.   
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1970 1975 1980 1985
Germany United Kingdom United States France
Science and Central Bank Independence 
87 
 
the US experienced a high of 13% annual inflation in 1980, inflation never rose above 
7% in West Germany while unemployment remained lower than in the US throughout 
the period. This observation triggered reflections on what could explain it and central 
bank independence came to feature prominently in this explanation.  
 
Figure 3.2. Unemployment rate in the US and West Germany, 1968-1987 
 
 
Source: OECD (data on the UK and France was highly incomplete and is omitted) 
 
The academic literature, in turn, fell into two categories: a theoretical and an 
empirical. The former approached the question game-theoretically and worked out 
logical arguments in favour of central bank independence. The latter took a more 
empirical approach by studying the determinants of independence and establishing a 
correlation between the degree of independence and inflation rates. Both these strands 
of research came to inform the way the ECB and its officials think about and justify 
the ECB’s independence (see, e.g., ECB 2017a, Mersch 2017a, Draghi 2018a).  
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The Theory of Central Bank Independence  
If one text can be said to have originated the contemporary theory of central bank 
independence, it is Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott’s article “Rules Rather 
than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans” from 1977.2 This article, 
according a Swedish central banker, demonstrated that “governments in democratic 
countries may have a time consistency problem” and offered “a common explanation for 
events that, until then, had been interpreted as separate policy failures” (Sparve 2005: 
272, emphasis in original). It offered a comprehensive explanation for the Stagflation 
Crisis based on an inherent weakness of democratic politics: its inability to make long-
term commitments to a certain policymaking regime. This research informed the shift 
away from a preoccupation with “isolated policy measures … towards the institutions of 
policymaking, a shift that has largely influenced the reforms undertaken by central banks 
and the design of monetary policy in many countries” (ibid., emphasis added),   
Few subsequent theoretical and empirical works on central bank independence 
do not make reference to Kydland and Prescott’s article, whether explicitly or through 
invoking its central concept of ‘time inconsistency.’ However, while the article 
provided the theoretical justification for central bank independence, it did not explicitly 
advocate central bank independence. This link was only forged later on, particularly 
by Kenneth Rogoff (1985), who based on Kydland and Prescott as well as Barro and 
Gordon (1983a, 1983b) developed the most systematic and influential theoretical 
justification for central bank independence.  
 
The Problem of Beginnings and the Rules-based Order 
The central problem for Kydland and Prescott is the question of rules vs discretion. In 
this regard, their intellectual forbearers are American neoliberals such as Henry 
Simons and Milton Friedman (see chapter 1); the latter’s work being explicitly invoked 
 
 
2 This is not to say that there was no academic or political discussion of central bank independence prior 
to the publication of this article. However, at this point there was no systematic theoretical 
justification for central bank independence (see Forder 2005). At the same time, there was no general 
consensus that privileging low inflation would be desirable because it was, based on the general 
acceptance of the Philips-curve relationship, understood to have negative effects on other economic 
parameters such as employment and growth. Nordhaus (1975: 188) concluded that while central 
bank independence might be considered a possible remedy to the so-called political business cycle 
in relation to monetary policy, “The costs and benefits of independent policy determination are 
difficult to weigh” and it can be objected against it that “delegating responsibility to an agency which 
is not politically responsive to legitimate needs is even more dangerous than a few cycles.” 
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as a reference point (1977: 474). While reaching the same conclusion as Simons and 
Friedman had done – rules rather discretion – they approach the subject in a manner 
that reduces the importance of an ultimate normative horizon. The neoliberal 
approach is thereby, in one sense, perfected because its conclusions are reached on an 
‘all else equal’ basis: regardless of economic policy objective, rules provide a better 
avenue for realising it than discretion. 
As discussed in chapter 1, neoliberals rejected the monetary policy discretion 
that central bank independence threatened to introduce. To them, there was no link 
between central bank independence and price stability. Monetary policy, instead, was 
to be conducted on the basis of monetary rules fixed in law. Simons and Friedman 
thereby encountered a difficulty that was not easily overcome except through the 
general public acceptance of a system of beliefs, namely a ‘religion’ of individual 
(negative) liberty. Given that coercion and manipulation are excluded, how else would 
it be possible to ensure that the public favours and compels its political representatives 
to institute a rule? What neoliberals encountered, in other words, was the problem of 
political beginnings, the paradoxical nature of which Simons (1936: 14) explicitly 
recognised.  
The problem of political beginnings is a recurring problem in political and 
constitutional thought and practice (see, for instance, Arendt 2006; Kalyvas 2008; 
Loughlin and Walker 2008). As discussed in chapter 1, it was a crucial problem for the 
ordoliberals who sought its resolution in the Schmittian conception of the 
comprehensive decision as the political equivalent of the miracle. The problem, 
however, is perhaps most closely associated with Rousseau’s Social Contract, which 
introduces the figure of the Legislator in order to solve it.  
Rousseau was of course not the first thinker to confront the problem of 
beginnings. In Hobbes, for instance, the social contract is also a means of addressing 
the problem of beginnings but Rousseau’s conception of the nature of the problem 
differed markedly from Hobbes’. To Hobbes, it was of little importance what kind of 
institutional framework and system of values was constituted as long as it could be 
reasonably expected to be able to secure a viable political order. As such, Hobbes could 
assert with (almost) complete indifference that the commonwealth is constituted by the 
multitude conferring “all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one 
Assembly of men” (Leviathan part II, ch. 17), which then has undivided and unlimited 
authority to govern and legislate as it sees fit. It is, in other words, of no importance to 
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Hobbes whether the multitude constitutes a monarchy, aristocracy or democracy, 
whether the order is ‘free’ or not, or whether the laws promulgated by the sovereign 
are just. In that sense, Hobbes was a normative relativist. His absolutism concerns only 
the demand for political order as such. 
The Rousseauian problem of beginnings, which the ordo- and neoliberal 
thinkers of money also confronted, was different from this. Rousseau’s difficulty arises 
because a normative requirement is attached to the order that is to be constituted. For 
Rousseau, it was not enough to establish order because order was not by definition 
better than the anarchic state of nature – “Man is born free; and everywhere he is in 
chains” (Social Contract bk. 1, ch. 1; see also Discourse on Inequality). It had, however, the 
potential to be so. But for an order to be better than no order, it had to be rational, 
free, equal, and just. The legitimacy of the political order could not be derived from its 
mere existence but only from its ability to secure and promote such objectives. The 
‘beginning’ that Rousseau envisioned had to institute a system of government that 
could deliver not just the security of mere life but the betterment of the human 
condition, the good life (see also Arendt 1958; and, comparing Arendt and Rousseau, 
Canovan 1983). 
The problem for Rousseau was how to make the multitude choose a particular 
political order. The problem, in other words, is how people can create ‘good’ laws, 
which are in their collective best interest, even though the multitude – in a state of 
nature or in an existing, corrupt political order – cannot possibly be expected to know 
what makes laws good without the enlightenment that comes from good laws. 
Completing the ‘paradox of politics’ (Honig 2009) or ‘paradox of democratic 
legitimacy’ (Benhabib 1994), then, the multitude needs, as Rousseau suggested, the 
‘good’ laws in question in order to understand that they are good and what their own 
best interests are.3 Rousseau’s, in other words, was a classical hen-and-egg problem 
(Honig 2009: 14-16), which he resolved through the introduction of the mythical 
Legislator, whose role in the life of the political community would be exhausted in the 
constitution of a body of good laws that the community would come to revere as a civic 
religion. 
 
 
3 The paradox in Rousseau is that in order for the people to make ‘good’ laws, the people need to be 
‘good.’ But in order to have ‘good’ people, you need ‘good’ laws (see Honig 2009). 
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If in the German context, the military authorities played the role of the 
Rousseauian Legislator, providing good monetary laws and institutions able to 
promote the general will and instil in the people a religious fervour for price stability, 
this form of abrupt break with the past and external legislative influence on the present 
could not be expected or desired in other countries. As such, a different approach to 
the question had to be adopted. Simons and Friedman placed their trust in a gradual 
shift of public opinion: “The requisite measures, radical in the money field and even 
more radical elsewhere, will become possible politically only with the revival or 
development of a real religion of freedom, of a strong middle-class movement, and of 
values (and revulsions) of a rather intense sort” (Simons 1936: 18). Referring to Dicey’s 
Law and Public Opinion, Friedman (1951) expected legislation in the future to come to 
reflect prevailing public opinion in the present. The task of “neo-liberalism,” then, was 
“to provide the philosophy that will guide the legislators of the next generation … We 
have a new faith to offer; it behooves us to make it clear to one and all what that faith 
is.” The neoliberals, in other words, sought the gradual emergence of a new Gramscian 
ideological hegemony. It was to be promoted and nurtured by an intellectual 
avantgarde that would be able to educate both the people and the policymakers in how 
to think about the laws needed for the promotion of the good life. 
 
The Futility of Politics 
In contrast to the approach of hoping to penetrate the “mysteries” of public opinion 
(Friedman 1951), Kydland and Prescott’s theory of time inconsistency provides a more 
pragmatic approach to the problem of establishing a rules-based order which bypasses 
the problem of beginnings and the question of swaying the public. While written in the 
context of the Stagflation and its accompanying crisis of Keynesian thinking – a 
historical context amenable to the kind of ideological change envisioned by Friedman 
– the argument does not rely on the public becoming ready for abandoning the old 
gods in favour of new. It does not present itself in the same explicitly ideological garb 
as the neoliberalism of Simons and Freidman but it promotes much the same 
conclusions: monetary policy conducted according to rules rather than discretion, and 
those rules being, for instance, the Friedmanian notion of “a stable growth in the 
money supply” (Kydland and Prescott 1977: 487). 
Kydland and Prescott (ibid: 473, my emphasis) sum up their argument as 
presenting an explanation for why “discretionary policy, namely, the selection of that 
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decision which is best, given the current situation and a correct evaluation of the end-of-
period-position, does not result in the social objective function being maximized.” 
Government planning and discretionary control over the policy making process does 
not have to be fallible or subject to partial interests in order to produce sub-optimal 
outcomes in terms of a “well-defined and agreed-upon, fixed social objective function” 
(ibid.). In other words, even if policymakers know and wish to promote the general will 
and welfare, they will be unable to do so if they react sequentially to developments as 
they happen. Policymakers, in other words, “should follow rules rather than have 
discretion” not because “they are stupid or evil” but because it is logically impossible 
for discretion to achieve its intended aims. Even fully informed and well-meaning 
discretionary policymaking “either results in consistent but suboptimal planning or in 
economic instability” (ibid: 487). 
In contrast to the German approach to monetary policy, the important 
problem is not to ensure that the ‘social objective function,’ the general will, attaches 
primacy to price stability. While Kydland and Prescott assume price stability to be a 
desirable social objective, they recognise that it is only one among many. The 
important problem is the question of change and the realisation of a regime of 
policymaking that compromises any conceivable ‘social objective function’ as little as 
possible. 
This suboptimality of consistent but discretionary policymaking “arises because 
there is no mechanism to induce future policymakers to take into consideration the effect 
of their policy, via the expectations mechanism, upon current decisions of agents” (ibid: 
481, emphasis in original). When policy makers react to a development, whether 
economic or political, they are acting not on a stable state but on a dynamic system, 
comprising economic actors who have already second-guessed the future actions of the 
policymakers and factored them into their own behaviour in the present. The economy 
on which the policymakers of the future act, in other words, changes in the present as 
a result of the expectations of rational actors concerning future policy, thus changing 
the conditions on which the policy acts before it is enacted. The economy is a target 
that moves in expectation of future attempts to hit it, meaning that the effects of policy 
will be different from those intended and expected by the policymaker: “changes in 
policy induce changes in structure, which in turn necessitates reestimation and future 
changes in policy, and so on” (ibid: 474). This ‘feedback loop’ is what leads to either 
“consistent but suboptimal” policy – leading to a secular rise in the rate of inflation 
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while leaving ‘real’ economic variables unchanged – or to a scenario where 
“stabilization efforts have the perverse effect of contributing to economic instability” 
(ibid.). Discretionary, reactive policies are for that reason either suboptimal or harmful 
because economic policy “is not a game against nature but, rather, a game against 
rational agents” (ibid: 473). In a discretionary regime, both policymaking and the 
environment on which it acts move continuously in relation to each other, constantly 
undermining the intended consequences of each other’s adjustments.  
In relation to the question of “the apparent trade-off between unemployment 
and inflation,” Kydland and Prescott (ibid: 478) apply this logic to challenge the 
conventional assumption “that expectations depend in some mechanical ad hoc way 
upon past prices.” This is mistaken, they claim, because “A change in administration 
which reflects a change in the relative costs society assigns to unemployment and 
inflation will have an immediate effect upon expectations.” The market, in other 
words, does not base its expectations for the future only on the past but on information 
about future policy-making gathered in the present: “Changes in the social objective 
function reflected in, say, a change of administration do have an immediate effect upon 
agents’ expectations of future policies and affect their current decisions” (ibid: 474). 
This means, for instance, that a government known to prioritise employment over 
price stability cannot hope to stimulate employment through an expansionary 
monetary policy. Because the effects of this expansion will already have been factored 
into the setting of prices (in contracts, for instance) in the present, it will result in 
“excessive rates of inflation without any reduction in unemployment” (ibid: 477). The 
result can only be increased economic instability without gains in terms of the ‘social 
objective function.’  
Despite its extraordinary assumptions, this account offered a compelling 
explanation for the Stagflation’s secular trend towards both higher inflation and 
unemployment rates. It explained why discretionary monetary policies, such as those 
practiced in the US and elsewhere at the time, were failing to cure the problem of 
unemployment while leading to higher inflation. As such, it offered a logical critique 
of the Phillips-curve relationship and suggested that regardless of other objectives, a 
monetary policy “of maintaining price stability is preferable” (ibid.) for the simple 
reason that monetary policy, as Friedman had suggested, could not meaningfully 
stimulate employment. Monetary policy ought to be focussed on what it could do, 
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namely, to stabilise the price level. Unemployment would have to be dealt by other 
means. 
While Kydland and Prescott (ibid: 487) suggest that “economic theory be used 
to evaluate alternative policy rules and that one with good operational characteristics 
be selected”, it does not appear to be of particular importance what exact rule is 
chosen. Following Simons, they suggest that “[i]n a democratic society, it is probably 
preferable that selected rules be simple and easily understood, so it is obvious when a 
policymaker deviates from the policy” (ibid.). A comprehensive constitutional-political 
decision or a general shift in public opinion towards a particular ideology is therefore 
unnecessary as long as it is generally acknowledged that the political control of 
monetary policy is futile (see also Lohman 1992). What must be ensured, however, is 
a credible commitment to a rule, so that a change of government, for instance, does 
not lead to changes in inflation expectations. This does not mean that economic 
planning based on a political commitment to full employment is the ‘road to serfdom’ 
but simply that the use of monetary policy for such purposes is clumsy and sub-optimal. 
As such, the principle guiding the use of monetary policy in economic policy emerges 
from the market itself and there is no need for a radically new beginning. The 
Legislator emerges from within the economic order and the introduction of the good 
law depends simply on recognizing the market’s governing logic. 
Kydland and Prescott (1977: 487) suggested that “[t]here could be institutional 
arrangements which make it a difficult and time-consuming process to change the 
policy rules in all but emergency situations.” They did not, however, invoke the need 
for an independent central bank. While it has subsequently been interpreted as such, 
some elements were missing. In particular, Kydland and Prescott’s conclusion does not 
depart significantly from Friedman’s: it does not introduce a rationale for the central 
bank’s independence but only for a rules-based monetary policy. If discretion is in any 
case eliminated, why would the central bank need to be independent?  
 
Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of the Rule 
Interpreting Kydland and Prescott’s article as an argument for central bank 
independence demands two assumptions: first, that it is difficult, if not impossible, for 
policymakers to commit to a monetary rule without institutional commitment-devices, 
and, second, the German notion that central bank independence is equated with the 
pursuit of low inflation. Barro and Gordon (1983a, 1983b) explicitly address the former 
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of these by introducing the question of the role of reputation in enforcing 
commitments.  
Barro and Gordon (1983b: 101) develop their model on the basis of Kydland 
and Prescott’s argument that “people understand the policymaker’s incentives and 
form their expectations accordingly.” A policymaker without some kind of 
commitment device is unable credibly “to commit its course of future action” (Barro 
and Gordon 1983a: 591) and will end up reacting to developments as they happen in 
a manner that compromises its intended objective. This is a variant of the problem of 
politics: because politics always involves the possibility of changing course, it suffers 
from a commitment problem that may result in, among other things, monetary 
instability. This problem can be overcome, they claim, “[i]f commitment were feasible 
through legal arrangements or other procedures.” This would eliminate “the 
countercyclical aspect of monetary policy” (ibid.) and leave ‘everyone better off’ (ibid: 
592).  
The problem is how to enforce the rules when policymakers always have the 
option of ‘cheating’ by creating ‘surprise inflation’ (Barro and Gordon 1983b).  
Paradoxically, the more credible the commitment is in the first place, the greater will 
be the benefits of cheating. The pre-commitment may thereby introduce additional 
incentives to cheat. This, in turn, will affect how rational actors behave and reintroduce 
the initial problem. Thus, even in the presence of a “once-and-for-all binding choice 
… there may be no mechanism in place to constrain the policymaker to stick to the 
rule … as time evolves” (1983a: 598). Even if the problem of good beginnings could be 
resolved, in other words, the problem of politics would remain. From this follows that 
we must not only focus on getting the rules right, but on the “legal or institutional 
mechanisms to enforce them” (1983b: 108).  
One of the crucial elements in this regard is reputation and credibility (1983b: 
102). This at the same time introduces an opening for separating the conduct of 
monetary policy from electoral politics in so far as it introduces a longer time horizon 
in monetary policy making: “any known finite horizon for the game rules out 
[reputational equilibria]” (1983a: 605). A discretionary monetary authority that is 
responsive to political changes cannot credibly commit to a rule for monetary policy 
because there is no way of committing any possible future government to the rule in 
the present (1983b: 102-4). Barro and Gordon develop a model of monetary policy 
based on rules enforced by reputation and the reputational costs of departing from the 
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rules in response to this problem. The notion of central bank independence, however, 
remains absent from their framework.  
The link between commitment to low inflation and central bank independence 
as a means of enforcing this commitment was forged by Rogoff (1985), who introduced 
the hypothesis that “dynamic inconsistency theories of inflation … make it plausible 
that more independent central banks will reduce the rate of inflation” (Alesina and 
Summer’s 1993: 151). It was, in other words, Rogoff who combined the scientific 
approach with the German notion of central bank independence. Rogoff, however, 
presents a solution that is much less demanding both in terms of ensuring the right 
rules and enforcement-mechanisms as well as in terms of securing general public 
acceptance of the primacy of price stability.  
Rogoff (1985: 1177) suggests that taken to its logical conclusion, the rules-based 
approach would require the “design of a permanent constitutional reform that 
absolutely ruled out systematic inflation, and yet left the central bank scope to respond 
to disturbances.” In other words, the rules-based approach could not overcome the 
problem of beginnings. It would, furthermore, come with certain drawbacks by 
introducing “the danger that the rule will be difficult to alter after it becomes 
outmoded” (ibid.). To counter this drawback, Rogoff (ibid.) promotes the ‘conservative 
central banker’ as an “alternative, less drastic, response to the stagflation problem”: 
“society can make itself better off by selecting an agent to head the independent central 
bank who is known to place a greater weight on inflation stabilization (relative to 
unemployment stabilization) than is embodied in the social loss function” (ibid.).  
Reputation plays a key role in Rogoff’s framework, but it is a reputation of a 
very different kind than that discussed by Barro and Gordon. It is not the reputation 
gained through honouring certain commitments that counts, but the reputation for 
inflation-hawkishness.4 In this framework, only the central bank’s independence and 
conservatism are crucial because this allows, as it did in Germany, for a commitment 
to price stability. Taking advantage of the time-inconsistency model, which presents 
 
 
4 Rogoff’s (1985: 1179-80) model takes advantage of a peculiar incentive of central bank governors: 
“One incentive that the head of the central bank might have for holding down inflation is that he 
can thereby improve his standing in the financial community, and thus earn greater remuneration 
upon returning to the private sector.” Rogoff, in other words, seeks to institutionalise the influence 
of ‘shadow principals’ (Adolph 2013) in central banking, by “deliberately allowing the central banker 
to be captured by the financial community” (Lohman 1992: 276). 
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the pursuit of price stability as being neutral with respect to other economic objectives, 
Rogoff develops a model that promises to resolve the problem of politics through a 
relatively minor institutional adjustment. Because there is no trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment, society’s interests can be served unproblematically by an 
independent central bank systematically biased in favour of price stability. Monetary 
policy is conceptualised as being distributionally neutral and can, as such, be safely 
removed from the general political process for expressing societal priorities and values: 
“society can be made better off by having the central bank place ‘too large’ a weight 
on inflation rate stabilization” (ibid:1187).  
 
Measuring Independence  
Rogoff (1985: 1187) suggests that his model “may help explain why many countries set 
up an independent central bank and choose its governors from conservative elements 
of the financial community.” Like Kydland and Prescott and Barro and Gordon, he 
presents no empirical evidence to support his model. No central banks are studied in 
terms of their independence or conservatism. The postulated link between central bank 
independence and low inflation is not supported with reference to historical data. The 
theory, of course, stands and falls with this question: does central bank independence 
actually lead to lower observed inflation rates? 
While it is perhaps inherently impossible to answer this question conclusively 
(see, e.g., McNamara 2002; Forder 2005), a veritable academic industry developed 
around addressing it. The pre-occupation with it has two dimensions. On the one 
hand, it reflected the search for an institutional solution to the problem of inflation. 
The theory postulated a causal relationship, but if it were to serve as the basis of 
institutional reforms, it would have to be proven that it was at least ‘tentatively’ 
plausible (Alesina 1988: 17). On the other hand, establishing that the theory ‘worked’ 
was crucial because of the sensitive question of the independent central bank’s 
democratic legitimacy. Unelected discretionary power – particularly if it is responsive 
primarily to the financial community (Rogoff 1985; Lohman 1992) – is democratically 
questionable. As such, the benefits of the institutional arrangement would have to be 
established beyond doubt in order not to be rejected all too easily for its lack of 
democratic legitimacy as, for instance, Nordhaus and Friedman had done. It would, 
as it were, have to be able to demonstrate a robust ‘output legitimacy’ to make up for 
its lack of ‘input legitimacy.’  
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Central Bank Independence and the Political Business Cycle 
One of the characteristics of attempts at establishing a relationship between central 
bank independence and low inflation is the search for an index for measuring central 
bank independence. That is, what are the determinants of independence and how can 
the independence of different central banks be compared? The literature on this 
question is substantial (to name but a few, Bade and Parkin 1988; Alesina 1988; Alesina 
and Summers 1993; Grilli et al 1991; Cukierman 1992; Eijffinger and Schaling 1993) 
and it continues to attract attention in academic debates, whether one agrees or 
disagrees with the basic premises of the approach (see, e.g., De Haan and Eijffinger 
2000; McNamara 2002; Forder 2005; Mudge and Vauchez 2016). The different 
indices refer explicitly to the theory of central bank independence discussed above and 
attempt to formalise some of the variables identified in the theoretical works. The 
literature on ‘measuring central bank independence’ thereby operationalises the theory 
in order to a) test whether there is empirical evidence to support the claim that 
independence leads to lower observed inflation, and b) to provide guidelines for 
reforming or creating new central banks.5 
Alberto Alesina’s “Macroeconomics and Politics” (1988) is one of the most 
substantive early works in this vein. It develops a justification for central bank 
independence explicitly based on Barro and Gordon, but in doing so it emphasises an 
element that was under-developed in the theoretical work: the political business cycle. 
The original theory of political business cycles hypothesises that macroeconomic policy 
will tend to be distorted by governmental interventions informed by incentives arising 
from the electoral process (see, e.g., Nordhaus 19756). When chasing re-election, the 
theory hypothesised, rational political actors will introduce policies with short-term 
benefits but long-term costs. The ordinary political process thereby leads to politically 
induced booms and busts, i.e., economic instability:   
a perfect democracy with retrospective evaluation of parties will make decisions 
biased against future generations. Moreover, within an incumbent’s term in office 
 
 
5 This latter aspect is often explicitly addressed in the context of EMU (Alesina and Grilli 1992; Grilli et 
al 1991; Cukierman 1992, Eijffinger and Schaling 1993).  
6 Kalecki (1943) developed a theory of political business cycle before Nordhaus. He derived the origin 
of the cycles in the preference of the capitalists for relatively high unemployment due to a fear of the 
power of the workers to capture surplus value. Kalecki, in other words, did not see the cycle as a 
product of the political process as such but of the capitalists’ control of it (Nordhaus 1975: 181).   
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there is a predictable pattern of policy, starting with relative austerity in early years 
and ending with the potlatch right before election (Nordhaus 1975: 187).  
This somewhat gloomy conclusion seems to point to the necessity of delegating 
policymaking authority to politically independent bodies. While recognising this, 
however, Nordhaus (ibid: 188) dismisses it due to the dangers of such bodies being 
unresponsive to societal wants and bringing uncertain benefits. 
To Alesina (1988: 15, 35-38), the key aspect of the political business cycle is its 
partisan dimension. The problem of committing to price stability is not only related to 
the electoral mechanism as such, he claimed, but to the fact that parties with different 
ideological positions compete for governmental power. Credible contestants for 
governmental power may attach different weights to combatting inflation, thereby 
generating “suboptimal fluctuations in money supply and in output and 
unemployment” (ibid: 39). The response to this problem of politics for monetary 
stability is to institute “a Central Bank, independent from each current government” 
(ibid., emphasis added). The central bank should, in other words, not be absolutely 
isolated from politics but specifically from partisan politics. This, Alesina (ibid: 40, 
emphasis added) suggests, might both ensure commitment and address the democratic 
shortcomings of central bank independence because it only prevents “direct political 
pressure from each current government.”  
Alesina restates the problem of politics in relation to monetary issues as 
involving two elements: periodic elections and competing political parties that hold 
different opinions regarding the importance of monetary stability. The problem, in 
other words, is the normal functioning of democracy and the threat that it poses to the 
stability of monetary values. While this argument may justify central bank 
independence, it says little about what ensures independence and whether it actually 
works as hypothesised. In order to test the hypothesis, central bank independence must 
be measured and compared to observed inflation rates. On the basis of such a measure, 
then, Alesina (ibid: 41) shows that the two countries that have the greatest central bank 
independence, Germany and Switzerland, also enjoy the lowest rate of inflation. While 
Alesina (ibid: 42) notes that this is a correlation, not necessarily a causal link, it appears 
to confirm the ‘central bank independence = low inflation’-thesis.  
This and other such findings to the same effect (e.g., Bade and Parkin 1988; 
Masciandaro and Tabellini 1988) rationalised the Bundesbank’s and the SNB’s relative 
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success during the Stagflation Crisis. But it raises (at least) two questions: What do these 
findings show? And what is being measured?  
On the first question, Alesina (1988: 42) notes that the direction of the causal 
link is not clear, if indeed there is a causal link. The “relationship may be due to the 
fact that countries with a preference for low inflation also prefer more independent 
central banks.” That is, there may be a general political culture in favour of price 
stability – a Stabilitätskultur – in the countries concerned that explains why there is low 
inflation. The populations of these countries may simply be more willing than others 
to make sacrifices to achieve price stability. Central bank independence may not be 
the independent variable. While the theory brings forward a hypothetical causal 
direction from central bank independence to inflation and formal explanation for why 
this might be so, the data cannot confirm it. But the data did not falsify the theory 
either and the supposedly close causal link between central bank independence and 
low inflation quickly became taken for granted as a basic consensus of the economics 
profession (Forder 2005). 
A similar critique can be advanced of the second question (what is measured?). 
One of the most important variables in the different indices is the central bank’s legal 
independence. This, of course, includes the government’s ability to determine 
monetary policy but it also includes the legislated objectives of the central bank. In line 
with the theory discussed above, a specific content is given to the notion independence: 
how strong is the legal commitment to pursue price stability? This measure reflects 
both the German and ‘Rogoffian’ notion of independence being synonymous with 
inflation-averseness and the legal enshrinement of the objective of price stability could 
be seen as a measure of how conservative central bankers are likely to be. It is “one of 
the means by which a government can choose the strength of its commitment to price 
stability” (Cukierman et al 1992: 354; see also Lohman 1992; McNamara 2002).  
In Cukierman’s (1992: 374) oft-cited index, this is a central element. A central 
bank’s independence is considered ‘perfect’ if it has price stability as “the only or major 
goal, and in case of conflict with government [the central bank] has final authority to 
pursue policies aimed at achieving this goal.” Based almost to the letter on the 
institutional position of the Bundesbank, the measure is constructed on the basis of 
what it is trying to explain: the Bundesbank’s success (see Forder 1999 for a general 
critique of the ‘measuring’ literature to this effect). Indeed, the various available 
measures of central bank independence agree on little but the independence of the 
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Bundesbank and the SNB (Forder 1999: 29). Not surprisingly, then, the Bundesbank 
is the clear ‘winner’ with the SNB a close second. On this basis, there appears to be a 
strong correlation between central bank independence and low inflation.7 Conversely, 
if “price stability is mentioned with a number of potentially conflicting goals (e.g., full 
employment)” the central bank is considered significantly less independent (Cukierman 
1992: 374). Consequently, given that the Fed has a dual mandate – maximum 
employment and stable prices – it scores lower in terms of independence than the 
Bundesbank. Cukierman (ibid: 370) explicitly recognises that what he attempts to 
gauge is “not the independence to do anything that the [central bank] pleases” but 
“the ability of the bank to stick to the price stability objective.” Central bank 
independence is thereby defined as a commitment to price stability “even at the cost 
of other short-term real objectives” (ibid.). The measure, in other words, does not 
measure central bank independence as such, but, circularly, the political commitment 
to price stability expressed in legal form (Forder 1999). 
Independence is tested not only against inflation but also against government 
debt and budget deficits. In doing so, Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991: 375, 
emphasis added) find that central bank independence leads “to low inflation, 
irrespective of political institutions and budgetary problems … having an independent 
central bank is almost like having a free lunch; there are benefits but no apparent costs in 
terms of macroeconomic performance.” The thrust of this conclusion is shared by 
Alesina and Summers (1993: 151), who conclude that “while central bank 
independence promotes price stability, it has no measurable impact on real economic 
performance.”  
This conclusion corresponds to that of Friedman as well as that of the theory 
of central bank independence: a monetary policy geared towards price stability does 
not affect other economic variables. It is, as such, irrelevant for other economic 
policymaking and can safely, even ‘optimally,’ be removed from the ordinary political 
process. This ‘truth,’ however, should be qualified. The question of the control of the 
central bank has consequences for the wider question of economic governance: if 
monetary policy is determined by an independent central bank that refuses to monetise 
 
 
7 Across measures, this correlation seems to disappear once the Bundesbank and the SNB are excluded 
from the sample (Forder 1999).  
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government deficits, then “budget deficits are determined by the Central Bank” 
(Alesina 1988: 44). An important and intended ‘beneficial’ effect of central bank 
independence is its introduction of constraints on the government’s room of 
manoeuvre not only with regard to monetary policy but also in terms of the budget. In 
doing so, central bank independence presents itself not only as a response to the 
problem of politics with regard to monetary policy but also with regard to fiscal policy 
more broadly. Despite ‘having no effects’ on other economic variables, it creates 
constraints on economic policymaking.  
There is an inherent tension in the literature on this issue. On the one hand, 
central bank independence is an institutional fix to the specific problem of inflation, 
without any measurable effects on other economic outcomes. At the same time, 
however, it is an institutional arrangement that compels governments into acting in 
certain ways. It is a ‘free lunch’ paid for with the sacrifice of the government’s political 
freedoms concerning economic policy. It is, as such, a way of strengthening the 
disciplinary forces that governments face in economic policymaking; a way of making 
governments ‘less dangerous.’ While monetary policy can be ‘safely’ separated from 
general economic policymaking, the link between the monetary and the broader 
economic order – highlighted by all three approaches discussed in chapter 1 – does not 
disappear. Central bank independence is thus simultaneously ‘neutral’ and significant 
for constraining a government’s economic policymaking capacity in a particular way. 
Such a paradox can, of course, not be sustained as ‘scientific.’ As Gunnar Myrdal 
would perhaps have remarked, its proponents have left behind the realm of science 
and entered that of ideology and politics.  
The findings of the ‘measuring’ literature are presented as having “important 
implications for the ongoing debate over the feasibility and appropriate sequencing of 
the European monetary integration” (Grilli et al 1991: 375-6). In short, it provides 
empirical support for the ‘monetarist’8 path to economic and monetary integration: a 
monetary union with an independent central bank can successfully precede full 
economic (and political) union because a single monetary policy will have the effect of 
 
 
8 ‘Monetarist’ refers here not to monetarism as an economic theory but to the perspective that European 
monetary integration would engender subsequent economic convergence and integration and could 
therefore precede ‘deeper’ integration efforts. In debates on EMU it contrasted with the ‘economist’ 
perspective, which considered general economic convergence to be a necessary precondition for 
monetary union. 
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constraining the general economic policies of the Member States, thereby paving the 
way for the necessary economic convergence. 
 
Conclusion: The Elimination of the Political Question 
In the German context, the authority of the central bank was to be founded upon a 
broad societal consensus on the need for isolating the conduct of monetary policy from 
political control. The theoretical and empirical literature on central bank 
independence introduced a different or additional foundation: science. Logically and 
empirically, the literature claimed, central bank independence was superior to 
politically controlled central banks. Based on the principle of central bank 
independence established by the Bundesbank, both the theoretical and the measuring 
literature sought to replace the political question of the objectives of monetary policy 
with the more technical question: what works? The political question, in turn, had to 
be abandoned because its mere presence in political economic life would lead to 
suboptimality and instabilities.   
In Keynes (see chapter 1), the technical question was crucial to the question of 
the structure of the central bank. No political choice about economic policy made sense 
without an effective technical execution of the monetary policy supporting it. But the 
political question about the objectives of monetary policy could, and indeed should, 
never be abolished. It ought to inform elections and the daily activity of democratic 
governments. With central bank independence defined as the single-minded pursuit of 
price stability, this political question is entirely eliminated, leaving only the technical 
question behind. Central bank independence is a way of eliminating the continuous 
possibility of politically determining the order and orientation of monetary policy and 
replacing it with a distinctly ‘economic’ rationality, which promises to contribute to 
economic welfare only through distorting economic processes as little as possible.  
While the causal link between central bank independence and low inflation 
cannot be established beyond reasonable doubt, the theoretical and empirical 
literatures nevertheless offer a justification for central bank independence: it provides 
an institutional means of constraining the potentially destructive power of politics in 
relation to the economy without being associated with any significant costs itself. What 
the ‘scientific’ grounding does is to present central bank independence as (economic) 
reason’s conquest of the (political) passions. The ‘scientific’ justification for central bank 
independence thereby ‘confirms’ the message conveyed by the ‘myth.’ But it also adds 
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an additional layer to it. It claims that while inflation may become catastrophic, this is 
not necessarily the most relevant aspect of it. Inflation is also quite simply unnecessary 
and counterproductive. If central bank independence was perceived as entailing 
certain sometimes difficult sacrifices in the name of a higher objective in the German 
context, this need no longer be the case. It is the closest thing economic life comes to 
‘a free lunch.’ 
Except, of course, it isn’t. Depoliticising monetary policy and rendering it 
outside partisan control does not make it non-ideological, unpolitical or unpartisan (see 
McNamara 2002). As is recognised in the literature itself, for instance, the political 
dedication to low inflation is more commonly a feature of conservative political 
programmes than of more progressive ones. Low inflation, furthermore, has significant 
distributional consequences by benefitting creditors more than debtors. Such 
distributional consequences can only be assumed away if price stability is somehow 
considered the ‘natural state’ of the economy or if any inflation is seen as a prelude to 
societal collapse. This underlines the understanding of politics and policymaking that 
informs the theory: politics is not an adequate way of expressing the people’s wishes. It 
is an inherently distortive force, particularly as it relates to economic and monetary 
issues. While it cannot be avoided entirely, it must be made less harmful. Central bank 
independence promises a way of achieving this that requires no grand constitutional 
programme or new beginning. In the EMU, however, central bank independence was 
introduced in a grand constitutional programme that constituted a new beginning for 
its citizens and Member States. In the process, central bank independence unavoidably 
became a constitutional issue. This is the theme of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
The Constitution of the European Central Bank 
 
 
Introduction  
“When the Maastricht Treaty was discussed and the statute for the future ECB was 
debated,” according to Otmar Issing1 (cited in Jeffrey 2016), “a few strands came 
together.” On the one hand, “an increasing number of studies showed that the degree 
of price stability coincided with the independence of the central bank. So the mood for 
independence was supported.” But this ‘mood’ did not come from such studies. It 
came, rather, from the fact that “the Bundesbank was independent” and “had helped 
to ensure monetary stability in Germany since the creation of the Deutschmark in 
1948.” What came together in the creation of the ECB was “[a] combination of 
empirical evidence and an insistence by Germans” on the institutional form of 
independence enjoyed by the Bundesbank. What came together, in other words, were 
the mythical and the scientific groundings of central bank independence. 
Beyond establishing that the ECB would become independent, however, this 
‘mood’ says little about the actual institutional form of the ECB. While the principle of 
the Bundesbank’s independence had to be retained, its exact institutional form and 
foundation of authority could not be replicated at the European level. While the 
problem of politics in relation to money had to be addressed in a similar manner, a 
different approach to doing so had to be adopted. This chapter analyses the peculiar 
constitutional structure that resulted from this approach. 
A basic premise of both the German notion of central bank independence and 
the theory of central bank independence is that there is a government to be 
independent from. In the European context, however, there is no such government 
but rather a multiplicity of political authorities at different levels of government. The 
constitutional position of the ECB would therefore have to differ from other central 
 
 
1 Issing was the first Chief Economist of the ECB and was a Member of the Executive Board 1998-2006. 
Prior to this, he served on the German Council of Economic Experts and on the board of the 
Bundesbank.   
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banks. If the Bundesbank’s independence, for instance, made it ‘a state within the 
state,’ as Chancellors Adenauer and Schmidt both complained, the same accusation 
cannot be levelled at the ECB. It would have to stop at ‘a state,’ which would hardly 
be satisfactory or particularly accurate. In terms of its position within the governmental 
framework of the Eurozone, the ECB is not the European Bundesbank for the simple 
reason that the Eurozone is not, at least not in public law terms, the German state on 
a larger scale. Focussing on the question of differences in the degree of independence 
risks overlooking this basic fact and its significance for the general EMU constitution. 
Similarly, while the US Federal Reserve System was often presented as a source 
of inspiration for the ‘Founding Fathers’ of the ECB, they ended up choosing a 
different path. As noted in chapter 2, the Werner Report’s vision of EMU advocated 
a political structure within economic policy quite similar to that of the US. The central 
bank’s position within this structure would have been similar to that of the Fed, which 
describes itself as ‘independent within government.’ This description inscribes itself in 
a tradition of thinking about the organisation of governmental powers that reflects, as 
I highlight in this chapter, central Montesquieuian ideas. In this model, the political 
control of monetary policy is not abolished, but is mediated through a complex 
structure of checks and balances. Within this structure, what is sought is not the 
elimination of politics, but the prevention of monetary policy being dominated by one 
set of interests, partisan or otherwise. The structure seeks the mediation of the exercise 
of sovereign power with respect to monetary policy. 
The framers of the EMU in the Delors Committee, as discussed in the next 
section, consciously rejected this model. Building on, but modifying considerably, the 
Bundesbank model, the Maastricht Treaty constituted the ECB as an independent 
body exercising sovereign powers checked by Treaty law. As such, the ECB formalised 
the notion of being the direct monetary representative of the people discussed in 
relation to the Bundesbank in chapter 2. In doing so within the particular constitutional 
structure of the Eurozone, I highlight, the ECB’s institutional form addressed the 
problem of politics in relation to money in a manner similar to that which Hobbes 
proposed for overcoming the problem of politics in general. Within the realm of 
monetary affairs, the ECB was set up to eliminate the potentially destabilising effects 
of conflicting or divergent political opinions and practices with regard to monetary 
policy. Through its transnational constitutional depoliticisation, monetary policy was 
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to be conducted beyond the reach of ordinary politics within, as well as beyond, the 
state. In this particular sense, the Maastricht Treaty achieved the ordoliberal notion of 
founding a transnational monetary order in a constituent moment. That being said, it 
addressed a question the ordoliberals never fully answered: the question of 
transnational public authority. 
The analysis that follows can be described as ‘idealist’ as opposed to 
‘materialist.’ That is, it focusses not on the ‘real’ legitimacy of the institutions discussed 
or on whether the structures described adequately achieve what they claim to do in 
terms of expressing the people’s will. While it may be true, for instance, that central 
banks act in ways that primarily favour holders of financial assets over regular wage 
earners, this cannot inform their justifications. As public institutions they must claim 
to serve the public interest, not the private interests of particular sectors or groups in 
society. The general public is always seen as the ‘master’ that such public institutions 
‘serve.’ How they are institutionally set up to serve the public, however, differs. 
 
Monetary Union and the Transnational Problem of Politics 
The European monetary union was intended to help complete the single market for 
capital: “With full freedom of capital movements and integrated financial markets 
incompatible national policies would quickly translate into exchange rate tensions and 
put an increasing and undue burden on monetary policy” (Delors Report 1989: 11). 
The problem at the time was that individual Member States could conduct economic 
and monetary policies that were potentially in conflict with the realisation of the single 
market. The problem was the continued political freedom of Member States to seek 
the realisation of domestic goals that jeopardised the achievement of common aims.  
The problem of politics faced by the European Community at the time was not 
only or mainly the problem that monetary value is simultaneously grounded in and 
threatened by politics. It included this problem and reflected the same logic, but it was 
broader in scope. The problem was that the realisation of a certain shared agenda 
would have to be founded on a political agreement between the contracting parties, 
but this agreement would thereafter be under constant threat from the politics internal 
to each of those parties: “Decision-making authorities are subject to many pressures 
and institutional constraints and even best efforts to take into account the international 
repercussions of their policies are likely to fail at certain times” (ibid.). The problem 
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was thus similar to the time inconsistency problem discussed in chapter 3: relying on 
voluntary cooperation in the present would jeopardise the achievement of the common 
good in the future because there would be no way of securing the cooperation of future 
decision-making authorities without institutional controls.  There was a “need for more 
binding procedures” (ibid.).  
 
From Werner to Delors 
When the Delors Committee was given the task of preparing a report on how to 
achieve EMU following the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986,2 the 1970 
Werner Report was revisited. While the Delors Committee agreed with the general 
objective that Werner outlined for monetary union, the institutional approach was 
deemed outdated and to have suffered from “intrinsic weaknesses” (Baer and Padoa-
Scioppa 1989: 56). One such weakness was its “lack of clarity on independence”3 and 
on the distribution of decision-making responsibility for monetary policy (ibid: 57).  
The Werner vision of EMU entailed a comprehensive gouvernement économique at 
the European level, which would perform an active and interventionist role in shaping 
economic conditions and policies across the Union. This reflected the largely 
Keynesian consensus of the post-war years; it embraced political authority in the 
ordinary conduct of economic and monetary policy. This meant that the central bank’s 
independence would be limited and that final responsibility for monetary policy would 
remain with political actors. Baer and Padoa-Schioppa4 (1989: 58), however, 
highlighted that the stagflation had “destroyed” the consensus that informed Werner. 
Now, as discussed in chapter 3, “a new consensus” had emerged which “emphasized 
the need for monetary arrangements that promote and preserve stability” (ibid.). In 
terms of economic policy, furthermore, emphasis had shifted towards “the supply side 
 
 
2 The Single European Act was the first major reform of the 1957 Rome Treaty and is considered to 
have sparked the momentum necessary for moving towards EMU in 1992. It was motivated by the 
need to complete the single market and introduced a number of institutional changes that would 
make this possible by 1992, including the introduction of majority voting in a number of areas 
relating to market integration (Cowles 2012).  
3 From “Comments on “The Werner Report revisited,” Tommasso Padoa-Schioppa in correspondence 
with Henry Joly Dixon, 28 July 1988, Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), TPS-
184. 
4 Gunter Baer and Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa participated in the work of the Delors Committee as 
rapporteurs and were instrumental in coordinating work on and drafting the report. 
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of the economy and structural policies” (ibid.). In institutional terms, this neoliberal 
turn entailed the abandonment of the idea of a gouvernement économique. Focus turned 
instead to the question of the monetary policy regime.  
According to the Delors Report (1989: 14), economic policy could remain a 
Member State responsibility “within an agreed macroeconomic framework and […] 
subject to binding procedures and rules.” This element reflects the ordoliberal 
approach to economic policy being based on rules rather than discretionary political 
authority. While a political decision is necessary in order to establish and maintain the 
framework conditions (see Selmayr 1999: 378), the exercise of public power should 
retreat as much as possible from an active involvement in steering economic activity. 
As Röpke (1954: 250) argued in the context of discussing the possibility of 
transnationalising economic governance, “there would be little advantage in taking 
away from national Governments the sovereign right of collectivist economic control 
for the sole purpose of transferring it to an international authority.” In relation to 
monetary policy, however, the Delors Report (1989: 14) does not emphasise rules and 
procedures but rather a transfer of “decision-making power” to “one decision-making 
body.” Delors thereby incorporates the notion of central bank independence discussed 
in the previous two chapter: the central bank should be an independent actor with final 
decision-making authority within monetary policy. This decision-making body, in 
turn, ought to be single-mindedly devoted to the “stability of the value of money” which 
was to be the “prime objective of European monetary policy” (Pöhl 1989: 137, 
emphases in original). Reflecting the German approach to central banking, then, this 
“overriding commitment … must be safeguarded through the central bank’s 
independence of instructions from national governments and Community authorities.”  
In terms of institutional structure, there was, in short, a significant shift of 
emphasis from Werner to Delors. Whereas Werner emphasised a comprehensive 
economic policy formulated at the European level, the emphasis was now on a single 
monetary policy acting as an externally given constraint on the coordinated but 
separate economic policies of the several Member States. Delors’s EMU promised to 
accomplish this by leaving fiscal policy in the hands of Member States but subject to a 
body of rules, while introducing a politically independent central bank pursuing price 
stability. 
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The Question of Transferring Sovereign Powers 
The question is: why was the solution to the problem of divergent national economic 
policies sought in the creation of a single monetary authority and a set of fiscal rules 
rather than in a comprehensive ‘economic constitution’ enforced by a common public 
authority? There were, of course, practical political obstacles to creating coercive 
public authority at the European level. But the constitution of an economic order 
without comprehensive political authority also had a distinct normative dimension to 
it (Selmayr 1999: 378; Zilioli and Selmayr 2000: 627). This is perhaps best captured in 
a January 1990 speech by Karl Otto Pöhl, then President of the Bundesbank. The 
EMU, according to Pöhl, would introduce  
binding arrangements … in major sectors which make unilateral action more difficult 
or impossible for member states and which set a minimum standard of ‘good 
conduct’ for them, particularly in fiscal policy. This will necessitate the surrender of 
sovereignty by the individual member states, but this need not mean corresponding gains in Community 
authority.5  
The point of the ‘E’ in EMU, in other words, was to eliminate a set of existing policy 
prerogatives rather than to transfer them; the Community would not assume the 
governmental capacity surrendered. Once the rules and procedures were put in place, 
it would be simply a question of following them with minimal political discretion. The 
Community would have no direct policymaking power, no sovereign powers, within 
the sphere of general economic policy.  
The ‘M’, on the other hand, would “transfer the decision on future monetary 
policy to an independent Community institution”6 which “must have the weapon 
which every efficient central bank must have: the monopoly of money creation.”7 It would 
involve a “transfer of sovereign rights to a supranational institution.”8 The “Member 
States transferred their sovereignty with regard to monetary policy to the Eurosystem” 
(ECB 1999: 55). The sovereignty surrendered by the Member States with respect to 
 
 
5 Pöhl, K.O. “Herr Pöhl discusses the basic features of a European monetary order,” speech in Paris, 
16 January 1990, p. 1, emphasis added. HAEU, TPS-193. Pöhl is thus in agreement with Röpke’s 
1954 notion that “To diminish national sovereignty is most emphatically one of the urgent needs of 
our time. But the excess of sovereignty should be abolished instead of being transferred to a higher 
political and geographical unit.” 
6 “Herr Pöhl discusses,” p. 5. 
7 Ibid., emphasis in original. 
8 “Herr Pöhl examines issues relating to the creation of a European central bank,” BIS Review No. 93, 
Basle, 13 May 1988, p. 3. HAEU, TPS-184. 
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monetary policy would not remain unclaimed but would be assumed by the ECB. This 
was justified by the fact that the advantages of independence apply to the Community 
“to an even greater extent than to national states because in a confederation such as 
the EC there is always a tendency to orientate oneself towards averages and 
compromises, but that is the worst possible compass for monetary policy.”9 That is, the 
central bank must be above the ordinary haggling of intergovernmental policymaking: 
“a modern, efficient central bank system must be independent of the instructions and 
pressures of national governments and European institutions” because “[p]rotracted 
consultation and concertation processes are not consistent with the requirements of the 
financial markets which need fast and flexible reactions by the central bank.”10 The 
imperatives of the governmental activity itself demand depoliticised but efficient 
decision-making. The markets demand decisive sovereign authority. 
In reflecting on the institutional structure of its proposed EMU, the Delors 
Report (1989: 13, emphasis in original) noted that it would have to respect the plurality 
of the Member States by allowing them “a degree of autonomy in economic decision-
making.” Pöhl’s notion of an asymmetric sovereignty transfer/surrender was justified 
with reference to “[t]he existence and preservation of this plurality” (Delors Report 
1989: 13). As such, “it would not be possible simply to follow the example of existing 
federal States” as the Werner approach had done. “[I]t would be necessary to develop 
an innovative and unique approach” (ibid.). The EMU would have to develop an 
institutional structure that differed from any existing. 
 
The Fed: ‘Independent within Government’  
How did the EU’s ‘innovative and unique approach’ differ from existing approaches? 
To answer this, it is necessary to have an idea of the approaches that were rejected. 
Because of their federal structures, the two most relevant were considered to be the 
German and the American approaches to the question of the relationship between the 
central bank and government. As the German approach was discussed in chapter 2, 
this section focusses only on the US approach and the institutional form of the Fed. 
Both, however, serve as grounds of comparison in the section on the ECB below.  
 
 
9 “Herr Pöhl discusses,” p. 3. 
10 Ibid. 
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The Fed’s Foundation of Independence 
According to a former Vice-Chairman of the Fed’s Board of Governors, Alan Blinder 
(1996: 8-9)11, 
a central bank is a repository of enormous power over the economy. And if the 
central bank is independent, as the Federal Reserve is, this power is virtually 
unchecked. Such power is a public trust, assigned to the bank by the body politic 
through its elected representatives. In return, the citizens and their elected 
representatives have a right to expect – indeed to demand – that the bank’s actions 
match its words.  
In line with the notion of central bank independence, the Fed’s powers are exercised 
independently of political instructions. They are ‘unchecked’ in the sense that no 
political body can (ordinarily) veto the Fed’s decisions. The Fed, however, is only 
‘virtually’ unchecked. Its power is derived from Congress and the President (‘elected 
representatives’), who in turn derive their governmental authority from the ‘body 
politic.’ From this structure of authorisation and delegation follows a certain right: the 
right to demand something from the Fed. In the final instance, then, the Fed is 
accountable to, and controlled by, the people’s elected representatives from whom it 
derives its ‘enormous power.’  
On the basis of this structure of authorisation and accountability, the question 
“Who does the Fed Serve?” (ibid: 2) can be answered meaningfully only by recognising 
that its “constituency can only be the entire nation” (ibid: 4). The question is how the 
relationship between the Fed and the nation is given institutional form.  
In accordance with the theory and empirical evidence on central bank 
independence, Blinder (ibid: 9, emphasis in original) claims that the nation is best 
served by a central bank that is “free to decide how to pursue its goals” and whose 
technical decisions are immune to being “countermanded by any other branch of 
government.” Monetary policy demands “[f]arsightedness and patience,” none of 
which are “the strong suits of the political process in a democracy” (ibid: 10). Thus, 
“many governments wisely depoliticize monetary policy by delegating authority to 
 
 
11 Blinder’s should of course not be understood as the authoritative account of the Fed’s form of 
independence. It reflects, however, a common way of conceptualising the Fed’s independence. It 
may not be adequate in terms of the wider governmental role of the Fed because it focusses narrowly 
on the Fed’s monetary policymaking role (see Conti-Brown 2016, 2017), but since monetary policy 
is the focus of this thesis, the broader inadequacies of the conception are to a significant extent 
irrelevant for the present purposes. 
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unelected technocrats with long terms of office, thick insulation from the hurly-burly 
of politics, and explicit instructions to fight inflation” (ibid: 10, emphasis added). 
Governments thereby follow the reasoning “which led Ulysses to tie himself to the 
mast. He knew he would get better long-run results even though he wouldn’t feel so 
good about it in the short run!” (ibid: 11). In accordance with the discourse discussed 
in chapter 3, central bank independence is a Ulysses contract. It allows ‘us’ – voters, 
public, politicians – to conquer our future irrationality in a moment of clarity (see 
Conti-Brown 2017).  
While the logic of separating monetary policy from the ordinary political 
process is similar to that found in the discourse of the German central bankers, there 
is a telling difference in the way Blinder presents it. In his presentation, it is the 
government that introduces central bank independence as a self-constraint. While in a 
formal sense, both the Bundesbank and the Fed derive their authority from ordinary 
legislation, the Bundesbank sought to ground its authority in something more 
foundational than this so that its independence would be immune from changes of 
opinion within the Bundestag. The question is whether the same can be said for the 
Fed. That is, what is the Fed’s relationship to the broader political system of the US 
federal government?  
In the US system of government, one must differentiate between different 
moments or ‘stages’ of democracy: “certain decisions are reserved to what is sometimes 
called the ‘constitutional stage’ of government, rather than left to the daily legislative 
struggle” (Blinder 1996: 11).  The rationale for such a differentiation, Blinder suggests, 
is to ensure that “basic decisions” will “be hard to reverse.” This distinction between 
extraordinary and ordinary politics – between ordinary and higher lawmaking 
(Ackerman 1993) – applies “[s]imilarly with monetary policy” (Blinder 1996: 11). 
However, despite invoking it, Blinder does not make the claim that the Fed’s 
independence was settled at the constitutional stage (which would, in any case, be 
wrong). Rather, the Fed’s dual mandate and independence are derived “from authority 
delegated by Congress” (ibid: 11). Its authority is not derived directly from the constituent 
power of the nation but from the constituted power of the legislative branch of government.  
This, in turn, has important consequences for the institutional relationship 
between the Fed and the nation. Congress’ delegation of authority to the Fed “makes 
it very difficult, but not quite impossible, for elected officials to overrule or influence a 
ECB Constitution 
114 
 
 
monetary policy decision” (ibid: 11, emphasis added). Whereas the conduct of 
monetary policy is insulated from ordinary politics, the general framework of the 
monetary order, including the Fed’s independence and mandate, is not. The Fed can 
thereby be overruled should elective representatives so wish: “Central bank decisions 
should be reversible by the political authorities, but only under extreme circumstances” 
(ibid: 12). While such mechanisms of ‘political control in the last resort’ “have never 
been used in the history of the Federal reserve … America is wise to have them in place 
nonetheless. Delegated authority should be retrievable, not absolute” (ibid: 13, emphasis added). 
The Fed is, as such, open to consequential scrutiny by the nation’s elected 
representatives in Congress. This as well as the fact that the President appoints the 
Members of the Board of Governors confers political legitimacy and authority on the 
Fed (ibid: 12). The institutional relationship between the nation and the Fed is 
mediated by political representatives and the political responsibility for the Fed’s 
actions or inactions remains ultimately with them.  
The Fed’s foundation of authority in a relationship of delegation between the 
people, elected political representatives and the Fed informs the nature of the Fed’s 
political accountability. This is reflected in a number of ways. For one, unlike the 
Bundesbank’s, the Fed’s independence from political authorities is not explicitly 
enshrined in law but is a product of custom, certain structural characteristics and 
agreements such as the 1951 Treasury-Fed accord, which ended the wartime 
Presidential control of the Fed (Hetzel and Leach 2001). Most importantly, the Fed is 
independent in making monetary policy decisions and its budget is not subject to the 
congressional budgetary process. Its independence, however, is limited. At a 
fundamental level, it is limited by Congress’ constitutionally enshrined right “To coin 
Money, [and] regulate the Value thereof” (article I.8.5 US Constitution). This right is 
explicitly invoked in section 31 of the Federal Reserve Act, which stipulates that 
Congress retains the “right to amend, alter, or repeal this act.” Combined with 
Congressional oversight hearings, this final authority over the Fed gives Congress a 
powerful means of holding the Fed to account and a considerable degree of influence 
over the Fed’s monetary policy (Weintraub 1978; Grier 1991; Binder and Spindel 
2017).  
The Fed’s independence is also qualified through its relationship with the 
executive branch. The most direct and formalised way for the President to influence 
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the policy direction of the Fed is through the presidential appointments of the seven-
member Board of Governors. The 14-year, staggered, and non-renewable tenures of 
the Board’s members are supposed to ensure that a president can only appoint two 
members of the Board in any one term (Hackley 1972). A single term president can 
therefore ideally not ‘pack’ the Board. The President’s discretion in this regard is 
further limited through the requirement that the Senate approve the appointees 
(section 10.1 Federal Reserve Act). However, the President (and Senate) is also 
responsible for designating who among the Board members are to be Chair and Vice-
Chairs. These positions, in particular the Chair, are the most influential in terms not 
only of agenda-setting power in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC12), but 
also in terms of controlling the Fed’s bureaucratic resources (Knott 1986; Chappell et 
al 2004). The key to the President’s power over the Fed in this regard is that these 
designations are relatively short (four years) and they are renewable (section 10.2 
Federal Reserve Act). This means that every full-term President will hold a certain 
sway over the agenda-setting power within the Fed and can exercise pressures on its 
leading personalities through the appointment process (Chappell et al 1993; Saeki and 
Shull 2003; see, however, Keech and Morris 1997). In addition to the President’s 
power of appointment, the Treasury retains the right to decide in situations of conflict 
between the Fed’s and the Treasury’s responsibilities and prerogatives (Section 10.6 
Federal Reserve Act). In contrast to the Bundesbank, the question of final authority in 
situations of conflict is explicitly addressed and settled in favour of the political 
representatives. Political authorities thereby retain considerable scope for influencing 
the Fed’s conduct of monetary policy (Wooley 1984; Stein 1994; Havrilesky 1988; see 
also chapter 3).  
The significance of such qualifications of independence is attested to in the 
history of the Fed (see, e.g., Friedman and Schwartz 1963; Sylla 1988; Wood 2005; 
Bernholz 2013; Humpage 2014; Garbade 2014). The Federal Reserve Act has been 
amended multiple times since it was signed into law by President Wilson in 1913 to 
account for small or large changes in the opinions on, and perceived necessities of, 
 
 
12 The FOMC is the highest decision-making body on monetary policy within the Fed. Its membership 
counts the seven members of the Board as well as five of the Presidents of the 12 Federal Reserve 
Banks on a rotating basis. The President of the New York Fed, however, holds a permanent position 
on the FOMC. The Chair of the Board is also the Chair of the FOMC.   
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central banking in the US. Two of the most significant of these changes were the 1933 
Banking Act (part of the New Deal) and the Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1977, 
which introduced the dual mandate of maximum employment and stable prices.  
The executive power’s influence over the monetary order and the orientation 
of monetary policy has also proven substantial over time. With the ‘Nixon Shock,’ for 
instance, President Nixon radically altered the basic monetary order of the US (and 
the world) and thereby the conditions under which the Fed exercised monetary policy. 
But this was only Nixon’s most dramatic assertion of presidential power. When Nixon 
entered office in 1969 the then Chairman of the Board, William McChesney Martin, 
opposed the President’s wish to lower interest rates and expand the money supply. 
Consequently, Nixon did not to renew Martin’s term but installed his friend, Arthur 
Burns, as Chairman, hoping that he would prove more receptive to Nixon’s point of 
view, which he reluctantly did (Wood 2005: 361-3). 
Another example, which became a turning point not only in the history of the 
Fed but of monetary policy in general, was President Carter’s appointment of Paul 
Volcker to the Chairmanship in 1979. Volcker, according to his own testimony, made 
it clear that he did not intend to compromise his dedication to “an independent central 
bank and the need for tighter money” (Volcker as cited in Wood 2005: 375). Hailing 
this as the victory of central bank independence overlooks that this was precisely why 
Carter appointed him. Mandated by the office of the highest political representative of 
the nation, Volcker shifted the theoretical basis of the Fed’s operations from one 
inspired by Keynesianism to one inspired by monetarism (Tobin 1981; McCallum 
2008). Without presidential backing, however, it is doubtful whether the Fed would 
have had the legitimacy to commence on a monetary policy course whose effects were 
so dramatic that the resulting recession often carries Volcker’s name (Wood 2005: 378) 
and is widely understood as marking the advent of the ‘neoliberal revolution’ (S. Hall 
2011; Streeck 2013, 2014). 
 
The Governmental Role of the Fed 
The close relationship between the Fed and the political branches of government as 
well as the continuous possibility of legislative or executive interventions in the activities 
of the Fed is what has prompted the description: “independent – not independent of 
Government, but independent within the structure of the Government” (McChesney 
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Martin 1957: 2). Unlike the Bundesbank, which was explicitly made “independent of 
instructions from the federal government” (article 12 of the original Bundesbankgesetz, 
my translation), the Fed is seen as a part of the government and, in stark contrast to 
the Bundesbank, only its detractors would claim that the Fed is unaccountable to 
political representatives. As the head of the Board’s legal division at the time noted, 
“[t]here is at least one proposition as to which there can be no dissent: the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System is an independent establishment of the 
Federal Government, ‘a part of the Government itself’” (Hackley 1972: 194). 
According to McChesney Martin13 (1957: 2-3), this notion is crucial to understanding 
the Fed’s independence:  
[It] does not mean that the reserve banking mechanism can or should pursue a course 
that is contrary to the objectives of national economic policies. It does mean that 
within its technical field, in deciding upon and carrying out monetary and credit 
policy, it shall be free to exercise its best collective judgment independently … The 
Reserve System is an instrument of Government designed to foster and protect the 
public interest.  
The Fed still uses the phrase “independent within government”14 and characterises 
itself as an “independent government agency” (see also Humpage 2014). In doing so, 
it inscribes itself within the American tradition of independent agencies. 
The independent government agency is a specifically American innovation in 
thinking about administrative power.15 It goes back to the founding of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission in 1887; “an event that profoundly altered the system of 
separated powers” because it introduced into the American system of government “a 
strange amalgam of executive, legislative, and judicial powers, combining functions of 
all three branches yet the creature of none” (Miller 1986: 41). According to 
Rosanvallon (2011: 77), it became “the symbol of a new approach to public 
administration” and “marked a break with the traditional ideas about the role of the 
bureaucracy.” Since then, a multitude of such agencies have been established, 
including the Fed in 1913.  
 
 
13 The longest serving Chairman of the Board, serving between 1951-1970. 
14 See https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12799.htm [last updated 1 March 2017, accessed 6 
December 2019]. 
15 It has subsequently been transferred to Europe and, somewhat controversially, to the EU (see Shapiro 
1997; Everson 1995; Majone 1997, 2002; Thatcher 2002; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002; 
Rosanvallon 2011). 
ECB Constitution 
118 
 
 
Reflecting Blinder’s justification of the Fed’s independence, Rosanvallon (2011: 
77) argues that informing the introduction of independent government agencies is a 
concern with “‘keeping politics out’ of the business of regulating a sector of the 
economy of vital importance to the nation’s general interest.” At the same time, the 
creation of an administrative apparatus specifically dedicated to a particular policy 
area allows for improving the quality and effectiveness of government by subjecting it 
to specialised expertise. Informing the notion of the independent agency is the idea 
that the government of some spheres of societal life is enhanced through its separation 
from direct (partisan) political control. While government, broadly construed, ought to 
remain responsible for the policies concerned, the formulation and execution of those 
policies ought not to be carried out directly by the non-specialised branches of 
government because these lacked the necessary expertise, on the one hand, and were 
liable to be biased in favour of certain interests, on the other. 
Independent government agencies have been the subject of considerable 
political contestation and constitutional scrutiny over time, particularly in the 1930s – 
in the context Roosevelt’s radical expansion of the powers of the federal government – 
and again in the 1980s – in the context of Reagan’s assertion of presidential power to 
reorient public policy along ideological lines (Foote 1988). The controversy over these 
agencies derives from the difficulty of reconciling them “with a tripartite structure of 
government” (Miller 1986: 43). The independent agency, it seems, threatens to 
introduce an ill-defined, ‘headless fourth branch of government’ created “[w]ithout too 
much political theory” (Landis as cited in Miller 1986: 43) and perhaps even against 
the normative logic of the Montesquieu-inspired separation of powers (Koch 1996: 
421). Despite such objections, however, the independent agency has resisted attacks 
and the ‘three great constitutional branches of government’ have accepted their 
existence as useful for a number of reasons. One of the reasons is that the independent 
agency can function as a means of checking the power of the other branches of 
government (Strauss 1984). In so doing, it does not necessarily compromise the 
Montesquieuian system of checks and balances between the different governmental 
powers. It may even enhance it.  
Independent agencies may enhance the balance of powers through the 
relationship between their coming into being and their operation once in place. 
Congress creates the agencies and has the power “to vest substantial discretion in 
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agency heads, and to provide that action by the agency head is a necessary 
precondition to the effective exercise of the authority in question” (Miller 1986: 44). 
Congress, then, can create independent agencies in order to limit the power of the 
President or, more precisely, to orient and give direction to, and thereby bypass the 
President’s direct control of, the exercise of executive power. That being said, the 
President retains “the constitutional power to direct the [agency] officer to take 
particular actions within his or her discretion or to refrain from acting when the officer 
has discretion not to act” (ibid.). This (ultimate) subjection of the concrete activities of 
the independent agency to executive direction reintroduces the President’s ability to 
check the power of Congress (see Datla and Revesz 2013).  
The key motivation for creating such agencies was not to make them 
independent of Congress, Courts, or executive. It was not even to make them 
independent of partisan politics as such. The intention was, rather, to make them 
“[i]ndependent of control by a single political party” (Shapiro 1997: 279, emphasis 
added). Thus, the “American independent agencies have been independent in the 
special sense of being isolated from the immediate control of either of the two major 
political parties rather than being independent of the three great constitutional 
branches” (ibid: 280, emphasis added). In other words, the independent agency was 
instituted to ensure that no one partisan position could dominate and exercise the full 
executive powers of the state within certain spheres of policymaking. Such agencies 
should be understood as being “somewhat separated from politics because of their 
exercise of technical expertise but not too separated” (ibid.).  
Accordingly, the independence of the Fed should be seen not as a way of 
depoliticising monetary policy absolutely but as a way of mediating the political 
exercise of governmental power with regard to monetary policy. On the one hand, it 
ensures a degree of specialisation which would be all but impossible should elected 
representatives be responsible for monetary policy. On the other, it ensures a certain 
distance from the ordinary party-politics of the elected branches of government. It 
ensures that monetary policy is never directly controlled by any one party and 
conducted for purposes internal to that party itself. It ensures, as it were, that the 
exercise of sovereign power with respect to monetary policy is never direct but is 
mediated through a complex institutional setup of checks and balances.  
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Montesquieu and the Mediation of Sovereign Power 
An independent agency such as the Fed entails a double mediation of sovereignty. On 
the one hand, its foundation of authority in the nation is not direct but is mediated 
though political representatives. This gives elected representatives the power to control 
the objectives and activities of the Fed through the ordinary political process. On the 
other hand, because of the Fed’s independence elected representatives are not directly 
in control of monetary policy. Their influence is mediated by the Fed. The exercise of 
sovereign powers with respect to monetary matters by elected representatives is thereby 
channelled through and mediated by the Fed as an intermediate power. This dual 
mediation is as essential feature of the Fed’s institutional form and means that it cannot 
be considered a direct, organic representative of the people in the manner of the 
Bundesbank. 
As hinted at above, the notion of intermediation in the activity of governing is 
not necessarily antagonistic to the Montesquieuian notion of moderate government 
arising from the institutionalised ‘arrestation of power by power.’ It may, in fact, be 
one of its essentials. This, at least, is Carl Schmitt’s (2014 [1921]: 83) reading: 
“Montesquieu’s state theory is only comprehensible if one bears in mind that what was 
referred to in the most crucial parts of his treatise was the idea of intermediate powers.” 
The intermediate powers, however, are referred to not in the context of discussing the 
separation of powers but in discussing ‘laws in their relation to the nature of 
monarchical government’ (The Spirit of the Laws, bk. 2, ch.4). For republican 
government, the relevance of the principles of monarchy stems from the republic’s dual 
weakness: “If a republic is small, it is destroyed by a foreign force; if it is large, it is 
destroyed by an internal vice” (bk. 9, ch. 1). To secure its viability, the republic must 
be complemented by principles from the other ‘pure’ forms. In this regard, 
Montesquieu gives special attention to “a kind of constitution that has all the internal 
advantages of republican government and the external force of monarchy … the 
federal republic.”  
While the monarchical executive office is introduced in the context of external 
security, Montesquieu’s discussion of its place within the separation of powers 
underlines that its role and functions extend to the domestic sphere. Executive power, 
Montesquieu claims, “should be in the hands of a monarch, because the part of the 
government that almost always needs immediate action is better administered by one 
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than by many” (bk. 11, ch. 6, p. 161).16 Within the framework of the separation of 
powers, the executive power derives its relevance from its ability to act on “matters of 
political necessity” (Loughlin 2003: 49). The ever-present possibility of circumstances 
unforeseen by the law introduces the need for an office capable of direct and immediate 
action. The executive thereby introduces a permanent but domesticated dictatorial 
power (The Spirit of the Laws, bk. 11, ch. 6, p. 159, bk. 12, ch. 19; see also Schmitt 2014: 
87-8; Rossiter 1948; Balkin and Levinson 2010). It allows governmental power to 
“reach where law cannot, and thus supply the defect of law, yet remain subordinate to 
law” (Mansfield 1989: xvi; see also Rousseau 2012: 118). 
The prerogative of the executive office to exercise sovereign power directly in 
legal grey areas, however, introduces the danger of arbitrariness. For Montesquieu, 
this danger can be alleviated through the mediation of the exercise of sovereign power: 
“Intermediate, subordinate, and dependent powers constitute the nature of 
monarchical government” (bk 2, ch. 4, p. 17). This means that even in a political system 
where the monarch “is the source of all political and civil power” (bk 2, ch. 4, p. 17), 
i.e., where there is one undivided source of public authority, the monarchical office is 
not free to execute its will arbitrarily. It is, essentially, a definitional question for 
Montesquieu: in order to be considered monarchical rather than despotic, the rule of 
one “necessarily assume[s] mediate channels through which power flows; for, if in the 
state there is only the momentary and capricious will of one alone, nothing can be fixed 
and consequently there is no fundamental law” (bk 2, ch. 4, p. 17-18). Such mediate 
channels need to be as “permanent” as the monarchical office itself and “have the 
people’s trust” (bk 2, ch. 4, p. 19).  
While Montesquieu’s republic – where the powers of the different estates, the 
different political classes, ‘arrest each other by the arrangement of things’ (bk. 11, ch. 
4) – would not seem to need intermediate powers, this is only the case in conditions of 
political inequality. Here different political classes derive their right to govern and their 
power to do so from independent sources (birth, wealth, numbers). In conditions of 
political equality, where all political power emanates from one source (‘the people’), 
the question of intermediate powers is reintroduced. That is, when the divine right of 
 
 
16 In transferring the concept of monarchy to a republican context, it is important to stress that what is 
referred to is the narrow meaning of the term, the ‘rule of one,’ rather than kingship. 
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kings is secularized and the hereditary political privileges of the nobility lose political 
meaning, there can be no ‘arrestation’ of power by power in the Montesquieuian 
sense.17 All powers of the state are now dependent upon one will: the will of the people. 
‘The people’ thereby becomes sovereign in a sense that is absent from Montesquieu’s 
federal republic.18 
The absence of popular sovereignty from Montesquieu’s theory does not make 
his notion of intermediate powers irrelevant to the modern theory of the state as 
founded on popular sovereignty. On the contrary, what Montesquieu identified was 
the notion of a  
‘mediation’ of the plenitudo potestatis rather than a balancing of powers. The 
omnipotent state should never be able to intervene arbitrarily … It should rather be 
arbitrated, mediated in its exercise by an appropriate organ with well-defined 
authorities – a pouvoir borne [limited power] whose authority … cannot be suspended 
arbitrarily … The result is that civil liberty is protected from the omnipotence of the 
state, which is regulated by a network of limited authorities (Schmitt 2014: 86).  
Montesquieu’s entire framework of government is, according to Schmitt, based on the 
premise of intermediate powers, governing autonomously within limited spheres. The 
activity of governing is thereby separated from sovereign authority. But while 
separated, the entire governmental apparatus of the state remains composed of and by 
(representatives of) the people. Ultimately but with difficulty, it remains subject to the 
(changing) will of the people. The people thereby retains the continuous authorship of 
the entire framework of government allowing it to change its outlook, but only over 
time, or, alternatively, in extraordinary manifestations of popular will. Through 
intermediate powers, the activity of governing is rendered more stable because it is 
(almost) never composed all in one stroke but only gradually in the constitutionally 
 
 
17 Arendt (2006: 169-170), however, held that the genius of the American Constitution was that it 
reintroduced the logic of Montesquieu’s political inequality by constituting a legislature based on the 
Roman separation between power (potestas in populi) and authority (auctoritas in senatu), while at the 
same time retaining the federal principle that all central powers are derived from the constituent 
entities instead of being the product of devolution from a unitary sovereign.  
18 It is, perhaps, no coincidence that the first independent agency in the US was established after the 
Civil War. According to Schmitt’s rendition of the theory of the federation, what characterizes the 
federal political form is that the question of sovereignty remains unsettled or suppressed (Schmitt 
2008 [1928]: 389-90; see also Beaud 2009). While this may have been the case at the founding of 
the Republic, (see Ackerman 1993), the question of sovereignty was ‘settled’ during the Civil War in 
favour of the federal level, whereby the US could no longer be considered a federation but rather a 
federal state (Schmitt 2008: 391-2; Ackerman 2000). 
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orchestrated rhythm of expressing democratic will through elections.19 It acquires a 
permanence and continuity that moderates the effect of, but does not abandon, the 
periodic expression of the will of the people. Independent agencies are thereby a means 
of ensuring that the entire governmental apparatus of the state is never taken over by 
any one party or faction of the people and it emerges as an integrated structural feature 
of the separation of powers within the unitary state. In the intermediate powers we find 
a manifestation of the institutional “recognition of the opposition as an institution of 
government” that Arendt (2006: 259) considered an important source of the (relative) 
political stability of the American (and British) system of government. 
With regard to the institutional position of the central bank, this means that its 
independence is one of distance from the immediate control of political authorities. 
The link between them is to be made more circumscribed, but it is not to be broken 
entirely. This is not dissimilar from Keynes’ notion of central bank independence. But 
whereas Keynes emphasised that the conduct of monetary policy should not be directly 
controlled by the government of the day, its general objectives were nevertheless to be 
politically determined by the majority of the day. This reflects the constitutional make-
up of Keynes’ political system of reference, the British, in which the executive and the 
legislature are (normally) not too separate. In the US political system, the difficulty of 
the very notion of an electoral majority means that the link between the conduct of 
monetary policy and political authority is further mediated. The US federal political 
system incorporates the electoral representation of the people in three bodies: the 
Senate, the House of Representatives, and the Presidential office. Each of these forms 
of representation can potentially lead to different majorities, which, in turn, makes it 
more difficult, but not impossible, for any one party to monopolise the activity of 
governing. This applies equally to the Fed’s independence (see Lohman 1998; Mabbett 
and Schelkle 2019). But because of the possibility of one party (or cross-party outlook 
on monetary policy) commanding a majority in all branches of government, this 
independence is not absolute. The elected representatives in the legislative and 
executive branches of government hold the ultimate responsibility for the direction and 
consequences of the monetary policy being pursued by the Fed.  
 
 
19  On the significance of rhythm for the incorporation of legitimate opposition in government, see White 
2017b. 
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The Fed is independent, but it is also, as McChesney Martin noted, an 
instrument of government. It is designed, instituted and mandated by Congress to 
govern within the specific area of monetary policy to achieve particular goals. It is a 
specialised agency allowing for monetary policy to be conducted with technical 
expertise by designated and trusted experts. In this arrangement it is impossible to 
speak about the central bank being the ‘monetary sovereign’ or the ‘bearer of monetary 
sovereignty.’ ‘Monetary sovereignty,’ if it is a meaningful concept at all, remains 
anchored in the relationship between the governmental apparatus of the state as a 
whole and the people, not in any one institution. The power to decide on the monetary 
order and/or the orientation of monetary policy remains a legitimate concern of 
ordinary politics and the people remains able to manifest its will through the election 
of representatives for legislative and executive offices. As a response to the problem of 
politics with regard to money, the Fed’s institutional form reflects the Montesquieuian 
notion of seeking to moderate government by preventing the direct, unmediated and 
potentially arbitrary exercise of sovereign power. It gives institutional form to the 
attempt to mitigate the potentially harmful effects of partisan excesses, not to the 
attempt to eliminate political control entirely.  
 
ECB: ‘Independent of Governments’ 
The Fed’s institutional form was, as noted, rejected as a model for the ECB. Similarly, 
while the principles informing the Bundesbank’s independence may have been the 
ideal to be realised by the ECB, its exact institutional form and place within German 
society could not be reproduced at the European level. Both the American and the 
German model rely on the notion of a unitary people or nation authorising the entire 
governmental apparatus, including the central bank, whether directly or indirectly. 
The foundational expression of sovereignty in these models is found in the (federal) 
constitution as an expression of the unitary people’s constituent power, which gives 
legal form to the state as a comprehensive political relationship between the governing 
apparatus and the citizens. The different structure of sovereignty in the becoming-
Eurozone simultaneously prevented the adoption of any of these models and informed 
the ‘unique’ institutional form chosen for the ECB.  
One description of the ECB that clearly marks it out from other central banks 
is that it is ‘a central bank without a state’ (see, e.g., Zilioli and Selmayr 2001; James 
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2012). At the governmental level of the ECB, there is no state. This, according to Issing 
(2000a: 31), reveals that  
many strands of Hayek’s thinking … may have influenced the course of events 
leading to Monetary Union in subtle ways. What has happened with the introduction 
of the euro has indeed achieved the denationalisation of money, as advocated by 
Hayek.  
However, while the euro may have ‘denationalised’ money in Europe by detaching its 
creation and government from the nation state, it did not abolish the public control of 
money. Although not embedded within the general governmental framework of a 
state, the ECB is a public institution and the product of European public law. It claims 
the monopoly on the issuance of legal tender within its jurisdiction (article 128 TFEU) 
and is not subject to the form of currency competition that Hayek envisaged as a model 
of European currency reform in the 1970s (Zilioli and Selmayr 2000: 602). The ECB, 
in short, is not a Hayekian response to the problem of politics.  
At the same time, the ECB cannot be considered ‘independent of government’ 
(like the Bundesbank) or ‘independent within government’ (like the Fed). Those kinds 
of independence demand the question: what government? In the Fed’s case, this 
question was answered with reference to the general institutional framework of the US 
federal government. In the Bundesbank’s case, the answer was, simply: Cabinet. Both 
these answers reflect that within the respective constitutional orders, there is an 
economic policymaking authority equivalent or superior to the central bank. In the 
Eurozone, there is no such authority.20 The Maastricht Treaty established no 
‘European Government’ and any such entity remains embryonic at best. Neither the 
European ‘executive’ (the Commission) nor the European co-legislator (the Council of 
Ministers and the European Parliament) hold economic policymaking prerogatives of 
the kind associated with the US Congress and President or the German Cabinet and 
Bundestag. The ECB is, consequently, often described as ‘independent of 
 
 
20 A fact perhaps best attested to in calls for its establishment following the Eurozone Crisis. Forces 
within the European Parliament, for instance, have called “for the executive authority to be 
concentrated in the Commission in the role of an EU Finance Minister” (Verhofstadt 2016: para. 
25; see also Trichet 2011a, 2011b). ECB officials have, similarly, stressed that the ECB “needs clearly 
identifiable and fully empowered interlocutors” (Cœuré 2012). I discuss the question of 
strengthening European governmental authority in more detail in chapter 7. 
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governments’ in the plural (see, e.g., Pöhl 1991: 84; Economist 18 May 2000; Trichet 
2009; Stark 2011). 
Being situated outside the governmental structure of a state, the ECB can 
equally not be considered an independent government agency in the sense discussed 
above (Zilioli and Selmayr 2000: 608-612). Given that it is their relation and ultimate 
subjection to the general governmental apparatus of the state that defines such 
agencies, such a characterisation would miss a crucial aspect of the ECB’s 
independence.21 This is underlined by the notion that the Maastricht Treaty implied a 
transfer of ‘monetary sovereignty’ to the ECB (see below; see also Zilioli and Selmayr 
1999, 2000, 2001, 2007). While such an adjectival qualification of the concept of 
sovereignty is bound to bring a certain confusion (see Loughlin 2016), this notion is 
crucial to understanding the peculiar constitutional imaginary informing the 
institutional position of the ECB as well as the principles informing its exercise of 
governmental powers (see chapter 5).  
The conceptualisation of the central bank as a sovereign power within its 
specific domain, and thus as being outside or separate from the general governmental 
structure of the political community, is perhaps the aspect of the ECB’s institutional 
construction that sets it most apart from other central banks. And it begs the questions: 
is the notion of monetary sovereignty meaningful? If so, in what way? Observing ECB’s 
‘enormous’ powers within the Eurozone as well as its institutional loneliness, questions 
similar to these prompted Howarth and Loedel (2005) to ask the provocative question: 
is the ECB ‘the new European Leviathan’? The ECB, of course, is not a Hobbesian 
Leviathan in every respect. It is not omnicompetent. Its powers are specialised, 
circumscribed and limited in a number of important ways. It is, in principle, not above 
the law and is, accordingly, subject to the ECJ’s judicial review (although see Borger 
2019; see also chapter 6). The Hobbesian comparison is nevertheless not as outlandish 
as a checklist approach would suggest. Hobbes’ theory of sovereignty, particularly his 
notion of sovereign representation, can serve as a useful heuristic for capturing essential 
 
 
21 Attempts to make sense of the ECB within this tradition often conclude that the ECB is as an extreme 
or abnormal case, stretching or transforming the framework beyond recognition (see, e.g., Everson 
1995: 188; Torres 2013: 101). As Williams (2005: 84) asks: “are state-based agencies really the 
relevant unit of comparison for the EU’s independent agencies?” Shapiro (1997), furthermore, 
suggests that the differences in the structures of the American and European political systems make 
it difficult, perhaps impossible to transfer the American idea of independent agencies to the EU.  
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aspects of the ECB’s institutional form both as envisioned by its framers and as 
expressed in EMU public law. There is, furthermore, something in the nature of how 
the problem of politics is addressed institutionally through the ECB that reflects the 
Hobbesian ‘science of politics.’ 
 
The Hobbesian Problem of Politics 
The problem of politics is Hobbes’s central concern. Contrasting Hobbes’ theory with 
Aristotle’s notion of zoon politikon, Harvey Mansfield (1971: 100) captures this 
succinctly: “For Aristotle, men come to government because political controversy is 
natural; for Hobbes, men are forced to consent to government to escape the 
consequences of political controversy.” To Hobbes, then, the fundamental question 
was to neutralise the destructive effects of competing political (and religious) 
convictions and allegiances.  
According to Hobbes, people’s passions are the source from which the state 
emerges. The passions are what drive wilful acts, the “Voluntary motions” (Leviathan, 
ch. 6), and arise from the condition of being in the world. While including the most 
basic desires and strongest aversions, passions are not necessarily irrational or ‘just 
feelings.’ They are based on experience in combination with imagination, which gives 
rise to conceptions of causes and consequences, which in turn lead people to develop 
opinions about what constitutes the Good and the Evil. But since “No Discourse 
whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact” (ch.7, p. 47) such opinions 
degenerate into ambition and self-perceived superiority over others (ch. 11, p. 72), 
resulting in a “perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power” (ch. 11, p. 70). The 
human condition, in other words, is one of perpetual struggle between rivalling factions 
claiming to have a superior grasp of the Truth. 
The problem is the fundamental condition of insuperable equality (ch. 13, p. 
86). This leads not to the development of a natural and permanent dominion of some 
over others but to a condition of permanent upheaval and disorder where “notions of 
Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice” (ch. 13, p. 90) have no meaning because such 
notions rely on the question of the Good being settled. This question cannot but remain 
unsettled as absolute knowledge is impossible; it is by definition ‘unsettleable’ in the 
absence of an umpire, a ‘non-equal.’ It is the question of the Good, the direct political 
question, that the artificial person of the sovereign settles (Mansfield 1971: 97). But the 
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settlement is indirect. The institution of sovereignty is not a realisation of a 
transcendent Truth. Rather, the constitution of sovereignty introduces a mechanism, 
a machine, for governing as if such a truth had been found. It is not the truth of the 
political Good that is settled with the constitution of the sovereign but rather the 
impossibility of further disputing what the Good ought to be. Only through this 
settlement and its constitution of a common yardstick of values can concepts of right 
and wrong, justice and injustice, emerge as meaningful categories in societal life. 
“Sovereignty is a source of certainty, and hence a source of peace, without warring 
factions contesting every normative question” (MacCormick 1993: 15). 
In Hobbes, the institution of the sovereign is the multitude’s way of alienating 
their political agency, their own opinions of the Good, in order to cater to the 
‘conscience’, the common knowledge, of everyone that the political freedom to engage 
in controversies of political opinions jeopardises the possibility of enjoying all other 
freedoms. In Hobbes’ covenant we find, like in the theory of central bank 
independence, a movement of reason to conquer the passions and a moment of self-
limitation that suspends yet confirms the postulated effects of the passions and grounds 
civilized life in the fear and danger of a mythical state of nature. In the covenant to 
institute the artificial person of the state, the preference for stability and security trumps 
the individual’s ambition and freedom to constitute and pursue her opinion of the 
Good as the common standard of societal value. The sovereign office is the 
representative of the entire body of those covenanting – even those against the 
particular order constituted have consented to order as such (ch. 14; Mansfield 1971: 
101). 
By subjecting themselves to the common power, everyone authorises every act 
of the sovereign. The sovereign is given the “Right to Present the person of them all” (ch. 
18, p. 121). But although the power of the sovereign is unlimited, it is not arbitrary: 
“The concept itself contains the idea that the sovereign has duties” (Pitkin 1967: 33; 
see also Loughlin 2003: 57). The sovereign representative is bound to its subjects in a 
relationship of duty to protect and promote the Good for which it was constituted (ch. 
17, p. 121). The subjects, however, can have “no right—that is, no institutional 
mechanism—to enforce these duties of which the sovereign is in law the sole judge” 
(Loughlin 2003: 57, emphasis added). In other words, the subjects have neither a right 
to nor legitimate institutional means of controlling or disputing the actions that the 
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sovereign takes on their behalf. That there may be conflicting opinions in this regard 
is no argument against this order of things as these are, as noted, inherently fallible. In 
government it is, in other words, better to accept a Good that may potentially be 
‘wrong’ than to subject the exercise of governmental power to conflicts between equally 
fallible opinions about what the Good should rather be. 
Politics and political controversy are to be eliminated in two senses: the 
question of the Good is settled by virtue of the covenant, and the means of obtaining 
it are removed from legitimate political dispute. Securing the common Good (security, 
stability) is left entirely to the sovereign representative. Sovereign power, in Hobbes’ 
theory, becomes the Good itself (Mansfield 1971: 103) and it is order as such that must 
be constituted and preserved, not a particular order. This does of course not mean that 
the order is not a particular order but rather that the covenanting parties, in the name 
of security, have relinquished their right to politically decide and change their minds 
on the question of the particular order that the sovereign representative is bound to 
protecting.  
 
The Social Contract and the ECB as a Sovereign Representative 
Hobbesian sovereign representation constitutes an institutional means of eliminating 
the destabilising effects of competing political views on the activity of governing. In 
order to ensure this, the sovereign representative must be independent of instructions 
in its decision-making and its decisions cannot be subject to veto. While Hobbes’ theory 
applied to the activity of governing in general, central bank independence reflects a 
similar logic with regard to the more limited task of overcoming the problem of politics 
in relation to the government of money. Restating the theory of central bank 
independence in this light, the theory holds that the destabilising monetary effects 
(inflation) of the competition for the control of political power can be overcome 
through the institutionalisation of a consistent response to the question of the good of 
monetary policy. The more absolute the central bank’s independence, in turn, the 
more consistent the answer will be.  
With the creation of the ECB, this conception was taken to its logical 
conclusion. The two main principles – the once and for all settling of the question of 
the good of monetary policy and the institutional elimination of the possibility for 
politically contesting its meaning – are reflected in the public law framework of the 
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ECB. The primacy of price stability is firmly enshrined in the Treaties (articles 119.2, 
127.1, 219.1-2, 282.2 TFEU; article 3.3 TEU). The Good of monetary policy has been 
settled and depoliticised through a constitutional contract (Selmayr 1999) that made 
price stability a Grundnorm of the Eurozone’s economic constitution (Zilioli and Selmayr 
2000: 628, 2001: 35-36). Short of fundamental treaty reform, there are no legal-
institutional mechanisms for politically reformulating this basic commitment (Zilioli 
and Selmayr 2007: 370-1). At the same time, the question of how to achieve this Good 
was also removed from political contestation through the ECB’s independence from 
all political authorities (articles 130, 282.3 TFEU). The ECB was thereby given the 
power to determine what price stability means22 and how to achieve it without there 
being institutionalised means of overriding or changing its decisions politically. 
The ECB as an institutional response to the problem of politics for monetary 
policy differs markedly from the Fed. It reflects not an attempt to mediate partisan 
control of monetary policy but an attempt to eliminate politics entirely from the 
government of money. Political control of the central bank through ordinary politics is 
not only to be made more difficult, it is to be abolished entirely through a manifestation 
of political will in a constituent moment. This entails a different relationship between 
the foundational source of political authority, the people, and the central bank.  
The Fed’s relationship to the people, both in public law and the Fed’s self-
conception, is mediated by constituted powers who continue to hold supreme 
legislative authority over the Fed. The state as the abstract unity of the federal 
governmental apparatus remains, in Hobbesian terms, the sovereign representative of 
the people and the Fed only exercises sovereign powers at the behest of the ‘great 
constitutional branches of government.’ The ECB’s relation to its foundational subject, 
the plural “European peoples” (ECB 2002a: 46), on the other hand, is direct. There is 
no constituted power above it from which it derives its authority. This is reflected both 
in Treaty law and in the ECB’s self-conception: 
It was the sovereign decision of the peoples of Europe (through their elected representatives) 
to transfer the competency for monetary policy and the other tasks enumerated in 
 
 
22 As the ECB notes on its website, “The primary objective of the ECB – price stability – is clearly 
established in the [TFEU]. The Treaty does not, however, give a precise definition of what is meant 
by price stability.” See: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/strategy/pricestab/html/index.en.html 
[accessed 3 December 2019]. 
ECB Constitution 
131 
 
 
the Treaty to a newly created European body, and to endow it with independence 
from political interference (ECB 2002a: 46, emphasis added).  
In this conception, the ECB “exercises not powers delegated to it by the Community 
institutions, but originary powers given to it directly” (Zilioli and Selmayr 2001: 18, 
emphases in original). Or as Yves Mersch (2017b: 13), member of the ECB’s Executive 
Board, put it: “the citizens of Europe made the ECB independent and gave it a clear 
mandate.” 
The Maastricht Treaty, of course, cannot be considered a social contract of a 
formless multitude of individuals “every one, with every one” (Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 18, p. 
121). It was negotiated and signed by representatives of existing state peoples. But it 
did not come into force until it had been ratified by each of the parties to it “in 
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements” (article 48 TEU). The 
Treaty, in other words, did not come into effect through an intergovernmental 
agreement but only through constitutional amendments in the individual Member 
States, i.e., in accordance with the different institutional expressions of popular 
sovereignty.23 In so far as elected representatives acted on behalf of the peoples “in a 
singular act completed with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty” (ECB 2002a: 
46), they acted as ‘extraordinary representatives’ and their authority over the ECB 
ended with its constitution. The ECB’s authority is thereby not derived from a 
constituted legislature, whether in the Member States or at the EU level, but directly 
from the Member State peoples (acting through extraordinary representation). In that 
sense, it can be understood as the product of a ‘social contract’ among ‘the peoples of 
Europe.’ This notion is reflected in ECB discourses:  
The EU can in fact be regarded as perhaps the most ambitious example of the 
philosophical theories that underpin the social contract. As Thomas Hobbes 
remarked in his Leviathan, sovereign states are established to regulate social 
interactions and avoid the ‘war of all against all’ that would prevail without the rule 
of law. States, however, compete with each other and therefore may even resort to 
 
 
23 The Danish ‘nej’, the French ‘petit oui’ and the resounding Irish ‘yes’ in Maastricht Treaty referenda 
underline that the legal force of the Treaty depended on the people’s consent. Referenda, however, 
are only one possible form for expressing popular will and the absence of referenda in other countries 
should not be understood as the absence of an expression of popular sovereignty per se. It might be – 
“In einem Fall war ich wie ein Diktator, siehe Euro” (Helmut Kohl as cited by Paul 2010: 293; see 
also Der Spiegel 2013, 8 April; Euobserver 2013, 8 April) – but the doctrine of popular sovereignty 
cannot limit the forms in which the people’s foundational will manifests itself a priori (see, on this, 
Schmitt 2014).  
ECB Constitution 
132 
 
 
arms in the absence of a supranational body imposing social contract laws (Cœuré 
2013).24 
In the constitutional imaginary of the EMU, the ECB’s authority to act 
independently is derived from an expression of the peoples’ constituent power in a 
founding moment. This expression, in turn, entailed a “transfer of national currency 
sovereignty,” which “represents a partial surrender of political sovereignty … rightly 
perceived by citizens as marking a deep change in the way in which nations consider 
themselves” (Issing 2000b). The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, in other words, 
transformed the way in which Member States govern themselves. This is manifest in 
that the peoples have both individually (through national constitutional amendments) 
and collectively (through the contractual creation of the ECB) inscribed a 
governmental power that is external to each state within the governmental apparatus 
to which each of the Member State peoples are subject. The decisions of this 
governmental power, in turn, are self-authorised and immediately effective within the 
territory of the Member States without being subject to veto by those Member States 
individually or collectively. The governmental apparatus, which each people is both 
subject to and author of, can thereby no longer be seen as unified under the abstract 
notion of the State. The foundational political will of each Member State people is 
expressed through separate organs, with none holding final authority over the other.  
The notion of the ECB as a separate representative of the will of the peoples 
reflects the notion of dual representation discussed in relation to the Bundesbank in 
chapter 2. The Bundesbank’s representative claim, however, was not formalised but 
emerged ‘organically’ from a particular political culture (Stabilitätskultur). The notion of 
the ECB’s foundation of authority being derived from a ‘sovereign decision of the 
peoples,’ on the other hand, formalises and constitutionalises this representative claim. 
The ECB thereby realises the Bundesbank ideal of constitutionalising price stability 
and central bank independence. But the ECB’s powers are not constitutionalised 
within a state structure that expresses the unity of the people in political form. It is not 
the product of one constituent power but many. It is, therefore, not inscribed in a 
traditional constitutional separation of powers as a ‘fourth branch’ of government., 
 
 
24 While the reference to Hobbes in this speech concerns the EU as a whole, Cœuré stresses that it 
applies “to an even larger extent to” the Eurozone. 
ECB Constitution 
133 
 
 
Rather, it is created as a body exercising sovereign powers separate from any state. Like 
the state, the ECB is a sovereign representative and the notion of dual representation 
within the state is restated as the dual sovereign representation of the people through the 
ECB and the Member States: every people of the Eurozone is represented 
simultaneously and with equal right by two separate organs claiming sovereign 
governmental authority within certain spheres of societal life. Neither the ECB nor the 
Member States are omnicompetent; they are ‘limited sovereign representatives,’ with 
the ECB, of course, being qualitatively more limited than the Member States.  
 
The Monetary Union as an Escape from the State of Nature 
How does the creation of the ECB as a limited sovereign representative alongside the 
Member States alter the basic organisation of the exercise of governmental powers in 
the Eurozone? And what justifies this change? The first question is discussed in chapter 
5. Below I address its justification.  
Hobbes presented the constitution of a sovereign representative as a necessary 
means for achieving a political stability that would remain elusive as long as social 
relations where characterised by anarchy. To Hobbes, anarchy is characterised by a 
fundamental equality meaning that any constellation of forces favouring order was 
unstable and bound to be temporary; no phenomenological power would be able to 
secure the perpetuation of order even if it might be able to secure a temporary one 
based on the command of superior force. Anarchical order would always be liable to 
revert to anarchical chaos.25 The sovereign representative, the Leviathan, offers a 
means of overcoming this fragility of the anarchical order by subjecting and 
channelling the force of all through the authority and power of one. Rivalling powers 
would thereby sacrifice their freedom to pursue power and self-interest in the name of 
security and a life without fear. In short, political freedom would be sacrificed for 
existential stability, without which political freedom was, in any case, meaningless.  
 
 
25 While Hobbes’ (ch. 17, p.117) notion of “Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words” is perhaps 
most famous, an equally valid conclusion from Hobbes’ theory is that ‘swords, without the covenant, 
are but weapons’ (see Arendt 1970). 
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To support and justify his argument, Hobbes constructs his mythical state of 
nature. The state of nature26 precludes the permanent realisation of the benefits of 
cooperation because the imperative of individual survival favours, in game theoretical 
terms, cheating and the individual pursuit of power. As in the prisoner’s dilemma, the 
equilibrium outcome is one that leaves all worse off than if cooperation could be 
ensured. What the sovereign representatives promises to do is to break this structure. 
Once established, then, undermining the sovereign representative amounts to a return 
to the state of nature. For this reason, the surrender of powers must be permanent.27 
 
The Myth of the Hyperinflations and the ECB 
The notion of the danger of (a return to) a state of nature is pertinent to the question 
of the ECB’s institutional form in several ways. The myth of the German hyperinflation 
is, for one, never far from the surface (see Leaman 2001; Tognato 2012; Mee 2013, 
2017; Schieritz 2013; Economist 2013). The work of this mythical narrative, as discussed 
in chapter 2, is to posit price stability as a fundamental condition for civilised societal 
life. Without it, all other values evaporate with it and something akin to a Hobbesian 
state of nature emerges in which there is no common yardstick of value, no settled 
notion of the Good. “Inflation - like war,” Issing (2002: 23-24) claims,  
erodes the social fabric of society and, ultimately, puts the very foundations of 
democracy and freedom at risk. This is one of the lessons of the bitter history of the 
20th century, which was a century of hyperinflation in the wake of wars and wars in 
the wake of hyperinflation.  
 
 
26 Hobbes’ anthropology is pessimistic (homo homini lupus) but the structural outcome of the anarchic state 
of nature is not dependent on this. In Rousseau’s more optimistic anthropology, the state of nature 
leads to much the same outcome. This is particularly evident from the stag hunt metaphor presented 
in A Discourse on the Origins of Inequality. The problem, according to Rousseau, is not that people have 
an inbred proclivity for evil, but that the imperative of individual survival in the state of nature makes 
cooperation impossible to sustain because of the risks involved. In the stag hunt, every member of 
the company of hunters would reap greater rewards if all committed themselves fully to hunting the 
stag. The individual hunter, however, could secure her own sustenance with less risk, but also less 
reward, by defecting if given the chance to kill a hare. Because of this, the stag hunt is likely to fail 
and all are left worse off than if cooperation could be enforced and defection credibly punished.  
27 This emphasises that sovereign representation must not be vested in a natural person but in an 
artificial person, an office (see Loughlin 2003). If sovereign power were to be vested in a natural 
person, this would introduce the danger of the interregnum when the natural body of the sovereign 
perished (see Kantorowicz 1957; Agamben 2005).  
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In the Treaty, therefore, “the primary objective of price stability has a special 
constitutional – and thus lasting – status, placing it above shorter-term political 
influences” (Issing 2000c, emphasis added). 
The myth of the hyperinflations was also explicitly invoked in the context of 
discussions on the institutional form of the future ECB. Pöhl, for instance, justified both 
the price stability mandate and the ECB’s independence with explicit reference to the 
hyperinflations:  
Most Germans, with traumatic memories of two hyperinflations, would not accept a 
central-bank system that attributed this goal [price stability] less significance than 
does the Bundesbank Act. The task of ensuring price stability would be facilitated … 
by a European central-bank system being free to formulate objectives and make 
decisions—independent not only of national governments but also of European 
Community institutions.28 
Tietmeyer (1991: 182-3), Pöhl’s successor at the helm of the Bundesbank, similarly 
noted that 
The experience gained twice with hyperinflation in the first half of this century has 
helped to develop a special sensitivity to inflation and has caused the wider public to 
believe in the critical importance of monetary stability in Germany. For this reason, 
the strong position of the Bundesbank is widely accepted by the general public – 
questioning its independence even seems to be a national taboo. This social 
consensus has yielded strong support for the policy of the Bundesbank … In the light 
of the success of the Bundesbank, it is only natural that the German public will expect 
that any successor, which could take its place at the European level, should be at least 
as well equipped as the Bundesbank to defend price stability. 
The two Bundesbankers invoke the myth of the hyperinflations in the context of 
asserting the Bundesbank’s ultimatum that the Maastricht Treaty should 
constitutionalise the primacy of price stability and central bank independence. Without 
these elements, they threaten, they will make sure the German people will not subject 
itself to the covenant.  
 
International Monetary Anarchy 
Another important justification for the creation of the euro and the ECB is to be found 
in the pre-existing monetary relations among European states. Following the collapse 
of Bretton Woods, if not before, international monetary cooperation was informal and 
 
 
28 Pöhl, K.O. The Wall Street Journal, 20 July 1988, HAEU-TPS 184. 
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the major currencies of the world floated against each other. While the dollar was the 
world’s primary reserve currency, it was the first among equals in something akin to 
an international monetary anarchy. While this anarchic order was not necessarily 
chaotic or problematic in general, it presented a particular problem in the context of 
European integration and in particular in the context of completing the single market. 
As the Delors Report alluded to, the capital market liberalisations of the 1980s had 
allowed current account imbalances to grow more rapidly than before. Eventual 
corrections thereby threatened to become much more dramatic than previously. Such 
“large cumulative imbalances were what convinced Europe’s policymakers that a 
monetary union was the only way of avoiding the risk of periodic crises with currency 
realignments whose trade policy consequences threatened the survival of an integrated 
internal European market” (James 2012: 12, emphasis added). Currency realignments 
in the name of the national pursuit of self-preservation, in other words, were seen as 
an existential threat to continued European integration.  
The problem was not an existing lack of political will for cooperation – the 
European Monetary System (EMS) under the de facto leadership of the German 
Bundesbank was fully functional at the time and widely considered a success. The 
problem was that if one or more Member States were put under intense strain, there 
would be no way of preventing defection in the name of self-preservation. Such 
defections, in turn, would jeopardise the stability, the collective achievements of 
integration and the material well-being not only of the Member State in question but 
of all the other Member States as well. As the participating states and central banks 
were equals, no state or central bank could enforce cooperation on another within the 
EMS and there were no means available for coercing a Member State into compliance. 
The Bundesbank may have been the ‘strongest,’ but its strength was, as in Hobbes, not 
great enough to compel all others to obey indefinitely. And even if that had been the 
case, the other Member States could not live indefinitely with being dominated by a 
power that was formally their equal. Neither the ‘strong’ nor the ‘weak’ were thus 
adequately served by existing cooperative arrangements under the fundamental 
condition of international monetary anarchy (see also Howarth and Loedel 2005: xiii).  
The condition of international monetary anarchy, where each state is, in 
principle, free to pursue whatever monetary policy it sees fit, was understood as being 
unsustainable in the context of ‘ever closer union.’ The externalities associated with 
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the continued possibility of divergent national monetary policies made the institution 
of a common power able to “preserve order” in the monetary field an urgent priority 
(Howarth and Loedel 2005: xiii; see also, in less Hobbesian language, Delors Report 
1989). The creation of the artificial person of the ECB to protect the monetary order 
is thus similar to Hobbes’ covenanting parties introducing “that restraint upon 
themselves” which serves to promote “their own preservation, and of a more contented 
life thereby” (Leviathan, ch. 17, p. 117).  
Like Hobbes’ covenant, the creation of the Monetary Union and the ECB as a 
sovereign representative involves relinquishing certain political freedoms; most 
importantly the freedom to decide monetary policy. This, furthermore, was done in 
the name of securing the conditions necessary for the realisation of a number of other 
freedoms and privileges, which were threatened by the potential, if not actual, 
opportunistic or ‘self-preservational’ behaviour of peoples and governments in the 
(latent) ‘monetary war of all against all.’ And indeed, in establishing the Maastricht 
framework, a number of Member States seem to have been at least partially animated 
by the perception that a monetary order not to their liking was a lesser evil than the 
failure to institute order (Dyson and Featherstone 1999).  
The possibility of having a seat at the decision-making table may have played 
an important role in this regard, but the ECB was specifically set up institutionally not 
to take into account the opinions of the Member States.29 “We are not representatives 
of our countries,” as Tietmeyer allegedly remarked at the first meeting of the ECB’s 
Governing Council (Issing as cited in Jeffery 2016). In contrast to the EMS, dominated 
by the monetary policy of the Bundesbank on the basis of German conditions, the ECB 
was set up to conduct monetary policy on the basis of conditions in the Eurozone as a 
whole. Thereby the de facto but inherently fragile dominance of the temporarily 
strongest was overcome through the establishment of the non-equal.30 
 
 
29 This points to a separate, important aspect of the ECB’s institutional form: it is a supranational rather 
than an intergovernmental body (Zilioli and Selmayr 2001). That is, the decision-making body is 
composed of central bankers in their personal capacity as experts on monetary matters, not as 
representatives of their Member States (see also chapter 5). The decision-making body of the ECB 
is thereby decidedly aristocratic.  
30 One may, of course, argue that the de facto monetary dominance of Germany was not overcome but 
simply given institutional form through the creation of the euro. This, however, does not challenge 
the notion that the euro established governmental order based not on cooperation among formal 
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Irreversibility  
If overcoming the potential dangers associated with international monetary anarchy 
was a motivation for transferring sovereign powers to the ECB, the same Hobbesian 
logic militates that once in place, “[t]here can be no turning back, as the failure of 
Monetary Union would not only be extremely costly from an economic point of view, 
but the political fallout would be unimaginable and would be tantamount to a catastrophe” (Issing 
2000a, emphasis added). This potential political catastrophe justifies the 
constitutionalisation of “this (irreversible) transfer of sovereign power” (Zilioli and 
Selmayr 2001: 19-20).  
The legal irreversibility of the transfer of sovereign power does not necessarily 
mean that it is practically impossible to reverse it. It means, rather, that within the 
constituted order there are no legal means of doing so. A reversal or radical alteration 
demands a transformation of the constitutional order as a whole through a new 
manifestation of constituent power, a new social contract. That is, a people that wishes 
to change the ECB cannot do so by its own accord and under the Treaties there is no 
procedure for exiting the euro.31 It is a permanent order to which each state has 
committed itself irreversibly. If a state were to exit, it would have to do so through an 
extraordinary act that at the same time reconstituted the state as a post-EU-Member 
State. The ‘irreversibility of the euro,’ famously pronounced by Mario Draghi (2012) 
during the Euro Crisis, was already a basic principle in the Maastricht Treaty and its 
protocols (Zilioli and Selmayr 1999: 277, 2000: 604; Smits 1997: 133). It follows from 
the very purpose and institutional form of the Eurozone and the ECB.  
 
Sovereign Loneliness, Plural Sovereignties 
The creation of the ECB as an independent sovereign power in response to ‘the 
monetary state of nature’ does of course not mean that individuals or states cannot seek 
to influence the ECB. The ECB can and does seek support from political authorities 
 
 
equals but on command by a superior. Whether that superior is more ‘German’ than, say, ‘Greek’ 
is irrelevant in this regard.  
31 It should be noted that while is not entirely clear from the Treaties whether a Eurozone state has the 
legal right to abandon the euro, the absence of a legally specified procedure for exiting the euro 
probably reflects the difficulty, if not impossibility, of a regulated and orderly exit from the euro. 
This does not mean, however, that the Member States do not have a political right to exit. 
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and its policymaking can be influenced in various more or less formal ways; the 
appointment of the leading personalities being the most direct avenue. What the ECB’s 
institutional status does mean, however, is that there are no institutionalised means of 
controlling the ECB and compelling it to pursue, or refrain from pursuing, a particular 
course of action on the basis of competing convictions, opinions and perceptions of 
need.32 Thus, “in parallel to its denationalization,” the EMU constitutional framework 
has led “to a complete depoliticisation of monetary policy” (Zilioli and Selmayr 2001: 34, 
emphasis in original).  
The depoliticisation of the ECB is remarkable not least because it has been 
given wide-ranging executive and legislative powers. Its monetary policy decisions are 
immediately effective and cannot be vetoed or reversed by any other political body. 
Furthermore, like EU regulations in general, an ECB regulation “shall have general 
application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States” (Article 34.2 Statute of ESCB and ECB). ECB’s regulations, in other words, 
have the same legal status as those adopted by the EU legislature (Zilioli and Selmayr 
2001: 37). In contrast to EU regulations, however, there are no Member State 
representatives or political bodies involved in the adoption of ECB regulations. This 
reflects the conception that “‘in a field as sensitive as monetary policy [it] can be 
considered wise and not at variance with the requirements of democracy’ to hive off 
part of the legislative power and of the executive from the representatives of the 
people” (Zilioli and Selmayr 2001: 48 referring to Smits 1997). This means that some 
degree of unchecked rule by the ECB must be accepted:  
The fact that it will be difficult to correct the ECB’s behaviour, much more so than 
in respect of State central banks thus far, is unavoidable in the present constitutional 
make-up of the Community … it may even be desirable in view of the lack of a 
tradition of independence for central banks in Europe (Smits 1997: 500).  
The constitutional depoliticisation of monetary policy is not only a product of 
the normative commitment of the theory of central bank independence. It is also a 
product of the institutional elimination of any constituted power above (as in the US) 
or alongside (as in Germany) the central bank. This has led some to highlight the 
 
 
32 The ECJ may review ECB acts, but it cannot determine what the ECB should do or not do. The ECJ 
thereby provides a legal, not political, check on the ECB’s powers.  
ECB Constitution 
140 
 
 
problematic nature of the ECB’s ‘institutional loneliness’ (Padoa-Schioppa as cited in 
Rudzio 1999, Padoa-Schioppa 2000, 2004; Braun 2017; Mabbett and Schelkle 2019). 
In an interview, Padoa-Schioppa (as cited in Rudzio 1999, my translation; see also 
Cœuré 2012) highlighted that “the ECB’s problem is not its independence but rather 
its loneliness. Europe is no political union and we in the ECB lack a European 
government, a counterpart.” While this loneliness may be considered unfortunate (see 
also De Grauwe 2011; Aglietta 2012, 2019), it is not a ‘mistake’ but an integral aspect 
of the EMU’s constitutional construction.33  
Independence as such, as discussed in relation to the Fed and the Bundesbank 
and as highlighted by Padoa-Schioppa, does not necessarily entail loneliness. The 
independence of sovereign representation, however, does. The sovereign must, 
following Hobbes, be independent of other powers and it must be unrivalled in the 
exercise of its powers: “The sovereign is alone (sovereign) or is not” (Derrida 2011: 8). 
The sovereign loneliness of the ECB, however, is different from that of the (unlimited) 
sovereign state. Whereas the sovereign state monopolises the legal expression of 
political will within its territory, the ECB does not. It is lonely only in the sense that it 
has no equal or superior at its governmental level (the European). It is not the lone 
sovereign representative of the peoples within the territory in general because the 
Member States retain the right to exercise other sovereign powers within their 
respective territories. The Member State, however, is no longer the sole sovereign 
power within its territory. From the perspective of supreme governmental authority, 
the Eurozone is simultaneously a unified territory and separate territories. It is, 
however, without an omnicompetent sovereign.  
As noted above, and as I discuss in more detail in chapter 5, the absence of a 
sovereign is envisioned to produce an order of constraints on the exercise of sovereign 
powers within the realm economic policy and to depoliticise the exercise of sovereign 
power within the realm of monetary policy. It is envisioned as a constraint on the 
potential expressions of popular will through the agency of the state. In one sense, then, 
 
 
33 While it is true, as Mabbett and Schelkle (2019) highlight, that the many veto players within the US 
political system often render the Fed de facto lonely in its governmental activities, this loneliness is 
qualitatively different from that of the ECB. In the US contingent circumstances may render the Fed 
without an effective counterpart. In the EMU the absence of a counterpart is part and parcel of the 
constitutional construction.  
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sovereignty may be said to be divided and thus destroyed, with the result that the EMU 
suffers from a chronic lack of political authority and steering capacity. The exercise of 
sovereign powers by one may conflict with the exercise of sovereign powers by several 
in a manner that leads not to an order of mutual (self-)restraint but, following Hobbes, 
to chaos and internal strife. Chapters 6 and 7 address how the Eurozone Crisis 
emphasised the importance of such conflicts. However, while the division of the 
exercise of sovereign powers entailed by the Eurozone’s constitutional framework 
eliminates ‘the sovereign’ (state), it does not necessarily entail a division and elimination 
of sovereignty as such. Or at least, it is not supposed to.  
The constitutional imaginary of the EMU relies both for its legitimacy and 
governmental order on the notion of the continued sovereignty of the peoples. The 
authority of the order as a whole must be derived not only from the founding 
expression of the will of the peoples but also from their continued will for it; expressed, 
if nothing else, in continued membership. If not, the order of constraints it imposes on 
the exercise of governmental powers at the Member State level appears as a blatant 
violation of the principle of democratic self-government. However, the state can no 
longer be seen as sovereign, seeing that the governmental apparatus of the state no 
longer holds the monopoly on legal authority and governmental power within its 
territory. Sovereignty must therefore be popular sovereignty. But because the people 
does not/must not/cannot govern directly, it must be represented in the activity of 
governing by institutions authorised by it. Through such representation, the will of the 
people is manifested in governmental practice. But as highlighted above, the 
foundational will of the peoples of the Eurozone is not expressed in a unified but a dual 
structure of sovereign representation.34 Sovereignty remains an expression of the 
political relationship between the people and its governmental apparatus (see Loughlin 
2003: 81-82) but the representation and realisation of the peoples’ will in governmental 
activity is no longer performed by the state’s governmental apparatus alone. The ECB 
is thus inscribed in the sovereignty relation between the individual peoples and their 
governmental apparatuses. The governmental apparatus of the separate peoples 
 
 
34 Dual sovereign representation thereby creates the possibility of the will of the people being in conflict 
with itself: the foundational will for the euro may be in conflict with the expression of will through 
the agency of the state. I discuss this tension in chapter 6. 
ECB Constitution 
142 
 
 
thereby contains a shared governmental power, which derives its power and authority 
from the will of each and of all. 
The ECB creates an existential link between the peoples of the Eurozone. 
Within the sphere of monetary policy, they are governed as one. The peoples, however, 
retain their separate political existences. They remain in the plural as the political 
subjects authorising both the ECB and their respective state apparatuses. They retain, 
in other words, the fundamental political right to authorise governmental acts as 
individual and separate political subjects, not as one. While the transfer of ‘monetary 
sovereignty’ to the ECB reduces the governmental capacity of each individual state, 
the transfer does not constitute a division of the sovereign right of authorisation. The 
constituent power of the several peoples remains the political foundation on which all 
governmental power is exercised.  
 
Conclusion 
The notion of the ECB’s mandate and institutional status resting on the constituent 
power of the peoples is crucial to the constitutional imaginary informing the EMU as 
a governmental order. It reflects the ordoliberal (and Hobbesian) notion of overcoming 
the problem of politics in a foundational moment that settles the Good of monetary 
policy and the principles according to which it is to be conducted. In the transnational 
setting of the Eurozone, this entailed that Member State governments would face the 
monetary policy of the ECB as an external condition over which it would have no 
control. From the perspective of Member State governments, the euro reproduced the 
logic of the gold standard via an economic constitution (see also Wilsher 2014; Morys 
2014; Pettifor 2015). Monetary policy, however, would not governed by a monetary 
rule or an automatic mechanism but by an independent central bank exercising 
technocratic discretion.  
The technocratic discretion of the ECB is not, as in Keynes, controlled by 
political authority but by law. As a concretisation of the foundational will of the 
peoples, this law constitutes, in principle, a binding constraint on the ECB’s exercise 
of powers. It cannot be altered except through a new constituent moment. As such, the 
continued existence of the peoples as separate political subjects represents a means of 
constraining the exercise of sovereign power with regard to the monetary order. While 
exercising sovereign powers, the ECB has no right alter those powers or the purposes 
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to which they are put. Even within its sphere of policymaking, the ECB’s independence 
is limited by constitutional concretisation of the foundational will of the peoples. The 
ECB is thereby a limited sovereign representative in two senses: in terms of its sphere 
policymaking and in terms of positive legal constraints on its powers. And the same is 
true of the Member States. As I discuss in the next chapter, this structure of dual, 
limited sovereign representation gives rise to a particular set of governmental 
principles, as well as a number of tensions and contradictions. 
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Chapter 5 
The Governmental Logics of the ECB and Their 
Contradictions 
 
 
Introduction  
This chapter examines the principles informing and regulating the exercise of 
governmental powers by the ECB as a sovereign representative. It identifies and 
discusses three governing logics – the rule of law, technocracy and democracy – and discusses 
their respective rationalities and the relationship between them. While mutually 
reinforcing in the regulation of the activity of governing, according to the justificatory 
discourse, the three principles are also potentially contradictory. These contradictions, 
which may be ‘dormant’ in ordinary times, are written into the constitutional structure 
of the ECB. In exceptional circumstances, they threaten to destabilise the structure and 
call for something new.  
This chapter is devoted to the more or less abstract expounding of the three 
governing logics, the mutual relation and their contradictions.  The next two chapters, 
then, turn to discussing how the contradictions manifested themselves in the Eurozone 
Crisis (chapter 6) and how the Crisis introduced a structural instability that pointed 
beyond the existing structure (chapter 7).  
While the main focus is on the ECB’s institutional form and governmental 
rationality, a consistent theme is what the structure entails for the conduct of economic 
policy more broadly. While the ECB may be alone at its governmental level, it is not 
alone in the activity of governing in general. Throughout, the chapter therefore 
discusses also how the ECB’s governmental rationality affects and structures the 
exercise of sovereign powers by the Member States as well as the sovereignty relation 
between peoples, states and Union. The conferral of rights and duties on the ECB has 
implications for the general governmental structure of the political community and the 
general organisation of the exercise of sovereign powers with regard to economic policy 
in the Eurozone. An appreciation of the meaning of the EMU’s particular way of 
addressing the problem of politics concerning monetary affairs demands an 
appreciation of these implications.  
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The Rule of Treaty Law 
The modern theory of the state sees the state not only as a means of governing societal 
life but also for resolving conflicts between societal groups and classes concerning issues 
that impact the associational life of the political community as a whole. The peaceful 
resolution of conflicts within the framework of established decision-making procedures 
plays a key role in generating the authority of the state and the legitimacy of its 
governmental activities. In this regard, the power of the modern unitary state rests in 
the form of its representative structure. The constituted powers represent the 
community as a whole and as such they mediate and implement ‘the will of the people’ 
through various institutional configurations including, but not limited to, the different 
branches of government. Unless they involve secessionist or revolutionary forces, 
conflicts within such a setting take place within a framework in which even the defeated 
party accepts the legitimacy of political decisions resulting from a pre-agreed decision-
making procedure.  
In relation to central banks, this principle has taken a number of different 
forms. In the US, conflicts involving the Fed always take place within the framework 
of the mediation of will of the people through elected representatives. The Federal 
Reserve Act gives the Fed a certain independence while at the same time constraining 
and orientating its exercise of governmental powers. Ultimately, however, it is the 
political authority generated through the political system that enforces and determines 
the Fed’s governmental freedoms and practices.  
In West Germany, there was no institutional mechanism for resolving conflicts 
between the Bundesbank and the Federal Government. The Bundestag may have 
retained legislative superiority over the Bundesbank Law, but in practice conflicts 
concerning monetary issues tended to be resolved through competing appeals to the 
public. The conflict, in other words, was decided through a manifestation of whose side 
‘the people’ stood (or at least was more or less uniformly interpreted to stand by the 
political elites). The manifestation of popular sovereignty through public opinion 
added an ‘organic’ dimension to the formal electoral representation of the people in 
the relationship between the central bank and the political system. Mostly the 
Bundesbank bank prevailed, but not always (see Mee 2016; Tognato 2012). 
In the case of the Eurozone and the ECB, there is no authority at the European 
level which can claim for itself a legitimate right to counterbalance, challenge or rein 
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in the central bank. Political representation at the European level takes a very different 
form from ‘monetary representation.’ Whereas the levels of ultimate political and 
monetary authority tend not to be differentiated within the unitary state,1 political 
decision-making bodies in the EU/Eurozone represent not one sovereign political 
subject but several. The ECB, on the other hand, is constituted to act in the singular 
as the sovereign representative of the several constituting subjects as one. The highest 
decision-making body of the ECB, the Governing Council, is thus composed not of 
representatives of Member State governments but of central bankers appointed to their 
office on the basis of their expertise within the field. This structure of singular 
representation by the central bank and multiple representation by the authorities 
responsible for general economic policy distinguishes the ECB from both the Fed and 
the Bundesbank. It is, furthermore, difficult to imagine a meaningful European public 
sphere that would be able to legitimately provide the kind of manifestation of public 
opinion encountered in the German context. In a conflict between a particular 
Member State government and the ECB, for instance, what is the relevant public?  
 
The Community of Law 
The absence of a unified subject of political legitimation as well as institutionalised 
mechanisms of politically resolving conflicts means that law becomes the primary 
means of governing and regulating the relationship between political representatives 
and the central bank as well their respective exercises of power. As then member of the 
ECB’s Executive Board, Lorenzo Bini Smaghi (2010) noted:  
the European Union is a community of law, subscribed to by the Member States in 
which pacta sunt servanda. This refers to all the pacts, starting from fiscal discipline in 
 
 
1 There are and have been exceptions to this, but due to the (historically) intimate link between money 
and sovereignty (Aglietta and Orléan 1998; Goodhart 1998), the monetary authority usually resides 
at the level of government that can credibly claim sovereignty for itself. That is, if, in a federal system, 
the constituent states are considered sovereign, monetary authority tends to be decentralised. If, on 
the other hand, the federal level has manifested itself as sovereign, as in the US after the Civil War, 
monetary authority tends to become more centralised. An important qualification to this is the 
question of the integration of the financial system. The territorial integration of this often generates 
pressures for an integrated central banking system (see Schelkle 2017). There is thus, as the work of 
Charles Goodhart and Michel Aglietta and their respective associates has shown, a dual 
determination of central banking: sovereignty and banking/finance, which reflects both the dual 
nature of money (being a creature of sovereignty, on the one hand, and the money creating activities 
of banks, on the other) as well as the role of the central bank as being both the ‘banker of the 
sovereign’ and the ‘banker of banks.’ 
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the Member States to the commitment of the Member States to pay their debts … 
The euro, and its underlying institutional construction, is about respect for the law. 
The importance of the rule of law in the context of the monetary union is 
derived from the EU’s general public law structure. As is generally recognised, the 
EU’s legal-political form differs from both the state (including federal states such as the 
US and Germany) and the international organization (e.g., NATO, WTO). What 
characterises the EU is that it governs itself without comprehensive sovereignty. Unlike 
the state, the EU governmental apparatus cannot be considered sovereign and the 
European level has no political authority to override, suspend or change the general 
legal order established by the contracting Member States. Its legal order is not self-
authorised. Its authorisation is attributed to the constituent power of the European 
peoples: “[t]he national parliaments when ratifying a treaty decide as representatives 
of their peoples. The result is attributed to the peoples. Hence, [the Treaties] can be 
regarded as an expression of the will of the peoples of the Member States” (Grimm 
2015: 48). In this understanding it “is not merely an agreement between states but an 
agreement between the peoples of Europe” (Maduro 2008: 21). This agreement, in 
turn, “forms the ‘basic constitutional charter’ [of the EU]” (ibid.). This means that only 
the Member States acting collectively (as well as individually) in their capacity as 
(extraordinary) representatives of the constituent powers of the peoples are rightfully 
able transform the basic legal order through a new moment of constitutional politics, 
as if contracting anew ‘every one, with every one.’ Like the international treaty organisation, 
the EU cannot, in principle, transform itself; it does not hold the competence to decide 
on its own competences (or Kompetenz-Kompetenz; Grimm 2017). 
The constituted order, however, is unlike that of the international organisation. 
Most importantly, Union level legislative and executive acts have direct effect in the 
Member States and claim supremacy over potentially conflicting laws within domestic 
legal orders. The exercise of constituted powers at the Union level, in other words, 
does not require national ratification or implementation to be effective and are 
enforceable in national courts.2 In this respect, the EU resembles the federal state; it 
subsumes subsidiary legal orders.  
 
 
2 To this effect in the context of the EU, see the German Constitutional Court’s rulings in Case No 1 
BvR 248/63 and 216/67 [1967] and Case No. 2 BvR 225/69 [1971]. In the former, the Court ruled 
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These two characteristics of the EU are clearly discernible in the ECB’s legal 
structure. The ECB’s mandate and independence are enshrined in the EU Treaties. 
As such, they claim a protected status that only few national constitutional provisions 
can trump. It requires unanimity among the Member States and peoples to change the 
status of the ECB. Similarly, neither the ECB nor the other European institutions can 
decide to alter or abolish the fundamental tenets of its institutional structure.3 Thus, 
the exercise of sovereign powers within the monetary sphere has been transferred to 
the ECB and no constituted body holds sovereign (legislative) rights over the ECB’s legal 
form and mandate. At the same time, the ECB’s legislative and executive acts are 
immediately effective within the territory of the Eurozone.4  
 
 
that with the treaty “A new public authority has … been created, which is autonomous and 
independent vis-à-vis the public authorities of each Member State. Consequently its acts do not 
require approval (‘ratification’) by the Member States, nor can they be annulled by those States. The 
EEC Treaty to a certain extent constitutes the Constitution of the Community. … [T]he Treaty … 
forms its own legal order which is part of neither public international law nor the national law of the 
Member States” (Oppenheimer 1994: 413). In the latter, the Court ruled that “The effect of the 
Treaty, following its ratification in the Federal Republic, was to create an autonomous legal order 
inserted into the municipal legal order and enforceable by municipal courts” (ibid: 416). Before this, 
the ECJ had established the principles of direct effect and supremacy of Community law in Van Gen 
den Loos (1963) and Costa v ENEL (1964).  
3 See Grimm (2017: 47), who concludes that because the EU “lacks the constituent power” it is not 
sovereign.” Habermas’ (2012: 36) notion of the European population’s “pouvoir constituant mixte” seeks 
to introduce the notion that the EU has a constituent power supporting it. However, Habermas does 
not clarify how European citizens as EU citizens are involved in the exercise of constituent power. 
As such, he fails to address the question of what happens in a potential conflict between the majority 
opinion of EU citizens and the majority opinion of the citizens of one Member State. Should an EU 
citizenry be allowed to override a Member State people’s veto? If so, under what conditions? In any 
case, as Grimm (2017: 51) notes, there is little legal evidence to suggest that any aspect of popular 
sovereignty as constituent power has been transferred to the European level. This does not, however, 
necessarily mean, as Grimm (ibid: 55) suggests, that “the Member States may still be called sovereign, 
whereas the EU is not sovereign.” If sovereignty rests in the representational relationship between 
the people and its governmental apparatus, as discussed in chapter 4, sovereignty may remain a 
relevant concept and essential aspect of the legal order even though no single institution or 
assemblage of institutions can claim to be ‘the sovereign.’ In other words, ‘the sovereign’ may have 
disappeared without sovereignty as such being affected.  
4 Open market operations or changes to the key interest rates, for instance, are not subject to approval 
by national parliaments or central banks. The ECB has, furthermore, the right and power to “make 
regulations to the extent necessary to implement” (article 34.1 Statute of the ESCB and the ECB) 
monetary policy (articles 3.1, first indent, and 19.1 Statute), sustain a functioning clearing and 
payment system (article 22 Statute), and relating to prudential supervision (article 25.2 Statute). The 
ECB has even been given the power to impose sanctions and fines on non-complying institutions 
(article 34.3 Statute). Like the price stability mandate (article 2 Statute) and the ECB’s independence 
(article 7 Statute), furthermore, these rights are unamendable through the simplified amendment 
procedure (article 40 Statute). Such powers are similar to those exercised by independent 
government authorities but with the crucial difference that they cannot be overridden, vetoed or 
reversed by political authorities. They can be challenged in court, but this only underlines that the 
ECB is subject to the law alone.  
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The ECB’s mandate and powers, in other words, are not products of a 
legislative power with retained sovereign prerogatives vis-à-vis the institution (as is/was 
the case with the Fed and the Bundesbank), nor is it a product of a single constituent 
power, which can decide unilaterally to alter or abolish it. It is, instead, the product of 
the constituent powers of the several Member State peoples. The positive law of the 
Treaties and the Statute is the legal expression of the shared will of the sovereign 
peoples who chose (in accordance with national constitutional provisions) to adopt the 
euro as a currency, thereby transferring and surrendering the right to exercise 
sovereign powers within the sphere of monetary affairs to the artificial person of the 
ECB. This transfer, however, does not involve the simultaneous transfer of the 
competence to alter the basic organisation of the exercise of those powers to the ECB 
or any other body. Furthermore, because the constitutional-contract establishing the 
ECB is not an act of a sovereign or of sovereignty in the singular (which claims for itself 
the inalienable right to alter or abolish anything it may have brought forth in the past) 
but of sovereignties, it must be carefully stipulated and it must, in its essentials, be 
unalterable in the absence of a new such act.  
The rule of law thereby becomes the crucial mechanism for regulating the 
relationship between the ECB and the Member States as well as the ECB’s 
governmental activities. In the context of the agreement reached in the contracting 
moment, the law is supreme. This supremacy of law has two distinct applications for 
the channelling of the ECB’s exercise of governmental powers: it protects it from 
politics, on the one hand, and protects society from the ECB, on the other. 
 
Law as a Protection from Politics 
As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, a key concern of the theory of central bank 
independence is the necessity of protecting the conduct of monetary policy from 
ordinary partisan politics and the so-called ‘political business cycle’:  
If stable money is regarded as a common good for the benefit of all, and if it is seen 
as a pre-condition for long-term prosperity and social justice, then it makes sense for 
society to create an independent institution that stands above the fray of day-to-day 
politics and can pursue this objective with minimum distraction. This is the basis for 
central bank independence (Issing 2002: 27). 
In the Treaty and Statute this notion is captured most explicitly in articles 130 and 7, 
respectively, which oblige the ECB and the national central banks (NCBs) to refrain 
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from ‘seeking or taking instructions’ from any other institution whatsoever. At the same 
time, the articles oblige the Union institutions and Member State governments to 
respect ‘this principle and not to seek to influence’ the central banks of the Eurosystem. 
The independence of the ECB (and the NCBs) from ‘all political pressures’ is thereby 
judiciable.5 By placing the independence of the ECB at the level of primary law, it is 
the rule of law that governs the relationship between political institutions (national and 
European) and the ECB and the question of monetary policy is to be taken out of the 
political debate.6 Between moments of constitutional politics, the democratic process 
should ‘forget’ the question of monetary policy, so to speak. This is the ‘economic 
wisdom’ that the law has been constituted as the guardian of (Herdegen 1998).      
As Herdegen draws attention to, however, this is only the most direct insulation 
of the ECB from political pressures. The EMU legal framework includes a range of 
other legal provisions that are supposed to ensure the central bank’s independence in 
the pursuit of price stability while securing a general orientation to governmental 
practice in the Member States that supports this. For instance, according to the theory 
informing the monetary union, a single monetary policy can only function smoothly 
and uniformly across the different constituent economies if these are not too dissimilar 
in certain respects. To put it in Schmittian terms (2008), the suppression of political 
sovereignty in the activity of governing can only be sustained if the homogeneity 
among the constituent entities is sufficient to preclude fundamental conflicts and 
tensions based on divergent socio-economic conditions. This principle is legally 
embodied in convergence criteria that outline the basic homogeneity necessary to 
participate in the project in the first place (article 140 TFEU) as well as in budget rules 
that outline in general terms the fiscal practices necessary for sustainable participation 
(articles 121, 126 TFEU; Stability and Growth Pact). While both convergence criteria 
and budget constraints – which reflect the same basic commitment to fiscal discipline 
 
 
5 The so-called OLAF case (Case C-11/00 Commission of the European Communities v. the European 
Central Bank) was the first test of the implications and limits of the ECB’s independence. While the 
ECJ ruled against the ECB’s claim that its independence entitled it to design its own anti-fraud 
regime and that it could not be subject to the general European one (OLAF), the ECJ stressed that 
this limitation of the ECB’s independence was justified because it did not constitute an avenue for 
exerting political pressure on the ECB in the performance of its core task, namely monetary policy 
(paragraphs 134 and 137 of judgement).  
6 In Gauweiler, Advocate General Cruz Villalón (2015: § 109, emphasis added) argued that “the ECB’s 
independence is also intended to ensure that it is kept away from political debate.”  
Governmental Logics 
151 
 
 
and the attempt to regulate governments’ fiscal discretion through law – have been 
unevenly enforced, they reflect the basic (ordoliberal) notion of governing 
governmental practice through law. Rules enshrined in supranational law are to 
govern and constrain the discretion of political authorities; a discretion which might, 
in the final instance, threaten the achievement of price stability.7 
The rule of law approach to governmental practice is also reflected in the 
prohibition on monetary financing (article 123 TFEU8). In the absence of such a 
clause, the ECB might be forced to support states following ‘unsustainable fiscal paths’ 
(see Heipertz and Verdun 2004: 767). Precluding such practices in law, then, appeared 
to be a desirable way of “safeguarding the credibility of ECB independence” (Artis and 
Winkler 1998; see also Heipertz and Verdun 2004).  It promised to introduce a bulwark 
against governments being able to influence the actual conduct of monetary policy 
through their own actions. In central bank-speak, this is commonly referred to as the 
danger of ‘fiscal dominance.’ It refers to scenarios in which the central bank is 
effectively ensuring “the solvency of the government … through the printing press” 
(Weidmann 2013) or in which the central bank is forced “to use monetary policy to 
maintain the market value of government debt” (Woodford 2001 as cited in Weidmann 
2013). Through the protection against fiscal dominance, the ECB was not only to be 
protected from direct political pressures but also from indirect, even unintentional, 
ones resulting from (irresponsible) government practices in the Member States.  
Both legal provisions – budget constraints and the no monetary financing 
clause – give legal expression to the notion that fiscal practices must be governed 
according to the logic of the market. Knowing that public debt will not be monetised, 
rational market actors will demand higher yields on bonds issued by governments 
pursuing unsustainable public policies. This, in turn, should impose government self-
 
 
7 This is not to say that the protection of the ECB’s mandate and independence were the only 
motivations for introducing such constraints. However, throughout the process of monetary 
integration from the Delors Report to the Maastricht Treaty and beyond there was a clear concern 
and pre-occupation with the so-called problem of ‘moral hazard.’ This problem concerns the ability 
of Member States to free-ride on the ECB’s monetary policy with potentially destabilising 
consequences for the union as a whole and threatening, specifically, the independence of the ECB 
and its ability to achieve price stability (see Heipertz and Verdun 2004).   
8 A similar logic applies to the no-bailout clause (article 125 TFEU), which stipulates that neither the 
EU and its institutions nor other Member States shall be “liable or assume the commitments” of a 
Member State.  
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restraint. Ideally speaking, the law thereby reinforces the logic of the market, a notion 
that was explicitly discussed in the Delors Committee.9 While a government controlled 
central bank might be able to postpone the potentially catastrophic consequences of 
unsustainable fiscal practices, they will eventually manifest themselves. According to 
this perspective, which mirrors that of the neoliberals (chapter 1) and the German 
central bankers (chapter 2), the economy operates according to natural laws. While 
access to the printing press, for instance, may provide the illusion that these can be 
suspended, any suspension is only temporary. The economic forces will, in time, 
manifest themselves with a vengeance. The sovereign powers to control economic 
policy that the Member States surrendered by adopting the euro (and which the 
supranational level did not claim) were thus in any case limited by the order of things. 
The EMU legal structure thereby enforces a ‘reality check’ on political authorities and 
the legal protection of the central bank from politics at the same time constitutes a 
protection of society from governments seeking to suspend the natural laws of the 
economy.  
 
Law Protecting Society Against the Central Bank 
In liberal democracies, a constitutionally established power is a constitutionally limited 
power. This is no different in relation to the ECB, whose powers are both explicitly 
limited (no monetary financing, for instance) and by virtue of enumeration (enumeratio 
ergo limitatio). EMU law not only protects the ECB from politics (and society from 
 
 
9 Prior to the work of the Delors Committee, but in many ways prefiguring some of the key discussions 
within it, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa had addressed, in the context of European market integration, 
the notion that “the coordination of government actions is increasingly brought about by the 
‘invisible hand of markets’, rather than by the more visible hand of government authorities” 
(Lindbeck 1977: 229-30 as cited in Padoa-Schioppa 1982: 20). Padoa-Schioppa, however, doubted 
whether capital markets alone would secure the economic policy coordination and convergence 
necessary for the functioning of the common market. Markets, he thought, were incomplete 
regulatory mechanisms, because they themselves needed regulation and supervision. As such, the 
“high road to policy coordination and economic convergence” should be found in a “complete 
monetary union” (Padoa-Schioppa 1982: 23). According to Lamfalussy (1989: 96), however, this 
alone would not solve the problem. Within a monetary union it was unclear whether market forces 
could exert “sufficiently strong disciplinary effects on national governments’ fiscal behaviour.” 
Markets might, as it were, expect other Member States or the Union institutions to step in as a debt 
guarantor of last resort. This problem, he thought, could be solved through “explicit no-bail-out 
provisions, which would encourage greater prudence on the part of both borrowers and lenders” 
(ibid: 97). A correctly instituted monetary union would, in other words, reinforce the hypothesised 
disciplining power of markets. 
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governmental irrationality), it also limits the powers of the ECB, whereby the law is to 
protect society from the arbitrary exercise of powers by the ECB. Its subjection to 
judicial review reflects this and is intended to ensure “that the central bank acts within 
the limits of its mandate and legal framework” (ECB 2002a: 47).  
Apart from this, however, there are few (if any) institutional means of checking 
the ECB’s powers. While the ECB and researchers within it tend to stress the 
importance of the ECB’s accountability towards the European Parliament (see, e.g., 
ECB n.d.a; ECB 2002a; Fraccaroli et al 2018), there is little that any of the EU 
institutions, Member States or affected citizens can actually do to hold the ECB to 
account (see chapter 4; see also Curtin 2017). As the ECB (2002a: 47; see also Smits 
1997) itself has noted, “[w]hile in theory, sanctions may appear a suitable means for 
enforcing central bank accountability, the specific nature of monetary policy means 
that, in practice, certain qualifications should be added.” Or in the colourful prose of 
Otmar Issing (2002: 43):  
Should we fail in the pursuit of [price stability] the statutes of the ECB may not 
provide for any immediate sanctions or material punishment. As mentioned before, 
I would not regard such sanctions as either necessary or effective. However, central 
bankers may well take fright from a glance at Dante’s Divina Commedia. There, a 
certain Adam of Brescia is mentioned, guilty of the crime of falsifying coins – that is, 
creating inflation. His punishment in one of the darkest – or rather hottest – corners 
of hell is a horribly inflated belly. Central bankers beware! 
The absence of formal institutional checks on the ECB’s exercise of powers is 
considered justified by the ECB and its officials in light of the specific nature of its 
governmental task. The necessity of overcoming the problem of politics with regard to 
monetary policy in the context of a political community that lacks a (German) 
“tradition of independence for central banks” (Smits 1997: 500), in other words, 
justifies the creation of an essentially politically unaccountable governmental 
institution. 
That judicial review is the only formalised means of checking the ECB’s powers 
means that, in contrast to both the Fed and the Bundesbank, it is subject to no political 
checks short of the ‘threat’ of Treaty change. Within legal bounds, the ECB’s powers 
are absolute in the sense that they are unchecked by any other institution. This reflects 
the notion of the EU/Eurozone being a governmental order without a sovereign: 
within the constituted order, no institution or institutionalised process can politically 
determine what the ECB should or should not do. The law alone limits the ECB’s 
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powers and there are, in principle, no means of suspending it or authorising 
derogations from it in exceptional circumstances. The law is the law. This reflects the 
ideal of the rules-based approach to central banking: monetary policy ought to be 
conducted without discretion. Such a ‘perfect’ regime, of course, is impossible to 
sustain, but the constitutionalisation of price stability reflects the ideal of overcoming 
the problem of politics and human agency in relation to the government of money. To 
quote Issing (2002: 28, emphasis added) again:  
if an independent central bank is assigned a clear and limited mandate, this 
represents a constraint on the discretionary exercise of power not only by the government but also 
by the central bank itself. In the absence of a complete and universally applicable rule 
for monetary policy, an independent central bank which is firmly committed to the 
single overriding goal of price stability is the closest realistic and credible 
approximation to a literal ‘rule of law’. In particular, such a central bank does not 
have the discretion to pick and choose at will among several objectives.  
The ECB traditionally places great emphasis on the notion of a clear and 
limited mandate (see, however, chapter 6; see also Borger 2019). “A clearly defined 
mandate lies at the very heart of the aforementioned ‘contract’ between the people and 
the independent central bank” (ECB 2002a: 50) and the Treaty “gives the ECB the 
very clear and limited mandate to maintain price stability in the euro area” (ECB 
2017a). Mario Draghi (2015a, Draghi and Constâncio 2015) has, similarly, claimed 
that the ECB is a ‘rule-based institution, not a political institution’ in response to 
questions concerning whether political considerations informed its approach to the 
financial situation of Greece in 2015.10  
The problem with a political decision by a supranational, unelected institution 
such as the ECB goes beyond the question of its dubious democratic credentials. In 
case the ECB makes political decisions (understood here as decisions not explicitly 
provided for in the law), it would break the contract established by the act of 
sovereignties in the first place. As such, it would be a challenge to the continued 
political existence of the Member State peoples as autonomous entities in that they 
would not have authorised the act. The law is thereby not only a protection against the 
danger of despotism in the exercise of governmental powers (as in the traditional liberal 
understanding of constitutionalism), it is also a protection of the sovereignty of the 
 
 
10 The ECB’s role in the Greek crisis of 2015 is discussed in more detail in chapter 6. 
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Member State peoples and their political right of self-determination, including the 
right of self-limitation (see Maastricht and Lisbon decisions of the BverfG). Acting beyond 
the mandate (ultra vires), according to this perspective, constitutes a breach of the 
sovereignty relation between peoples, Member States and the ECB, as the initial 
‘sovereign decision’ did not only specify the creation of the ECB and its objective but 
also a set of constraints on the ECB’s right to exercise sovereign powers.  
 
The Problem of Discretion, Legal Uncertainty and Change 
The absence of ‘a complete and universally applicable rule for monetary policy’ points 
to the central limitation of the rule of law approach to central banking. The 
government of money cannot, as it were, be governed by laws and rules alone. No legal 
order can ever predict all possible future scenarios and make provisions accordingly. 
As such, the absolute rule of law remains an unobtainable ideal and the principle of 
enumeratio ergo limitatio can only be taken so far. Even a specified but general mandate 
such as price stability leaves considerable definitional discretion to the ECB. The 
mandate does not specify what interest rate to set or the timing of its change. It does 
not specify what open market operations to conduct and it cannot determine the 
interpretation of exceptional circumstances. A host of issues are left to the discretion 
and judgement of the central bankers. This is the first limitation of the pure rule of law 
approach and its remedy is sought, as I discuss in the next section, in the governmental 
logic of technocracy. 
The rule of law approach in the context of the Eurozone’s structure of 
sovereignty also entails a high degree of legal rigidity. The fundamental tenets of the 
law cannot, in principle, be changed without either a new act of sovereignties or 
without challenging the underlying contract. The law, however, is a product and a 
vision of a particular economic order. As a product of a certain constitutional 
imaginary, the law has a ‘world-making capacity’ (Loughlin 2015). It introduces certain 
principles and rules that public authorities including the central bank and governments 
should follow. One of the crucial principles of EMU law is that markets are supposed 
to do some of the disciplinary work that cannot, according to the constitutional-
contract and the constitutional imaginary informing it, be done by a centralised public 
authority. However, in a situation where the economy does not function according to 
this logic or if the underlying socio-economic conditions change radically within a short 
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period of time, the law may not equip the authorities (whether monetary or political) 
with the means necessary to tackle the expediencies of the situation. The cumbersome 
process of treaty change might even be seen to threaten the very survival of the 
constitutional order due to the circumstances at hand.11 In such situations, the 
ambiguities of the legal text might be exploited in an act of reinterpretation that allows 
for conduct that was previously considered outside the law. If such a legal change 
happens, however, the question of its legitimacy, and thus of democracy, is bound to 
emerge. This is the second limitation of the rule of law approach as it relates to the 
specific case of the ECB. It cannot provide authorisation for its own change. As in the 
founding moment, it must seek authorisation in something external to itself and as such 
it opens up for a more active role for political decision-making, whether democratic or 
not.12 
 
The Rule of Technocratic Expertise 
The theory of central bank independence and the legal status of the ECB is premised 
on the central bank being relieved from (democratic) political pressures to act in certain 
ways based on political rather than economic expediency. One of the central 
justifications for the independence of the central bank is that it allows for an 
optimisation of monetary policy for its own sake rather than it being balanced against 
potentially conflicting objectives. By delegating certain tasks and transferring the right 
to exercise certain sovereign powers to the central bank, according to the theory, the 
political community restricts its own political freedom in order to enjoy the benefits of 
a rational, time-consistent monetary policy. Such an outcome, however, is conditioned 
on monetary policy actually being performed ‘expertly’ (see Vauchez and Mudge 2016 
and Marcussen 2006). Central bank independence is not enough on its own. The 
scientific principles of monetary policy must be enshrined in law but since the law 
 
 
11 This is the logic of the state of exception or emergency politics; the theme of chapter 6.  
12 These are limitations internal to the rule of law approach. I leave out the question of the viability of 
the rule of law approach or the question of its normative justifiability. One might, for instance, 
advance the critique that Hannah Arendt (2006) levelled at the faith in the rule of law as a 
mechanism for checking power and argue, as she does, that only power can check power without 
destroying it. One might also, as Walter Benjamin (1978) did, advance a Marxist critique of the rule 
of law as entrenching and seeking to naturalise class rule and particular relations of exploitation and 
domination.  
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cannot be complete, its gaps must be filled by expertise. Monetary policy, in other 
words, must become technocratic.  
 
Technocracy as the Highest Form of Bureaucracy  
In ‘The Types of Legitimate Domination,’ Max Weber discusses the rationality of 
bureaucracy within what he calls the ‘legal type of legitimate domination.’13 Placing 
bureaucracy within the legal type – i.e., rule of law and through legally specified 
procedures – Weber stresses that the bureaucratic method of ruling does not rely on 
personal discretion or opinions. The person of the bureaucrat and her opinions, as it 
were, are irrelevant. What the bureaucrat might think about a particular issue in her 
personal capacity should have no bearing on how she does her job. This is specified in 
procedures that the individual bureaucrat has a negligible influence on. It is the office, 
the bureau, that governs, not the person. The bureaucratic form of domination rests, 
like the rule of law, on the acceptance or “belief in the legality of enacted rules and the 
right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands” (Weber 1968a: 
215).  
The bureaucrat, however, is more or less indifferent to the way in which the 
rules came about as long as they can make a credible claim to being obeyed by those 
“who stand in certain social relationships or carry out forms of social action which in 
the order governing the organization have been declared to be relevant” (ibid.). 
Bureaucracy is thus a value-neutral form of domination by an “administrative organ” 
(ibid: 218) whose “specific commands … [are likely to be] obeyed by a given group of 
persons” (ibid: 212).  
 
 
13 Herrschaft is difficult to translate into the English. While ‘domination’ retains the lordship (dominus) 
connotation, it does not convey an image of public power that is particularly legitimate. To Weber, 
however, Herrschaft is a neutral word for the activity of ruling and being obeyed and he uses Herrschaft 
and Autorität as near synonyms (in the introduction he writes: Herrschaft (“Autorität”)) and as such I do 
the same when referring to Weber’s text. Weber (1968b: 946, emphasis in original) clarifies his 
understanding of Herrschaft in the essay of the same name (translated as “Domination and 
Legitimacy”): “domination shall be identical with authoritarian power of command … domination will thus 
mean the situation in which the manifested will (command) of the ruler or rulers is meant to influence 
the conduct of one of more others (the ruled) and actually does influence it in such a way that their 
conduct to a socially relevant degree occurs as if the ruled had made the content of the command 
the maxim of their conduct for its own sake. Looked at from the other end, this situation will be 
called obedience.” In this thesis I only use ‘domination’ when referring to Weber.  
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While it might be argued that Weber is describing bureaucracy, not 
technocracy, it should be remembered that the term ‘technocracy’ was only coined in 
the first quarter of the 20th century, by some accounts in 1919 by W.H. Smyth, a 
follower of Veblen and an early proponent of the Technocracy movement. Back then 
it meant something very different from what it does today.14 Weber might not have 
been familiar with the term before his death in 1920, but even if he was, its meaning 
was different from what he was trying to capture, namely the general phenomenon of 
ruling according to formalised procedures. The notion of government by experts and 
the emphasis on the technical element, however, was a key element in Weber’s (1968a: 
218, emphases added) writings on the subject:  
The rules which regulate the conduct of an office may be technical rules or norms. 
In both cases, if their application is to be fully rational, specialized training is necessary. 
It is thus normally true that only a person who has demonstrated an adequate technical 
training is qualified to be a member of the administrative staff of such an organized 
group, and hence only such persons are eligible for appointment to official positions.  
The crucial distinction between bureaucratic rule and the other forms of rule 
(charismatic and traditional) is that technical qualifications within the particular 
domain of administrative practice are essential for appointment to office. That officials 
“are appointed, not elected” (ibid: 220, emphasis in original), furthermore, means that 
elevation to authority depends not on popularity, promises or ancestry but on merit 
and expertise within the relevant field. This principle of technical bureaucracy, 
technocracy, is embodied in the Treaty and the Statute of the ECB (articles 283.2 and 
11.2, respectively, emphases added): “[All] members of the Executive Board shall be 
appointed by the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, from among persons 
of recognised standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters.” It is not a 
political appointment in the sense of marking out a particular policy-making approach 
 
 
14 The American Technocracy movement was inspired by the works of Thorstein Veblen (1904), one of 
whose key ideas was that capitalists engage in the conscious destruction of social value (by limiting 
production to raise prices, thereby causing unemployment) in order to increase profits. Instead, 
Veblen proposed, experts in the industrial process (‘engineers’) should be placed in charge of 
production and it should be governed not by the profit motive but by the maximisation of social 
value. The Technocracy movement generalised such ideas and campaigned for turning the 
comprehensive system of government over to ‘engineers’ working for the public good understood as 
the maximisation of the production of goods and services. 
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(whether this holds true is another matter), but a matter of choosing the most able 
candidate.15 
In accordance with the logic of the theory of central bank independence, this 
dedication to specialisation makes  
the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization … from a purely 
technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in 
this sense formally the most rational known means of exercising authority over 
human beings … It thus makes possible a particularly high degree of calculability of 
results for the heads of the organization and for those acting in relation to it (Weber 
1968a: 223).  
In a capitalist economy this calculability makes the technocratic administrative 
apparatus a particularly suitable organisation of the exercise of public power. Its 
“superiority” in this regard “lies in the role of technical knowledge” (ibid.), since 
“[b]ureaucratic administration means fundamentally domination through knowledge” 
(ibid: 225). In order to be technical, the knowledge needs to be of the rules governing 
certain phenomena (say, the economy). Domination through technical knowledge is 
therefore, in principle, rules-based; it is based on technical knowledge of the laws 
according to which the economy works. The expert is thus akin to the engineer in the 
bridge-currency analogy (see chapter 2). Acts of public authority thereby become 
transparent and those who are expected to obey (financial market actors, citizens, 
governments) can with a certain degree of confidence predict how the monetary 
authority will act in the future and adjust their behaviour in the present accordingly 
(see ECB 2002b).16 More importantly, this is supposed to ensure that while the 
technocratic authority may act discretionarily to fill the gaps left by the legal 
framework, it will not do so arbitrarily: the logic of the technocratic form of domination 
itself ensures that even discretion is rules-based and predictable (see Papademos 2004). 
 
 
15 While nationality, gender and political allegiance should, in principle, be irrelevant for appointments 
to the Executive Board, this principle is imperfectly applied in relation to the ECB. In practice, the 
large Member States always have a national on the Board. The appointment of Board Members, 
furthermore, is often subject to debates about the future policy-direction of the ECB and as such the 
appointment process gives rise to attempts to influence the ECB’s monetary policy-making. This 
undermines somewhat the ECB’s claim to political neutrality. It underlines, however, that politics 
can never be taken out of the question of monetary policy entirely.  
16 This notion informs the economic rationality behind the general movement towards greater 
transparency in central bank communications (see Krippner 2007) and the central bank’s 
governmental technique of ‘forward guidance’ in the context of the Crisis (see McKay et al 2016; 
ECB 2017b).  
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As such, technocracy complements the rule of law through correcting its inherent 
defects and filling out the blanks in the spirit of the law itself.  
 
The Telos of Technocracy and Its Grounding 
While technocracy is not arbitrary but based on a certain systematic knowledge – a 
knowledge that can, in principle at least, be checked by outsiders – this says little about 
its objectives. A certain body or field of knowledge can be employed for varying and 
potentially competing ends. Such ends cannot be internal to the knowledge or expertise 
itself and like the rule of law technocracy requires an external impetus: “at the top of a 
bureaucratic organization, there is necessarily an element which is at least not purely 
bureaucratic” (Weber 1968a: 222). It needs something outside itself, so to speak, as its 
“ultimate source of authority” (ibid: 219). This impetus, however, is different from the 
rule of law. Whereas the rule of law requires a positive formulation of the law in its 
totality (or at least in its fundamentals), technocracy requires only an objective, a telos. 
On the basis of this, it can, in principle, fill out the rest by itself. What grounds the 
legitimacy of technocracy is its superior ability to achieve any given objective. As the 
ECB (2002a: 46) has it, “the conduct of monetary policy and the performance of the 
other tasks have been made subject to independent decision-making for a specific 
purpose: the maintenance of price stability in the euro area.” The ECB, then, “can 
derive ‘output legitimacy’ from the successful performance of the tasks entrusted to it.” 
Furthermore:  
an independent central bank, which successfully and consistently provides the ‘public 
good’ of a stable and trusted currency, can earn the highest levels of public support, 
obtain the confidence of the citizens and enjoy full legitimacy in spite of its intentional 
distance from the normal political process (ibid.). 
Conversely, reflecting the German central bankers’ notion of the importance of public 
trust (discussed in chapter 2), researchers within the ECB have argued that if the central 
bank fails in achieving its mandate, the public’s trust in and support for it is bound to 
decline, making “it vulnerable to political pressure” (Ehrmann et al 2013: 782; 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2011). In that sense, ‘output’ is the defining form of 
technocratic legitimacy.  
This, however, does not address the question of the source of the teleological 
impetus. Here democracy enters the picture again and the ECB appeals, as discussed 
above, to the “robust degree of democratic legitimacy” (Issing 2002: 32) that the ECB 
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derives from the “input legitimacy” (ECB 2002: 46a) of its “democratic naissance” 
(Zilioli and Selmayr 2001: 49). What else, one might ask, can ground and found the 
authority of the technocratic institution?  
Weber’s discussion of bureaucracy reflects this notion and he even suggests that 
bureaucracy and democracy are based on some of the same basic principles: equality 
and the rejection of inherited (arbitrary) privilege. As such, Weber (1968a: 226) 
claimed, “[e]verywhere bureaucratization foreshadows mass democracy.” But the 
logic goes further, Weber suggests. Understood as the ‘rule of the people,’ modern 
democracy implies delegation to bodies more specialised in the activity of ruling; “Mass 
democracy … unavoidably has to put paid professional labour in place of historically 
inherited ‘avocational’ administration by notables” (Weber 1968b: 984). The “demos 
itself, in the sense of a shapeless mass, never ‘governs’ large associations, but rather is 
governed” (ibid: 985). Democracy, technocracy and the rule of law thereby appear to 
be perfect companions in fostering a well-functioning polity; balancing political 
representation of the will of the people with efficiency in achieving it as well as means 
for the ruled to ensure that the rulers do not rule despotically.  
The output legitimacy of technocratic domination, however, means that its 
legitimacy can never be finally accomplished; its performance in terms of its telos is 
perpetually subject to evaluation, as noted in chapter 2. Technocratic legitimacy 
“cannot be instituted by a simple procedure … or by fixed rules … [N]or can it be 
regarded as an historical achievement. It is something that needs to be perpetually 
constructed and validated” (Rosanvallon 2011: 95). It is, as such, in constant need of 
supplying proof of its trustworthiness and “[e]ach intervention, each decision is 
tantamount to a refoundation of the institution” (ibid: 96). In other words, the fact that 
technocracy’s actions were in the general interest of the people yesterday does not 
mean that they are so also tomorrow. This means that the technocratic institution must 
subject itself to the people’s scrutiny, whether or not this is given institutional form.  
In the context of the Eurozone Crisis, the question of public trust in the ECB 
was problematised in ECB public discourses and research both on and within the ECB 
(see Cœuré 2012, 2013; Ehrmann et al 2013; Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2011; Gros and 
Roth 2010; Fischer and Hahn 2008). A lack of public trust in the ECB made it 
attractive and viable for political actors to challenge both the ECB’s independence, its 
objectives and the monetary union as a whole, the argument claimed. Without the 
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public’s trust, in other words, monetary policy was in danger of becoming repoliticised 
at both the foundational and governmental levels; whereby monetary policy would 
once again be subjected to the ‘destabilising effects’ of competing political opinions and 
convictions. This problematisation of the question of public trust reflects the notion of 
the ‘organic’ relationship between the technocratic power and the political subject it 
governs (for). As Zilioli and Selmayr (2001: 49) noted, “No public organization, even 
less a supranational organization [such as the ECB] can fulfil its tasks properly without 
the general support of the citizens from which, ultimately, it derives all its authority.” 
While in the Bundesbank context, this relationship was discussed mainly as providing 
a grounding for the central bank’s power vis-à-vis the government, it can potentially 
also provide other political actors with a source of power against the central bank. This 
reflects that democracy in relation to technocracy does not involve the demos in ruling 
or choosing officials directly but in “the measure of influence which the demos, or better, 
which social circles from its midst are able to exert upon the content and the direction 
of administrative activities by the means of ‘public opinion’” (Weber 1968b: 985). 
In the absence of electoral legitimacy, the question of public opinion becomes 
an inescapable aspect of the democratic legitimacy of a form of domination that is 
defined by its superior ability, even indispensability, in the achievement of certain 
objectives (ibid: 991). It serves to ensure that bureaucratic domination does not, 
whether in pursuit of technical excellence or group interests, detach itself too much 
from the pursuit of the public interest. While the technical achievement of the public 
good might be compromised by directly involving the “political ‘master’” – always “a 
dilettante facing the expert” (ibid.) – in governmental activity, the technocratic 
authority cannot be allowed unchecked reign without undermining its democratic 
claim to govern.  
 
Technocracy Against the Rule of Law and Democracy  
The notion of a direct and organic link between the ECB and the demos presents a 
distinct problem in the context of the Eurozone. Regardless of whether public opinion 
supports the ECB or not, this notion poses a potential challenge to the notion of the 
ECB being governed by the law of the founding contract. This is because it 
conceptualises the foundational power of the people(s) as being not only present in 
moments of constituent (law- and telos-giving) politics but as ever-present in the 
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legitimation and authorisation of the exercise of governmental powers. However, 
because no institution holds political authority over the ECB, the people cannot be 
made formally present in relation to the ECB’s governmental activity through electoral 
representation in a constituted body such as a legislature, as is the case for the Fed. Its 
presence vis-à-vis the ECB must take the form of public opinion. In an abstraction of 
the principle supporting the Bundesbank’s ability to resist government pressure, ‘the 
people’ emerges, through public opinion, as the power that authorises (or not) the 
central bank’s exercise of power.  
The people is present in the activity of governing only as a ‘sleeping sovereign’: 
a force that reigns but does not govern (see Tuck 2016; Agamben 2011). But the 
people’s foundational power is not exhausted in the formal process of the founding, 
law-making moment but is envisioned as a source of continuous evaluation and 
renewal of the technocratic telos. The people is envisioned as an active but vague and 
elusive force providing the technocratic institution an organic legitimacy as the subject 
in whose name and for whose welfare the technocratic authority exercises power. 
Following the notion of salus populi suprema lex esto, this technocratic obligation may 
demand even radical departures from the strict letter of the law. 
Technocracy’s challenge to the rule of law is thereby associated with the 
potential legal illimitability of its exercise of powers in the name of the public interest; 
in the name of the democratic imperative of governing for the people, as it were. 
However, technocracy and democracy are also at odds in important ways. As Weber 
(1968b: 991) highlighted,  
[w]e must remember the fact … that ‘democracy’ as such is opposed to the ‘rule’ of 
bureaucracy, in spite and perhaps because of its unavoidable yet unintended 
promotion of bureaucratization. Under certain conditions, democracy creates 
palpable breaks in the bureaucratic pattern and impediments to bureaucratic 
organization. 
Thus, while the “power position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always great, under 
normal conditions overtowering” (ibid.), democracy always entails the right to choose 
the ‘irrational’ against all expert advice. As the grounding authority of technocracy, 
democracy can also always suspend entirely or radically transform technocratic 
administration. This reflects that technocracy is a technology of governing given a certain 
order of values. Democracy, on the other hand, is a means of arriving at such an order 
and it can therefore always choose to instate a new order of values, thereby rendering 
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certain forms of technocratic expertise obsolete or irrelevant. Whereas the 
manifestation of democracy as ‘irrationality’ challenges technocracy as such, 
democracy as the grounding of values challenges only specific forms of technocratic 
rule, not the technocratic principle of domination. 
Technocracy, on the other hand, also poses a distinct challenge to the principle 
of democratic self-determination. Most importantly, in governing according to its telos, 
technocratic government cannot accept what appear as arbitrary limitations on 
fulfilling its objective in the most efficient manner possible. Technocracy thereby has 
an inbuilt tendency to overflow the boundaries between the sphere of social life that it 
is mandated to govern and spheres that it is not. If a neighbouring sphere is seen, in a 
purely technical sense, to be threatening or simply relevant for achieving its telos, the 
technocratic authority will seek to intervene in it and to try to create the conditions 
necessary for the realisation of its mandate.17 As such, spheres of social life not 
governed technocratically are perpetually threatened by technocracy’s quest to fulfil its 
(democratic) mandate.  
The problem of containing technocracy within specified bounds also has a 
specific legal dimension. As noted above, technocracy promises to respond to the 
problem of the inability of law to predict and provide a solution to all possible scenarios. 
The law is, in principle, static between moments of law-making and in the event of 
unforeseen circumstances, this may make a strict reliance on the rule of the letter of 
the law dangerous to the legal order. In such situations, technocratic governmental 
authority can give executive discretion a rules-based anchoring, supplying the defects 
of the law without undermining it. Technocracy as a governmental logic, however, is 
dynamic because its justification and legitimacy rests not only on the letter of the law 
but also on its ability to deliver on its telos. If the letter of the law is considered an 
impediment to this, the technocratic body might ‘supply the defect of the law’ not by 
filling its gaps but by ignoring, changing or suspending it. It will do “whatever it takes” 
(Draghi 2012). Draghi’s qualification “within our mandate” is ambiguous in this 
context because the ECB’s mandate is both the general positive law framework 
 
 
17 This is discussed in more detail in chapter 6, but the involvement of the ECB in the troika, its threats 
in secret letters to governments, and its preoccupation with explaining what kind of fiscal policies 
Member States should be pursuing in public discourses are examples of this. 
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governing its exercise of power and the general telos of price stability. The question, 
then, is what the hierarchy between the two should be. If the technocratic authority 
considers, in accordance with its expertise, that the realisation of the telos (price stability) 
demands the suspension of the law (say, article 123 TFEU), the technocracy will, 
paradoxically, have compromised its mandate while fulfilling it. The same is true if it sticks to 
a strict interpretation of the law that undermines its telos. The democratic impetus of 
the law and of the telos are, as such, in a potentially irreducible conflict and the choice 
between them is inescapably political. However, within the public law structure of the 
Eurozone, as opposed to the US, there are no institutional mechanisms for arriving at 
such a decision. This does not mean that such a decision will not be made but simply 
that it will be arrived at, as discussed in the next chapter, on the basis of ‘might’ rather 
that ‘right.’ 
These contradictions within the mandate of the ECB, even if the mandate is 
considered perfectly democratic, highlight the limits of addressing the problem of 
politics in relation to monetary policy through the constitution of the central bank as a 
sovereign representative. The problem of politics, as it were, does not disappear 
through the institutional attempt to depoliticise it. It merely manifests itself in a 
different form.  
 
The Rule of the Peoples 
If there is a sequential relationship between the three governmental logics discussed in 
this chapter, democracy is both logically and chronologically the principal. In the 
contemporary European political imagination, anything else would be unimaginable. 
All political projects must in some way claim to be based on popular sovereignty and 
the people’s right to influence and authorise the performance and organisation of 
governmental activity. As discussed above, this is no less true of the ECB: democracy 
entered at a foundational stage and constituted the law and the system of values and 
norms that the technocratic authority of the ECB operates within and promotes. 
Democracy is invoked as the foundational force grounding the authority and 
legitimacy of the legal order and the technocratic telos. The law constituted in the 
founding moment is thereby seen to express the democratic will of the peoples and the 
insulation of the ECB from subsequent political contestation serves as a means of 
protecting and promoting this expression in the most effective manner.  
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The notion of democracy contained in this conception sees it as a founding 
expression of political will, a constituent power, but not a governing power. But is there 
a space for democracy as a way of governing within the Eurozone? If so, what form 
does it take? What is the relationship between the legal and technocratic elements of 
the EMU’s organisation of the exercise of sovereign powers and democracy as way of 
deciding and acting in concert? What, in other words, is left of and for democratic 
politics in the EMU’s constitutional order?  
 
Tying the Hands of Government in the Name of Democracy 
When the ECB was created, little attention was devoted to the question of its 
democratic legitimacy. Or rather, the question was posed in a manner that made it 
easy to address without placing too onerous requirements on the future ECB. In 1990, 
for instance, Karl Otto Pöhl sought “to solve” the question of “the ‘democratic 
control’” of the ECB, which was “frequently raised, particularly by the French and the 
British.” According to Pöhl, this was not difficult because “an independent [ECB] 
would, in my opinion, be conceivable before the completion of political union if the 
governments … are prepared to surrender the corresponding sovereignty.” There was 
“no need to wait for complete political union, a European government and a 
parliament with real responsibilities” because “[t]he system would have an adequately 
democratic legal base if it came about by an agreement between democratic 
governments, if the agreement were ratified by democratically elected parliaments and 
if the system were provided with a clearly defined mandate … As for the rest, the 
system would be measured by its success.”18  
The democratic ‘input’ for the ECB could unproblematically be reduced to the 
founding moment and its performance in terms of that democratic mandate would 
constitute the source of its continued ‘output’ legitimacy. This, in turn, would be 
checked through reporting to the other European institutions, the EP in particular. 
The conclusions reached in the Delors Report reflected this and stressed that the EMU 
institutional framework “would have to promote efficient economic management, 
properly embedded in the democratic process” (Delors Report 1989: 21). It made few 
 
 
18 Pöhl, K.O., “Herr Pöhl discusses the basic features of a European monetary order,” speech in Paris, 
16 January 1990, HAEU, TPS-193, p. 5-6. 
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demands on the ECB in that process, however. In so far as the issue was addressed at 
all, the Report only outlined accountability requirements as “reporting … in the form 
of submission of an annual report by the ESCB to the European Parliament and the 
European Council; moreover the Chairman of the ESCB could be invited to report to 
these institutions” (ibid: 22). The problem of the ECB’s democratic legitimacy was thus 
largely ignored or reduced to the question of accountability understood as “verifying 
that the rules and principles laid down for the central bank are respected” (Bini Smaghi 
and Gros 2000: 146).  
In order for such accountability to function adequately, in turn, “the rules and 
principles for central bank action can thus not be continuously changed by the 
government according to specific and changeable interests” (ibid.). This, then, entails 
that “[a] central bank cannot be made fully independent if its objectives are not clearly 
and precisely defined” and, further, “it cannot remain independent if it does not give 
a public account of its actions” (ibid: 147). The ECB’s independence is legitimated by 
its giving account of rather than being held to account for its actions, which is, as a number 
of scholars have noted, a rather weak form of democratic accountability (Buiter 1999; 
Berman and McNamara 1999; de Haan and Eijffinger 2000;  Kaltenthaler et al 2010; 
Curtin 2017).19 
The democratic accountability of the ECB follows from the conception of its 
foundation of democratic legitimacy: it is based on the founding act that created the 
law rather than the continuous expression of democratic will in and through political 
institutions composed of elected representatives. Through the notion of accountability, 
democracy re-enters the framework but only in a vague form without any express 
powers. Its role is limited to checking whether the technocratic authority remains 
faithful to the original expression of will. Even then, however, there are no institutional 
means of sanctioning potential transgressions. The lack of democratic powers vis-à-vis 
 
 
19 What many contributions to the debate on the ECB’s accountability highlight (even those not critical, 
see Issing 1999; Bini Smaghi and Gros 2001) is that the Treaty framework specifying how the ECB 
is to be accountable leaves much discretion to the ECB as to how this is to be done. While the ECB 
may have augmented its accountability practices vis-à-vis the EP relative to Treaty requirements, 
much of this is unenforceable and subject to the discretion of the ECB. The ECB’s accountability 
practices are thus largely a ‘gift’ from the ECB to the EP (and the European citizens). Whether it, 
like gifts, entails a certain expectation of reciprocity and an expectation that the gift will not be turned 
against the giver is an open question.  
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the ECB reflects the notion that law, not political authority, was supposed to constrain 
the ECB’s governmental activities. It also reflects a specific conception of democracy 
and of democratic representation in the activity of governing.  
The dual constraint of the law discussed in the first section of this chapter entails 
that democratic government is constrained by the democratically established law and 
independence of the central bank. At the same time the democratically established 
independent central bank is constrained by the democratically established law and, to 
a lesser extent, the disciplining power associated with democratic accountability. While 
involved in all aspects of the construct, however, democracy is reduced to the initial 
sacrifice of political freedom concerning monetary policy. The order as a whole can, 
of course, be reconstituted, whereby political freedom is reintroduced in a founding 
moment, but within the constituted order political freedom is highly constrained. 
A monetary order without political freedom is essentially what the notion of 
central bank independence seeks to realise through the removal of the conduct of 
monetary policy from politics. In the Eurozone in particular, where the depoliticisation 
of monetary policy is accompanied by the denationalisation of money, this produces a 
monetary order akin to the gold standard: from the perspective of the individual 
government monetary policy is an externally given constraint on economic policy. 
Political freedom concerning economic policy at the Member State level is, in 
principle, constrained by the original democratic decision and will of each of the 
Member State peoples to subject themselves to the institutional structure. The 
justification for the constraints on democracy as an active governmental force thus 
stems from a conceptual separation between government and the popular will akin to 
that discussed in relation to the Bundesbank: the people’s foundational will for price 
stability justifies the constraint on the economic policymaking freedom of government 
as a necessary means of promoting a popular will more foundational than that 
expressed in periodic elections.  
The EMU structure thereby incorporates the traditional liberal suspicion of 
government and presents its constraints on democratically elected government not as 
limitations of democracy but as a means of realising a true democratic will that would 
otherwise be compromised by partisan politics and self-serving political elites. While a 
government might not be ‘evil,’ this conception stresses that it cannot be trusted to 
adequately constrain itself from acting ‘irrationally’ or, simply sub-optimally: 
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government in T+0 cannot, as discussed in chapter 3, commit government in T+1 
without commitment devices such as central bank independence.  
This is not necessarily a problem of democracy as such, since democracy can, 
in accordance with the theory, tie its own hands (government) to the mast of time 
consistency through measures such as central bank independence. The will of the 
people can thereby be better realised through excepting certain policy issues from the 
ordinary democratic process. Because there is a potentially antagonistic relationship 
between electoral representation and the people’s foundational will, the latter may 
more ‘authentically’ be represented by independent institutions. One might, of course, 
object that ‘really existing democracy’ works through elected representatives, whereby 
the limitation on their powers becomes a limitation of democracy. This, however, 
would miss the point. The ECB’s independence is not presented as a means of 
overcoming the shortcomings of democracy but the “shortcomings of the 
parliamentary system.” It is seen as “a counterweight to the preponderance of 
parliamentary power in general” (Christodoulou 2005:185).  
Informing the justification for central bank independence is a conception of 
democracy as being separate from and somewhat trapped by the political process. The 
problem is government and its partisanship, not democracy. As such, constraining the 
political freedom of governments and parliaments need not entail an impoverishment 
of democracy. It might, in fact, enrich it. 
 
Tying the Hands of the People in the Name of Democracy 
While government may be constrained by the EMU’s constitutional framework, then, 
democracy is not necessarily constrained. The euro, however, constitutes not only a 
constraint on the governmental capacity of individual governments but also on the 
people’s ability to express political will. This constraint is not absolute; it does not, in 
principle, affect the ultimate sovereign right of the people to determine the 
constitutional ordering of its governmental apparatus. Through the initial transfer of 
sovereign powers to the ECB, however, the possibility of exercising this sovereign right 
is tempered by the fear of the potentially catastrophic consequences associated with 
reversing it. This fear is central to the notion of the irreversibility of the euro. The 
question is whether it can be understood as being democratic. Or, rather, what 
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conception of democracy allows for perceiving such a constraint on the people’s ability 
to express political will as being democratically legitimate?  
Even if a) the euro and the ECB are considered products of an act of the 
constituent power of the peoples, b) are trusted in public opinion, c) the ECB’s 
accountability practices are considered to ‘work,’ and d) the constraints on 
governments’ political freedom in terms of economic policy are considered legitimate, 
it is not immediately clear that this would make the governmental structure 
democratic. Positing ‘the people’ as the foundation for governmental power is not 
unique to the democratic form of government, nor is the notion of the rulers having to 
retain the public’s trust or govern for the population at large. In De Cive, for instance, 
Hobbes held that the initial assembly of the multitude erecting sovereign power is by 
definition democratic. The governmental order created by the founding assembly, 
however, needed not be. The undemocratic governmental order may thereby be 
democratically founded. In Machiavelli’s The Prince, similarly, the distinctly 
monarchical prince could never make himself safe against a hostile people. If the 
people turned against the prince, the principality would be lost but this did not make 
the prince’s politics democratic.  
Despite invoking the popular foundation of the legitimacy of political rule, 
neither Hobbes nor Machiavelli were developing theories of popular participation in 
the activity of governing. As Canovan (2005: 27) highlights, there is a long, and for 
many years dominant, tradition of political thought which invokes ‘the people’ as the 
foundational political subject, the “constituent sovereign,” without necessarily 
reserving for the people an active role in government. This conception of the people’s 
sovereignty is very much in line with the notion of the ECB deriving its mandate from 
a ‘democratic naissance’ in a sovereign decision by the European peoples. That the 
founding moment is said to be based on the sovereignty of the people(s) does not 
necessarily make the constituted governmental form democratic. Monarchy can be 
justified in this way as can the mixed constitution of the (old) republican tradition,20 
which incorporates elements from the rule of the (common or poor) people 
(democracy), rule by the most qualified (aristocracy), and rule by a supreme military 
 
 
20 Machiavelli’s Discorsi and Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws are perhaps the best-known examples 
from this tradition. 
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commander (monarchy). The ECB might therefore be non-democratic in its 
governmental form (technocracy being a modern variant of aristocracy) even if it is 
accepted that it derives its ultimate authority from the people(s) as political subject(s), 
it has the people’s trust, and it governs for the people.  
If the ECB is a manifestation of techno-aristocracy, the question is whether 
democracy exists elsewhere in the Eurozone’s constitution. The question of 
democracy, in other words, becomes one of identifying the active democratic element 
in a mixed regime.  
The idea of taking certain issues out of democratic politics without thereby 
undermining democracy as such is at the heart of the liberal theory of democracy. In 
liberal thought, constitutionalism and constitutional protections of individual rights 
constitute not so much a constraint on democracy as that which allows democracy to 
flourish. Without protections of property rights, for instance, there can be no 
meaningful democracy because the minority will always threaten to sabotage and 
revolt against majority decisions that go against them. As Stephen Holmes (1995: 29-
30) argues with reference to James Maddison:  
For a popular government to persist … the mass of poorer citizens must keep the 
confidence of the wealthy. Without the willing cooperation of the rich, no system as 
inherently unstable as collective self-rule could possibly last. If property-holders 
believe that democratic procedures will lead to confiscatory policies, they will refuse 
to go along. They will sabotage the workings of popular government, and they will 
use their private wealth to resist collective decisions. The poor will counterattack. 
The likely outcome is class warfare, social turmoil, and the general call for a dictator 
on horseback. 
Ultimately, then, the insistence on the pure democratic form (understood as majority 
rule) ends up undermining itself. A (very) similarly logic21 informs the notion of taking 
monetary policy out of democratic politics. In the absence of institutional safeguards, 
the democratic control of money risks, following the myth of the inflations, producing 
the conditions for democracy’s own undoing. An independent central bank pursuing 
the primacy of price stability thereby becomes a precondition for a stable democracy. 
The de-democratisation of monetary policy is seen as fundamental condition for the 
 
 
21 According to Röpke (1957: 19), “Erosion of property and erosion of money go together; in both cases, 
that which is solid, stable, firmly held, assured and meant to last is replaced by that which is brittle, 
precarious, fleeting, uncertain, and meant for the day.”  
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maintenance of the social norms conducive to the functioning of democracy. Without 
it, democracy risks collapsing into chaos and/or authoritarian dictatorship. 
The de-democratisation of monetary policy serves, in this view, to provide the 
existential preconditions for a functioning democracy. Still, however, this does not 
address the role of democracy as an active governmental force. That is, does the de-
democratisation of monetary policy make democratic politics more meaningful in the 
spheres of governmental activity that are not de-democratised?  
The Maastricht Treaty stipulates that economic policy remains a Member 
State responsibility. If democracy is to enter as an active governmental force it must be 
sought here. The question, then, is how the de-politicisation of monetary policy (and 
the legal constraints on fiscal policy) affects the democratic conduct of economic policy. 
The bridge-currency analogy of Wilhelm Vocke (see chapter 2) implies that there are 
two ways in which we can understand constraints on economic policymaking. We 
might, on the one hand, see the stability of money as an a priori, legal-institutional 
constraint on the political freedom of governments. This implies that certain courses 
of government action will be ruled out from the outset because the central bank will 
refuse to sponsor them. If the government’s policy is democratically mandated, this will 
constitute a constraint and a limitation on what democracy can decide to do in terms 
of economic policy. On the other hand, the democratically mandated government 
might ignore the central bank’s warnings and take control of monetary policy in the 
name of implementing a policy intended to improve public welfare (stimulate 
employment, for instance). While this may, according to the Bundesbank approach as 
well as the theory of central bank independence, provide the illusion that economic 
policy is democratically controlled, the workings of the ‘natural laws’ of the economy 
will ultimately undermine its intended positive effects and may bring unintended 
destructive effects that undermine democracy as such. Unconstrained democratic 
control of economic policy is in any case an impossibility: it is either constrained by the 
institutional structure at the outset or by the order of things in its effects.  
What institutional and legal constraints do is to enforce the realisation of 
constraints on the democratic decision-making process, thereby making democracy 
more realistic in its demands on economic policy and focussing its energies on what it 
can actually do in terms of economic policy. By dispensing with the illusion that you 
can have your cake and eat it, it forces democracy to confront the ‘real’ choices 
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between competing values and distributional policies in a manner that reflects the ‘real’ 
priorities of the people. Democratic government, in this conception, is made more 
‘authentic’ by the enforced realisation of the always already existing material 
constraints on economic policy. For instance, once the power of the printing press – 
paradoxically, as Friedman noted, both essentially impotent and fundamentally 
destructive – is removed from the political realm, democracy faces economic reality as 
it is, not as it wishes it to be. Consequently, the contemporary liberal democratic regime 
of ‘constrained democracy’ (Müller 2011) of which central bank independence is part, 
is the legal-political form given to the attempt to make the people realise the inherent 
constraints of democratic politics. Ignoring such constraints comes at a price. They do 
not disappear in the absence of the legal-institutional constraints. Their manifestation 
is merely postponed, potentially with catastrophic consequences. In the Eurozone, 
then, the legal-institutional separation of monetary and fiscal policy simply formalises 
the ‘real’ limits of democratic sovereignty that exist by virtue not of the law as such but 
by the (economic) order of things. The right of sovereignty may be unlimited in 
principle, but its exercise cannot but be conditioned, constrained and oriented by 
economic reality. The law and the institutional depoliticisation of monetary policy does 
not create this state of affairs, it only makes it explicit and forces democratic politics to 
reckon with it in moments of economic policy decision-making. 
 
The Limits of Constrained Democracy 
The discussion in the preceding subsections has focussed on the conception of 
democracy that allows for conceiving of the general Eurozone governmental order as 
being somehow democratic. It has not, however, addressed the openings for 
democracy that emerge from tensions between the rule of law and technocracy, on the 
one hand, and how democracy eo ipso may create difficulties for a particular legal-
institutional order such as that of the Eurozone.  
As discussed above, there is a potential contradiction between the rule of law 
and technocracy: governing in the name of the telos may demand the abrogation of the 
letter of the law, and vice versa. Given that the two structuring conditions for 
governmental activity derive from the same source of authority – the original decision 
of the Member State peoples – the hierarchy between them cannot necessarily be 
settled a priori. The question, then, is how such a conflict is to be resolved and by whom?  
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A contradiction between two facets of a foundational expression of political will 
demands a political decision; a new act of sovereignty. In this regard, democracy offers 
a procedure for deciding in a legitimate manner on suspending, altering or abolishing 
either the letter or the telos of the law (or both) in either the limited sense of the concrete 
situation or in a more generally applicable sense. Democratic sovereignty can thus be 
invoked as judge in a conflict between the rule of law and technocracy that is irresoluble 
within the legal-institutional order itself.22 Within unitary structures of sovereignty, this 
decision can emerge from the ordinary political process, as for instance, was the case 
in relation to the Fed’s controversial decision to bail out the insurance giant AIG during 
the Financial Crisis. Within the Eurozone’s governmental structure, however, there 
are, as discussed, no institutionalised means for making such a decision. This does not 
mean that a decision is not made, but that it is made in a manner that leaves its 
legitimacy in doubt.  
The decision may not necessarily be undemocratic, but the problem of 
establishing its democratic legitimacy becomes somewhat thorny. The problem is how 
to make the people present in the evaluation of a political decision. This is not a 
problem specific to the Eurozone, but it takes on a particular meaning in a 
governmental order where the institutional expression of sovereignty is divided.  
There is in the Eurozone and the EU more broadly no political institution able 
to invoke a direct mandate from the people (as in the contemporary US) and there are 
no provisions in the Treaties, which, as in Switzerland, allow for a mixed exercise of 
constituent power by the people as a whole and the peoples of the Member States. The 
EU has not, despite Habermas’ (2012) reconstructive efforts, formalised the possibility 
of ‘a European people’ authorising fundamental changes to the basic meaning of the 
constitutional order in their names as citizens of both the EU and their respective 
Member States. The people as an active force must take a different form in relation to 
the ECB and Eurozone governance in general. 
In Constitutional Theory, Carl Schmitt (2008: 131) invoked acclamation as “the 
direct expression of a people’s will.” However, he noted, “In modern, large states, the 
acclamation … has changed its external form. In these states, it expresses itself as 
 
 
22 If a court of law makes such a decision it is not acting as a court but a political body and the validity 
of its ruling will tend to depend on its political reception (see Schmitt 2015a; Ackerman 2000). 
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‘public opinion.’” In terms of political effect, in other words, public opinion has taken 
on the role of the public square. As noted, the ECB attributes considerable importance 
to public opinion expressed as public trust (measured in Eurobarometer polls). The 
importance of public trust follows from the logic of ‘output legitimacy’ as the defining 
form of legitimacy for a technocratic institution but it also touches on the more difficult 
question of establishing the legitimacy of legally questionable act: if the ECB is able to 
demonstrate that it governs effectively for the people(s), thereby gaining the people(s)’s 
trust, this constitutes a continuous justification for the ECB’s existence as an 
independent technocratic body even though its acts transgress the original mandate.  
This conception of the role of the people corresponds to Locke’s (1988: 427, 
emphases in original; see also Canovan 2005: 15ff) notion that “The People shall be Judge; 
for who shall be Judge whether his Trustee or Deputy acts well, and according to the 
Trust reposed in him, but he who deputes him and must, by having deputed him have 
still a Power to discard him, when he fails in his Trust?” This conception is reflected in 
the ECB’s description of its accountability, which, although not allowing the EP any 
formal powers over the ECB, concedes to it a representative function and the power 
to “form a judgement on the ECB’s performance against its objectives” (ECB n.d.a., 
see also Fraccaroli et al 2018). This conception, then, entails that if the ECB has 
forfeited the people’s trust through its actions, the people retains the ‘reserve’ power of 
naming new rulers or recreating the regime (Locke 1988: 428). 
The possibility of a negative judgement appears to introduce the possibility of 
evaluating the democratic legitimacy of any political decision and as such, democracy 
could potentially become an active force in deciding in the conflict between the letter 
and telos of the law. At best, however, surveys of public trust provide a measure of 
popular satisfaction but cannot provide explicit political authorisation. Even measured 
popular distrust (as was the case in Eurobarometer surveys between November 2011 
and November 201823) is subject to the politics of interpretation and is difficult to 
employ as either affirmation or rejection of particular acts or of the institution itself. 
Similarly, the EP’s role as a political representative of the peoples depends on the 
 
 
23 Survey available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/chartType/line
Chart//themeKy/9/groupKy/27/savFile/194 [accessed 7 May 2019]. 
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peoples actually seeing it in that way; which there, at present, is little evidence to 
suggest. Furthermore, the corollary of the notion of public opinion as acclamation is 
the fact “[t]hat no special will is perceivably expressed simply signifies the enduring 
consent to the existing constitution” (Schmitt 2008: 132). Thus, in the absence of an 
effective expression of dissent, the ECB’s interpretation of its mandate must be 
considered legitimate. The democratic legitimacy of the ECB, whether in normal or 
extraordinary circumstances, rests on the people deciding through their passivity. The absence 
of (successful) revolt becomes a sign of consent (a variant of this argument is found in 
Genovese et al 2016).  
This conception, of course, offers only a thin understanding of democracy as 
an active force. It sees governmental acts as deriving their legitimacy from a 
“comfortably unmobilised political climate” (Wallace and Smith 1995: 145). Its force 
in terms of reorganising governmental practice, however, is potentially radical. As long 
as they do not manifest their discontent effectively, the peoples can be understood to 
have decided in favour of practices that depart from the letter of the law (this notion is 
discussed in more detail in chapter 6). But if the absence of revolt is interpreted as 
implied consent, this entails a radical departure from constrained democracy. 
Democracy becomes, however absurdly, unlimited through its potentiality for 
authorising silently. Democracy becomes an active authorising force, but only through 
its passivity. 
 
Conclusion  
When does the rule of law become so rigid that law prevents, rather than facilitates, 
the realisation of social objectives? When does technocracy pass from being rule by 
technical knowledge and established procedures in the general interest to becoming 
instead an unaccountable power exercised by unelected leaders for opaque purposes? 
When is democracy so hollowed out that what remains is only an empty shell? While 
this chapter has not addressed such questions directly, the discussion of the rule of law, 
technocracy and democracy in this chapter highlights that despite complementarities, 
supposed or real, there are important tensions and contradictions between the three 
dimensions of the constitutional imaginary and institutional construction of the 
Eurozone. While it seeks the elimination of politics in the government of money 
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through law and technocracy, it cannot but reintroduce it through the tensions it 
creates. The form in which politics re-emerges, then, becomes the crucial question. 
Democratic legitimation by silence is a problematic notion and it reflects that 
democratic politics as an active governmental force sits uneasily with a constitutional 
structure based on the rule of law and technocratic authority. While democracy is 
necessary as a foundational authority- and legitimacy-bestowing power, it is unwanted 
as an active governing force. The contradictions between the rule of law and 
technocracy discussed in this chapter nevertheless mean that the political and 
constitutional meaning of the people cannot be exhausted in the constituent moment. 
However, if representative institutions, such as the European Parliament, were 
empowered to effectively sanction legally ambiguous ECB acts, they would be able to 
override the expressed political will of the Member State peoples in the constituent 
moment. It would become endowed with the creative power of democratic sovereignty. 
Several proposals to this effect have emerged during the Eurocrisis (see chapter 7). 
What they share is that they point beyond the current constitutional structure of the 
EMU as a political order without a sovereign. Overcoming the contradictions inherent 
in the Eurozone’s constitutional order may, in other words, both challenge the existing 
constitutional imaginary and demand a reconfiguration of the political relationship 
between the peoples, Member States and the Union. The manifestations of such 
contradictions as well as the question of how they point beyond the existing 
constitutional structure, are the subjects of the next two chapters.
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Chapter 6 
The Emergency Politics of the ECB 
 
 
Introduction  
Sovereign representation, whether partial or absolute, embodies a promise to honour 
the original contract. This, in turn, entails that the sovereign representative must act 
on its own interpretation of this promise. The ECB did this with its emergency politics 
during the Eurozone Crisis. In doing so, it played an extraordinary role in managing 
the Crisis and is often credited with having ‘saved the euro’; in particular through 
unconventional monetary policies such as the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) 
and Quantitative Easing (QE) programmes (launched respectively in 2012 and 2015). 
In addition to these measures, the ECB was involved in a number of unconventional 
uses of conventional monetary policies (e.g., negative interest rates and loosening 
collateral requirements); it played a crucial role in formulating economic policy 
conditionality in the Troika and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) along with 
the Commission and the IMF; it has overtly and covertly threatened Member State 
governments (e.g., in ‘secret letters’ to heads of governments); and it played a highly 
controversial role in the Greek crisis of 2015. As a result of its activities during the 
Crisis, furthermore, the size of its balance sheet, a rough indication of its involvement 
in the Eurozone economy, more than tripled between 2007 and 2018.1 In short, the 
ECB’s emergency politics during the Crisis was both qualitatively and quantitatively 
extensive.  
 The question, then, is: why did the ECB become such an important actor 
during the Crisis? How does this role relate to its constitutional authority and 
independence? One aspect of the answer to these questions is derived from the nature 
of its governmental activity and of the crisis itself: the ECB, like other central banks, 
played a crucial role in the Crisis because it was a crisis of money, banking and finance. 
The ECB’s technocratic expertise within this sphere of policymaking made it, 
 
 
1 See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/annual/balance/html/index.en.html [accessed 9 December 
2019].  
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supposedly, well-placed to identify relevant policy measures. This aspect of the ECB 
role in the crisis, however, does not differentiate it from other major central banks. 
During the Great Recession, central banking became ‘the only game in town’ across 
the world (see, e.g., Bini Smaghi 2014; El-Erian 2016). In the Eurozone, this situation 
may have raised concerns about adequate political oversight and democratic 
accountability that other central banks did not face to the same extent. This aspect of 
the ECB’s role in the Crisis, however, does not fundamentally challenge the 
constitutional construction of the EMU as outlined in chapters 4 and 5. If there was a 
problem of democratic legitimacy associated with the ECB’s unconventional uses of 
conventional monetary policies – its ‘ordinary’ emergency policies, so to speak – it was 
the product of an already existing democratic deficit in the EMU’s institutional 
structure. As such, it does not raise additional problems in terms of the constitutional 
position of the ECB.  
The ECB’s emergency politics, however, went beyond this. In addressing the 
Crisis, the ECB took on the role of a ‘constitutional guardian.’ What it protected, 
however, was not the letter of the constitution (the Treaties) but the very existence of 
the Eurozone. It acted, in other words, not only in the name of price stability, but in 
the name of the general political stability of the Eurozone, its governmental order and 
governing ideology.  
Constitutional guardianship entails, by definition, a conservative element: the 
constitutional order is to be protected. The question is how the constitution is 
understood. The potential conflict between the written law of the constitution and its 
telos (discussed in chapter 5) means that there may be an inherent ambiguity as to what 
the ‘essence’ of the constitution is. Constitutional guardianship therefore entails a 
decision not only on safeguarding the constitution but also its meaning. This means 
that the conservation of the constitution may demand its transformation in some 
important respect; conservation through transformation, as it were. This is precisely 
what the ECB’s constitutional guardianship entailed.  
The ECB’s actions to preserve the euro follow logically from its position as a 
sovereign representative of the peoples of the Eurozone. The euro is based on the 
expression of political will for the euro. Representing the will of the European peoples 
therefore entails the obligation of protecting the product of this will. The expression of 
the will of the peoples in the Treaties, however, is not confined to the existence of the 
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euro but includes, as highlighted in chapter 5, a number of other obligations. Some of 
these may be in conflict with the technocratic interpretation of the necessities 
associated with preserving the euro in an existential crisis. As a result, the ECB may 
confront the choice between honouring two equally valid but competing obligations, 
both stemming from the same original expression of political will. The existential crisis 
forces a decision.2 
This chapter discusses two significant manifestations of emergency politics by 
the ECB and how they relate to the contradictions inherent in the ECB’s foundation 
of authority: the ECB’s OMT decision and its involvement in the Greek crisis. These 
two instances of ECB emergency politics highlight the contradictions between the rule 
of law, technocracy and democracy. At the same time they highlight how these 
contradictions reintroduced the problem of politics in relation to the monetary order 
in a double sense: with respect to efforts at reforming the Eurozone’s governmental 
framework, and with respect to the relationship between democracy at the Member 
State level and the governmental necessities of the euro. Before turning to how the 
ECB’s actions in the two cases challenged the existing constitutional order and 
reopened the problem of politics (discussed in more detail in chapter 7), the first section 
outlines in conceptual terms the particular form of emergency politics that the ECB 
engaged in, namely constitutional guardianship. 
In the original EMU construction, as highlighted in chapter 5, rules and 
institutions were supposed to be mutually reinforcing. Government in accordance with 
technocratic knowledge was to fill the inevitable gaps in the rules, but the general telos 
of the constitutional construction as a whole was supposed to be reinforced, not 
threatened by, a set of rules and prohibitions. During the Crisis, however, emphasis 
was systematically skewed towards an ‘institutional approach’ to Eurozone governance 
in justificatory discourses. With this shift of emphasis, the importance of rules was 
 
 
2 ‘Existential crisis’ is not an objective description of a set of events (see White 2015, forthcoming). When 
it comes to socio-economic phenomena, a crisis is to a large extent a matter of perspective and for 
some it will appear more critical than for others. Naming something an ‘existential crisis’ is, 
accordingly, to be understood as a way of painting a situation as requiring and justifying 
extraordinary actions by a certain (set of) actor(s). Schmitt (2005) famously defined sovereignty 
precisely in relation to the ability to ‘decide on the exception,’ since the ability to do so effectively 
entails the privilege of defining what the norm is. According to Schmitt, then, the relevance of 
emergency political action is not limited to the exceptional moment: it defines both the nature of 
sovereign authority in the political community as well as its basic norms and values.  
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downplayed in favour of technocratic discretion. This challenges a central tenet of the 
Eurozone’s constitutional order, namely the law as a protection not only of the ECB’s 
independence from politics, but also as a protection of society against the arbitrary 
exercise of powers by the ECB. The turn to institutional discretion at the same time 
raises the stakes of democratic accountability and control of the ECB. But the question 
is whether democratic accountability and control can be strengthened meaningfully 
without threatening the continued existences of the peoples as separate political 
subjects.  
 
Constitutional Guardianship and the ECB 
At the height of the Eurozone Crisis in 2012, yields on Eurozone Member States’ 
government debt were diverging to the extent that the continued existence of the euro 
was perceived to be in jeopardy. Extant extraordinary measures by Union institutions 
and Member States had not done enough to assuage market fears and the ECB’s use 
of both conventional and unconventional monetary measures had had only modest 
effects (see Mody and Nedeljkovic 2018). The Eurozone was in an ‘existential crisis’ 
and while the Eurozone’s political leaders appeared “manifestly incapable of mastering 
events, something had to be done … That something was a forceful intervention by 
ECB President Mario Draghi” (Baldwin et al 2015: 11).  
The symbolic significance of Draghi’s (2012) promise to do “whatever it takes 
to preserve the euro” can hardly be exaggerated. By announcing that decisive action 
would be taken – that decisive action being the OMT programme – Draghi was widely 
understood to have saved the euro and the continued existence and integrity of the 
Eurozone. A 2015 report by sixteen prominent European economists reflected the 
general consensus when it hailed Draghi’s promise as the turning point in the crisis. It 
switched “markets from the ‘doom is inevitable’ expectations back to the old ‘we will 
get through this thing’ expectations” (Baldwin et al 2015: 11). While it did not solve 
the Crisis, it provided an indication that the euro’s collapse would be averted. It 
indicated, in Draghi’s (Draghi and Constâncio 2012a) words, that “a fully effective 
backstop to avoid destructive scenarios” would be implemented. It would bring about 
the calm necessary for other crisis measures to be put to work. To Jürgen Habermas 
(2015) this meant that all European citizens owe Draghi “a debt of gratitude for 
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uttering a single sentence that saved them from the disastrous consequences of the 
threat of an immediate collapse of their currency.”  
The ECB, in other words, is widely considered to have acted as the guardian 
of the currency. But its Hüter der Währung-role differed somewhat from that associated 
with the Bundesbank in the German context. Whereas the Bundesbank’s ‘Hüterschaft’ 
consisted in its ordinary vigilance against the demands of government and others in the 
eternal fight against inflation, the ECB’s guardianship was extraordinary; it was an 
emergency political guardianship. The Bundesbank’s guardianship of the currency, 
furthermore, was a product of its ability to maintain price stability. In the context of 
the Eurozone Crisis, this order was reversed: the currency had to be saved first if the 
mandate of price stability was to remain meaningful in the future. It was not price 
stability but the very preservation of the currency that was the primary objective of 
central bank intervention.  
Despite these differences, there is nevertheless, at least at a symbolic level, a 
connection between the Bundesbank’s Hüterschaft and the ECB’s role in the Eurozone 
Crisis. Through the mythical link between price stability and general political stability, 
the Bundesbank presented itself as a general guardian of the post-war German 
(economic) constitutional order; on a par with the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BverfG), 
one might add. In saving the euro, the ECB performs a similar function by averting 
the ‘catastrophic consequences’ of the euro’s collapse. But whereas this role was a 
product of the mythical construction of the Bundesbank’s authority, the ECB’s role as 
the guardian of the constitution is more explicit: without the euro, a fundamental 
constitutional link between the peoples and states of the Eurozone disappears. Without 
the euro, the common sovereign representation of the peoples of Europe in the 
institution of the ECB breaks down. Along with it, a whole series of constitutional 
constraints that are derived from this basic constitutional construction would collapse. 
The transnational constitutionalisation of central bank independence as a solution to 
the problem politics in relation to money that the euro entails would evaporate.  
Whether the ECB’s actions during the Crisis – including its announcement of 
the OMT programme and involvement in the Greek crisis – preserved or transformed 
its constitutional mandate and with it the Eurozone’s constitution, is a point of 
significant controversy. Perhaps more than anything, this controversy highlights a 
crucial dimension or difficulty of constitutional guardianship: it may not so much 
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protect the constitution as define its essence. But in defining its essence, it may 
transform central aspects of the existing constitution if considered necessary for the 
protection or realisation of this essence. As such, Schmitt argued, the question of the 
guardian of the constitution is inescapably political. While a question of the highest 
political importance, Schmitt considered constitutional guardianship to be best 
performed by an office beyond the control of the traditional political authorities of 
government and parliament. Like the independent central bank according to its 
theory, the guardian needed to be beyond the ordinary squabble of politics with its 
intrigues, power struggles and horse trading. It “fundamental proposition [was] 
‘independence’” (Schmitt 2015b: 162).3  
The guardian’s independence, in turn, needed to be based on its ability to 
“connect itself immediately with [the] unified will of the … people and to act, on that 
basis, as the guardian and preserver of the constitutional unity and wholeness of the … people” 
(ibid: 173, emphasis added). The guardian must, in other words, be an organic 
representative of the people and its task is above all the protection of the continued 
unity of that people. 
The Schmittian notion of the guardian of the constitution highlights that the 
existential crisis demands decisions and actions that are inherently political because 
they involve the decision on the essence of the constitution as well as on the means 
necessary to defend it. Regardless of what institution makes such decisions, it will act 
as a political power. It settles a question of legal ambiguity and/or fundamental 
disagreement over the meaning of a constitutional norm, thereby producing new law 
by redefining the meaning of clauses or redefining the hierarchy of norms. The organ 
that puts “the disputed content of a statute beyond doubt … acts as a legislator. And if 
it puts beyond doubt the ambiguous content of a constitutional statute it acts as a 
constitutional legislator” (Schmitt 2015a: 117).4  
 
 
3 In this respect, Schmitt’s conception of the constitutional guardian resembles his conception of the 
dictator, who must also be “independent of the influence of any other institution” and “able to issue 
orders and to execute them immediately” (Schmitt 2014: 4). The evaluation of such actions, in turn, 
can only be “related to the question whether the means, in a very technical sense, are appropriate 
or not – that is, whether they have achieved their goal.” Thus, under dictatorship, “only the goal 
governs” and it is “freed from restrictions imposed by the law and is only determined by the need to 
create a concrete situation” (Schmitt 2014: 8).  
4 To Schmitt, the question of constitutional guardianship could not be a purely legal question. Even if 
such a question were settled by a court, the decision would not be legal but political. For Schmitt, 
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The inescapable ambiguity of the legal order demands, according to Schmitt 
(ibid: 118), political authority for the “authoritative removal of doubt” concerning 
competing interpretations of the law or measures necessary to protect it. Political 
authority is thus needed to fill legal gaps, iron out constitutional kinks, and extend the 
application of the constitution to situations unfamiliar to or unpredicted by the law. 
This reflects that while the constitution takes legal form, this is only its language. Form 
should not blind to essence and in essence the constitution is “a political entity” and 
must find “a genuinely political guardian” (Schmitt 2015c: 226). To Schmitt, then, the 
political task of guarding the constitution belongs to the highest representative of the 
political community, the office that represents its political unity.5  
The open-endedness of Schmitt’s conception of the guardian of the constitution 
was unacceptable to Kelsen, as was the notion of the essence of the constitution being 
defined in the emergency situation. According to Kelsen, all political acts, even 
emergency degrees, are legal acts and there is nothing ‘outside’ the constitution. The 
relevant question is only of determining the relative position of a concrete act in 
relation to the constitution and “Guarantees of the constitution are therefore … 
nothing but means for the prevention of unconstitutional [legal acts]” (Kelsen 2015a: 
30). A political act, whether executive or legislative, can, in turn, be unconstitutional if 
it is enacted without due regard to constitutional procedure and/or if it violates the 
 
 
the narrow and formal evaluation of the legality of a particular act was largely irrelevant for the 
question of constitutional guardianship: the “[f]ormalist constitutional law [of Kelsen] stops where 
the real problem begins” (Schmitt 2015a: 112). The relevant question concerned, rather, conflicts in 
which “the case is unclear and doubtful, be it for reasons of fact, or be it by virtue of the necessary 
incompleteness and vagueness of every written constitution” (ibid: 101). In such cases, i.e., when the 
constitutional principle in question is subject to legitimate contestation and differing interpretations 
or if constitutional provisions are contradictory, “the question is not a ‘purely legal question’ and the 
decision of the court is something other than a judge’s decision” (ibid.). “[T]he judge will find himself 
in a position to take political measures or to prevent them, and to become politically active in a way 
that will make him a powerful political factor” (ibid: 102). 
5 While the Weimar Constitution made the emergency political power of the President explicit, the 
important issue is not whether the power is legally enshrined but rather that the constitution needs 
unified political authority in order to address fundamental existential threats. The need for this form 
of unity in the face of “the economic and financial state of exception” (Schmitt 2015b: 150, emphasis added) 
is greatest in pluralistic political systems, i.e., political systems based on a plurality of competing 
political forces with none able “to establish itself as the decisive factor in the formation of the will of 
the state.” That is, unified guardianship of the constitution is primarily necessary in a situation in 
which a plurality of powers prevents decisive and unified action in the state of exception, whether 
due to procedural obstacles or internal disagreement. The ordinary political system itself can thereby 
turn a difficult situation into an existential threat to the constitutional order. As such, a dictatorial 
office (in the technical sense of the term) is necessary, according to Schmitt. 
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fundamental norms specified in the constitution. But while norms may be threatened 
in an emergency situation, they are independent of it, not defined by it. It is, rather, 
the existing norms that determine whether emergency decrees are legal: they must 
conform to the law of the constitution and are therefore subject to legal evaluation (see 
also Kennedy 2011: 287). If this were not the case, they would simply be illegitimate 
usurpations of power.  
 Kelsen’s conception of the constitution as a comprehensive legal order 
regulating all political acts entails that guardianship of the constitution “must not be 
conferred upon one of the organs whose acts are to be subjected to control” (Kelsen 
2015b: 175). The guardian of the constitution must, in other words, not be in the hands 
of legislative or executive powers but located in a specialised organ dedicated to 
deciding “on the legality of all acts immediate to the constitution” (Kelsen 2015a: 51). 
That is, the constitution can only be protected by vesting the power of constitutional 
guardianship in the hands of an independent constitutional court in the form of judicial 
review.  
 
The OMT and the Ambiguity of the Law 
The conflict between Schmitt’s and Kelsen’s visions of constitutional guardianship 
manifested itself with particular force in the constitutional complaint against the OMT 
programme in the Gauweiler case at the German Constitutional Court (BverfG) and, 
through referral, the European Court of Justice (ECJ). However, evaluating whether 
the OMT programme was legal or not, and whether the ECJ was right or wrong to 
confirm its legality, is not my purpose here. Such an exercise would to a significant 
extent miss the point of the OMT controversy. What the controversy revealed was a 
tension between the letter of EMU law and its telos. In the existential crisis, the ECB’s 
mandate itself turned out to be ambiguous because it demanded fidelity both to the 
letter of the law and to the peoples’ expressed constituent will for the euro. In so far as 
the former fidelity principle constituted a threat to the latter, the ECB was forced to 
make a decision. This decision, in turn, could only be political as it concerned the very 
meaning and hierarchy of constitutional norms. The emergency situation thereby 
reopened the problem of politics in relation to the monetary order, and the wider economic 
governmental order associated with it, in a foundational sense. The constitutional 
dispute nevertheless highlights a number of the contentious issues associated with the 
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OMT programme and can serve as a fruitful avenue into understanding the emergency 
political nature of the measure.  
 
The ECB’s Usurpation of Powers 
The BverfG considers itself as, and was created with inspiration from, the Kelsenian 
conception of the guardian of the constitution (see e.g., Stone Sweet 2002; Collings 
2015). In the Gauweiler case, this was clear in its approach to the OMT programme (see 
Borger 2019). By announcing it, the BverfG worried that the ECB had (in the manner 
of the Schmittian guardian) redefined the meaning of some of the core norms of the 
EMU constitution. If that were the case, the ECB would have violated the German 
constitution and the continued sovereignty of the German people because it had 
exercised powers not delegated to it and/or abrogated norms established through the 
original expression of sovereign will in the law of the Treaties. The OMT programme, 
the claimants argued and the BverfG appeared to agree, amounted to a “structurally 
significant transgression” of the ECB’s mandate and as such it might constitute “a 
unilateral usurpation of powers” (BverfG 2014: 3 (b)). By introducing a ‘fully effective 
backstop’ in the sovereign bonds market, the ECB had effectively become a lender of 
last resort to the Member State governments, thus flouting one of the fundamental 
norms of the EMU constitution, namely the no monetary financing clause of art. 123 
TFEU. In doing so, furthermore, it had violated the constitutionally established 
procedure for altering the constitutional order. The ECB, in other words, had acted 
unconstitutionally and violated the division of competences between the Member 
States and the Union by extending its own competences and suspending the EMU’s 
foundational legal framework. 
The OMT programme worked through a guarantee that the ECB would step 
in to buy potentially unlimited amounts of sovereign bonds of certain Member States 
in secondary markets. The bonds in question were those of Member States who had 
signed up to a bailout programme under the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) or ESM and whose bond yields had soared as a consequence of the Crisis (ECB 
2012). The ECB thereby attached conditionality requirements to the programme but 
so long as a Member State showed a willingness to abide by the programmes, the ECB 
would ensure that the market for the bonds in question would not dry up. The ECB 
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thereby became a “debt buyer-of-last-resort” (Baldwin et al 2015: 11) or, simply, a 
lender of last resort to the Member States of the Eurozone (De Grauwe 2013).  
The ECB did not promise to buy the bonds directly from the Member States 
in question (i.e., on the primary market). This would have been in blatant violation of 
the no-monetary-financing clause (art. 123 TFEU). Despite never actually being 
activated, the OMT programme nevertheless affected the workings of the primary 
market of government bonds through its influence on investors’ expectations. Its very 
inclusion in the arsenal of monetary policy weapons was enough to assuage market 
fears. The ECB thereby employed its powers to intervene in government bonds 
markets and affect the market price of sovereign debt. Its promise to employ public 
power to provide a fully effective last resort backstop rendered the bonds in question a 
markedly less risky proposition for investors and it precipitated a fall in yields and 
ensured a functioning market for the bonds in question.  
 
Suspending Market Discipline  
One of the crucial issues in the Gauweiler case was whether the ECB had a right to 
interfere in and suspend the market’s free pricing of Eurozone government debt in this 
way. The claimants’ argument in this regard rested on a traditional, albeit somewhat 
dogmatic, understanding of the EMU constitution. According to this perspective, one 
of the crucial aspects of the EMU was its legal reinforcement of market discipline on 
Member State economic policies. Within such a (ordo/neoliberal) disciplinary regime, 
the market is seen as providing a mechanism for evaluating most effectively and 
authentically the true value and risk-profile of any given (financial) product or activity. 
When the market price concerns government debt, the market evaluation concerns the 
general orientation of government policy and the underlying structural position of the 
economy in question (competitiveness, default risk, growth potential, etc.). In short, the 
evaluation concerns the general ‘soundness’ of a government’s budgetary position and 
economic policies. A government that ignores the market’s evaluation risks losing 
credibility, its ability to finance itself, as well as its ability to retain and attract economic 
activity and investment. The legal framework of the EMU, including constraints on 
the ECB’s powers such as the no monetary financing clause, then, was supposed to 
signal to markets as well as Member State governments that there were no alternatives 
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to market discipline: governments would not be able to escape market discipline 
through implicit guarantees associated with euro-membership.  
Market discipline is central to the process of European market integration in 
general and the governmental order of the EMU. As a 2007 ECB working paper 
argues: 
financial integration … is instrumental for financial markets to provide an accurate 
assessment of the risk-return profile of government bonds. Accurate asset pricing 
implies that governments pursuing unsound fiscal policies will be forced to offer higher yields to 
attract risk-averse investors, in order to compensate them for the higher default risk. 
Via this channel, progress in financial integration will ultimately reinforce any 
market-driven disciplinary effect (Magnanelli and Wolswijk 2007: 7, emphasis 
added). 
Under perfect market discipline, government policy is governed by the impersonal and 
‘objective’ mechanism of the market because “[g]overnments have to take into account 
these [potentially] higher financing costs when planning their fiscal policies. Ceteris 
paribus, market discipline provides a deterrent against unsound fiscal policies, and thus 
supports fiscal discipline” (ibid: 10).6 Employing public power to interfere with such 
market pricing can therefore only lead to distortions, inefficiencies and moral hazard. 
In order for market discipline to function adequately certain constraints on the 
exercise of public authority need to be in place to prevent interventions in the market 
pricing of public debt in accordance with political priorities. In the EMU, this is 
reflected in the fiscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which, in line with 
the ordoliberal notion of the economic constitution, are part of the legal framework 
intended to help realise the competitive free market order. The same is true of legal 
prohibitions such as the no bailout-clause (art. 125 TFEU) and the no monetary 
financing-clause (art. 123 TFEU). These serve not only to prohibit the practices in 
question, but also to shape expectations of market actors by conveying the message 
that governments failing to correct unsound fiscal practices will not be saved the Union 
 
 
6 The question of market discipline in relation to fiscal soundness was explicitly addressed in debates 
within the Delors Committee. See, for instance, Baer, G. “Economic Union: implications of a 
monetary union,” HAEU, TPS-184; Committee for the Study of  Economic and Monetary Union 
(CSEMU), “II. How to define the final stage of  economic and monetary union,” p. 2, 31 January 
1989, draft of  chapter 2 of  Delors Report, HAEU, TPS-196; Lamfalussy, A. “The need for co-
ordination of  fiscal policies in a European Economic and Monetary Union,” 31 January 1989. 
HAEU, TPS-196; Borio, C.E.V. “Macro-co-ordination of  fiscal policies in an economic and 
monetary union in Europe,” appendix II, p. 13, 1 February 1989. HAEU, TPS-196. 
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or the other Member States. For market discipline to function, the Member States have 
to remain fully and individually responsible for their fiscal positions. They must, in 
other words, retain sovereign powers within this sphere. Surveillance and punishment 
procedures such as the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) signal to markets that the 
community is serious about individual responsibility, thus encouraging markets to 
evaluate government debt individually rather than on the basis of an assumption of 
solidarity, which would in any case, according to this perspective, only be able to 
provide temporary relief.7  
Whether or not market discipline reinforced by rules functioned according to 
theory in the years preceding the Eurozone Crisis is to a certain extent irrelevant. What 
is clear is that the market’s pricing of Eurozone government bonds generally converged 
in the years leading up to and following the euro’s introduction. With the onset of the 
Eurozone Crisis in 2009-10, however, this changed and yield spreads on Eurozone 
government bonds increased to the point where the solvency of certain Member States 
was threatened by the increased refinancing costs that this entailed. The ‘truth’ that 
the market spoke was, in other words, that the fiscal position of certain Member States 
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain in particular) rendered them on the brink 
of bankruptcy and, in so far as a redenomination risk was factored into the higher 
yields, exit from the euro. However, from the perspective of preserving the integrity of 
the euro, this ‘truth’ was unbearable. Remaining true to the letter and spirit of the 
original EMU legal framework was seen as a threat to the very existence of the EMU. 
In order to safeguard the euro, the ECB had to step in to suspend the market pricing of 
 
 
7 The normative basis of this economic constitution rests on the attempt to avoid ‘moral hazard,’ or ‘the 
overexploitation of the commons’ of a shared currency. At the same time, it reflects the notion of 
making democratic politics more authentic through, for instance, the removal of access to the ‘Siren 
song’ of the printing press, whereby budget policy would be constrained by the requirement of being 
fully financed. This, in turn, would have the effect of forcing the state’s politics to become 
‘reasonable’ and ‘economical’ by forcing it, like the household, to ‘live within its means’: spending 
would have to be financed exclusively through taxes and borrowing on market terms. There would 
be no lender of last resort when market liquidity dried up. The legal framework was thereby intended 
to reinforce the discipline of the market. This conception of what the EMU’s fiscal framework does 
still resonates in EU policy-circles. As Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis put it in the context of the 
conflict between the Commission and the Italian government over the proposed Italian budget in 
late 2018: “Breaking rules can be tempting on a first look. It can provide the illusion of breaking free 
… But, at some point, the debt weights [sic] too heavy and you end up having no freedom at all” 
(The Guardian 2018, 23 October). As such, the Commission’s tough stance on the budget should not 
be seen as an act of hostility but of help; the Commission is only seeking to prevent what would 
otherwise be inevitable. 
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government debt by promising to act as a lender of last resort with the OMT 
programme and, later, with the public sector dimension of the QE programme.  
The ECB justified its right to act as the lender of last resort to governments by 
introducing a new approach to governing. Or, rather, the ECB emphasised the 
technocratic dimension of its mandate in order to justify this role. This was clear 
already in Draghi’s (2012) ‘whatever it takes’-speech. Here Draghi underlined that the 
problem was the “premia that are being charged on sovereign states borrowings,” i.e., 
the market’s pricing of government debt. While such prices might, he concedes, be 
justified on the basis of economic fundamentals (the regime of market discipline 
assumes that they are), Draghi claims that they are not. In terms of economic 
fundamentals, he argues, “the euro area has done either like or better than US or 
Japan.” And even in the exposed Member States, “progress in undertaking deficit 
control, structural reforms (sic) has been remarkable.” In other words, the increasing 
yield spreads are, in the ECB’s analysis, unfounded. The market’s evaluation of the 
general economic policy position of the Member States was not reflecting an 
underlying truth. What was at stake, rather, was a misperception of the “risk of 
convertibility” – i.e. the market’s evaluation of the potential reversibility of the euro. 
But since “the euro is irreversible,” this convertibility-premium is a mistake of the 
market in need of correcting.8  
What Draghi did with the ‘whatever it takes’-promise was to substitute the 
market’s evaluation of the economic situation of the Member States with the ECB’s 
own evaluation of their progress as the basis for governmental action. Through this 
substitution of market evaluation with a technocratic evaluation, the OMT is presented 
as a technical matter intended merely to correct a market misperception that hampers, 
 
 
8 Draghi presents the OMT programme as one ‘leg’ of the general Eurozone Crisis response (Draghi 
and Constâncio 2012a). The other ‘leg’ is composed of the economic policies of the Member States. 
This introduces an important contradiction. One the one hand the risk premia are based on 
“unfounded fears” (Draghi 2012; Draghi and Constâncio 2012a). On the other hand, in the August 
press conference, Draghi (Draghi and Constâncio 2012b) claimed that “in order to create the 
fundamental conditions for such risk premia to disappear, policy-makers in the euro area need to 
push ahead with fiscal consolidation, structural reform and European institution-building.” The risk 
premia are thus, paradoxically, artificial and irrational to the extent that the threaten the survival of 
the euro but real and rational to the extent that they demand structural reforms and austerity in the 
Member States in question.  
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in a purely technical sense, the smooth functioning of “monetary policy transmission 
and the singleness of the monetary policy [of the ECB]” (ECB 2012). 
The ECB’s shift to a technocratic evaluation of the sustainability of government 
debt9 was addressed in the Gauweiler case (and again in the Weiss case concerning the 
ECB’s QE programme). The claimants and the BverfG challenged the ECB’s right to 
interfere with the “price formation [Preisbildung] on the market.”10 In its preliminary 
reference, the BverfG thus argued that  
Spreads always only result from the market participants’ expectations and are, 
regardless of their rationality, essential for market-based pricing. To single out and 
neutralise supposedly identifiable individual causes would be tantamount to an 
arbitrary interference with market activity.11 
The ECJ’s response to this challenge is notable in that it does not defend the 
OMT programme as being unrelated to the question of price formation in the market. 
It justifies, rather, the ECB’s right to interfere on the basis of is technical assessment of 
the concrete situation, thereby affirming the ECB’s shift towards the technocratic 
evaluation of government debt. The ECJ argues that since the ECB “is required, when 
it prepares and implements an open market operations programme [like the OMT], 
to make choices of a technical nature and to undertake forecasts and complex 
assessments, it must be allowed … a broad discretion.”12 As such, unless “a manifest 
error of assessment”13 can be shown, one must accept the ECB’s expert opinion as 
valid. That its “reasoned analysis has been subject to challenge does not, in itself, suffice 
to call that conclusion into question” because “in view of the [ECB’s] broad discretion, 
nothing more can be required of the [ECB] apart from that it use its economic 
expertise and the necessary technical means at its disposal to carry out that analysis 
 
 
9 This is not to say that the ECB has entirely abandoned references to market discipline and EMU rules. 
The ECB, for instance, insists, somewhat contradictorily, that neither the OMT nor the QE 
programme is intended to suspend the market formation of prices. Article 4(1) of its Decision 
2015/774 on the QE programme, for instance, explicitly states that “To permit the formation of a 
market price for eligible securities, no purchases shall be permitted in a newly issued or tapped 
security.” When pressed on the length of the so-called ‘blackout period,’ the ECB noted “that the 
length of the period is measured in days rather than weeks” (ECJ Judgement of 11 December 2018 
(C-493/17) in Weiss: 115).  
10 BverfG, Order of the Second Senate of 14 January 2014 (preliminary reference) - 2 BvR 2728/13 – 
in Gauwiler v Deutscher Bundestag: 87(cc), also 90, 92. 
11 BverfG, Gauwiler 2014: 98. 
12 ECJ, Judgment of 16 June 2015 (C-62/14) in Gauweiler v Deutscher Bundestag: 68. 
13 ECJ, Gauweiler: 74; see ECJ, Weiss: 24. 
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with all care and accuracy.”14 According to the ECJ, then, the ECB has a right to pass 
(technocratic) judgement on the truth of the market’s pricing of government debt and 
act to correct it in accordance with its own interpretation and evaluation of the 
situation.  
 
The Essence of the EMU Constitution 
The notion of the ECB’s ‘broad discretion’ in this regard has become a crucial element 
in the ECB’s self-conception and governing philosophy (see ECB 2015a, 2017c; Draghi 
2015b; Cœuré 2015; Praet 2015; Mersch 2016, 2017a; Gren 2018). In discussing this 
approach, Draghi (see, e.g., 2015c, 2016a, 2019a) labels it an ‘institutions-based’ rather 
than ‘rules-based’ approach to governing and argues that the ECB’s successful 
handling of the Crisis was the result of its moving “from a rules-based system to an 
institutions-based monetary integration system” (Draghi 2016b). This, he argues 
(Draghi 2019a), provided a “greater flexibility of action” during the Crisis.  
The crucial critique that Draghi (2019a, see also 2015c) advances of the EMU’s 
original “rules-based approach” to fiscal policy and economic coordination is that it 
failed to achieve the stability-oriented government policies that is was supposed to. 
Member States violated the rules and the markets neither differentiated adequately 
between the government debt of different Member States nor punished unsustainable 
public or private sector finances. Market discipline did not, in other words, work to 
correct economic practices that were ‘unsound.’ It therefore needs to be replaced with, 
or at least supplemented by, a different rationality of government. Sticking to the rules 
when they were not working risked placing the whole economic governmental order 
of the EMU in jeopardy. 
Draghi’s critique emphasises that the existing governmental means of the EMU 
– market discipline reinforced by law – had failed to achieve the ends of stability 
oriented economic policies and financial stability. In line with the discussion in chapter 
5 of the difference between the rule of law and technocracy, Draghi (2019a, emphasis 
in original) argues that this is because  
rules are generally static and require countries to adhere to specific actions, whereas 
institutions are required to achieve prescribed objectives. Rules therefore cannot be 
 
 
14 ECJ, Gauweiler: 75; see also ECJ, Weiss: 91. 
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updated quickly when unforeseen circumstances arise, whereas institutions can be 
dynamic and employ flexibility in their approaches. 
Allowing “discretion and flexibility in the use of our tools,” the institutions-based 
approach reflects the technocratic privileging of the teleological understanding of the 
mandate. The Eurozone must institutionalise technocratic evaluations of everything 
from labour market structures to banking practices as the basis of governmental action. 
This is necessary in order to secure, at a basic level, the survival of the euro but in doing 
so it defines the true essence of the constitution: stability oriented economic policies. 
In the original EMU construction, rules and institutions were supposed to be 
mutually reinforcing. Government in accordance with technocratic knowledge was to 
fill the inevitable gaps in the rules, but the general telos of the constitutional construction 
as a whole was supposed to be reinforced, not threatened by, a set of rules and 
prohibitions. Draghi’s juxtaposition of a rules-based and an institutions-based 
approach to economic and monetary policy, however, reflects the potential tension 
between technocratic government and the rule of law. It reflects, furthermore, the 
difference between having a single sovereign representative within one particular 
sphere of policymaking and the existence of multiple such representatives within 
others. As Draghi (2019a, see also 2015c) highlights: “the EU has thus far employed 
two methods of governance to facilitate cooperation.” Within some spheres, decision-
making authority has been invested in “common institutions with executive power.” 
“In others, executive power remains with national governments, with cooperation 
through common rules, such as the framework for fiscal and structural policies.” 
According to Draghi (2015c), the latter approach proved inadequate during the Crisis, 
thereby creating a demand for a “quantum leap in institutional convergence.”  
The emphasis on technocratic discretion introduces a central role for 
centralised public authority in Eurozone economic governance. The question is what 
this role consists in. As a number of analysts of the Eurozone Crisis have noted, the 
general governmental apparatus of the Eurozone turned to more authoritarian 
enforcements of a certain set of policies through both emergency politics ‘of  last resort’ 
and conditionality requirements of structural adjustments and austerity (Somek 2015; 
Streeck 2015; Wilkinson 2015a, 2019; White 2015, forthcoming). The markets could 
no longer be trusted to engender economic reforms and convergence, meaning that 
coercive public authority ‘had to’ step in in order to ensure the outcomes that were 
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‘supposed to’ have emerged from the Member States’ internalisation of the demands 
of the markets reinforced by law.  
The shift from impersonal market discipline to public intervention and even 
outright coercion in Eurozone governance is evident in a number of ways. In the ECB’s 
OMT and QE programmes the nature of the shift is particularly evident. In the two 
programmes, the ECB has retained for itself the right to withdraw its support for 
specific Member States on the basis not only of their compliance with bailout 
conditionality but also simply on the basis of “the attitude of the Member States 
concerned” (ECJ, Gauweiler: 117, ECJ, Weiss: 135, emphasis added). It is the ECB’s 
evaluation of whether a government is politically dedicated to following a “sound 
budgetary policy” (ECJ, Gauweiler: 117) that determines whether a particular Member 
State may benefit from the support offered through the programmes. If not, the ECB 
retains for itself the right to unleash the forces of the market on the Member State in 
question.15 The emergency politics of the ECB does thus not suspend the applicability 
of the law entirely but works through its selective application (see also White 2015, 
forthcoming). The ECB thereby becomes the ultimate protector of Member State 
public finances, but only as long as Member State governments display the right 
‘attitude.’  
While the means of its realisation may have changed as a result of the ECB’s 
emergency politics, the EMU’s governing economic ideology has not. Rules and 
markets were supposed to ensure the spontaneous and ‘voluntary’ convergence of 
Member State economic policies. Their failure to do so adequately (or non-
catastrophically), however, introduced the necessity of active public interventions. 
 
Necessity, Law and Democratic Authority 
Following the presentation of the OMT programme in a press conferences on 6 
September 2012 (Draghi and Constâncio 2012a), the ECB’s ‘irreversibility claim’ is 
challenged by a journalist: “What gives you the democratic legitimation, the authority 
to say that? Because I have looked it up in the Treaty. It does not say anywhere that it 
 
 
15 Given that this right may conflict with the imperative of preserving the unity of the currency, the 
threat may be empty. It does, however, underline the shift from market to technocratic evaluation 
of governmental practices. 
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is the role of the ECB to decide what kind of currency the European countries have.” 
In other words, is there a democratic basis for the ECB’s substitution of technocratic 
discretion for market discipline and rules in its guardianship of the euro? Draghi does 
not address this question in the press conference but in subsequent public discourses, 
ECB officials have grappled with the answer to it. If the emergency political necessities 
of the Crisis trump the letter of the law, how do they relate to the democratic legitimacy 
of the constitutional order?  
The question of the democratic credentials of the ECB’s emergency politics was 
central to the Gauweiler case. In its proceedings, the BverfG conducted a so-called ultra 
vires review of the OMT programme. The ultra vires review is based on the notion that 
a transfer of sovereign powers from the Member States to the EU cannot at the same 
time involve a transfer to the EU or any of its institutions the competence to decide on 
its own competencies, i.e., Kompetenz-Kompetenz (see also chapter 5). The BverfG’s 
position is based on the notion that since there is no ‘European people’, no European 
demos, as a foundational political subject of the EU (Maastricht and Lisbon decisions; see 
also Weiler 1995, Craig 2011), the EU can only exercise sovereign powers to the extent 
the European peoples, the European demoi, have transferred such powers explicitly in 
the Treaties. The Member State demoi remain the fundamental political subjects, the 
collective constituent legislator, of the EU. And they remain, as discussed in chapter 4, 
in the plural: the peoples of Europe. From this follows, as discussed in chapter 5, that 
when EU institutions exercise sovereign powers, they must do so within the limits of 
the mandate specified by the Treaty and they must not interpret their mandate in an 
manner that violates the basic contract (Craig 2011: 395).  
The BverfG links the question of ultra vires to the constitutional identity of 
Germany as a democratic state:  
[The] substantive content of what is guaranteed by the right to vote is violated only, 
but always so, if this right is in danger of being rendered ineffective in an area that is 
essential for the political self-determination of the people, i.e., if the democratic self-
government of the people … is permanently restricted in such a way that central 
political decisions can no longer be made independently (BverfG, Gauweiler 2014: 19).  
In performing an ultra vires review, the BverfG thus “examines whether the legislative 
instruments of European agencies and institutions remain within the limits of the 
sovereign powers conferred upon them or whether they transgress those limits” 
(BverfG, Gauweiler 2014: 21). Has the ECB as a limited sovereign representative, in 
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other words, overstepped its limits? In Gauweiler the question was whether the OMT 
programme violated the ECB’s ‘democratic naissance,’ the expression of sovereign will 
contained in the original constitutional contract among the peoples of Europe. In the 
absence of a new such contract, the BverfG saw its constitutional guardian role as 
ensuring that acts of the ECB did not challenge the continued existence of the German 
people (and by extension, the European peoples) as the (respective) popular sovereign(s) 
and constituent powers of Germany (and the other Member States) as well as of the 
EU and its institutions. This, in turn, could only be done through a (Kelsenian) 
evaluation of whether the emergency act conformed to the existing law in terms both 
of content and procedure.  
The BverfG’s defence of the German constitutional identity as a democracy 
sees the positive expression of the people’s will as the source of all law. For the people’s 
will to be known, there has to be a specific act expressing it. This contrasts with the 
organic form of representation that the Schmittian guardian of the constitution 
exercises. In the Schmittian conception, it is not necessary for the people to express its 
will positively through formalised procedures. In fact, the people does not need to 
express its will positively at all so long as it does not effectively reject the existing 
constitution or acts that seek to defend it (see Schmitt 2008: 132). In Rousseau’s (2012: 
30) words: “so long as the Sovereign, being free to oppose them, does not do so … the 
agreement of the people [to the orders of rulers] must be presumed from the universal 
silence.” Acts of public authorities can, in other words, be considered expressions of 
the general will as long as there is no open revolt against them. This means that in the 
existential crisis there is an alternative source of law: necessity. When the existence of 
the community (whether of a people or of peoples) is placed in jeopardy, ‘necessity’ and 
the will of the people must logically coincide and necessity becomes “the ultimate 
grounds and very source of law” (Agamben 2005: 26).16 This does not necessarily 
 
 
16 See also Romano (1909: 362 as cited in Agamben 2005: 27): “[necessity] constitutes a true and proper 
source of law … It can be said that necessity is the first and originary source of all law.” The reasoning 
informing this idea is that law as a structing condition of social and political life emerges, at its most 
basic level, from the necessity of establishing the ‘rules of the game,’ without which social and 
political life would be impossible (see also Arendt 1970). This logic, however, feeds into the state of 
exception through the existential threat that it poses to the community. The community’s survival, 
without which its laws are rendered meaningless, thereby becomes the most fundamental law of the 
community itself.  
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bypass the notion that all law is derived from the will of the people(s), but it is an implied 
will for survival rather than a positive expression. As such, it is also more open-ended 
and subject to the discretion and interpretation of the organ that acts as the guardian 
of the constitution in the emergency situation.17  
The necessity associated with the emergency situation in the summer of 2012 
and its relationship with the law was central to the Gauweiler case. As the Advocate 
General noted, the situation was “regarded as exceptional” (Cruz Villalón 2015: 3) and 
raised questions about “whether the euro could survive” (ibid.) and the “possible 
disintegration of the euro area” (ibid: 7). Given such exceptional circumstances, the 
ECJ was “confronted with the difficulties which extraordinary circumstances have long 
presented for public law” (ibid.). In the OMT case, the difficulty concerned the exact 
nature and limits of “the powers of the ECB” (ibid.).  
The Advocate General summarised two positions in this regard. The ECB’s 
position was that  
the OMT programme is a proper instrument for dealing with exceptional 
circumstances, since, despite its ‘unconventional’ nature and the risks it entails, its 
objective is merely to do what has to be done in order to restore the ECB’s ability to make 
effective use of its monetary policy instruments (Cruz Villalón 2015: 7, emphasis 
added). 
As an extraordinary measure intended to restore the ordinary functioning of the ECB’s 
monetary policy, it should, like the acts of the Schmittian guardian, only be evaluated 
on the basis of its effectiveness.  
On the other hand, the BverfG raised “the question of the limits to which the 
powers of the ECB are subject in exceptional circumstances” (Cruz Villalón 2015: 93), 
thus reflecting the Kelsenian notion that even emergency decrees are subject to legal 
scrutiny. The question of determining the limits was crucial because it was unclear to 
the complainants and the BverfG what was “the real aim of the OMT programme.” 
If the real aim was, simply to restore the functioning of monetary policy, it might be 
acceptable even if it was not entirely legal. Only acts which are “manifestly in violation 
of powers and … highly significant for the allocation of powers” should be considered 
 
 
17 As Schmitt (2008: 131) notes: while “the people are superior to every formation and normative 
framework” they are not an organised entity. This means that “their expressions of will are easily 
mistaken, misinterpreted, or falsified.” The people’s will only exists through interpretation. 
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ultra vires (BverfG, Gauweiler 2014: 24, emphasis added). In the view of the claimants 
and the BverfG this seemed to be the case for the OMT programme and they suggested 
that “the ultimate object of [the OMT] programme is to transform the ECB into a 
‘lender of last resort’ for the States of the euro area” (Cruz Villalón 2015: 7). If this 
were so, the ECB would have changed the meaning of central treaty provisions without 
an explicit democratic mandate. It would have usurped the competence to decide on 
its own competences. The claimants and the BverfG thereby raised doubts as to the 
temporary nature of the emergency measure, arguing that it amounted both to a 
significant extension of the ECB’s powers and mandate (thus violating fundamental 
norms of the constitution), and to a transformation of the competence to decide on the 
competences of the EU institutions (thus violating procedural aspects of the Treaties 
and the continued independent political existences of the Eurozone peoples).  
 
Permanent Transformation and Political Authority 
The BverfG’s position in its initial referral of the case to the ECJ highlighted that the 
question of the OMT programme’s legality was a question relating to the constitutional 
balance of powers between the peoples, Member States and the Union. It was a 
question of the political right to determine the values and norms according which the 
Eurozone is governed.  
By virtue of its independence and responsibilities as a sovereign representative 
of the Eurozone peoples, the ECB had to act on its own interpretation of the situation, 
regardless of whether that interpretation was in violation of the legal framework. But 
because it thereby altered the principles informing the ECB’s exercise of sovereign 
powers, and with it the governmental order of the EMU as a whole, the OMT 
programme cannot be considered a temporary suspension of the rules that brings 
about the conditions necessary for their re-application after the threat has passed. It 
introduced, rather, a permanent transformation of the fundamental legal framework 
of the EMU. As such, the measure is creative: it alters both the substantive content of 
the constitution (abolishing legal prohibitions) and its modality of governing (from 
treaty rules to technocratic discretion). It may even be said to alter the political form 
of the Union, because it challenges the principle of the Member States remaining 
masters of the Treaties in treaty-making and -amending moments. The OMT measure 
as the ECB’s act of constitutional guardianship par excellence thereby calls for a novel 
Emergency Politics 
199 
 
 
form of authorisation for the reconfigured hierarchy of constitutional norms that it 
entails. 
In so far as the OMT programme was problematic, then, it was so on the basis 
of the question of political authorisation. If the individual peoples’ sovereign right to 
determine and authorise the contents and limits of the ECB’s powers was violated by 
the OMT programme, it was violated on the basis of the ECB’s interpretation of the 
peoples’ shared will for the continued existence of the euro. The question of the 
legitimacy of the OMT programme is thus ultimately a political question and the 
contradiction between the rule of law and technocracy that it revealed can only be 
overcome through an appeal to popular will. The problem is that the very form in 
which central bank independence has been institutionalised in the Eurozone precludes 
the possibility of expressing popular will one way or the other with regard to the ECB; 
short of treaty change, that is. The democratic evaluation and judgement of the 
measure thereby becomes a question for the constituent power of the Member State 
peoples in a moment of extraordinary politics. In the absence of such, the democratic 
legitimation of the ‘new ECB’ (Beukers 2013) can only remain incomplete or non-
existent from a procedural point of view.  
In ECB discourses the problem of political authorisation and democratic 
legitimacy is explicitly recognised in calls for stronger forms of democratic 
accountability at the Union level (see, e.g., Draghi 2012, 2013; Cœuré 2013; Mersch 
2017b; Fraccaroli et al 2018). In the context of explaining how to understand the OMT 
programme, Benoît Cœuré (2012), Member of the ECB’s Executive Board at the time, 
argued that 
The notion that the euro is a currency without a state is in my view misguided. The 
euro is a currency with a state – but it’s a state whose branches of government are 
not yet clearly defined.  
Cœuré thereby implicitly recognises the problem of political authority in relation to 
the euro. The euro entails a state-like governmental structure, but this Eurostate-in-
becoming is inadequately constituted and defined. Alongside the necessity of clarifying 
the distribution of powers in the Eurostate-in-becoming, Cœuré presents a particular 
vision of the ECB’s accountability. It is accountable to “les Européens” (translated as: 
“the people of Europe”) and “les citoyens de l’Union européenne” (translated as: “the 
people of the European Union”) and such accountability is particularly relevant “in 
times of crisis, when policies become less conventional and more complex.” Cœuré, 
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then, makes an additional observation referring to an article by Habermas ‘and others’ 
(Peter Bofinger and Julian Nida-Rümelin):  
a rallying cry of the American War of Independence – “No taxation without 
representation” – has a new and unexpected resonance in today’s Europe. Once we 
create scope in the euro area for policies that result in redistributive effects across 
national boundaries – they write – [a] European [legislator]18 who represent[s] the 
people19 must be able to decide and vote on these policies. I tend to sympathise with 
this view.  
Cœuré, in other words, affirms the need to empower a legislature based on a unitary 
‘people’ in order to be able to legitimise decisions concerning the government the 
Eurozone. What the ECB needs, then, are “clearly identifiable and fully empowered 
interlocutors.” In this vision, the ECB’s accountability towards the European 
Parliament (EP) takes on a significance beyond mere reporting requirements and 
monetary dialogue. If the EP is the representative of a ‘European people,’ it would, 
presumably, be able to exercise legislative power on behalf of that people, thereby 
becoming a sovereign representative, if not the sovereign representative, of le peuple. 
Such a political authority would, like the legislature in a unitary state, be able to grant 
transformations or radical reinterpretations of the ECB’s mandate democratic 
legitimacy. It would introduce the possibility of generating new political authorisations 
at the European level without having to involve Member State governments or 
peoples. As such, it would be able to free Eurozone governance, including the ECB, 
from the strict adherence to the contents of a political decision reached in an ever more 
distant past. The ECB, according to this perspective, needs to be brought out of its 
loneliness and into a structure of generating political authority in the present that 
enhances the governmental capacity of the Union. 
Disregarding the question of the accuracy of Cœuré’s analysis of the Eurozone 
as a state-in-becoming or the feasibility of his vision, it underlines that the ECB 
considers the problem of political authorisation following the emergency politics of the 
Crisis central (see also, e.g., ECB n.d.a, Draghi 2016a, Mersch 2017b; Fraccaroli et al. 
2018). In this regard, Cœuré’s institutional approach constitutes a procedural response: 
 
 
18 Le législateur européen, in Cœuré’s speech, ein europäischer Gesetzgeber, in the original article by Habermas, 
Bofinger and Nida-Rümerlin (2012).  
19 Le peuple in Cœuré’s speech, die Bürger in the original article. 
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political authorisation is to be generated through a transformed institutional structure 
that sees the EP emerge as a true legislative force on the basis of a claim to being “the 
direct representatives of the people of Europe” (Draghi 2016a; see also Draghi 2018b). 
The notion of the unitary ‘people of Europe’ being the source of the ECB’s 
authorisation, however, does not only figure in ECB justificatory discourses as referring 
to the EP. On its website and in public speeches by ECB Executive Board members, 
‘the people of Europe’ has become the referent for the ECB’s governmental activities. 
The ECB’s (n.d.b.) “mission is to serve the people of Europe”20 and it “ultimately acts 
on behalf of the people and for the people” (Mersch 2017b: 13). Following the Crisis, 
the ECB thus invokes the kind of organic political authorisation and representation 
that the Schmittian constitutional guardian embodies, but which the BverfG has 
rejected the existence and even possibility of in its case law  
* 
With the OMT programme, the ECB shifted the foundation of its authority from an 
expression of political will in the past to necessity and the will for survival in the present. 
At the same time, it justified its emergency act with reference to a future constitutional 
structure able to generate political authorisation in the present at the European level. 
For this more perfect constitution to be realised, however, a new settlement of the 
foundational problem of politics is necessary. In this regard, the ECB’s discourse on 
‘the people of Europe’ and its insistence on the necessity of strengthening the European 
centre stresses that the ECB’s emergency politics re-opened the problem of politics in 
the foundational sense from the perspective of the ECB itself. The question, then, is 
how it is to be addressed. Before turning to this question in the next chapter, the next 
section highlights a different but equally important manifestation of the problem 
politics, namely that associated with conflicts between the expression of democratic will 
at the Member State level and the Eurozone’s constitutional order. 
 
The Peoples against the People: The Case of Greece 
The OMT programme emphasised the re-emergence of the problem of politics in 
relation to the fundamental monetary-political order at the European level. But the re-
 
 
20 This formulation was changed in 2016 from referring to the “citizens of Europe” (see Lokdam 2016).  
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emergence of the problem of politics was not limited to this. The Crisis also exposed 
the continuing relevance of the ordinary problem of politics for the EMU as a 
constitutional order. In this regard, the Greek case stands out in several ways. 
Particularly the election in 2015 and the ensuing confrontation between the leftist 
Syriza government and the ‘European powers-that-be’ revealed the full extent of the 
contradictions and tensions between the existing legal framework, technocratic 
discretion and the expression of democratic will. It is this confrontation that serves as 
the focal point of the analysis in this section. Even before that, however, the Greek case 
emphasised the continuing problem of politics for the monetary order: national level 
politics did not spontaneously adapt economic policy and structures to the demands of 
the euro. The disciplinary framework of the EMU did not foster the economic 
homogeneity deemed necessary for the sustainability of the euro. The possibility of a 
politics that did not conform to the rules and the discipline of markets revealed the 
continuing threat that ordinary politics posed to the monetary order. 
The transformation of the Eurozone’s governmental apparatus during the 
Crisis cannot be understood in isolation from the emergence of political movements 
and parties at the Member State level that challenge the Eurozone’s governmental 
order ‘from below.’ The conflicts between Member State governments and the 
European level governmental apparatus that have resulted from such challenges tell a 
distinct story about the nature of dual sovereign representation. They highlight both 
the nature of the constraints that Eurozone membership is considered to entail and the 
coercive powers available to the European level for enforcing them. This is the focus 
of the present section. But such conflicts also reveal, like European level 
transformations, that the re-emergence of the problem of politics involves the question 
of the foundation of legitimate governmental authority. If the political self-
determination of a Member State people can be suspended for certain ends, how does 
this affect that particular people’s autonomous political existence, its sovereignty? The 
question of addressing the problems of ordinary politics and foundational politics 
thereby becomes intertwined.  
 
The Problem of Politics ‘From Below’ 
The Greek sovereign debt crisis, whose depths were revealed in 2009-2010 in many 
ways kickstarted the Eurozone Crisis proper. But it is not the economics of the crisis or 
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its causes that are of interest here. It is, rather, the nature of the Greek challenge to the 
euro as a monetary order and how it relates to the general exercise of governmental 
power by the European level that I focus on. 
To put the dominant European narrative of the Greek crisis crudely,21 the debt 
crisis revealed that successive Greek governments had, to an extraordinary extent, 
failed to live up to the demands of the EMU, specified in particular in the Stability and 
Growth Pact. As such, it revealed both the failure of the EMU as a disciplinary regime 
and the continued possibility of destabilising Member State economic policies. The 
EMU had insufficient means of enforcing its demands on Member States and had left 
too much discretion at the hands of governments. In so far as the accumulation of 
unsustainable debt constituted a threat to confidence in the euro, the Greek problem 
became a problem for the Eurozone as a whole. And through its threats to other 
national banking systems and/or investor confidence in other Member States’ 
sovereign bonds, it became an internal affair for each of the Eurozone’s other Member 
States.22 Politics within each of the Eurozone’s Member States remained, in other 
words, a threat to the monetary order as a whole and the system of economic 
government associated with it.  
This threat came to a head in April 2010, when Greece petered on the brink 
of sovereign default after its credit rating had been downgraded to ‘junk’ and its access 
to capital markets had frozen up. It was in this context that Greece was offered a bailout 
package by the Troika of the Commission, the ECB and the IMF. This bailout, like 
subsequent ones, was subject to conditionality, including public sector spending cuts, 
tax increases, wage restrictions, pension reform, and privatisations. In short, a long list 
of austerity-policies and economic reforms that would otherwise not have been 
implemented by the national government were demanded and implemented in return 
for the bailout. 
 
 
21 This narrative can be challenged and there are good reasons for doing so. But since it is not the 
accuracy of the analysis of the causes of the crisis that are of concern here but the governmental 
responses to it, something akin to the ‘official’ narrative serves my purposes best. 
22 This reflects Lutz’ (1989: 233-4; see also chapter 1) notion that an international monetary system 
demands “confidence in political stability at home and abroad.” In the absence of this confidence, 
economic activity becomes governed by political considerations concerning “the real or supposed 
general security or financial security of the countries concerned” rather than purely economic ones. 
An international currency system thereby demands the willingness of governments to make the 
necessary sacrifices to maintain the currency system. 
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The question, then, is how this was possible. Against massive protests and 
widespread political disenchantment, a series of policies, programmes and priorities 
established (democratically) over decades were undone. But what allowed the Troika 
in conjunction with the changing – elected and unelected – Greek governments of the 
post-2010 era to radically reform the makeup of Greek society? There is no simple or 
single explanation for this but one political priority stands out: membership of the euro. 
As Lucas Papademos, former vice president of the ECB and head of Greece’s 
technocratic government from November 2011 to June 2012, put it to the Greek 
Parliament: staying in the Eurozone “is the only choice” (CNN 2011, 14 November). 
This statement can be read in two ways. On the one hand, one may emphasise its 
‘There Is No Alternative to staying the Eurozone’ dimension. This was the message 
Papademos conveyed. On the other hand, one may emphasise the ‘choice’ dimension: 
the only relevant choice is whether to stay in the Eurozone. While this may not have 
been Papademos’ message, it is an unmistakable assumption informing it. It underlines 
that as long as the commitment to Eurozone membership remained, the demands of 
the euro – now formulated as commands by the Troika and the Eurogroup – would 
be law. Any policy-programme followed from the choice for (or against) the euro and 
the threat of politics to the monetary order was to be overcome through a fundamental 
political commitment to that order.  
The notion of the euro being the ‘only meaningful choice’ resurfaced in the 
context of the Greek crisis of 2015. The election of the Syriza government in January 
2015 promised to mark a turning point on austerity. Given a relatively clear popular 
mandate, the government promoted an anti-austerity economic programme and 
sought to renegotiate the conditionality terms of the bailout packages. When the 
Troika and Eurogroup refused to budge, the demands of the democratically elected 
government were pitted against technocratic commands in the July referendum. The 
Greek people as the popular sovereign would decide in a manifestation of emergency 
politics ‘from below.’ And yet, despite the clear popular ‘oxi’ to the existing deal and 
status quo, the European ‘powers that be,’ in Yannis Varoufakis’s terms, were 
unmoved. If the Greeks would not accept the terms of the bailout, they would have to 
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leave, or take a “time-out” from23, the euro (see also Wilkinson 2015b). This was the 
‘only choice.’  
 
Ein Exempel Statuieren: Mythical Violence in Greece 
The European level’s approach to the confrontation with Syriza can perhaps best be 
understood along the lines of what Walter Benjamin (1978) called ‘mythical violence.’ 
In Benjamin’s essay “Critique of Violence” the notion of mythical violence is 
introduced in order to highlight that inherent in any contract and any law is a reference 
to a violence without which it would lose its compelling force. The creation of law and 
order and the violence necessary to enforce it are inseparable. But more than that, 
even when expressing and defending certain values enshrined in law, both the making 
and the enforcement of a legal order manifests hierarchies of power. They define the 
limits of the possible and fix relationships of domination and subordination. 
Lawmaking power and law-preserving violence24 thereby serve the same purpose: the 
manifestation of the boundaries of the acceptable and the authority to determine what 
those are. In any given situation, determining whether something is lawmaking or law-
preserving is futile: it is both simultaneously because its ultimate end is the creation or 
fixation of boundaries and distinctions. 
At the time of its election, the Syriza government’s demands were seen as a 
threat to the established order. They were seen not merely as a threat to the financial 
interests of lenders but as a challenge to the principles informing the way in which the 
Eurozone Crisis had been governed. More importantly even, it threatened to 
undermine the notion of the EMU as not an external constraint on the democratic 
freedom of the Member State peoples, but as a means of making democracy at the 
national level more authentic (as discussed in chapter 5). If the Greek government was 
given concessions and would later turn out to be successful in bringing Greece out of 
its state of exception, the very notion of the EMU as being simply a legal reinforcement 
of the inherent constraints of the economic realm would crumble. The EMU’s 
 
 
23 From leaked draft of Eurogroup decision on Greece dated 12 July 2015 - 15:00, p. 4. The time-out 
was taken off the table later the same day so the threat of expulsion from the Eurozone remained 
only as a latent one (see RT 12 July 2015; see also Wilkinson 2015b).  
24 Benjamin uses the German term ‘Gewalt,’ which is notoriously difficult to translate because it can 
refer both to physical violence and rightful authority.  
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constraints on Member State economic policies would appear merely arbitrary and 
open the door to similar challenges of the EMU’s basic economic order and ideology 
elsewhere as well.25 
The Greek case was not only addressed on its own terms but also symbolically 
and in terms of the broader message it conveyed. Through the threat of unleashing the 
violence of sovereign default on the Greeks, then, the Eurogroup sought to make an 
example of the Greek government in order to demarcate the boundary between the 
possible and the impossible. It was the Eurozone’s equivalent of Benjamin’s mythical 
violence: Apollon and Artemis killing the merely human Niobe’s children in revenge 
for her affront to their goddess mother, Leto, but leaving Niobe behind as a mourning 
statue of stone and a reminder to others of the consequences of challenging the existing 
order of things (Benjamin 1978: 294). The draconian demands on Greece were not 
merely a punishment for a transgression of the existing law of the EMU. They also 
established a new order: expressions of democratic will at the Member State level were 
suspendible if in conflict with the demands of the Eurozone’s governmental order. This 
was not a temporary state of exception, at the end of which waited a return to the status 
quo ante. It was the instantiation of the principle that as long as membership of the 
euro is not given up, the euro’s demands – interpreted by the Troika and the 
Eurogroup – trump demands emerging from the democratic process in the individual 
Member State. The decision on the euro claimed supremacy with regard to all past, 
present and future democratic decisions. Importantly, however, the relationship of 
subordination is asymmetric: it only applies to Member States in need of financial 
assistance. ‘Access to democracy’ is thereby contingent on a Member State’s access to 
money. 
 
Access to Money as a Means of Coercion 
The ECB played a role in the emergency political negotiations between Greece and 
the Eurogroup in July 2015 following the referendum, but its role was not limited to 
this. After the Greek government called the referendum on the bailout programme, 
 
 
25 Perhaps not incidentally, support for the Spanish anti-austerity party Podemos peaked at the time of 
Syriza’s election in January 2015 and declined significantly in the wake of the Syriza government’s 
“thoroughly unsuccessful revolt against the EU elite” (Mudde 2015).  
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the ECB’s Governing Council exercised its power to control a Member State’s access 
to money by deciding not to raise the cap on Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to 
Greek banks; a move that prompted a bank holiday and the introduction of capital 
controls. This decision was in direct and explicit response to the Greek government’s 
decision to call the referendum (see ECB 2015b). In line with the notion of central bank 
independence entailing the power to act against a democratically elected government 
if its actions are perceived as a threat to the central bank’s mandate, the ECB acted in 
response to and against a political decision in a particular Member State.  
The ECB also played a crucial role in bringing the Greek crisis to a head in the 
first place. In early 2015, the ECB had outstanding loans to Greece equivalent to 
around 68% of Greek GDP. In 2010, furthermore, the ECB (2010) waived “the 
minimum credit rating threshold in the collateral eligibility requirements for the 
purposes of the Eurosystem’s credit operations in the case of marketable debt 
instruments issued or guaranteed by the Greek government.” Despite being rated 
‘junk’, in other words, Greek sovereign bonds continued to be treated as eligible 
collateral in Greek banks’ dealings with the ECB. The ECB, in other words, made an 
exception to its ordinary operating framework in order to support the Greek financial 
system. According to Draghi (2015a), this showed that “one can really say that the ECB 
is the central bank of Greece.”  
The support provided through the waiver, however, was conditional. And in 
early February 2015, ten days after the election of the Syriza government, the ECB 
decided to lift the Greek waiver, thereby restricting Greek banks’ access to its ordinary 
lending facility (ECB 2015c). The justification for doing so was that the Greek 
government could no longer be ‘assumed’ to be committed to adhering to the 
conditionality requirements of the existing bailout programmes (ECB 2015c). The 
ECB thereby effectively forced Greek banks to make use of the more expensive ELA.26 
The ECB, in other words, reacted to and punished political developments in Greece 
that were considered a threat to the general monetary order even before they had 
manifested themselves in a change of political practice. In doing so, it highlighted that 
 
 
26 ELA follows the Bagehot principle for lending of last resort: funds are relatively freely available but 
come at a punitive interest rate in order to prevent moral hazard. The interest rate charged on ELA 
lending is not public but is estimated to be around 100-150 basis points higher than the ECB’s 
benchmark interest rate (Reuters 2015, 22 June). 
Emergency Politics 
208 
 
 
the Member State’s governmental apparatus was not fully sovereign within its territory: 
the ECB implemented a decision that the government would not otherwise have done 
and which it could not veto. 
The ECB was justified in suspending the eligibility of Greek bonds, according 
to Draghi (2015a), on the basis that it is “also the central bank of all the other 
countries.” The ECB cannot, according to this notion, intervene in Greek affairs in a 
manner that jeopardises its responsibilities to all the other members of the euro. Its 
responsibility to ‘all the other countries,’ however, can mean a number of things, 
including that ECB’s actions to support Greece must not have undue negative effects 
on other Member States. What Draghi invokes, however, is not the material effects of 
its lending to Greece but that “[t]he ECB is a rule-based institution. It’s not a political 
institution.” The important rule in this regard turns out to be Article 123 TFEU, “the 
prohibition of monetary financing” or the same article that was interpreted flexibly, to 
say the least, with the OMT programme. What Draghi invokes is the positive law of 
the ECB’s mandate. It is not necessarily the material interests of the other Member 
States that are at stake, but the fidelity to the original expression of political will in the 
founding moment. As a sovereign representative of the European peoples, it cannot 
make an exception for a single people as this would be in violation of the original 
democratic will of all the peoples, including the Greek. 
In light of the discussion of the OMT programme above – which was associated 
with a move from a rules-based to an institutions-based approach to governing – the 
insistence on a strict application of rules and the positive law of the original Treaty 
rings hollow. The hollowness of this insistence is underlined both by the timing of the 
lifting of the waiver and by its reintroduction in June 2016, i.e., once it had become 
clear that the Syriza government would, after all, comply with the bailout programme. 
As the ECB (2016) press release states: “[the Governing Council] acknowledges the 
commitment of the Greek government to implementing the ESM macroeconomic 
adjustment programme and, therefore, expects continued compliance with its 
conditionality.” The introduction, lifting and reintroduction of the waiver highlights 
the importance of the technocratic evaluation of a government’s general attitude when 
it comes to applying the rules. In emergency political mode, the rules are not suspended 
tout court but are applied selectively and in accordance with particular objectives (see 
White 2015, forthcoming). In this case, the suspension of the rules served in the first 
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instance to protect a compliant Member State from the forces of the emergency. But 
when compliance could no longer be ‘assumed,’ the rules were re-applied in order 
expose the Member State in question to those forces once again. The emergency was 
not a given but a state that was manipulated in accordance with the desired ends.  
The emergency situation, in other words, became a means of addressing the 
problem of politics in relation to the monetary and economic order. It was used in 
order to force the fundamental decision between accepting the demands of continued 
membership of the euro and pursuing an elected government’s political agenda. On 
two separate occasions, the ECB employed its control of the access to money to force 
a reckoning between two conflicting expressions of democratic will: the will for the 
euro and the will for an anti-austerity economic policy. 
In the structure of dual sovereign representation, the Greek people faced itself 
in a standoff between its political will for the euro and its political will for a break with 
austerity. In principle equally valid, these wills could not be squared because neither 
the Greek government nor the Greek people could alter the governmental order of the 
euro by its own accord. This does not mean that the Greek people were or are 
‘unsovereign’ but rather that the foundational decision on the euro constituted the 
defining political question. The expression of political sovereignty, with regard to 
economic government at least, was reduced to the question of Eurozone membership. 
The ECB itself justified pushing the Greek government and people in this direction 
precisely with reference to its mandate. Since the Greek people had co-authorised it in 
adopting the euro, they must, as long as they remain parties to the contract, be assumed 
to accept the consequences of it. In a conflict of dual representation, the ECB thus 
appeals not to the hearts and minds of the people, to the popular sentiment in favour 
of its objective, as the Bundesbank did. It appeals to the form and content of the 
founding decision to create the euro and itself. It refers to the constitutional order (the 
Treaty) as a source of its independent power to act against democratically elected 
governments.  
* 
The Greek crisis revealed that the expression of political will through the institutional 
apparatus of the Member State remained a threat to the monetary order. In doing so, 
it highlighted a tension inherent in the structure of dual sovereign representation: the 
people may face itself in a conflict of political will through its sovereign representatives. 
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In such a situation, however, the ECB as a shared sovereign representative does not 
represent any one people alone. As such, it may see itself as being ‘forced’ to employ 
coercive means against one of its constituent peoples in case it sees its political 
behaviour as a threat to the whole. This, in turn, introduces a further element of 
discretion to the ECB’s exercise of powers: the discretion to determine when to apply 
the rules of the EMU and when to suspend them. This determination turns on a 
technocratic evaluation of whether the political choices of a people and its government 
constitute a threat to the order and its embodied ideology. The effects of the ECB’s 
governmental activities are thereby not limited to the monetary sphere but manifest 
themselves in any sphere the ECB considers relevant for realising its telos. The 
perceived necessities associated with governing in the name of its telos, in other words, 
necessitates interventions in and based on developments in spheres of policymaking 
that are outside the ECB’s formal remit. Seen together, then, the OMT programme 
and the Greek crisis raise the question of whether the exercise of sovereign powers by 
limited sovereign representatives can be constrained, regulated and directed by law 
alone. On the one hand, the ECB’s actions clearly transcended the limits imposed on 
it by the Treaties. On the other, Member State challenges to the existing order 
(through their actions in the past as well as political programmes in the present) 
highlighted that EMU law had failed to constrain government discretion with regard 
to economic policy. This raises the question of whether the Eurozone can be governed 
effectively (and legitimately) without an omnicompetent sovereign authority.  
 
Conclusion  
The Eurozone Crisis manifested the contradiction between the rule of law and 
technocratic authority. With the OMT programme, the ECB made a decision and 
chose technocratic discretion in the name of its telos, sacrificing in the process the 
meaning of one of the fundamental constitutional values enshrined in the legal 
mandate. The ECB thereby displaced its foundation of authority from a constituent 
decision in the past to an appeal to necessities, and even popular will, in the present. 
This, however, is in conflict with the constitutional order of limited, functionally 
differentiated sovereign representation. This constitutional ordering is not open to 
constitutional transformations, to higher lawmaking (Ackerman 2000), except in 
formal moments of constituent power politics. As such, the OMT programme and its 
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transposition of governmental authority reopens the problem of politics in the 
foundational sense and raises the question of democratic authorisation, including the 
question of the political subject capable of such authorisation.  
 From the perspective of the ECB and other conservative European actors, the 
Greek case revealed that the problem of politics in the ordinary sense continues to 
haunt the constitutional construction of the Eurozone. The economic convergence and 
relative homogeneity that was, and still is, seen as a prerequisite for a well-functioning 
EMU and single currency had not come about through voluntary self-restraint by 
governments. Market discipline reinforced by the legal framework of the EMU had 
proven too weak. It ‘had to’ be enforced through the exercise of coercive public 
authority, expressed in the combination of conditionality and controlling the access to 
money. When the Greek population elected a government that was seen as threatening 
the project of creating economic convergence through conditionality, the extent of the 
European level’s powers of coercion became clear and the Greek government and 
people were forced to decide between continued Eurozone membership (and the 
‘necessary’ economic programme associated with it) and the possibility of expressing 
democratic will in opposition to those demands.  
Like the OMT case, the Greek case raises the question of political 
authorisation. But it does so in a slightly different manner. In this case, it is not so much 
the law governing the ECB as a sovereign representative that was in question but the 
relationship between competing sovereign representatives, on the one hand, and the 
relationship between the continuous possibility of  expressing democratic will and the 
governmental necessities associated with the political will for Eurozone membership, 
on the other. In the Greek crisis, the former was sacrificed at the altar of the latter in a 
manner that established the boundaries of the possible and impossible in terms of the 
political freedom to determine economic policy at the Member State level. Individual 
expressions of democratic will became conditional on those expressions not being in 
conflict with the governmental order of the euro. The question of sovereignty was 
essentially boiled down to the constituent decision on whether or not to remain in the 
euro.  
The emergency politics of both the OMT and the Greek case reflect a 
decidedly Schmittian notion of constitutional guardianship. The response to the Crisis 
did not only address the forces of the Crisis itself but also defined the essence of the 
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constitution that was to be protected. However, because these cases involve not just 
one foundational political subject but many, the Schmittian question of preserving 
existential unity becomes a thorny one, not least for the question of the Eurozone’s 
post-crisis political form. In so far as the euro represents a form of existential unity, the 
ECB acted to protect it. But in doing so, it may have compromised the constitutional 
construction of limited sovereign representation because its actions point towards a 
unity of the constituent power of the people that is supposed to be absent from the 
EMU, whether in its procedural or organic form. The ECB may thus have undermined 
its own foundation of independent authority in a constitutional contract among several, 
formally equal, political subjects by displacing its temporality of authorisation from the 
past expression of political wills to the present embodiment of a political will. This 
reflects that the Eurozone’s governmental order was perceived as being both too weak 
(it did not constrain governments adequately) and too rigid (because of the absence of 
procedures for altering it short of Treaty change). In both these respects, the problem 
of politics re-emerged: the foundations of the constitutional, and thus monetary, order 
needed revisiting and the problem of ordinary democratic politics continued to be a 
threat to the stability of the order. The ECB’s constitutional guardianship did not lead 
to a closure of the problem of politics but opened it and underlined its continuing 
relevance for the question of monetary order.  
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Chapter 7  
The Technocratic Necessity of European Sovereignty 
 
 
Introduction 
The Eurozone Crisis revealed the continuing relevance of the problem of politics as a 
means of expressing political will for the monetary order. The euro had been created 
as an attempt to address this problem by removing monetary policy from ordinary 
politics at the Member State level and entrusting it to an independent technocratic 
authority, the ECB. The ECB’s independence, furthermore, was constitutionalised in 
order to secure a solid foundation for its power to single-mindedly pursue the 
overriding objective of price stability, even when this conflicted with the wishes of any 
or all of the Member States. At the same time, a body of rules for Member State 
economic policies were agreed, which were intended to foster convergence around 
stability-oriented economic policies. 
With the Crisis it became clear that the constraints on Member State 
governments’ economic policies implicitly and explicitly associated with membership 
of the euro had not produced the stability-oriented economic policies that they were 
supposed to. Politics at the Member State level continued to be ‘unruly’ and represent 
a threat for the stability of the monetary order. At the same time, the ‘necessities’ of 
the Crisis pushed the ECB to act on the basis of a much wider interpretation of its 
mandate than originally envisioned. The monetary and economic situation following 
the outbreak of the Crisis quite simply did not conform to the assumptions 
underpinning central bank independence as the institutional solution to the problem 
of price stability. This revealed the existence of a vacuum of legitimate governmental 
authority at the European level. It highlighted that the foundations of the 
governmental order of the Eurozone needed revisiting, at least from the perspective of 
those seeking to protect and enforce that order. The Crisis, in other words, called for 
a refoundation of the constitutional construction of the EMU, thus opening up the 
problem of politics in the foundational sense. And it did so both in relation to the 
European level monetary order, and in relation to economic government within the 
Member States. It re-emerged, in other words, in relation to the constitutional order 
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of government through dual, functionally differentiated and limited sovereign 
representation that was supposed to have settled the problem of politics in the first 
place.  
 In this chapter, I discuss a prominent vision for responding to this problem that 
has emerged from within the logic of the existing order as a response to the perceived 
problems associated with it. It is a vision of ‘conservation through transformation’: it 
presents a radical, even ‘utopian’ vision of reform that is supposed to be better able to 
serve and protect the essence of the stability-oriented EMU constitution. Promoted in 
programmatic speeches by a number of European leaders (see, e.g., Macron 2017, 
2018a, 2018b; Juncker 2018; Draghi 2019a, 2019b; Cœuré 2018), this vision reflects a 
perceived need to move beyond the current constitutional order of the Eurozone in 
particular. The euro, according to this vision, can no longer rely on governing through 
rules and constraints on Member State economic policies alone. It demands the 
possibility of exercising effective and unified public authority. The euro, as it were, 
demands ‘European sovereignty.’ 
The envisioned solution to the problem of politics in relation to the monetary 
order that this represents constitutes a break with the EMU’s original constitutional 
structure of limited sovereign representation. It constitutes a break with the idea – 
promoted in particular by the Delors Report and by (German) central bankers such as 
Karl Pöhl, Otmar Issing and Jürgen Stark – that constitutionalised central bank 
independence combined with rules for the fiscal behaviour of states is a means of 
ensuring the stability of the monetary and economic order that is superior to the 
constitution of supranational sovereignty. This is not to say that rules and central bank 
independence have been abandoned as ideals. It means, rather, that the realisation of 
the stability-ideology that the EMU’s constitutional structure embodies cannot rely on 
these factors alone. The realisation and protection of a stability-oriented economic and 
monetary order is no longer considered adequately realisable through the 
constitutional construction of dual, limited sovereign representation. In this regard, the 
reintegration and re-unification of sovereign representation is presented as the solution 
to the problem of politics in relation to the monetary order in both the foundational 
and ordinary sense. 
While a vision of radical constitutional reform, the notion of European 
sovereignty as a response to the problem of politics has not arisen from a vacuum. Over 
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the last decade or so, a variety of contingent and general, temporary and permanent 
measures have been adopted in ‘emergency mode’ (White 2015, forthcoming). The 
constitutional order of the Eurozone, its basic style and organisation of exercising 
governmental authority, has undergone a series of wide-ranging transformations (see 
e.g., Beukers et al 2017; Dawson and De Witte 2013; Tuori and Tuori 2013; Ioannidis 
2016). As a result of these, the Eurozone’s regime of government is to a large extent 
already deeply involved in controlling Member State economic affairs, perhaps even 
to a greater extent than the federal level is in the US (see F. Fabbrini 2013). But the 
transformation is still largely seen as being incomplete or inadequate in one way or 
another (see S. Fabbrini 2013). There is still an urgent need to ‘reinforce the 
foundations of the EMU’ (Five Presidents’ Report 2015: 4). It is the meaning and logic 
of the notion of European sovereignty as a response to this need that is the subject of 
this chapter.  
In focussing on the vision of ‘European sovereignty,’ the chapter focusses on a 
particular vision presented by certain segments of the ‘EU elite.’ In a context in which 
there is widespread agreement that the EU and the Eurozone needs reform, however, 
this vision is only one among many. The narrow focus on this vision is nevertheless 
justified in the context of the present thesis for two reasons. First, this vision is most 
closely associated with the ECB and a number of ECB officials have promoted it 
actively. As such, it would appear that this vision represents the solution to the problem 
of politics in relation to the monetary order favoured by the institution most 
immediately associated with protecting it. More importantly, this vision emerges from 
within the logic of the existing order as a response to governmental problems associated 
with realising and protecting it. In contrast to most other visions of Eurozone reform, 
it is not an attempt to redefine the basic normative values of the order but an attempt 
to protect its ideological and material substance by changing its political and 
constitutional form. In so far as it is transformative, it is so in constitutional terms, not 
ideological. It seeks to preserve the essence of the constitution through its reform. The 
question of whether it would succeed or be self-defeating if it were to be realised 
remains open, but the very perception of a necessity of European sovereignty 
underlines the inescapability of politics in relation to the monetary order.  
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The Crisis of Dual Sovereign Representation 
The EMU as a governmental order faced three distinct but interrelated problems in 
the context of the Eurozone Crisis. It faced, first, the problem of securing Member 
State obedience to the demands of the euro. As discussed in the previous chapter, this 
problem was to some extent overcome through employing the control of the access to 
money in a coercive manner. This ‘solution’ to the problem, however, introduced a 
different kind of problem: the problem of legitimate authority. Second, the EMU faced 
the problem of a lack of general governmental capacity. The European level may have 
been able to intervene in the internal affairs of debtor Member States and the ECB 
may have been able to redefine the meaning of its mandate, but the European level 
was, and still is, unable to develop and implement a general European economic policy 
autonomously. The general economic policy position of the Eurozone remains an 
aggregation of the economic policies implemented at the Member State level. The 
European level therefore remains only indirectly in control of the economic policy of 
the Union as a whole. Finally, the EMU, and the EU more generally, faced the 
problem of redefining its fundamental claim to authority. This problem is the product 
of the two former, but it is distinct from them. The EU in general has traditionally 
relied on generating legitimacy from its ability to produce certain outcomes. It has 
relied on ‘output legitimacy’ (Scharpf 1999) and based its authority and claim to 
obedience on a logic of governmental effectiveness (Isiksel 2016). It was able, or so the 
assumption goes, to secure outcomes that the Member States individually would not 
have been able to. The ECB epitomises this ‘functional’ basis of authority: despite its 
lack of ‘input legitimacy,’ it claims legitimate authority on the basis of its superior ability 
to secure price stability across the Eurozone.  
While the Crisis may be said to have put the EU’s functional constitution into 
sharp relief (Isiksel 2016), it has also, particularly in terms of its ‘output legitimacy,’ 
been severely challenged (see e.g., Schmidt 2015). The EU is no longer automatically 
perceived (if it ever was) to promote the economic welfare of its citizens in a Pareto-
efficient manner. The euro in particular creates winners and losers and it has involved 
sacrifices at the individual Member State level that are difficult to square with the 
notion of it being a ‘symbol of unity’ and a means of promoting economic growth and 
prosperity for all. In the wake of the Crisis, the EMU faced a crisis of authority that 
manifested itself as a problem of the authority to intervene in Member State affairs, a 
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problem of the authority to govern economic policy comprehensively, and a problem 
of redefining the foundation of the constitutional order’s authority.  
 
Overcoming the Member States’ Sovereign Power over Economic Policy 
European interventions in Member State affairs respond to the problem that domestic 
political processes do not necessarily always respect the constraints on democracy that 
EMU membership entails. As such, politics at the Member State level constitutes a 
threat to the stability and viability of the euro. Such conflicts present a distinct problem 
for the structure of dual sovereign representation. The basic assumption of the 
structure is a version of pacta sunt servanda: Member State politics is supposed to conform 
to the original agreement because the Member State itself was party to authorising it. 
The democratic naissance of the construct was supposed introduce the self-restraint on 
democratic decision-making processes necessary for the common currency to function 
and for all to benefit from it. The political freedom to continuously express changing 
opinions concerning economic policy was therefore supposed to have been sacrificed 
in the constituent moment in order to secure an economic and, in particular, monetary 
stability that had previously proven elusive (see chapter 4). 
 During the Crisis, the political freedom of Member States with regard to 
economic structures and policies was suppressed in emergency mode. Securing 
obedience in such a manner, however, is problematic in several ways. The legitimacy 
of such interventions is, for one, questionable. But perhaps more importantly from the 
perspective of Eurozone governability, they demand a sense of emergency. While 
emergency politics relies on a certain ‘securitisation’ narrative and a particular 
interpretation of concrete events (White forthcoming), it must refer to some nucleus of 
a general sense of fragility or instability. Emergency political coercion is a 
governmental approach that only works effectively when conditions are amenable to 
it and there is a general sense of things being out of hand and on the brink of collapse. 
As a permanent approach to governing, however, it fits uncomfortably with an 
ideology of stability and order. From the perspective of the ideology of stability, the 
ordinary government of the Member States from the European level must be 
regularised. 
During the Crisis, several measures were implemented to regularise the 
government of Member State economic affairs. One means of doing so was found in 
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the so-called ‘golden rule’ of balanced budgets contained in the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (or Fiscal 
Compact). The introduction of the golden rule in national legal “provisions of binding 
force and permanent character, preferably constitutional” (art. 3(2) TSCG) in many 
ways simply concretised the constraints perceived to be demanded by the euro. In 
terms of method, however, the Fiscal Compact, which was ratified outside the 
framework of EU law, differed somewhat from the traditional pacta sunt servanda-
method of the EMU. Rather than creating or reinforcing rules at the European level, 
the Fiscal Compact sought to introduce the golden rule into the expression of the will 
of the people in their respective constitutions. Thereby the constitutional expression of 
political will for the euro and for the basic outlines of economic policy were to be 
aligned. Constraints on government spending would not be externally imposed limits 
on the Member State peoples’ sovereignty, but an expression and concretisation of it. 
A government running persistent budget deficits would not (only) be violating EU law 
and agreements, but its own constitution.  
As a solution to the problem of politics at the Member State level, however, the 
approach of the Fiscal Compact does not diverge structurally from that traditionally 
associated with the economic policy dimension of the EMU. The Member State is still 
the only political actor able to give legal effect to economic policymaking decision. 
Even in Member States subject to structural adjustment programmes, it is only through 
the agency of the state that reforms take legal effect. The European level does not have 
the authority to implement, for instance, a budget on a Member State’s behalf. Despite 
efforts to strengthen the surveillance and punishment mechanisms available to the 
European level, the economic policy of the Union remains dependent on the 
cooperation (or emergency political coercion) of Member States. Regardless of legal 
limits, the Member States remain the sovereign representatives of their respective 
peoples within the sphere of economic policy. 
The Member State’s sovereign powers within economic policy means not only 
that the European level cannot take control of the economic affairs of the Member 
States, but also that the European level cannot conduct an autonomous economic 
policy. It cannot in any comprehensive manner control the uses to which public 
spending is put. These limits on the European level’s governmental capabilities have 
led to calls for reforms to make the EMU ‘genuine’ (Van Rompuy 2012) by 
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‘completing’ (Five Presidents’ Report 2015) and ‘deepening’ it (Commission 2017). 
Reforms are, in other words, presented as means of making the EMU more like it was 
always already supposed to be. They introduce nothing new but serve to realise the 
order that the Member States and their peoples had signed up to in the first place. The 
reforms are thus presented not as infringements of Member State rights, but as 
concretisations of the original political will of the Member State peoples for the euro 
and all that it entails. 
 
Democracy as the Constituent Decision on the Euro 
This perspective informs the so-called ‘Five Presidents’ Report,’ which presents a vision 
for ‘completing’ the EMU. In its first chapter, the Report (2015: 4) explicitly addresses 
the nature of the relationship between the emergency politics of the Crisis and its 
problematic relationship with the existing institutional and democratic structure of the 
EU:  
The challenges of recent years forced national governments and EU institutions to 
take quick and extraordinary steps. They needed to stabilise their economies and to 
protect all that has been achieved through the gradual and at times painstaking 
process of European integration … it is clear that the quick fixes of recent years need 
to be turned into a lasting, fair and democratically legitimate basis for the future. 
The ad hoc approach of the Crisis was driven by the necessity of conserving the 
European “house that was built over decades” and is justified as such, but it is 
unsustainable and democratically illegitimate in the long term. It is, therefore, “high 
time to reinforce its foundations” (ibid.), the importance of which is underlined by the 
continuing necessity of doing “a lot more… to improve economic policies” (ibid.).  
The Report stresses that “[t]he euro is more than just a currency. It is a political 
and economic project” in which “monetary sovereignty” is shared (ibid.). The Report, 
furthermore, explicitly recognises that this is associated with the sacrifice of a number 
of political freedoms when it comes to economic policy. “[N]ational adjustment tools,” 
for instance, have been given “up on entry” (ibid.). The sacrifice of these, however, is 
justified with reference to “benefits of using a credible stable currency within a large, 
competitive and powerful single market” (ibid.) and the EMU being a “means to create 
a better and fairer life for all citizens” (ibid: 2). The EMU’s failure, however, means 
that these promises of promoting the common good of all Europeans have not been 
fully realised. In order to do so, then, the EMU needs further reform and the reforms 
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already undertaken need to be better monitored and enforced. As an example of what 
needs to be done, the Report notes that the European Semester’s “Country-Specific 
Recommendations need to be concrete and ambitious.” These recommendations, 
however, “should remain ‘political’, i.e. Member States should have a degree of freedom 
concerning the exact measures to be implemented” (ibid: 9, emphasis added).1 
The notion of the Member States only retaining ‘a degree’ of political freedom 
regarding their economic policies underlines that “only a select few states in the 
eurozone retain the luxury of being able to generate change in domestic economic 
policy through electoral alternation” (Isiksel 2016: 225). That is, as long as a Member 
State is in some way subject to the European institutions’ evaluation of their economic 
policy position for access to money (through the ECB, for instance), it must, by and 
large, accept the demands of the Commission.2 According to the Report, however, this 
is not a big problem in terms of democracy because, “in an increasingly globalised 
world, Member States have a responsibility and self-interest to maintain sound policies and 
embark on reforms that make their economies more flexible and competitive” (Five 
Presidents’ Report 2015: 4, emphasis added). According to this perspective, democracy 
at the Member State level is always already constrained by external forces and any 
authentic expression of political freedom must conform to the limits of the possible. 
Political freedom is, as it were, unfettered as long as it conforms to what is expected.  
There are various other examples of such rhetoric in the Report and in general 
it leaves little if any room for meaningful democratic input into formulating the basic 
principles of economic policymaking at the Member State level. The Report seeks the 
justification for this order of things in political union, which is presented as providing 
“the foundation for all of the above [the various reforms] through genuine democratic 
 
 
1 Introduced in 2010, the European Semester is a process aimed at, in the words of the Commission, 
“ensuring sound public finances (avoiding excessive government debt)[,] preventing excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances in the EU[,] supporting structural reforms, to create more jobs and 
growth[, and] boosting investment.” See https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-
euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-
correction/european-semester/framework/european-semester-why-and-how_en [accessed 10 
December 2019].  
2 The Italian government’s confrontation with the Commission over its 2019 budget highlighted the 
difficulty a Member State faces when trying to implement a significant change to economic policy 
that the Commission does not approve of. Combined with the ECB’s right to withdraw support for 
Member States in its QE programme on the basis of a government’s attitude, the European level 
holds considerable means of ‘persuasion’ in such confrontations.  
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accountability, legitimacy and institutional strengthening” (ibid: 5, emphasis added). 
As such, the Report acknowledges that the limitations on democratic decision-making 
in the Member States will need to be compensated for at the European level. The 
democratic strengthening of the European level, however, focusses only on concepts 
such as ‘accountability,’ ‘transparency,’ ‘dialogue,’ ‘discussions,’ ‘debate’ and 
‘exchange of opinions’ (ibid: 17). There is no indication that parliaments, whether 
national or European, should have any form of decisive power in the envisioned 
‘political union.’ Parliaments in this framework are truly reduced to talking clubs, with 
particularly elected representatives in national parliaments on the “losing side of a 
reinforced two-level game” (Crum 2018: 269). 
If the stability of the euro demands the suppression of democracy as an active 
force for shaping economic policy, this leaves democracy at the Member State level, as 
discussed in relation to the Greek case in chapter 6, with essentially only a single 
important question: do we want the euro? When it comes to economic and monetary 
policy, democracy is reduced to the constituent decision on the basic monetary and 
economic order. Within the constituted order, economic policy becomes subject to the 
overriding concern of securing unity and relative homogeneity in order to safeguard 
the viability of the order. Democracy as the decision-making process that gives 
expression to the will of the people is a foreign element within this order and as such it 
can enter only at the founding moment, if at all. Politics as the continuous ability to 
redefine the values and priorities informing the activity of governing must be 
suppressed in the name of the stability of the monetary order. 
 
European Sovereignty in the Name of Stability 
The conclusion that political freedom must be suppressed in the name of stability 
echoes the Hobbesian notion of the sovereign as the means of allowing the political 
community to escape the destructive effects of competing interpretations of the Good 
of politics. In the ‘completion of the EMU’ as in Hobbes’ Leviathan, the imperative of, 
and supposedly common interest in, stability justifies the suppression of the political 
freedom to express and act on competing opinions. The sacrifice of political freedoms 
at the Member State level, furthermore, is not only justified with reference to the 
stability of the internal order but also with respect to Europe’s place in the world. 
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Political freedom in the Member States, in other words, makes the European project 
vulnerable not only to internal collapse but also to foreign domination.  
In this context, the continuing ambiguity of public authority in the Eurozone 
is unsustainable: 
In spite of the undeniable importance of economic and fiscal rules and respect for 
them, the world’s second largest economy cannot be managed through rule-based 
cooperation alone. For the euro area to gradually evolve towards a genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union, it will need to shift from a system of rules and 
guidelines for national economic policy-making to a system of further sovereignty 
sharing within common institutions (Five Presidents’ Report 2015: 5).  
The EMU must, in other words, shift towards a system in which the Union level has 
“its own fiscal capacity and a means of imposing budgetary and economic decisions on its 
members” (Commission 2012: 31, emphasis added; see also Trichet 2011a). The Union 
must evolve in a manner that allows it to implement economic policy with the same 
authority as it does monetary policy. It must move towards a structure that allows it 
“to take decisions immediately applicable in a particular economy that puts the euro 
area financial stability in danger” (Trichet 2011b; see also the discussion in chapter 6 
of Draghi’s notion of an ‘institution-based’ approach to governing).  
Suppressing the potentially destructive effects of conflicting economic policies 
at the Member State level and securing the governmental capacity of the Union within 
the economic realm is central to visions of ‘European sovereignty.’ What unites such 
visions is that the notion of European sovereignty promises an avenue both for 
overcoming and suppressing internal divisions and for strengthening the European 
level’s governmental capacity. 
 
Sovereignty as Governmental Capacity 
The notion of ‘European sovereignty’ reflects a particular conception of sovereignty. 
Seeking to explain how European level reforms “will change the relationship between 
the Union and the Member States,” Mario Draghi (2013) outlined this conception in 
some detail. While Draghi concedes that the reforms in question will entail a marked 
change, he asserts that they are, in line with the above, not producing something new. 
They are merely “‘perfecting’ something that has already begun.” As such, “Policy-
makers are,” quite simply, “following through the consequences of the decision to 
create a genuine single market supported by a single currency.”  
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In this context, Draghi claims that there are essentially two ways “to look at 
sovereignty.” The former he associates with Bodin and this sees sovereignty as a 
“normative” concept “historically favoured by absolutism.” It defines sovereignty “in 
relation to rights: the right to declare war, and treat the conditions of the peace, to raise 
taxes, to mint money and to judge in last resort.” In contrast to this, Draghi outlines a 
“positive” view, which sees sovereignty as relating to “the ability to deliver in practice 
the essential services that people expect from government.” In this view, sovereignty is 
not necessarily related to the expression and realisation of political will but is a means 
of governing effectively: “A sovereign that is not capable of effectively discharging its 
mandate would be sovereign only in name.”  
Draghi (2013, emphasis added) somewhat questionably associates the latter 
view of sovereignty with Locke and claims that “the sovereign exists only as a fiduciary 
power to act for certain ends. It is the ability to achieve those ends that defines, and legitimises, 
sovereignty.” Citing James Madison’s Federalist Paper no. 45, then, Draghi (2013) asserts 
a functional or teleological understanding of sovereignty and public authority: “‘no 
form of government whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the 
attainment of [the public good].’” When “deciding which powers should be at national 
or European levels,” one should “look at effectiveness, not at abstract principles that 
may be empty in today’s world.” While Draghi does not specify what those ‘empty 
abstract principles’ might be, his insistence that a “pragmatic focus on policy efficacy 
… should be the motor of further integration” suggests that sovereignty should at least 
not be ‘confused’ with the freedom to express values and opinions in, through and on 
economic policy at the Member State level. Draghi (2019a) thus develops a 
functionalist view of sovereignty that entails that “True sovereignty is reflected not in 
the power of making laws [but in] the ability to control outcomes and respond to the 
fundamental needs of the people: what John Locke defines as their ‘peace, safety, and 
public good.’”3  
This conception of sovereignty sees it essentially as a question of governmental 
capacity, “the actual ability to control things” (Loughlin 2016: 63). Sovereignty as the 
 
 
3 It ought to be noted that associating this view with Locke is a stretch. Locke conceives of the legislative 
as the supreme power of government, subject only to the people’s ultimate power to “remove or alter 
the legislative” (Two Treatises, bk. 2, ch. XIII). That true sovereignty should be unrelated to the 
rightful authority to make laws is a manifest misreading of Locke.  
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“rightful authority” (ibid.) to express political will in institutional form and 
governmental practice is of little relevance. Or rather, ‘true sovereignty’ is define in 
such a way that rightful authority follows from governmental capacity. Any insistence 
on rightful authority as determining in what form and for what purpose governmental 
capacity is to be exercised is counter-productive: “The ability to make independent 
decisions does not guarantee countries … control [of their fates] … independence does 
not guarantee sovereignty” (Draghi 2019a).  
The definition of sovereignty through governmental capacity contains an 
implicit critique of the original EMU structure. In this structure, the Member State, by 
virtue of remaining the sovereign representative of its people within the economic 
policy domain, retained the ‘rightful authority’ to make laws and define economic 
policy according to will. In the sphere of monetary affairs, on the other hand, the ECB 
had the rightful authority to enact laws and decisions without involving the Member 
State level. The sovereignty of the people of each Member State was expressed in a 
structure of dual sovereign representation, which divided and thus limited the 
governmental capacity of both Member States and the ECB. The source of authority 
and the subject of political authorisation, however, was neither divided nor limited. As 
such, every people of the Eurozone could in principle always decide to withdraw from 
the euro or express its political will in a manner that conflicted with the demands of 
the euro. This introduced a source of instability into the governmental order. The 
‘more perfect EMU’ therefore demands a reconstitution of governmental capacity, 
because its division and the continued possibility of expressing rightful authority 
against the project jeopardises the realisation of ‘peace, safety and public good.’ The 
continuous existence of plural relations of sovereignty within the Eurozone constitutes 
a threat to its continued unity. 
The reference to Madison is notable in this respect. Devoted to the question of 
the “Alleged Danger from the Powers of the Union to the State Governments,” 
Federalist no. 45 (Madison 2009 [1788]: 97) outlines a conception of the distribution 
of powers between the different levels of government as resting on the question of how 
best to ensure “the public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people” (ibid: 
98). The question of the rights of the States vs the governmental powers of the Union 
is thereby presented as one regarding which level is best capable of realising the will of 
the people. According to Madison, insisting on the sovereign rights of the States against 
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the Union is potentially a betrayal of the people as it might make the realisation of the 
will or welfare of the people impossible. From this it appears to follow that Union 
authority over the states is justified in so far as it is able to make the realisation of the 
will of the people more feasible in the face of external threats and “global disorder” 
(Macron 2018a) as well as internal strife and the reappearance of “a sort of European 
civil war” (ibid.).  
The question of sovereignty as the supreme power to realise the will of the 
people thereby becomes a question of being able to control the political community’s 
fate. And this “is what the EU gives to the people of Europe: a way of sustaining an open 
international order while also bending its outcomes to their will” (Cœuré 2018, 
emphasis added). Because the European states are unable on their own to exert 
themselves on the factual conditions of global trade and finance, for instance, the 
Union offers a better avenue for effective sovereignty: “the EU gives its citizens more 
democratic control over globalisation than is afforded to people in other countries” 
(ibid.). Asserting state rights against the EU (which Brexit is an example of, according 
to Cœuré) is thus, in line with Madison, potentially a betrayal of the will of the people 
because the EU’s “capacity to harness globalisation to the popular will” (Cœuré 2018) 
is greater than that of the Member States individually. In the realm of global affairs, 
sovereignty is only possible “through European integration” (Cœuré 2018; see also 
Draghi 2019b). In so far as the EU needs reform, it needs it to “achieve its full 
potential” (Cœuré 2018). 
 
The People of Europe as a Foundation of Sovereign Authority  
The question of realising ‘the will of the people’ raises two distinct questions: who is 
the people? And how is its will to be known and made the foundation of governmental 
activity?  
As a politico-legal category, the ‘the people’ is a notion of singularity; it wills in 
the singular. For the will of the people to become the foundation of governmental 
activity, it must be expressed through a process that reduces the inevitable multiplicity 
of opinions to a single authoritative expression of will. Within the democratic sovereign 
state, the process of reduction and ultimate closure can be achieved in multiple ways, 
including ordinary and extraordinary elections, referenda, and through the more 
elusive notion of public opinion. As long as the process of reduction is generally agreed 
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upon, any closure will (generally) be accepted as authoritative. In the Eurozone, the 
process of reduction and closure is more complex due to there being no supreme 
political authority at the European level. If a conflict exists between competing 
expressions of popular will by autonomously existing peoples concerning matters of 
common concern, how can closure be obtained?  
In the realm of monetary policy, closure is obtained through the ECB’s 
representation of the shared will of the peoples, expressed in the constituent decision, 
for the euro and for price stability. As long as the euro is not abandoned, the ECB wills 
and governs on behalf of the people within the realm of monetary affairs. For the 
purposes of monetary policy, the peoples are governed as if they were one people. This 
logic is clear in ECB justifications for unconventional monetary policies such as the 
OMT and QE programmes during the Crisis, where interventions in favour of (or 
against) a particular Member State are justified with reference to “safeguarding an 
appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the monetary policy” 
(ECB 2012, 2015d; see also chapter 6). OMT’s, for instance, could not be justified with 
reference to helping individual governments by bringing down yields but only with 
reference to maintaining the ability of the ECB to govern the Eurozone as one. In the 
Crisis, this logic was extended to the general ‘Eurozone government’ (on this notion, 
see Sacriste and Vauchez 2019), whereby the ESM, for instance, was only “to be 
activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole.”4 
While being governed as one within the sphere of monetary policy, however, 
the peoples of the Eurozone remain in the plural when it comes to economic or fiscal 
policy.  In the sphere of policymaking defined as ‘economic,’ the singleness of popular 
wills cannot be taken for granted because there exists no process or institution that 
reduces multiplicity to singularity. The Member State peoples remain free to express 
their wills through their respective governmental apparatuses. Multiplicities of 
opinions are not reduced to one, but to 19. In the absence of a single institutional 
expression of the peoples’ will, a single sovereign representative, even constitutional 
constraints remain only limits on the peoples’ freedom to express political will. The 
 
 
4 2011/199/EU: European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 amending Article 136 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States 
whose currency is the euro (emphasis added). 
European Sovereignty 
227 
 
 
question of the governmental capacity to control the community’s fate is two-sided as 
long as the peoples remain in the plural. The problem of governmental capacity at the 
Union level, including the question of being able to ‘impose budgetary and economic 
decisions on its members,’ is thus intimately tied to the question of the nature of the 
foundational political subject: the peoples or the people? 
In justifying its authority to depart from a narrow interpretation of its mandate 
and objective of price stability, the ECB has sought to invoke a more organic notion of 
the relationship between itself and the ‘the people of Europe’ (see chapter 6). While the 
ECB may have departed from the content of the constituent decision, there is a certain 
logic, however problematic, to the invocation of ‘the people’ in the singular in this 
regard. As discussed in chapter 6, emergency politics presents the legitimacy and even 
legality of any given act as being derived from the existential necessity of protecting the 
will and welfare of the people. The OMT programme’s departure from the strict letter 
of the law was justified with reference to the continuing political will for the euro and 
the Eurozone’s salut public (see, e.g., Draghi 2012). In the securitisation discourse 
associated with the kind of constitutional guardianship exercised by the ECB, the will 
and welfare of the people become merged with and indistinguishable from 
governmental practice on its behalf. As such, it seems only natural to the ECB and its 
officials to invoke and appeal to ‘the people of Europe’ in the singular when justifying 
its ‘increasingly complex’ and wide-ranging role in Eurozone government (see Draghi 
2016a, 2016c, 2016d, 2017, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2018f, 2018g, 2019b; Cœuré 
2012, 2013, 2016, 2018; Mersch 2017b; Constâncio 2017; Lautenschläger 2017; 
Angeloni 2019). The notion of an organic relationship to a singular foundational 
political subject reflects a shift from a formal basis of authorisation to one that is more 
informal and more akin to that discussed in relation to the Bundesbank in chapter 2. 
The question is how it relates to the broader notion of ‘European sovereignty’ as the 
general phenomenological capacity to affect change in the world.  
The securitisation discourse and its corresponding invocation of an organic link 
between the European governmental apparatus and the people of Europe in the 
singular has not only been presented in the context of the most ‘urgent’ phase of the 
Crisis. It is also invoked in the context of ‘perfecting’ the EMU and overcoming 
polarisations within it in order to strengthen Europe’s position in the world (see, e.g., 
Macron 2017, 2018a, 2018b; Cœuré 2018; Draghi 2017, 2019a; Juncker 2018; 
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Lautenschläger 2019). However, in this context, as opposed to the German, it is not 
only the central bank that is the organic representative of the people, but the European 
governmental apparatus as a whole. Only the European level can give the citizens of 
Europe the capacity to determine their own fate (Cœuré 2018). The will of the 
European people, therefore, needs neither elective representation nor other procedures 
of reduction and closure but can be deduced from the governmental activities of the 
Union. Following the Rousseauian notion of the acts of rulers being considered 
expressions of the general will so long as they are not opposed by the people (see 
chapter 6), it can arise organically. The legitimacy of the Union’s governmental 
capacity is thus defined ‘negatively’ from the absence of an effective expression of 
dissent.5 
In this regard, the invocation of the ‘European people’ rather than ‘European 
peoples’ takes on a distinct significance. On the one hand, it introduces a unified 
foundational subject of authorisation in the present, thereby reducing the importance 
of original, formal expression of a unity of wills in the Treaties. On the other hand, it 
reduces the importance of expressions of popular will at the Member State level. 
Relative to the great whole of the European people, the populations of the individual 
Member States are but minorities, to paraphrase Wilhelm Vocke (see chapter 2). Any 
part of the European population’s potential or actual opposition to governmental acts 
or constitutional transformations can be set aside in the name of the greater good and 
stability of the whole.  
The necessity of European unity is central to the vision of European 
sovereignty. Macron (2018b) introduces his vision of European sovereignty by stressing 
the imperative: “let’s not be weak, let’s not be passive.” European sovereignty is 
thereby presented as a means of becoming a more active and powerful governmental 
force both internally and externally. The primary problem of European sovereignty is, 
according to Macron, effective self-determination in relation to global forces. It 
expresses the refusal “to allow others to decide for us” (ibid.). It expresses the effort of 
Europe to take “its destiny into its own hands” and develop “‘Weltpolitikfähigkeit’ – the 
 
 
5 In this narrative, Brexit might be interpreted as ‘proof’ that individual peoples can indeed manifest 
their dissent by exiting. The absence of other exits, then, can be seen as a form of affirmation by 
‘silent referenda.’ 
European Sovereignty 
229 
 
 
capacity to play a role, as a Union, in shaping global affairs” (Juncker 2018: 5). Europe, 
in other words, “has to become a more sovereign actor in international relations” and 
“The geopolitical situation makes this Europe's hour: the time for European sovereignty has come” 
(ibid., emphasis in original). 
The strengthening of Europe’s power in the world, however, demands internal 
unity, as “division would be fatal; it would further reduce our actual sovereignty” 
(Macron 2018b, emphasis added). Since “[d]ivisions push us into siege warfare,” the 
external dimension of sovereignty is inextricably linked to the internal suppression of 
divisions. In this regard, Macron (ibid.) stresses the importance of championing 
“economic, fiscal and social convergence” and “competitiveness created by reforms in 
each State” (Macron 2018a). The Eurozone, furthermore, needs to be “stronger, more 
integrated” and have “its own budget, enabling investment and convergence” (Macron 
2018b). It must have “a budgetary capacity to promote stability and convergence” 
(Macron 2018a). European sovereignty is thus directly related to addressing the 
problems of the EMU discussed above. And the euro is central to European 
sovereignty because “long-term economic power can only be built around a single 
currency” (Macron 2017).6 It expresses the unity of Europe and it “must become the 
face and the instrument of a new, more sovereign Europe” (Juncker 2018: 10).  In order 
for the euro to become the symbol of European sovereignty, however, “we must first 
put our own house in order by strengthening our Economic and Monetary Union … 
Without this, we will lack the means to strengthen the international of role of the euro. 
We must complete our Economic and Monetary Union to make Europe and the euro 
stronger” (ibid: 10-11). In order to become sovereign, in other words, Europe must 
overcome the continued possibility of Member State politics obstructing the 
achievement of unity. 
The single currency, according to the perspective discussed, needs European 
sovereignty just as European sovereignty needs the single currency. At the same time, 
European sovereignty is justified with reference to the threat of civil war, on the one 
hand, and outside domination, on the other. In the final instance, then, the demands 
of the single currency must be realised both for and through European sovereignty: 
 
 
6 In the French original: “une puissance économique durable ne peut se construire qu'autour d'une 
même monnaie” (Macron 2017).  
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European sovereignty is necessary in order to be able to implement reforms even in 
the face of Member State opposition, but the reforms are at the same time necessary 
for European sovereignty to become effective in relation to the outside world.  
In so far as visions of European sovereignty make reference to democracy and 
political freedom,7 is to be realised through the European level. In this regard, the EP 
and its members are invoked as “the direct representatives of the people of Europe” 
(Draghi 2016c; see also Macron 2018a). Democratic freedom at the Member State 
level, however, is downplayed, particularly but not only, with regard to economic 
policy. In relation to Member State economic policy, emphasis is placed on stability, 
convergence and competitiveness reforms, not democracy and freedom. If democracy 
is to play a role at all, it is at the European level. ‘European sovereignty’ thereby 
espouses a vision of democracy that subscribes to the notion of a unified ‘European 
people’ rather than the continued existence of the European peoples. This, perhaps, 
reflects that a notion of unified sovereignty at the European level cannot but be based 
on a unified European people as its political subject of authorisation. It would, after 
all, be the representation of the unity of the European people. Governmental 
necessities in the face of global threats and internal division thus demand a 
reconfiguration not only of sovereign representation but of the foundational political 
subject itself.  
 
Monetary Order and the Problem of Politics after the Eurozone Crisis 
The autonomous political existences of the Eurozone peoples have been challenged, if 
not superseded, by the emergence of a ‘Eurozone government’ during the Crisis. Not 
in affect, perhaps, but to a large extent in governmental effect. The idea of European 
sovereignty based on a political relationship between the European governmental 
apparatus and a ‘people of Europe’ remains, of course, a vision, a ‘utopia’ (Macron 
2018b). From the perspective of European institutions such as the Commission and the 
ECB, however, European sovereignty has emerged as a kind of technocratic necessity. 
It expresses both a critique of the constitutional construction of the E(M)U for failing 
to deliver what it was supposed to and a means of overcoming this failure by 
 
 
7 In Juncker’s 2018 State of the Union, references to democracy are all but absent.  
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strengthening the governmental capacity of the centre. The notion of European 
sovereignty thereby highlights that the problem of sovereign authority has re-emerged 
in the context of the Crisis and it has done so, among other things, in relation to 
securing the stability of the monetary order. While I have focussed almost exclusively 
on the question of sovereignty as it relates to the authority and governmental capacity 
to conduct economic and monetary policy, the emergence of the problem of 
sovereignty is not limited to this. European sovereignty is as much a response to 
movements demanding national sovereignty in the context of divisions over liberal 
values and immigration (see Macron 2018a, 2018b; Juncker 2018) as it is to the 
problem of economic governmental capacity.  
 
Sovereignty, Economic Government and the Euro 
That European sovereignty is a response to ‘non-economic’ developments as well does 
not reduce its meaning and significance in relation to the economic and monetary 
order of the Eurozone. The vision’s relationship to the euro-project, however, is not 
entirely straight-forward. Given that the euro was born as an attempt to overcome the 
destabilising effects of national monetary sovereignty (see Draghi 2019a; see also 
chapter 4), European sovereignty may appear as a logical ‘completion’ of the EMU in 
that it seeks to supersede national sovereignty entirely. Visions of political union to 
complement monetary union have long informed thinking about the future of 
European integration and the idea of the EMU’s incompleteness is not new. In that 
sense, the vision of European sovereignty inscribes itself within the tradition of ‘forging 
Europe through crises,’ to paraphrase Monnet’s famous cliché.  
From an ideational point of view, however, deeper political and economic 
integration is neither inevitable nor necessarily a logical consequence of the single 
currency. The envisioned centralisation of economic governmental capacity at the 
European level reflects the idea of a gouvernment econonomique contained in the Werner 
Report. As discussed in chapters 2 and 5, however, this institutional configuration was 
abandoned not only due to pragmatic considerations but on principle by the Delors 
Committee. A stability-oriented monetary order, which found its guardian in an 
independent central bank, did not need, and might even be threatened by, a supreme 
economic policymaking authority. Such an authority was considered a threat to central 
bank independence and to the achievement of price stability as the ultimate objective 
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of the monetary order. Reflecting the ordo/neoliberal consensus at the time, the 
problem of monetary union was to curtail the sovereign powers of governments in the 
name of stability, not to redefine them at another level.  
From the ideological perspective of securing a stability-oriented monetary and 
economic order, the problem of centralised economic government is that its authority 
and power may, once established, be put to uses other than those of securing economic 
and monetary stability. This aspect of (supranational) political authority was what 
troubled economic thinkers such as Hayek and Röpke as well as (German) central 
bankers such as Karl Otto Pöhl, Otmar Issing and Jürgen Stark. From this perspective, 
a sovereign authority controlling economic policymaking could not be trusted to 
remain committed to a stability-oriented economic and monetary order. A unified 
sovereign deriving authority from a unitary people is, after all, illimitable and thus 
potentially capable of even radical changes in ideological outlook. The potential 
‘damage’ a limited sovereign representative can do, on the other hand, is exactly that, 
limited. Even if the vision of European sovereignty is, at present, dominated by 
technocratic governing principles and promoted by a set of leaders still wedded to a 
broadly neoliberal ideological outlook, there can be no guarantee that the next 
generation of leaders will remain so. A sovereign European economic government, in 
other words, reintroduces the problem of time inconsistency. With unified sovereignty, 
then, the problem of politics at the national level may be solved but it re-enters through 
the backdoor at the European.  
Relying on technocracy as a check on such an economic government’s 
ideological disposition, as discussed in chapter 5, is to rely on an in principle 
unprincipled governmental logic: it governs on the basis of effectiveness and telos, not 
ideological conviction. As such, the notion of securing stability through European 
sovereignty, whether democratic or technocratic, at the same time introduces the 
potentiality, if not actuality, of politically controlling and/or technocratically altering 
the general ideological orientation of economic and monetary policy. The notion of 
sovereignty as a response to the problem that politics at the Member State level poses 
to the stability of the monetary order reintroduces the problem of politics only at level 
potentially more powerful. 
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The Eclipse of Central Bank Independence as a Response to the Problem of Politics 
The vision of European sovereignty poses questions in terms of central bank 
independence. If supreme political authority is needed in order to secure the conditions 
necessary for the stability of the monetary order, where does this leave central bank 
independence as a response to the problem of politics? One can, of course, only 
speculate on this, but while the idea of central bank independence has not been 
abandoned as a normative ideal, the constitutional transformation implied by 
European sovereignty would alter the institutional position of the ECB. In visions for 
the future governmental structure of the euro, including among the European central 
bankers themselves, the ECB is no longer ‘lonely.’ It is no longer a sovereign 
representative on a par with the Member States, but an independent governmental 
institution within a general governmental apparatus. Its constitutive relationship would 
no longer be that between itself and the peoples, but that with the European 
government. Whether its independence would become more akin to the Fed’s or the 
Bundesbank’s is an open question, but if it is legal and governmental flexibility that the 
ECB is after, it would presumably resemble the Fed more than the Bundesbank. Like 
the American monetary order, then, the European monetary would become one 
backed not by (constitutional) law alone but by sovereign authority.  
The turn to sovereignty displaces the importance of the traditional notion of 
central bank independence as the single-minded pursuit of price stability as a response 
to the problem of politics in relation to the monetary order. This displacement is in 
many ways a logical consequence of changing socio-economic conditions. Unlike in 
the wake of the Stagflation Crisis, the preeminent problem of monetary policy is not, 
at present, inflation. Stability remains the defining concern, but it is a notion of stability 
that goes much beyond price stability.  
This, however, does not necessarily entail that the importance of the central 
bank as an independent governmental power is reduced. And the ECB’s powers have, 
indeed, been both formally and informally expanded and deepened in the context of 
the Crisis. With the Banking Union, for instance, the ECB’s (secondary) mandate to 
promote and protect financial stability was given institutional expression. Motivated 
by the need to ‘save the euro,’ Member States transferred additional sovereign powers 
to the ECB within the sphere of banking policy. This entailed curtailing the power of 
Member States to develop their own approaches to banking supervision and 
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regulation. This transformation of the European constitutional order (De Rynck 2016) 
reflects the same logic and ‘imperative’ of overcoming the reliance on Member States’ 
voluntary efforts to secure convergence as the vision of creating a greater direct 
economic policy-making capacity at the European level. It reflects the necessity of 
actively employing centralised public authority for securing the conditions necessary 
for general monetary stability as well as the technocratic push into spheres considered 
relevant for the realisation of its telos.  
The Banking Union can at the same time be seen as a step in the process 
towards ‘European sovereignty’: it introduces a European level capacity to intervene 
in the internal affairs of Member States in the name of the stability and interest of the 
whole. The decision on the euro in this as in other aspects of Eurozone governance 
trumps the possibility of expressing political will in ways that diverge from the demands 
of the euro. The central bank remains central to the stability of the monetary order, 
but its independence in the single-minded pursuit of price stability is no longer 
considered adequate. In terms of the normative basis of its governmental practice, the 
apprentice has distanced itself from its German Meister.  
Because the primary concern is governability – and thus the generation, not 
constraint, of governmental capacity – central bank independence takes on a different 
meaning in relation to securing the stability of the monetary order. In the Eurozone, if 
not beyond, central bank independence no longer only refers to price stability and the 
ability to say ‘no’ to governments. It is now a notion that refers to the technocratic 
discretion and authority to evaluate and act on economic, financial and monetary 
conditions in a manner conducive to the general stability, the general telos, of the 
monetary territory (for invocations of central bank independence as ‘broad discretion,’ 
see ECB 2015a, 2017a; Draghi 2015b; Cœuré 2015; Praet 2015; Mersch 2016, 2017a; 
Gren 2018). Within the vision of European sovereignty, the independent central bank 
remains an important governmental power, perhaps even as one of the constitutional 
branches of government, but it is not considered sufficient for securing the stability of 
the monetary order. In line with the discussion of technocracy as needing an external 
impetus for grounding its telos in chapter 5, it reflects that political authority is necessary 
to secure cohesion but also to give orientation to the exercise of governmental power.   
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Conclusion 
The notion of sacrificing political freedoms at the Member State level in the name 
securing the conditions necessary for the viability of the euro reflects the Hobbesian 
notion of sacrificing political freedoms in the name of security. As such, the vision of 
European sovereignty is in many ways a semantic reproduction of the original transfer 
of sovereign powers to the ECB in the Maastricht Treaty. What is to be constituted, 
however, is not a structure of limited sovereign representation but a structure of unitary 
sovereignty, something akin to a Euro-state (where this leaves Eurozone-outs is another 
matter). European sovereignty is, like the creation of the independent ECB in the first 
place, a vision of settling the problem of politics in a foundational moment, a moment 
of constituent power politics. In so far as the constituent decision on the euro remains 
the only meaningful democratic decision in terms of economic structures and policies, 
however, the danger of the Eurozone’s governmental structure becoming (or 
remaining) a form of ‘technocratic absolutism’ in the name of the telos of stability is 
real. Through the ‘need’ to protect the whole against threats emerging from its parts 
or from abroad, the peoples of the Eurozone need to be, and have to a large extent 
already become, governed as if they were ‘a people.’ European, or at least Eurozone, 
sovereignty merely expresses this already existing but still incomplete governmental 
order in the language of political form. 
This vision of a response and settlement of the problem of politics is not, of 
course, uncontested. A number of political movements at both the European and 
national levels have advanced critiques of the Eurozone’s emergency politics and its 
infringements of national or European democracy in the name of stability. Whether 
from the perspective of reclaiming state sovereignty (on the right, e.g., Marine Le Pen, 
AfD, Lega; on the left, see e.g., Lapavitsas 2018; Mitchell and Fazi 2017) or from the 
perspective of democratising European sovereignty (e.g., DiEM25; T-DEM), such 
movements emerge from a sense of loss: a loss of political freedom, a loss of welfare, a 
loss of identity. In such discourses, sovereignty is not reduced to the question of 
governmental capacity but appears as a means of reclaiming and protecting a 
meaningful democratic politics. In relation to the monetary order, the stress is put on 
the primacy of politics. Democratic politics thereby becomes a means of breaking with 
the established order and asserting the right to control the exercise of governmental 
powers. In such perspectives, politics is, as discussed in relation to Keynes in chapter 
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1, not a problem to be overcome but a means of realising the values and opinions of 
the community in governmental practice. It is a continuous process for generating the 
power and authority to shape the collective expression of the community’s existence. 
And it should inform the orientation of economic policy every step of the way. It is not 
only inescapable but desirable. As in Keynes, the monetary order ought not to 
determine the realm of economic policy possibilities but be placed in the service of 
political objectives.  
Despite its technocratic bent, the EU elite’s vision of European sovereignty does 
much the same. While framed in relation to technocratic necessities associated with 
preserving stability, it is inherently a vision for constituting a political authority more 
effective in achieving certain political objectives than a purely rules-based order. It 
reflects the recognition that laws alone do not govern, public authorities do. This is the 
notion informing Draghi’s claim that two approaches to government have informed 
the EMU construction, a rules-based and an institutions-based, and that the former 
failed.8 It failed because without means of enforcing rules, decisions and principles, 
‘covenants without the sword are but words.’ Sovereignty was fragmented within the 
rule-based approach, but not within the institutions-based. As a sovereign power, the 
ECB was able to pursue the political objective of the euro effectively because it had 
means of implementing and enforcing decisions. But only ‘limitedly.’ A wider 
reorientation of governmental practice in the Eurozone in the name of stability would 
demand sovereignty. The survival of the political project of the euro would demand 
sovereignty.  
The turn to an institutions-based approach to government in the Eurozone 
reflects that the monetary order is inescapably a political order. Regardless of its 
 
 
8 According to Draghi (2019a), fiscal and structural policies were originally “areas of economic policy 
… considered too specific to the situation of individual countries to be entrusted to a common body. 
It was felt that the only possible form of governance was for countries to exercise national 
sovereignty, thereby respecting their own specific set of circumstances. A rules-based approach was 
seen to be the only solution that was consistent with this vision. But it is worthwhile to reflect on how 
successful this choice has been. For the cases where executive power has been invested with 
institutions, most would agree that the institutions have performed relatively well. Trade policy has 
been effective in opening up access to new markets … Monetary policy has successfully fulfilled its 
mandate. But for the areas that use a rules-based approach, some shortcomings have been revealed. 
The fiscal rules have provided a framework for assessing fiscal policies but have at times proven 
difficult to enforce and hard to explain to the public. In the area of structural policies, the Country 
Specific Recommendations have had a limited impact, with less than 10% of recommendations 
being substantially implemented each year.” 
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constitutionalisation, ‘depoliticisation,’ or technocratisation, it is always in the service 
of some kind of politics. It encapsulates a vision and ideology of democracy and its 
limits, particularly as these relate to the possibilities and impossibilities of economic 
policy. The perceived (technocratic) necessity of reconfiguring sovereignty in the 
Eurozone for the purpose of protecting the monetary order only underlines this. The 
question of politics in relation to the monetary order, then, concerns only what form it 
takes. 
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Conclusion  
 
 
The monetary order is a political order. It is founded on political authority and it is 
governed according to political values and priorities. Politics, the process of 
formulating and expressing collective will, is the fundamental problem of the monetary 
order. Politics is a threat to its stability. 
Central bank independence is an intellectual and institutional response to this 
threat. It is a political idea that presents an institutional means of overcoming the 
potentially destabilising effects of politics. The identification of the problem of politics 
as a threat not only to monetary values but to the stability of the political and economic 
order as a whole constitutes the basic premise that gives central bank independence its 
specific meaning and, for some, its normative appeal. By removing the question of the 
basic principles and objectives of monetary policy from the ordinary political process, 
it promises to render politics less dangerous to the economic order. Central bank 
independence is thereby an idea of moderate government. It constrains the exercise of 
political power in economic matters and moderates the economic effects of changing 
ideological outlooks on how to govern the economy. Both in its effects on thinking 
about monetary matters and in terms of its institutionalisation, it is a means of 
entrenching a consistent response to the question of the ‘Good’ of monetary policy by 
removing the question from the realm of political contestation. Central bank 
independence does not make the monetary order less political. It seeks, rather, to 
depoliticise the values and priorities according to which money is governed. 
While the core normative underpinnings justifying central banks’ right to say 
‘no’ to political authorities (governments in particular) are relatively stable, the 
foundations of their authority to do so differ widely according to the institutional 
context. In analyses of the institutional positions of three major central banks – the 
Bundesbank, the Fed and the ECB – this thesis has highlighted that the nature of 
central banks’ independence differs qualitatively depending on the political culture and 
constitutional structure of the community in question. Regardless of independence, a 
central bank is always inscribed in a system of government that expresses certain values 
about the limits and conditions of exercising public authority. As highlighted in chapter 
1, furthermore, the question of the basic principles according to which monetary issues 
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are governed is linked to the broader question of the role of government in the 
economy. The structure of the monetary order and how it is governed – on this 
Keynes, the ordoliberals and neoliberals agreed – has implications that go far beyond 
the realm of monetary policy alone. It expresses political values and ideas about what 
the just society is and how it is best approximated. In the German, American and 
European contexts of central bank independence, such values and ideas express 
themselves in different ways through, and in, the relationship between the central bank 
and the broader governmental apparatus of the political community. 
In this thesis it has been argued that this relationship is one based on conflict. 
The question of conflict, in turn, manifests itself in different ways. As discussed in 
chapter 2, the German notion of central bank independence emerged – against 
prevailing political opinions at the time (see also chapter 1) – from a conflict over 
whether the central bank should be independent. In this conflict, central bank 
independence was justified on the basis of a political myth that grounded the meaning 
of central bank independence in a struggle to overcome a terrible past. Its meaning 
was grounded in something beyond its economic expediency. The myth of the 
hyperinflations presented the independence of the central bank and its ability to say 
‘no’ to government as a precondition for a civilised societal life and a functioning 
democracy. The constraints on the expression of political values through the ordinary 
democratic process associated with an independent central bank were thereby justified 
with reference to preserving the very possibility of expressing values in this way. Price 
stability was not one economic objective among others, but the foundation on which 
the societal order rested. Central bank independence, in turn, was presented as the 
only viable means of securing it. The broad public acceptance of this narrative 
provided the foundation of the Bundesbank’s authority to resist the government.  
In the German conception, the legitimacy of central bank independence is 
based on the foundational will of the people for price stability. Its authority, then, is 
based on a foundational relationship of representation that is distinct from electoral 
representation. Electoral representation is an incomplete way of representing the 
people’s will. In this dual structure of representation, in which neither representative 
can claim superiority over the other, the people, as the popular sovereign, is made 
present in the activity of governing by the central bank as well as by the government. 
While (informal) cooperation between equals may be the norm within this structure, 
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conflicts can only be resolved through a manifestation of whose side public opinion 
stands (the people being present only through mediation).  
A very different approach to the relationship between the people, the central 
bank and the government informs the institutionalisation of the Fed’s independence. 
As discussed in chapter 4, this relationship is characterised by a dual mediation. On 
the one hand, the will of the people concerning monetary affairs is mediated by elected 
representatives. On the other, the elected representatives’ control of monetary policy 
is mediated by the Fed as an independent government agency. This structure of 
mediation reflects an approach to moderating the exercise of political power 
concerning monetary policy that does not eliminate political influence on monetary 
matters. It makes it more difficult for any one party or ideological outlook to dominate 
monetary policy, but it does not abolish political control entirely. The ultimate 
authority of elected representatives remains the backdrop to any conflict between (a 
branch of) government and the central bank. The Fed may often prevail in conflicts 
with, say, the President, but its authority is derived from the constellation of (partisan) 
forces across the different branches of government, not, as the Bundesbank, from a 
direct political relation to the nation. The institutional inclusion of the opposition 
within the American framework of government is what gives the Fed the authority to 
say ‘no’ to government. The institutionalisation of central bank independence within 
the US system of government is thus a means of preventing the domination of 
monetary policy by one set of (partisan) interests in an effort to render it more stable 
over time. 
In both Germany and America, the central bank is a product of ordinary 
legislation. In the American context, this is an essential aspect of the governmental 
structure. It is this that allows for the dual mediation of the exercise of sovereign powers 
with regard to monetary policy. In the German context, the ordinary legal foundation 
of the Bundesbank’s independence and mandate meant that the central bank remained 
subject to the possibility of being changed by a simple majority in the Bundestag. As 
such, its foundation of authority to act against the government was informal and 
demanded a ‘constant vigilance’ in the effort to maintain the German Stabilitätskultur. 
Without this particular political culture, its independence could not be secured.  
When the ECB was created by the Maastricht Treaty, neither of these models 
was chosen. The framers of the Treaty in the Delors Committee consciously rejected 
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the notion of a European level equivalent to the federal governments of the US and 
Germany and the German Stabilitätskultur could not be assumed to be entrenched on a 
European scale. As such, the constitutional structure and the political culture of the 
Eurozone-in-becoming demanded a different institutionalisation of central bank 
independence as a response to the problem of politics. As discussed in chapter 4, this 
led to the constitutionalisation of both price stability and central bank independence 
and the ECB was constituted as an independent sovereign representative of the peoples 
of the Eurozone.  
The exercise of sovereign powers in the realm of monetary affairs was thereby 
transferred to a governmental level separate from the level at which other aspects of 
economic policy were conducted. This reflected an ‘insight’ from the theory of central 
bank independence that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s in response to the Stagflation 
Crisis (discussed in chapter 3). This literature highlighted that the conduct of monetary 
policy could be safely separated from the general conduct of economic policy without 
affecting the latter negatively. On the contrary, an independent central bank 
conducting a monetary policy geared towards price stability would, the literature 
suggested, lead to better outcomes in terms of inflation than a politically controlled 
central bank. And it would do so without requiring sacrifices in terms of other 
economic variables such as unemployment and growth. The monetary problem of 
politics, which in this perspective had led to the Stagflation Crisis, could be overcome 
through a limited institutional fix. ‘Solving’ it demanded no substantial sacrifices of 
economic governmental capacity. As the Stagflation Crisis had shown, governments 
were in any case not really able to control monetary policy effectively because rational 
market actors second-guessed their intentions and policies. By introducing an effective 
commitment device in terms of monetary policy, any government’s economic policy 
would become more credible and thus effective. Introducing central bank 
independence was therefore not to be understood as a sacrifice but an enhancement of 
the political community’s governmental capacity. It would allow the political 
community as a whole to bring inflation under control, thereby overcoming one aspect 
of the ‘governability crisis’ of the 1970s (see Crozier et al 1975). 
Disregarding the question of whether central bank independence can be 
considered a relatively minor institutional fix within a unitary state, it was certainly not 
a minor change to the way the Member States of the Eurozone governed themselves. 
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As highlighted in chapters 4 and 5, the creation of the ECB introduced a novel 
constitutional relation between the peoples, the Member States and the Union level. 
Based on a decision of the constituent power attributed to the Member State peoples, 
the ECB is, like the Bundesbank, conceptualised as a direct representative of the 
popular will for price stability. But because its foundation of authority is not derived 
from one people but from several, it is a shared representative of the ‘peoples of the 
Eurozone.’ Through the creation of the ECB, the peoples of the Eurozone thereby 
created an existential connection between themselves. The ECB would govern them 
on their own behalf as one. Unlike the Bundesbank, this direct representational 
relationship between the central bank and the foundational political subject(s) was 
formalised in the constitutional charter of the Eurozone. The ECB’s authority was not 
to be based on a delegation of power from a constituted power (like the Fed) or from 
an organic link to public opinion (like the Bundesbank), but on a constitutional 
mandate. This formal foundation of authority, moreover, is even more difficult to alter 
than national constitutions. In the Eurozone, the monetary problem of politics was 
thereby addressed constitutionally through the creation of an independent central bank 
exercising sovereign powers without political control. This was a model that took the 
idea of central bank independence to its logical conclusion by separating it from the 
need for certain political cultures or traditions. The ECB could thereby be seen as 
central bank independence in its most ‘pure’ form. 
The creation of the ECB as a sovereign representative of the peoples of the 
Eurozone at the same time transformed the representative nature of the Member 
States. Within its territory, the Member State was no longer the only body exercising 
sovereign powers. The ECB’s governmental acts are directly effective within the 
Eurozone territory as a whole and cannot be vetoed by the Member State. At the same 
time, the Member State is not involved in the formulation of the ECB’s policies. 
Through the creation of the ECB, the Member States were thus reconstituted as 
limited sovereign representatives, albeit less limited and functionally specialised than 
the ECB. The Member State peoples, in other words, were understood to have 
inscribed a supranational actor within the political relationship between itself and its 
governmental apparatus. The ECB and the Member State governmental apparatus 
govern the citizens subject to them with equal right, but in different governmental 
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spheres. In terms of general macroeconomic policy, a Member State people is 
governed not by one sovereign representative but two.  
The governmental order that this gives rise to, as discussed in chapter 5, is 
based on distinct governing logics. These are by no means specific to the Eurozone, 
but they take on a particular meaning within the Eurozone’s specific structure of 
sovereignty. The governmental order is, first of all, based on relatively comprehensive 
legal ordering that concretises and gives expression to the constituent will of the 
peoples. In relation to the ECB, it serves to generate the ECB’s authority, but also to 
limit it and give it direction. In the absence of an equivalent or superior political 
authority at the ECB’s governmental level, it is law alone that governs the ECB’s 
exercise of powers. The constitutional law of the Treaties is thereby both a protection 
of the ECB’s from political interference and a protection of the peoples from the 
arbitrary exercise of powers by the ECB. Within the constitutional imaginary, a 
violation of the law is violation of the will of the peoples, and thus their continued 
existence as separate political subjects, because the law is a concretisation of their 
foundational political will and a product of their right of authorisation.   
The law, however, cannot be complete. It has gaps and indeterminacies. It 
cannot predict all future developments and prescribe action accordingly. It therefore 
needs executive authority to complement it. In the ECB’s case, this executive authority 
is exercised technocratically. Based on expert knowledge of the immanent laws 
governing the order of things, technocratic government is, according to its ideology, a 
rules-based approach to executive discretion. It fills the inevitable gaps of the law in a 
manner that does not sacrifice its spirit. However, while government according to 
technocratic expertise is conceived of as a way of complementing the rule of law, it also 
creates tensions. This is because technocracy is a form of governing based on a 
teleological rationality. It governs for and on the basis of a specified objective. If the 
letter of the law is seen as an obstacle to realising this objective, the technocratic 
authority will ignore it. Or rather, the situation in which fidelity to the law risks 
compromising fidelity to the telos (or vice versa) reveals the inherent ambiguity of the 
basic mandate. Similarly, while the ECB exercises sovereign powers within a limited 
policymaking sphere, it may consider developments in neighbouring spheres 
threatening its objective and therefore seek to intervene beyond its formal remit. The 
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technocratic authority may, in other words, violate the will of the peoples expressed in 
law in the name of realising the will of the peoples expressed in the telos.  
The inherent ambiguity of the ECB’s mandate manifested itself as a 
contradiction in the context of the Eurozone Crisis, as discussed in chapter 6. The 
OMT programme was one such manifestation and the ECB’s role in the Greek crisis 
was another. These cases at the same time emphasised the difficult relation between 
the Eurozone’s governmental order and democracy. On the one hand, as highlighted 
in chapter 4 and 5, the legitimacy of the governmental order is based on a popular 
expression of will in a founding moment. On the other, democracy cannot remain too 
active a governmental or authorising force within the governmental order as this would 
reintroduce the problem of politics in relation to the monetary order. Democracy, in 
other words, is the only valid legitimation of governmental authority but its active 
expression must be avoided.  
The OMT programme highlighted the ambiguity and tension inherent in the 
ECB’s mandate. The legal limitation on the ECB’s powers was considered an 
impediment to realising its telos and was, to all intents and purposes, suspended or 
substantively transformed by the ECB’s acts. Transforming the meaning of the legal 
mandate in a structurally significant manner, however, raises the problem of political 
authorisation. It thereby reintroduces the problem of politics in relation to the 
principles governing the monetary order and the question of its democratic 
authorisation. The Greek crisis, on the other hand, highlighted a tension between the 
ECB being a representative of the people and the peoples at the same time. The expression 
of political will in Greece – through both the election of a particular government and 
through a referendum – was considered a threat to the monetary order and its 
embodied economic ideology. It was, therefore, understood by the ECB as a threat to 
the expressed will of the peoples as a whole.  
In the OMT case, the ECB transgressed the expressed content of the 
constituent will of the peoples in the legal framework constituted in the past; in the 
Greek case it negated the expression of political will by a people in the present. In both 
cases, however, it challenged the continued existence of the peoples as separate political 
subjects and thus one of the basic aspects of the Eurozone’s particular constitutional 
approach to overcoming the problem of politics in relation to money. In doing so, the 
ECB introduced the (technocratic) ‘necessity’ of a unified European constituent power, 
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a ‘European people,’ to authorise changes to the basic governmental structure. 
‘Europe’ would have to become sovereign in order to allow the Union level to act 
directly in and on the Member States in a more general manner to overcome problems 
associated with divergent expressions of political will. The Eurozone needed legal and 
political flexibility as well as a stronger governmental capacity to change itself and its 
constituent parts in response to urgent demands arising from changing socio-economic 
conditions. 
The Eurozone Crisis saw a host of reforms and reform proposals intended to 
address the governmental shortcomings of the original EMU framework by 
strengthening the governmental capacity of the European centre. The vision of 
‘European sovereignty’ presented by EU elites and political leaders (discussed in 
chapter 7) takes these efforts to their logical conclusion. The European level needs, 
according to this perspective, to be able to govern economic matters autonomously, 
without having to rely on the more or less voluntary cooperation of 19 separate 
sovereign representatives within the realm of economic policy. European sovereignty 
is thereby an approach to overcoming the problem of politics in relation to the stability 
of the monetary order. It is, however, a response that differs markedly from that 
associated with the notion of central bank independence. It does not seek its resolution 
in the fragmentation of political authority to control economic matters, but in the 
concentration of sovereign powers at a, supposedly, more powerful level. It seeks it, as 
it were, in a comprehensive Leviathan that is able to govern actively. As such, the 
notion of European sovereignty undermines the idea of overcoming the problem of 
politics through the transnationalisation of central bank independence as a means of 
constraining the exercise of governmental power.  
 Central bank independence has not been entirely eclipsed as a response to the 
monetary problem of politics in the Eurozone or elsewhere. However, in economic 
conditions where the importance of ‘removing the punch bowl just when the party gets 
going’ (McChesney Martin 1955: 12) is reduced, its specific meaning as a protection 
against inflation appears less relevant. It is not the excesses of politics when it comes to 
money that confronts contemporary economies but something else. In the Eurozone, 
the problem is understood as a problem of governmental capacity. The problem is not 
to constrain the exercise of governmental power, but to generate it. The question, then, 
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is not whether monetary and economic issues should be governed politically, but what 
form that politics takes.  
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L. Vinx (ed) The Guardian of  the Constitution: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the 
Limits of  Constitutional Law. Cambridge: CUP, 174-221. 
Kennedy, E. 1998. “The Bundesbank,” German Issues 19. The American Institute for 
Contemporary German Studies. 
Kennedy, E. 2011. “Emergency Government Within the Bounds of the Constitution: 
An Introduction to Carl Schmitt, ‘The Dictatorship of the Reich president 
according to Article 48 R.V.’” Constellations 18(3): 284-297. 
Keynes, J.M. 1920. The Economic Consequences of  the Peace. New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and Howe. 
Keynes, J.M. 1978a [1936]. The General Theory of  Employment, Interest and Money, in E. 
Johnson and D. Moggridge (eds) The Collected Writings of  John Maynard Keynes, 
Bibliography 
262 
 
 
Volume VII: The General Theory. Cambridge: Royal Economic Society and CUP. 
Keynes, J.M. 1978b [1923]. A Tract on Monetary Reform, in E. Johnson and D. 
Moggridge (eds) The Collected Writings of  John Maynard Keynes, Volume IV: A Tract on 
Monetary Reform. Cambridge: Royal Economic Society and CUP. 
Keynes, J.M. 1978c. The Collected Writings of  John Maynard Keynes, Volume XXI Activities 
1931-1939: World Crises and Policies in Britain and America, E. Johnson and D. 
Moggridge (eds). Cambridge: Royal Economic Society and CUP. 
Keynes, J.M. 1978d [1932]. “The Monetary Policy of  the Labour Party” in E. 
Johnson and D. Moggridge (eds) The Collected Writings of  John Maynard Keynes, 
Volume XXI Activities 1931-1939: World Crises and Policies in Britain and America, 
Cambridge: Royal Economic Society and CUP, 128-137. 
Kindleberger, C. 1973. The World in Depression, 1929-39. Berkeley: University of  
California Press. 
Knott, J.H. 1986. “The Fed Chairman as a Political Executive” Administration & 
Society 18(2): 197–231.  
Koch, C.H. 1996. “James Landis: The Administrative Process” William & Mary Law 
School Faculty Publications Paper 633. 
Krippner, G.R. 2007. “The Making of U.S. Monetary Policy: Central Bank 
Transparency and the Neoliberal Dilemma” Theory & Society 36 (6): 477-513.  
Kydland, F. E. and Prescott, E.C. 1977. “Rules Rather than Discretion: The 
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans.” Journal of Political Economy 85(3): 473-493. 
Lambert, R. and Norman, P. 1989. “The Bank of England’s sneaking German 
Envy,” Financial Times, 2 November. 
Lamfalussy, A. 1989. “Macro-coordination of fiscal policies in economic and 
monetary union in Europe” in Collection of  papers submitted to the Committee for the 
Study of  Economic and Monetary Union. Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of  the European Communities, 91-126. 
Lamfalussy, A. 1997. “The European Central Bank: independent and accountable” 
keynote speech at the Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Vienna, 13 May. 
Available at: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/1997/html/sp970513.en.html 
[accessed 16 December 2019]. 
Lapavitsas, C. 2018. The Left Case Against the EU. Cambridge: Polity. 
Lautenschläger, S. 2017. “The European banking sector – growing together and 
growing apart” speech at the LSE German Symposium, London, 2 March. 
Available at: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170302.en.html 
[accessed 23 July 2018]. 
Lautenschläger, S. 2019. “A Call for Europe” speech at lecture series “Mein 
Europa”, Heinrich-Heine University, Düsseldorf, 30 October. Available at: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2019/html/ecb.sp191030~c6127
fd888.en.html [accessed 16 December 2019]. 
Leaman, J. 2001. The Bundesbank Myth. London: Palgrave.  
Bibliography 
263 
 
 
Lenin, V.I. 2010 [1917]. Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. London: Penguin.  
Levinson, S. and Balkin, J.M. 2010. “Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its 
Design” Minnesota Law Review 94: 1789-1866. 
Locke, J. 1988. Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge: CUP. 
Lohmann, S. 1992. “Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus 
Flexibility” American Economic Review 82 (March): 273-86. 
Lohmann, S. 1998. “Federalism and Central bank Independence: The Politics of 
German Monetary Policy, 1957–92.” World Politics, 50(3), 401-446.  
Lokdam, H. 2016. “Is the European Central Bank Becoming a Central Bank for the 
People of Europe?” [blog] Verfassungsblog, 24 April. Available at: 
https://verfassungsblog.de/is-the-european-central-bank-becoming-a-central-
bank-for-the-people-of-europe/ [accessed 22 May 2018].  
Loughlin, M. 2003. The Idea of Public Law. Oxford: OUP. 
Loughlin, M. 2015. “The Constitutional Imagination” Modern Law Review 78(1): 1-25. 
Loughlin, M. 2016. “The Erosion of Sovereignty” Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 
2: 57-81.  
Loughlin, M. and Walker, N. (eds). 2008. The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent 
Power and Constitutional Form. Oxford: OUP. 
Lutz, F.A. 1949. ”Geldpolitik und Wirtschaftsordnung.” ORDO: Jahrbuch fu ̈r die 
Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 2: 207-228. 
Lutz, F.A. 1962 [1936]. ”Das Grundproblem der Geldverfassung.” F.A. Lutz. Geld und 
Währung - Gesammelte Abhandlungen. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 
Lutz, F.A. 1989 [1935]. “The Functioning of the Gold Standard” in A. Peacock and 
H. Willgerodt (eds) Germany’s Social Market Economy: Origins and Evolution. London: 
Macmillan, 219-241. Published originally as “Goldwährung und 
Wirtschaftsordnung” Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 41: 224-251. 
Luxemburg, R. 2003 [1913]. The Accumulation of Capital. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.  
Mabbett, D. and Schelkle, W. 2019. “Independent or Lonely? Central Banking in 
Crisis” Review of International Political Economy 26(3): 436-60. 
MacCormick, N. 1993. “Beyond the Sovereign State” The Modern Law Review 56(1): 1-
18.  
Macron, E. 2017. “Initiative pour l'Europe. Une Europe souveraine, unie, 
démocratique” speech at Sorbonne, 26 September. Available at: 
http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-
emmanuel-macron-pour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique/ [accessed 
30 October 2018]. 
Macron, E. 2018a. Speech at European Parliament, Strasbourg, 17 April. Available 
at: https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/04/17/speech-by-
emmanuel-macron-president-of-the-republic-at-european-parliament.en 
[accessed 16 December 2019]. 
Macron, E. 2018b. Speech on receiving the Charlemagne Prize, 19 May. Available 
at: https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/05/10/speech-by-m-
Bibliography 
264 
 
 
emmanuel-macron-president-of-the-republic-on-receiving-the-charlemagne-
prize-1.en  [accessed 30 October 2018]. 
Madison, J. 2009 [1788]. “Federalist No. 45,” in Hamilton, A., Madinson, J. and Jay, 
J. The Federalist Papers (edited by Genovese, M.A.). New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
Maduro, P. 2008. “Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Kadi” delivered 
16 January.  
Majone, G. 1997. “Independent Agencies and the Delegation Problem: Theoretical 
and Normative Dimensions” in B. Steunenberg and F. van Vught (eds) Political 
Institutions and Public Policy: Perspectives on European Decision Making. Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Majone, G. 2002. “Functional Interests: European Agencies” in J. Peterson and M. 
Shackleton (eds) The Institutions of the European Union. Oxford: OUP. 
Manganelli, S. and Wolswijk, G. 2007. “Market Discipline, Financial Integration and 
Fiscal Rules: What Drives Spreads in the Euro Area Government Bond 
Market?” ECB Working Paper Series no. 745, April.  
Manin, B., Przeworski, A. and Stokes, S.C. 1999. “Introduction” in B. Manin, A. 
Przeworski and S.C. Stokes (eds) Democracy, Accountability and Representation. 
Cambridge: CUP, 1-26. 
Manow, P. 2001. “Ordoliberalismus als ökonomische Ordnungstheologie” Leviathan 
29(2): 179–198. 
Mansfield, H.C. 1971. “Hobbes and the Science of Indirect Government” American 
Political Science Review 65: 97-110. 
Mansfield, Harvey C. 1989. Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power. 
New York: The Free Press. 
Marcussen, M. 2006. “Institutional Transformation? The Scientization of Central 
Banking as a Case Study” in T. Christensen and P. Lægreid (eds) Autonomy and 
Regulation: Coping with Agencies in the Modern State. Cheltenham, UK and 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 
Marsh, D. 1992. The Bundesbank. London: William Heineman. 
Marx, K. 1990 [1867]. Capital, volume 1. London: Penguin. 
Masciandaro, D. and Tabellini, G. 1988. “Monetary Institutions and Fiscal Deficits: 
A Comparative Analysis” in H. Cheng (ed) Challenges to Monetary Policy in Pacific 
Basin Countries. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers 
McCallum, B.T. 2009. “Inflation determination with Taylor rules: Is new-Keynesian 
analysis critically flawed?” Journal of Monetary Economics 56(8): 1101-1108. 
McChesney Martin, W. 1955. “Address before the New York Group of the 
Investment Bankers Association of America” 19 October. Available at: 
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/448/item/7800?start_page=13 [accessed 12 
December 2019]. 
McChesney Martin, W. 1957. Statement before the Committee on Finance, United 
States Senate, 13 August. 
Bibliography 
265 
 
 
McKay, A., Nakamura, E. and Steinsson, J. 2016. “The Power of Forward Guidance 
Revisited” American Economic Review 106 (10): 3133-58. 
McNamara, K. 2002. “Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and the Social 
Logic of Delegation” West European Politics 25:1: 47-76   
Mee, S. 2013. “The ECB thinks it is learning the lessons of 1923, but it’s not.” New 
Statesman, 17 January. Available at: 
https://www.newstatesman.com/economics/2013/01/ecb-thinks-it-learning-
lessons-1923-its-not [accessed 29 March 2018]. 
Mee, S. 2016. Monetary Mythology: the West German central bank and historical narratives, 
1948-78. DPhil Thesis. University of Oxford. 
Mee, S. 2017. “German Monetary Mythology.” Handelsblatt, 31 July. Available at: 
https://global.handelsblatt.com/opinion/german-monetary-mythology-
805492 [accessed 29 March 2018]. 
Mersch, Y. 2016. Oral hearing of the Federal Constitutional Court in the OMT 
proceedings, Karlsruhe, 16 February. Available at: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2016/html/sp160216.en.html 
[accessed 16 December 2019].  
Mersch, Y. 2017a. “Central Bank Independence Revisited” keynote address at the 
“Symposium on Building the Financial System of the 21st Century: An Agenda 
for Europe and the United States”, Frankfurt am Main, 30 March. Available 
at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html 
[accessed 16 December 2019]. 
Mersch, Y. 2017b. “Aligning accountability with sovereignty in the European Union: 
the ECB’s experience” in ECB Legal Conference 2017: Shaping a new legal order for 
Europe: a tale of crises and opportunities. Frankfurt: ECB. 
Miller, G.P. 1986. “Independent Agencies” The Supreme Court Review 1986: 41-97. 
Mitchell, W. and Fazi, T. 2017. Reclaiming the State. London: Pluto Press. 
Mody, A. and Nedeljkovic, M. 2018. “Central Bank Policies and Financial Markets: 
Lessons from the Euro Crisis” CESifo Working Paper No. 7400.  
Montesquieu, C-L de S. 1989 [1748]. The Spirit of the Laws. Cambridge: CUP. 
Morys, M. 2014. “Gold standard lessons for the eurozone” Journal of Common Market 
Studies 52: 728-741. 
Moyn, S. 2008. “Hannah Arendt on the Secular” New German Critique 105: 71-96. 
Möllers, C. 2007. “‘We are (afraid of) the people’: Constituent Power in German 
Constitutionalism,” in Louglin, M. and Walker, N. (eds) The Paradox of 
Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form. Oxford: OUP.  
Mudde, C. 2015. “Podemos, and the beginning of the end for Europe’s radical left” 
The Guardian, 21 December. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/dec/21/podemos-
europe-radical-left-party-syriza-pablo-iglesias-spanish-elections [accessed 16 
December 2019]. 
Mudge, S. L., and Vauchez, A. 2016. “Fielding Supranationalism: The European 
Central Bank as a Field Effect” The Sociological Review 64(2_suppl): 146–169.  
Bibliography 
266 
 
 
Müller, J-W. 2011. Contesting Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.  
Müller-Armack, A. 1978. “The Social Market Economy as an Economic and Social 
Order” Review of Social Economy 36(3): 325-331. 
Myrdal, G. 1953. The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory. translated 
from the German by Paul Streeten. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. 
Nordhaus, W. 1975. “The Political Business Cycle” The Review of  Economic Studies 
42(2): 169-190. 
Oppenheimer, A. (ed). 1994. The relationship between European Community law and national 
law: the cases. Cambridge: CUP. 
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